

# ISLAM AND COLONIALISM

BECOMING MODERN IN  
INDONESIA AND MALAYA



M U H A M A D   A L I

## Islam and Colonialism



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## **Becoming Modern in Indonesia and Malaya**

**Muhamad Ali**

EDINBURGH  
University Press

*For  
Neneng and Inas*

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Edinburgh University Press Ltd  
The Tun – Holyrood Road  
12 (2f) Jackson's Entry  
Edinburgh EH8 8PJ  
[www.euppublishing.com](http://www.euppublishing.com)

Typeset in 11/15 Adobe Garamond by  
Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire,  
and printed and bound in Great Britain by  
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY

A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 978 1 4744 0920 9 (hardback)  
ISBN 978 1 4744 0921 6 (webready PDF)  
ISBN 978 1 4744 0922 3 (epub)

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## Glossary

*adat*: custom. From Arabic, *adat* (*ade*, *adat istiadat*) becomes a local term in the Indonesian-Malay world. Another Arabic term is *urf* to refer to local custom.

*adatrecht*: customary law. From Arabic (*adat*) and Dutch (*recht*).

*agama* (*ugama*, *igama*): religion. From Sanskrit. A local term in Indonesia and Malaya.

Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah: People of the Tradition of Muhammad and the Community. This theological branch of Islam was developed by Abu Hasan Al-Ash'ari (874–936 AD) who attempted to reconcile reason and revelation. Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah is often identified as the Sunni in general. Groups who hold Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah usually reject Shi'ism, Mu'tazila, Khawarij and other theological branches they claim did not follow the Way of the Prophet and Early Community of Believers. They accept the four caliphs after Muhammad: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali. Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 AD) has been followed as one of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah theologians influential in the Indonesian-Malay world.

Aisyiyah: a women's department or sub-unit of the Muhammadiyah. Named after Prophet Muhammad's wife, Aishah.

*akhirah*: the final, everlasting world. From Arabic. The hereafter. A Qur'anic concept of the everlasting world to come, as opposed to the temporal world (*dunya*, *dunia*).

*aqidah*: 'to bind'. Faith. Belief. Another Arabic term for this is *'itiqad*.

*aql*: an Arabic term for reason, rationality. It is localised as *akal*.

*bangsa*: nation. Sanskrit. Often similar to Arabic *qawm* or *kaum*.

*Barat*: the West. A regional or cultural entity. In the Indonesian-Malay

world, *Barat* has become associated with Western Europeans and America.

*bid'ah*: religious innovation. From Arabic, it has become a local term. The term is found in the saying attributed to Prophet Muhammad that is divided into good innovation and bad innovation.

*bissu*: a healer. A local shaman in South Sulawesi. Of third gender.

*bumiputera*: sons of the soil. From Sanskrit. The local people.

*dar al-harb*: the abode of war. Often deemed the world of 'non-Muslims'. It refers to countries under the rule of *kafir* where Islamic law is not practised.

*dar al-Islam*: the abode of Islam. The term is not found in the Qur'an and the hadith, but it was used by Abu Hanifah (699–767 AD) and then by other jurists such as Al-Shafi'i (767–820 AD). Dar al-Islam refers to the countries under the rule of Islam in which Muslims enjoy peace and security.

*da'wah*: to call to the way of God. Islamic mission. It can be oral (preaching, *tabligh*), written and in action.

*din*: religion, path, way of life, law. Islam is described as *din*. Christianity, Judaism and many others are *adyan* (pl. of *din*). In Arabic, the term is discussed alongside *milla* and *shir'a*, or *shari'ah*.

*dunya, dunia*: this world. From Arabic, meaning the worldly, the temporal. See also: *akhirah*.

*fatwa*: an opinion by a scholar. Often not legally binding, but authoritative according to those who accept it. In Arabic, *ifta* is the process of delivering a fatwa; *mufti* is the fatwa-giver; *istifta* is the act of asking for a fatwa; and *mustafti* is the fatwa-asker. The fatwa became institutionalised following the institutionalisation of the *mufti*, whose main task is to issue fatwas. The Muhammadiyah employed the Indonesian term '*putusan*' rather than 'fatwa'.

*fiqh*: to understand. Islamic jurisprudence. Interpretations and practices of jurists.

hadith: The sayings and actions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. Considered secondary to the Qur'an, it is subject to debate between the Sunni, the Shi'ism and others.

*haji*: a pilgrimage to Mecca. Considered to be one of the five obligations in Islam. To occur once in a lifetime for a Muslim who can afford it. Hajji

- is a status for the person who has performed the hajj. For example, Hajji Muhammad As'ad.
- hijrah*: emigration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina. The date became the first Islamic year.
- hukum*: from Arabic, meaning law, rule, regulation. Hakim: judge.
- ibadah*: worship. In its narrow sense: ritual. In its broadest sense, every act of service to God and humanity.
- ijma'*: consensus. Scholarly consensus in a certain time and place.
- ijtihad*: independent reasoning to extrapolate rules and guidance from the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
- ilmu*: knowledge. From Arabic *ilm*, *ilmu* has many meanings. *Ilmu agama* (local term): religious knowledge. Associated with the knowledge about the Qur'an, the hadith, *kalam*, *fiqh*, *tasawwuf* and others.
- imam*: leader. Prayer leader or community leader in the Sunni tradition. Shi'ism defines imams as supreme spiritual leaders.
- iman*: faith. Belief in God, angels, scriptures, prophets, the Day of Judgement.
- jahiliyyah*: ignorance, darkness, before or outside Islam.
- jama'ah*: community, congregation.
- jam'iyah*: organisation, association, *perkumpulan*, *perhimpunan*, *persyarikatan* (in Indonesian and Malay).
- Jawa* – Java: the land of Java. An island in the archipelago. The people of Java live primarily in Central and East Java.
- Jawi* – Jawa: a language or an attribute to Jawi language spoken and written in many parts of the Indonesian-Malay archipelago. The Jawi people speak a Jawi language.
- jihad*: struggle. *jihad fi sabilillah*: any form of struggle in the path of God.
- kafir*: someone who covers (the truth). Often translated as 'non-believer', 'disbeliever', 'non-Muslim'. It is, however, a multifaceted concept.
- kalam*: to speak. Islamic dogma or theological discourse.
- kaum muda*: the young faction. The reformist.
- kaum tua*: the old faction. The conservative.
- khilafah*: caliphate. Universal Islamic leadership. *Khalif*: caliph.
- khutbah*: sermon. Weekly sermon on Fridays. But also daily, annually and on any occasion.
- kitab*: book. Associated with Arabic books, although not always.

*kiyai*: Islamic teacher. Often leader of an Islamic school. An honorary title.

Sometimes *kiyai* is mentioned together with haji, hence Kiyai Haji (KH). For example, KH Hasyim Asy'ari and KH Ahmad Dahlan.

*madhhab*: a school of thought within Islamic jurisprudence. There are five major Sunni madhhdhabs: Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi'i, Hanbali and Zahiri (the latter marginalised). There are two major Shi'ism *madhhab* (Ja'fari and Zaidi). Different *madhhab*s produced different interpretations about Islamic ritual and law derived from different techniques of extrapolation from the foundational texts.

*madrashah*: school, Islamic school or modern Islamic school.

Majlis: a place for meeting. Council.

Majlis Tarjih: a council created by the modernist Muhammadiyah in Java as an attempt to revive *ijtihad* or reasoning for making decisions and answers to contemporary issues.

Majlis agama islam dan adat istiadat: MAIK. The Council of Islamic Religion and Custom, founded by the Sultan and the scholars in Kelantan, Malaya.

*Melayu* (Malay): an ethnic group with a particular language and culture. It has multiple and changing meanings.

*mu'amalah*: social relations. One of the dimensions of Islam, alongside faith and worship. See also: *iman*, *aqidah*, *ibadah*.

*mufii*: someone who issues a *fatwa*, an opinion. *Mufii* is also institutionalised in some places. See also: *fatwa*.

Muhammadiyah: the organisation labelled modernist by many. Founded by Ahmad Dahlan in 1912 in Yogyakarta, Central Java.

Nahdlatul 'Ulama (NU): the organisation labelled traditionalist by many. Founded by Hasyim Asy'ari in 1926 in Surabaya, East Java.

*Pangngaderreng*: a cultural norm of the Bugis and Makassarese people, Sulawesi.

*penghulu*: a local headman or court official. Sometimes called *punggawa*.

*pesantren*: Islamic boarding school, from the Sanskrit word *santri*: student. Mostly in the village.

*pondok*: the hub for students to stay. Associated with Islamic boarding school or *pesantren*.

*priyayi*: members of Javanese administrative-aristocratic elite. Equivalent

- to *karaeng* and *daeng*, in South Sulawesi, and *keluarga raja* or *keluarga sultan*. Some members are called *datuk* and *tok* in Malaya.
- qadi*: a Muslim judge in the court. Usually the chief judge.
- qawm*: an Arabic term for ‘race’, ‘nation’. Localised as *kaum* or *bangsa* in Sanskrit.
- salaf*: the generation that passed. *Salaf Salih*: ‘Pious Generation’. The early Muslim generations after Muhammad, in opposition to *khalaf*, the later generation of Muslims. For the traditionalists in NU, ‘*ulama salaf* could refer to scholars like Imam al-Nawawi (d. 1277) and Imam al-Suyuti (d. 1505). For many reformists in Muhammadiyah, the *salaf* were the first three generations of Islam: the Companions of Muhammad, their followers, and the followers of the followers. Thus, *salaf* has various meanings.
- shari’ah*: a path, a religious path that is not necessarily Islamic. But it has become identical with Islamic law. It is deemed sometimes more general and broader than Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), but sometimes similar to it.
- shaykh*: great teacher. More than ordinary teacher. More credentials and charisma in many Muslim societies. *Shaykh* is sometimes used for *kiyai*, too, in the Indonesian-Malay world.
- Shi’ism: an Islamic group who believe that Ali ibn Abi Thalib, rather than Abu Bakar, was the successor of Prophet Muhammad. It shares common beliefs and practices with the Sunni, but they have some differences in aspects of beliefs, rituals and practices.
- shirk*: to associate the divine with anybody or anything else. It is used for judging certain ideas and practices. *Mushrik* is the person who does the association. Sometimes it is translated as ‘polytheist’, but can be defined as ‘associationist’.
- siriq*: a sense of communal dignity, a sense of social shame. In the Bugis-Makassarese communities in South Sulawesi, Indonesia.
- siyasah*: to gain and execute power. Politics. Strategy and technique associated with gaining and executing power and authority.
- sultan*: political power. The title given to Muslim ruler. Sometimes also called ‘raja’ (Sanskrit).
- sunnah*: tradition. The tradition of Prophet Muhammad, later recorded in the hadith.

Sunni: an Islamic group who believe that Abu Bakar was the first successor of Prophet Muhammad. See also: Shi'ism.

*surau*: a local term for mosque. A place for prayer.

*tabligh*: preaching.

*tafsir*: interpretation. An interpretation of the Qur'an.

*tajdid*: renewal. Refom.

*ta'lim*: teaching.

*taqlid*: to follow the authoritative schools of legal thought (*madhhab*).

*tarbiyyah*: education in its various forms. Education is deemed broader than teaching.

*tarik*: history. Often Islamic history. The meaning and its practice vary.

*tariqah* (*tarikat*, *tarekat*): a Sufi order or brotherhood.

*tasawwuf*: Sufism. A spiritual dimension of Islam.

*tauhid*: oneness of God. The opposite of *shirk*.

*'ulama*: a plural form of *'alim*, the learned individual, scholar. Originally meaning scholar in any form of knowledge, it becomes associated with *religious* scholar.

*ummah* (*umat*): a community. It is often associated with Islamic community.

*watan*: an Arabic term for homeland, or country.

*waqf*: religious endowment. Usually the land, the mosque, the school, funded or supported by a Muslim community, rather than particular individuals.

*zakat*: to purify one's wealth. Almsgiving. Charity. One of the pillars of Islam.

*zelf-bestuurder*: Dutch title for native officials working under Dutch Residents or Advisers, as part of indirect rule. Native regent or *swapraja*.

## Acknowledgements

This book would not have come to fruition without the aid of a number of institutions and individuals. I would like to express my gratitude to the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa (UHM), particularly the History Department and the Southeast Asian Studies Program, and the East–West Center, Honolulu, Hawai'i. My research interest in Islam in Southeast Asia was inspired by my interaction with Azyumardi Azra from the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta (also known as Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta), and his former mentor at Columbia University in the City of New York, William R. Roff (d. 2013), who later became my mentor at The University of Edinburgh. I would like to thank historians of Islam at Edinburgh, especially Carole Hillenbrand and Andrew Newman. In Edinburgh I was able to meet Montgomery Watt whose works influenced my scholarship in Islamic studies. During my graduate studies at UHM, I benefited greatly from Leonard Andaya, my primary advisor who continues to share his expertise and give me constructive advice and support. I am very grateful to Barbara Andaya for her tremendous help and support. Barbara read the whole manuscript and provided detailed and valuable comments and advice. I learned Southeast Asian history also from Liam Kelley, Michael Aung-Thwin and Vina Lanzona. My study of European colonialism and modernisation theories was aided by European historian Peter Hoffenberg and world historian Jerry Bentley (d. 2012). My paper on Islamic and secular education in a world history conference at Berkeley was partly in remembering Jerry Bentley's intellectual legacy. I am also grateful for the exchange of ideas with him, other professors, and other students at UHM.

During my research for this book, I consulted with Rohayati Passeng,

Robert van Neil, Robert Hefner, Anthony Reid, Timothy Barnard, Martin van Bruinessen, Leonard Blussé, Nico Kaptein, Hendrik Neijmeijer, as well as Anwar Syarifuddin, Didin Nurul Rashidin, Noorhaidi Hasan, Muridan Widjojo, Agus Suwignjo, and friends at Towards a New Age of Partnership (TANAP), an Indonesian–Dutch joint programme. The Toyota Foundation, Tokyo, Ford Foundation, Jakarta, and the Indonesian International Education Foundation, Jakarta, enabled me to conduct archival research at the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies (KITLV), the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), Universiteit Bibliotheque, and Nationaal Archief (Dutch National Archives), Den Haag.

I would like to thank librarians, including the Interlibrary Loans staff at the University of California, Riverside (UCR), and colleagues scattered around the world. I would like to specially thank colleagues who have read parts of or the full manuscript: Richard Fox, Michael Feener, Michael Laffan, June O'Connor, Ivan Strenski, Vivian-Lee Nyitray, Pashaura Singh, Henk Maier, René Lysloff, Michael Alexander, Sherri Johnson, Justin McDaniel, David Biggs, Mariam Lam, Deborah Wong, Jeffrey Hadler, Julia Howell, Julie Chernov Hwang, Ebrahim Moosa, Bruce Lawrence, Mark Jurgensmeyer, Merle Ricklefs, Andrée Feillard, Jason Carbine, Mark Woodward, Pieterella van Doorn-Harder, Ronald Lukens-Bull, Zayn Kassam, Richard Kraince, and Etin Anwar. I am also indebted to Jaida Samudra and Dannette Bock for editing this work. I am particularly grateful to the readers employed by Edinburgh University Press for their constructive feedback and helpful suggestions. I thank Nicola Ramsey especially for her advice and support. I thank all the EUP staff as well for their assistance.

In South Sulawesi, Indonesia, I am indebted to many people. Among them are Gurutta Muhammad Abduh Pabbaja (d. 2009), Gurutta Daud Ismail (d. 2006), Rafi Yunus Martan, Musafir Pababbari, Wahyuddin Halim, Syamsuddin Baharuddin, Mohammad Saleh, Abu Hamid, Rahman Halim, Mustari Bosra, Abdul Kadir Ahmad, Mohammad Noer, Andi Rasdiyanah, Muhammad Qasim Saguni, Jamaluddin, M. Qashim Mathar, Ahmad Sewang, Norman Said, Hashim Aidit, Khaidir, Rahman Halim, Abdurrahman, Dzulkarnain, Zamroni Ahmad, Syamsuddin Baharuddin, Mubarak, Indra Mutiara, Lilis and Iim Abdurrahim, Aan Farhani, Muhammad Abduh, and

Muhammad Saleh Tajuddin. I thank the Badan Arsip dan Perpustakaan Daerah (the Regional Archives and Library Institute), Makassar, the Faculty of Ushuluddin, the Faculty of Literature of UIN Makassar, Al-Markaz al-Islamy, the Muhammadiyah board in Makassar, As'adiyyah in Sengkang, the NU branch of Makassar, Golkar local office, PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) of Makassar, Darul Istiqamah, Pondok Modern IMMIM (Ikatan Masjid Mushalla Indonesia Muttahidah), Ma'had al-Birr, Pesantren Darul Istiqamah, and local publishers and bookstores.

In Jakarta, I would like to thank rectors, deans and department heads at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta for their support. I am grateful for the conversation with colleagues and friends at the same university. I also want to thank the National Library of Republic of Indonesia (Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia) and Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI).

In Malaysia, I want to thank the National Archives of Malaysia (Arkib Negara Malaysia) (ANM), Kuala Lumpur; the Regional Archives of Malaya in Kelantan (Arkib Negara Malaysia, Kelantan); the Library at Universiti Malaya (UM), Kuala Lumpur; the Library of Peringatan Za'ba at UM; the Library at Islamic Studies Academy (Perpustakaan Akademi Pengajian Islam), UM of Kelantan; and the Library of Tun Sri Lanang, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM). I am grateful for the insightful comments made by Shamsul AB, Zaidin Mohammad Noor, Tuanku Abdul Hamid Tuan Daud, Mustafa bin Ahmad, Raja Husni bin Raja Hasan, Che Mohd Fahmi bin Che Omar, Dato Hj Salleh bin Mohd Akib, Zainal Nur, Abdullah Che Tengah, Encik Nasir, Farid Razak, and members of the Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS) and the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) in Kelantan as well as the International Islamic Center in Kota Bharu, Kelantan. I would like to thank especially the teachers and students at Ma'had Muhammadiyah, Kelantan. I also wish to thank the Islamic Library or Muzium Islam of the Council of Religion and Custom (Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat, MAIK), Kelantan, as well as teachers and students at Pondok Pasir Tumboh, several other *pondoks*, and local publishers and book stores.

This book is also a product of my educational upbringing in madrasah, *pesantren* and the Department of Tafsir and Hadith, the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) (now Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN)). My years at

the Madrasah Aliyah Program Khusus (MAPK) at Pesantren Darussalam at Ciamis, West Java, are particularly significant in shaping the modern and the traditional dimensions of Islamic knowledge. MAPK was regarded as an Islamic school combining the ‘traditional’ Islamic knowledge and the ‘modern’ disciplines such as history, physics and mathematics, established by the Ministry of Religious Affairs under Munawwir Sadjali (whom I thank especially for this great educational initiative). This book would never have been the way it is now without the influence of my *kiyai*, KH Irfan Hielmy (d. 2010), and all teachers and *santri* friends at the *pesantren*. I visited and contacted KH Irfan Hielmy in Ciamis many times. In June 2006 I talked about this book project. He asked me some interesting questions for me to address: what does ‘power’ mean to different people? Does it mean politics only or power in general that includes knowledge? Kiyai Irfan Hielmy also commented that all sciences, such as *tafsir*, the hadith and *fiqh* were historical. He also said that *shari’ah* is permanent, but situations are changing. On colonialism, he remarked that the Dutch generally impeded Islam whereas the British did not. He contended that the British were probably ‘the most generous imperialists’ in the world, a contention I discuss in this book.

Finally, this book is dedicated to my other half Neneng Syahdati Rosmy for her true love and support, and to our daughter Inas Anandini Ali. I am very thankful to my father Miqdar Muhammad Umar (d. 2002) and my mother Zainab Anwar for their upbringing, conducted with both piety and wisdom. I would like to also thank my brothers and sisters, and all my in-laws, for their support. While I am humbly grateful to all the individuals and institutions mentioned above, I am the only one responsible for the content of this book.

M. A.

Riverside, California, 2015

## Abbreviations

ANM	:	Arsip Negara Malaysia
ARK	:	Annual Report Kelantan
BAK	:	British Adviser Kelantan
HIS	:	Hollands-Inlandse School
INIS	:	Indonesian–Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies
KAR	:	Kelantan Administration Report
KH	:	Kiyai Haji
KITLV	:	Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde
MAIK	:	Majlis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat, Kelantan
NA	:	Nationaal Archief, Den Haag
NU	:	Nahdlatul ‘Ulama
PSII	:	Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia
Q.	:	The Qur’an
SI	:	Sarekat Islam

## Transcriptions and Orthography

Complications derive from the different ways in which names and terms are written and pronounced in Arabic, Dutch, English, Sanskrit, Javanese, Malay, Indonesian, Bugis and Makassarese as they were connected at some points in history. There is also the issue of overlap between language and terminology used in historical and contemporary contexts. For example, ‘colonialism’ is an analytical term for ‘*penjajahan*’, although both convey rather different meanings and applications. The word ‘*moderen*’ is used in local periodicals (such as *Islam moderen*) although ‘the modern’ means different things to different people.

This book uses the transcription system that is widely accepted. Some consonants are in their English forms, such as sh, rather than sy (for example, *shari’ah* rather than *syari’ah*, but Hasyim Asy’ari rather than Hashim Ash’ari). For consistency, the English spelling Sumatra is used rather than Sumatera and so is Java rather than Jawa. In other cases, consistency is difficult. Tjokroaminoto is used instead of Cakraaminata; Agus Salim is used rather than Agoes Salim; *kemajuan* instead of kemadjoewan; *ummah* instead of *umat*, *oemat* or *umma*; and Sulawesi instead of Celebes. But in a few places I have to keep the original, old spellings, such as Moehammadijah instead of Muhammadiyah. It should be noted, however, that one term may have different uses in different languages, such as *adat*. *Adat* (and its variations, such as *ade* and *adat istiadat*) is originally Arabic, but it has become local in different parts of the Indonesian-Malay world even before conversion to Islam. I use s for plural forms of Arabic concepts (*fatwas*, rather than *fatawa*).

The following system of letters are used in the text for denoting original languages.

- A. Arabic
- B. Bugis
- D. Dutch
- I. Indonesian
- J. Javanese
- M. Malay
- S. Sanskrit

I utilise the Qur'anic translations by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1997), *The Meaning of the Holy Qur'an*, Beltsville, Maryland: Amana Publications, unless otherwise stated.

Many Arabic terms have become local and many Indonesian terms are Malay as well. Widely known names and words are spelled in their English forms, such as Ramadan and Muhammad. All dates follow Anno Domini (AD) or Common Era (CE) unless noted otherwise. (AH is used for After Hijrah, the Islamic era.) I cite original terms and passages when they are particularly important to my argument.





FORMOSA

PACIFIC OCEAN

LUZON

Manila

PHILIPPINES

PALAWAN

MINDANAO

NORTH  
BORNEO

CELEBES SEA

CELEBES

INDIES

South  
Sulawesi  
Makassar

CERAM

NEW GUINEA

NEW BRITAIN

FLORES

TIMOR

SOEMBAWA

AUSTRALIA



# Introduction

It is commonly held that European colonisation and the efforts to modernise Muslim lands challenged Islam and undermined local custom, and that Islamisation was generally opposed to European ideas and technologies and rejected local beliefs and practices. While colonial historiographies tend to focus on the influence of European actors, Muslim nationalist and postcolonial scholars emphasise Muslim and native agencies. In the Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya, however, the ideas and actions associated with the concept of modernity were formed as an outcome of the interplay between Islamic reform and European colonialism. Islam and colonialism were not as confrontational as is often assumed. In this book, I offer a comparative and cross-cultural history of Islamic reform and European colonialism as both dependent and independent factors in shaping the multiple ways of becoming modern in the Netherlands East Indies (or Indonesia) and Malaya (today's Malaysia) during the first half of the twentieth century.

I argue that in formulating and advancing their respective projects of reform and modernisation, Muslim reformers and European colonial scholars and administrators often differed, but they were not always antagonistic. Although they often understood progress differently, they sometimes worked in tandem in order to achieve common ends. For example, motivated by a mixture of economic, political and moral interests, Indonesian and Malay Muslim reformers understood Islam as a progressive faith and thus sought to build and foster communities by creating and expanding organisations and selectively borrowing Western vocabularies and organisation models. The colonial powers sought to know Islam and maintain control by conducting research on Islamic practices and local cultures, often accommodating Islamic scholars and the native elite. They, too, recognised the role of Islam and

custom in modernising local communities. The colonial bureaucracies were willing to accommodate sultans and native officials in developing systems of economy, government and law that would be not necessarily incompatible with Islamic norms of economy, government and law. The Muslim reformers developed publications to disseminate Islam and practical information that were not necessarily posing a threat to colonial administrations, even as they challenged discriminatory colonial policies and demanded ‘rights’ for the native populations. As the colonialists introduced new forms of government, Muslim reformers began to appropriate Arabic concepts of *siyasah* and Western notion of politics and government. While they were critical of the implementation with respect to personal and family life, they recognised that in the absence of effective Muslim government and law, the common or civil law that Europeans had introduced could ensure justice and order. In reinterpreting Islamic texts, Muslim scholars promulgated that *shari’ah* (now translated as Islamic law), need not be applied in its entirety to formal colonial institutions, as they concentrated on the ‘private’ sphere in the form of fatwas or *putusan*, non-legally binding religious opinions or edicts in Indonesia, or rather reinforced rulings in Malaya. For their part, in addition to Islamic knowledge, Muslim reformers adopted science into the curricula of their schools. As the colonialists promoted science and secular skills in their European schools and taught local languages and cultures in the vernacular schools, Muslim reformers made a distinction between *dunya* (A. worldly) and *din* (A. religious) domains in order to teach religion, science and other worldly skills deemed useful in their schools. While the European colonialists sought to separate the private and the public, and the religious and the secular, in order to effectively make progress, they emphasised vernacular languages and cultures, and tolerated Arabic and Islamic education outside the colonial institutions. Islamic reform and European colonialism worked often in different spheres but did not fundamentally serve as contradictory forces in both Indonesia and Malaya.

I focus on the varying discourses of progress and approaches to reform and modernisation in the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya, the similar and contrasting impacts of Dutch and British colonial policies and the similar and differing strategies adopted by Muslim reformers as they sought to become modern. I examine the myriad voices, attitudes, policies and lan-

guages, critically but not hierarchically, as part of the wider colonial and Islamic fields that produced them. I study the colonialists' responses to Islam and local custom and highlight the way in which Islam and local custom shaped Europeans' views of modernity and projects of modernisation. I explore the way in which Muslims in the Dutch or Netherlands East Indies developed voluntary associations and political movements in Java and the outer islands (particularly South Sulawesi); I find that in British Malaya (particularly Kelantan), by contrast, the management of religious matters was left in the hands of the Malay sultans and religious councils, while English-educated Muslim authors and activists formed journals and clubs to address Islamic and ethnic Malay issues.

The differences can be largely attributed to the fact that Dutch intervention in native and Islamic affairs was far more pronounced than that of the British in Malaya. In the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch were preoccupied with the textual and political manifestations of Islam, whereas the British were concerned with the historical and cultural expressions of Malay identity. Although Islamic law had a distinctly Malay flavour and the educational cooperation between Malay elite and British colonialists was relatively strong, the connection between Malay Islam and Arabic language and culture was close. By contrast, in the more ethnically and demographically diverse East Indies, Islamic law was localised within its many Muslim cultures, and the intellectual network and social organisation of Islam was far more varied than in Malaya. Thus, due to different Islamic contexts, colonial policies and local circumstances, European colonialists and Indonesian-Malay Muslims developed different approaches to social organisation, politics, law and education. In the process of becoming modern, they laid the basis for different conceptualisations of authority and community that developed in the independent nations of Indonesia and Malaysia. Muslim reformers and European colonialists contributed to the formation of modern organisation, politics, law and education in colonial and postcolonial Indonesia and Malaysia.

European colonial powers and Asian Muslims framed their activities around a general desire for improvement and progress, a movement towards what can be called 'modernity'. The term 'modern', from Latin '*modernus*', generally refers to that that is 'here and now', and is usually associated with qualities such as innovation, dynamism, and openness in conscience and

technology (Hodgson 1977: 417; Cooper 2005: 142). The ‘modern era’ was therefore frequently characterised as a period of rapid intellectual, political, economic, social, technological, cultural and psychological change (Black 1975: 20–5; Benavides 1998: 186). Such attitudes were not new in Southeast Asia and well before Europe’s economic and political control, a modern spirit was present, fostered through international trade and the trans-ethnic movement of religious and cultural ideas (Reid 1993). A desire to be ‘up to date’ was embedded in Southeast Asian cultures. ‘Being modern’ in the region was manifested in a selective localisation that combined the foreign and the indigenous in ways that empowered indigenous agency (Andaya 1997: 409; Wolters 1999: 39). From the late nineteenth century onwards, however, manifestations of ‘modernity’ came to be closely associated with developments associated with European influences, such as the use of print media, increased interest in science and technology, the adoption of European vocabularies, greater political engagement and a call for a more equitable and just government. It was from this time on that ‘modern fields’, such as administration, politics, law and education, were made alongside trade and the economy, communication and others.

For many Muslims the idea of intellectual and mental shifts was not new, for the Islamic conception of time reached back to a distant age of ignorance (A. *jahiliyyah*) that preceded the age of the Prophet Muhammad. The Muslim condition of general backwardness (especially when compared with the Christian West) drove reformers, inspired by the sacred texts and by Islam’s past achievements as well as the reformist ideas from Mecca and Cairo (Laffan 2003), to work for the revitalisation of *da’wah* (A. mission) and *ummah* (A. community), *siyasa* (A. politics), *shari’ah* (A. religious law), and *ta’lim* (A. teaching). By the turn of the twentieth century, various European and Asian leaders referred to the age in which they lived and their adaptations to change as ‘modern’ or ‘progressive’, although the interests, sources, terminologies and processes they associated with modernity were not necessarily identical.

### **Colonial Modernities: Westernisation, Christianity and Science**

Modernity, colonialism and the West were (and remain) loosely related concepts. Colonialism can refer to the occupation of a territory by a foreign

power, to a broad imperialist agenda or to a hegemonic ideology (Said 1994: 9). New concepts such as *penjajahan* (Indonesian word for ‘colonisation’ or ‘colonialism’) and *imperialisme Barat* (an Indonesian translation of Western imperialism), and Arabic terms such as *istima’riyyah* (the Arabic word for ‘colonialism’) emerged as labels for Western colonialism in Arabic and Asian countries. In general, however, although some European colonial governments were ‘reluctant modernizers’, and did not necessarily seek to bring colonised subjects into a closer relationship to the state (Cooper 2005: 143), they generally served as agents of modernisation. Colonial administrators and scholars functioned as modernisers to the degree that they introduced and conducted research, established bureaucracies and developed legal and educational systems that could serve administrative needs and ‘uplift’ colonial subjects. In so doing they associated modernity with ‘rationality’, differentiating the domains of administration, politics, law and education from the ‘non-rational’ domains of religion and tradition. They pushed modernisation through bureaucratic and administrative innovations, such as the Office for Native and Muhammadan Affairs, the People’s Council, native regency, the Committee of Malay Studies, State Councils, Residency, and Advisers, which were all new to local elites and Muslim reformers.

Under Dutch and British colonialism, modernisation was increasingly equated with Westernisation (hence, ‘Western modernity’). In some cases, colonial administrators and educators even encouraged local nobility and their children to learn Dutch or English, wear European clothing and adopt other aspects of Western (deemed ‘modern’) lifestyles or cultures. They distributed information to colonial subjects about Western practices in Dutch or English via print technology, in gazettes, reports, notices and newspapers. At the same time, they standardised local languages and preserved aspects of cultures by translating, collecting and publishing local histories and stories such as *hikayat* (the Arabic term for ‘stories’) in order to increase their accessibility and effectiveness. The promotion of Western science and technology was considered part of the modernisation package, since science was linked with rationality and there was an assumption that traditional beliefs and the resort to ‘magic’ and ‘superstition’ would decline as modern education advanced. Indeed, the argument that Western nations have dominated the world since the Enlightenment because they embraced science and dispensed

with religion as an organising narrative began to take root in the early twentieth century. Social theorists saw industrialisation as evidence of technological and economic progress, and claimed that non-European societies could only become modern if they followed the same path. More recently, however, scholars have demonstrated that modernisation does not necessarily weaken religion, render it irrelevant or consign it to the private domain (Casanova 1994; Hefner 2000; An-Na'im 2008). Indonesian scholar Nurcholish Madjid, for example, describes modernisation as the process of making Islam modern and the act of rationalising the valuable, secular domain of life without Westernisation (Madjid 1989: 171).

Christianisation complicates the conflation of Westernisation and modernisation. Most colonial administrators, although intent on modernising native populations, did not approve of missionaries spreading the Christian gospel in already Islamised communities (Steenbrink 2006: 98–123). The Dutch colonial government and the Christian missionaries showed both divergent and convergent interests. In many cases, the Dutch controlled and regulated Christian missionary activities partly in order to avoid problems with the native Muslims (Schroter 2010: 10–13). Other Europeans, doubting whether native cultures could themselves 'progress', tended to be more supportive of missionising, since they saw Christianity as morally preferable to Islam. Meanwhile, native populations assumed that Europeans were religious Christians and equated Christianity with Westernisation. Some embraced Christianity as a route by which they could acquire the faith and the status associated with being 'modern' (Keane 2007). Other colonised subjects had no more interest in changing accepted lifestyles than they had in converting to Christianity (Bigalke 2005). Still others adopted European ideals of governance and rule of law along with Western technological sciences as tools to be used on their way to becoming more religious and independent of the colonial enterprise.

Given these differing attitudes and complex responses and interactions, colonial modernity cannot be treated as a single phenomenon or even a definable goal. Anthropologist Talal Asad argues that academic analyses of 'modernity' frequently collapse a variety of processes pertaining to change 'for the better', thereby tending to treat all of these processes and their results as if they were unified. For Asad, a more important question concerns why

modernity ‘has become hegemonic as *a political goal*, what practical consequences follow from that hegemony, and what social conditions maintain it’ (Asad 2003: 13; italics in original). Asad has also maintained an argument that colonial power invented modernity (Asad 2006: 291–2). In this book, I read modernity not necessarily as a hegemonic political goal, but as an increasingly important project initiated by non-state Muslim reformers as well as the traditional ruling elite and colonial administrators. I find modernities filled with contradictions and divergences as well as compromises and convergences.

I agree with the notion of multiple modernities (Mitchell 2000; Hefner 1998), but I intend to focus on commonalities as well as differences, and to explore intersections and correspondences as well as disconnections and indifferences. I find that modernity has multiple definitions when different actors understand ‘progress’ toward a better future in multiple ways. Various aspects and patterns of modernity may overlap (Masud *et al.* 2009). It is therefore necessary to describe historically the ways in which colonial administrators and scholars defined the modern as universal, monolithic and linear and to compare the Muslim reformist use of parallel notions of ‘progress’, ‘justice’ and ‘rationality’ as well as other notions pertaining to the ‘new and here’ (Cooper 2005: 149). While some historians have argued that words such as ‘modernity’ and ‘religion’ are problematic in historical studies (Laffan 2011: xiii), I use the concepts while being aware of the interplay between categories of analysis and categories of practice. I follow the suggestion that theory and history could converge (Burke 1993).

### **Islamic Modernities: Reform, Islamisation and Progress**

The term ‘Islamic modernity’ refers to a non-essentialised, never completed and uneven project of making things both Islamic and modern. The word ‘Islam’ comes from the Arabic *aslama*, which literally means ‘submission’ (to God). A Malay author of the journal *Pengasuh* in Kelantan thus defined Islam by quoting a hadith: ‘Islam is to witness that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His messenger, to perform prayers, to give alms, to fast in Ramadan, and to go for *hajj* (A. pilgrimage) if you can afford the journey.’<sup>1</sup> Yet what Islam means to its adherents has constantly changed over time and around the world (Rippin 2007; Denny 2011). It has also evolved and

diversified (Gibb 1947; Metcalf 1982). Contemporary scholars have argued that Islam, modernity and modernisation, are not inherently incompatible. Islamic modernity had real power to the degree that Muslim reformers took action to sustain unity and progress (Nasr 2011). Here I link Islamic modernity to discourses and projects of renewal (A. *tajdid*) carried out by both modernists and traditionalists and use modernity as a category of analysis and of practice interchangeably.

According to Francis Robinson who works on Islam in South Asia, Islamic reform can be defined in part ‘through its opposition to Western cultural and political hegemony’. Since Muslim reformists made use of Western knowledge and technology ‘to drive forward [their] purposes’, Islamic reform was fundamentally shaped by interaction with the West (Robinson 2008: 2–3, 21). However, I consider Islamic reform to have occurred much earlier and to be much broader than this definition implies. Islamic modernity may imply Islamic reform – as exemplified by the primarily internal debate on individual reasoning (A. *ijtihad*) versus the following of religious authority (A. *taqlid*) – but it covers a broad range of ideas and practices that seek to change Muslim communities and society at large, before and beyond encounters with Europeans. After such encounters occurred, Muslim reformers in Indonesia and Malaya addressed different aspects of colonial modernity as well as considering other Islamic reforms in the light of local traditions. Those scholars and activists regarded as belonging to the People of the Tradition of Prophet Muhammad and the Community’ (A. Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah, or broadly ‘Sunni’), often associated with being ‘traditionalist’, sought to reform Muslim communities, in response to the struggle against ‘puritanist’ Saudi Wahhabism considered strict in rejecting Sufi orders (A. *tariqah*) and un-Islamic *adat*, and to the modernist groups who were more receptive of Western science and organisation and critical of their traditionalist approach to Islam. Because they emerged under colonial rule, some ‘traditionalist reformers’ had to deal with European influences and policies as well. They, too, played an important role in modernising society. The modernist reformers emphasised the discovery of an authentic Islam, at times by debating the adoption of Western symbols of modernity such as wearing trousers, taking photographs, driving automobiles and even reading newspapers (Laffan 2003: 8). But the traditionalists, who are often seen as opposed to change,

also adopted reformist strategies, and adapted to colonial rule and modernist means of organisation and teaching. Beyond the ideas of nation and community, they developed such concepts as *da'wah* and *tabligh*, *siyasah* and politics, *shari'ah* and law, *ilmu* and science, *ta'lim* and teaching while demonstrating a new awareness of the age of progress (I. *zaman kemajuan*).

As they wrote or talked about the modern age they saw it as a work in progress, a time for improving the worldly lives of Muslims while staying firm in the faith. In referencing the need for change, they cited Qur'anic passages, such as: 'Allah will not change the fate of a people unless they themselves change it' (Q.13:11). In their sermons and writings they quoted the hadith that stressed the necessity of taking action, working hard and being disciplined and patient if they wanted to improve their lives. Although rendered in various foreign and local terms, these reformist views were similar in certain ways to European ideas of progress and modernity.

In this book I have drawn on the term 'Islamisation' in order to discuss the nature of Islamic modernity. In its narrowest sense, Islamisation refers to the transmission of Islam into new cultures and the conversion of people to Islam. It describes the deliberate effort to invite people to the path of Islam, using the various modes of communication (Roff 2009: 97–115). The Islamic term most closely related to the notion of Islamisation is *da'wah*, usually translated into English as 'mission', 'propagation', 'proselytisation' or 'preaching' (Arnold 1984; Berkey 2001) but literally meaning 'calling' or 'inviting'. A Muhammadiyah author used an Indonesian term '*penyiaran*', meaning 'spreading (Islam)' to refer to *da'wah* (Mangkoeto 1936). A modernist Muslim in Java, Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934), wrote a book on a history of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad employing 'Islamic propaganda' to refer to *tabligh*, meaning 'conveying (the message)', one of the most popular meanings of *da'wah* (Tjokroaminoto 1955 [1931]: 4). An often recited Qur'anic verse expresses *da'wah* thus: 'Invite all to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching, and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious' (Q. 16:125). *Da'wah* is also linked to the concept of 'enjoining good and forbidding evil [A. *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*]', as in the Qur'anic verse, 'Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong. They are the ones to attain felicity' (Q. 3:104). *Da'wah* could be considered traditionalist

or modernist, conservative or reformist, oral, written or practical, depending on the message being conveyed, the method being used and one's perspective.

The common understanding of *da'wah* is rarely related to modernisation. Islamic modernist movements that looked to the West and actively sought to change Muslim attitudes are often singled out as the only modernisers (see Noer 1973). More traditional religious scholars have seldom been regarded in this light. Earlier modernisation theorists viewed Islam (like other religions) as an obstacle to progress and modernisation, and saw Islamisation as an effort to turn Muslims away from socio-political organisations, democratic government, legal reform and scientific education. Reform can, however, be given a broader interpretation, by which *da'wah* or Islamisation becomes a dynamic process that not only renders new ideas and practices more congruent with Islam and Islam more relevant to people's lives, but also adjusts some aspects of Islam to fit with new ideas, practices and institutions. This process is found in the various Muslim authorities and groups in Indonesia and Malaya. Conducted within a more localised and traditional framework, these organisational, political, legal and educational agendas can be read as attempts to modernise Muslim communities and society at large. Islamic reform and European colonialism play crucial parts in making modern Indonesia and Malaya.

While contemporary scholars have debated whether Muhammad was a 'modernist' for his time, American sociologist Robert Bellah argues that early Islam was 'remarkably modern' because of the 'high degree of commitment, involvement, and participation' expected from the ordinary members of the community, and in 'the openness of its leadership positions to ability judged on universalistic grounds and symbolized in the attempt to institutionalize a nonhereditary top leadership'. The dominant ethos of the Muslim *ummah*, Bellah continued, was 'this worldly, activist, social, and political . . . and also relatively accessible to the dominant ethos of the twentieth century' (Bellah 1970: 150–2). In the Indonesian-Malay world of the first half of the twentieth century, Muslim scholars viewed Islam as a new path to progress, allowing them to adopt and adapt the concept of *jam'iyah* (A. organisation) and Western political parties and administration, rejecting the Islamic political order of caliphate (A. *khilafah*) without rejecting the sense of a global *ummah* and, in Malay cases, the sultanate.

Since *da'wah* concerns the transmission of Islam, it is much related to teaching (A. *ta'lim*), and its role in conveying teaching about the faith, the Qur'an, the Prophet's life, ritual and social ethics, in order to create a 'good or better Muslim' in both the material and spiritual domains of life (Eickelman 1985; Berkey 1992; Hefner and Zaman 2007). In promoting education, Muslim reformers in the first half of the twentieth century used the local terms such as '*pengajaran*' or teaching and had not used the term '*tarbiyyah*' or '*pendidikan*'. But they drew upon central Qur'anic concepts such as *ilm*, *din*, *dunia* and *akhirah*. The '*ulama*' or scholars classified subjects as either part of religious knowledge (I. *ilmu agama*, *ilmu akhirah*, *ilmu al-din*) or worldly knowledge (I. *ilmu dunia*). In the Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya, this division between religious and secular knowledge facilitated the combination and integration of sciences into a Muslim educational system, although to varying degrees and emphasis. Some Muslim reformers maintained that science was transmitted from Arab, Muslim scholars to Europe in the Medieval Ages. Others believed that science was universal and did not belong to any race and that God was the ultimate source for revelation and all sciences. Education became a distinct sphere, conceptually and institutionally divided into the religious and the secular (and into the traditional and the modern) as a response to Islamic reform, colonial and Christian education and local context.

Islamic reform can refer to processes of modernisation. Desiring improvements in the lives of Muslims and their fellow countrymen under colonial control, being inspired by text and history, by their faith and reasoning, Muslim scholars opened up their ways of 'reaching goodness in this world' and attaining 'happiness in the hereafter' (Q. 28:77). For example, in the early twentieth century a Javanese Muslim reformer, Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1923) established an organisation, Muhammadiyah, intended to make society more Islamic and Islam more relevant in Java and in the outer islands, by educating boys, girls, men and women, conducting social work and providing health services. In developing modern initiatives, he sought to combine progressive ideas derived from the Qur'an and the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad with Dutch and Christian concepts and institutional models. In Malaya, however, writing (A. *kitabah*) and publication in the forms of book, newspaper and periodical, became the primary media for the *da'wah* apart from

schooling. In his writings, Syed Ahmad Al-Hadi (1867–1934), for example, criticised *kaum tua* (old faction) scholars, the sultan, and ordinary Malays for their old-fashioned and non-rational way of thinking. He called for them to change their attitudes toward Islam and promoted the use of reason in making sense of Islamic belief, ritual and ethics. Belonging to the *kaum muda* (young faction), Al-Hadi claimed to be modernist in orientation and mission, although the *kaum tua* associated with the sultan in Kelantan, also emerged as reformers of the state and society where Malay culture and religion were distinguishable from, but coexisting with, the British colonial sphere.

### **Islamisation and Secularisation**

Islamisation and secularisation are commonly held to be antagonistic. However, the religious and the secular are intertwined modern categories of analysis (Calhoun *et al.* 2011). The term ‘secular’, which implies concern with worldly matters as distinct from the sacred, is as complex and multi-dimensional a concept as that of religion. The word was unknown during colonial times and was hardly used in Muslim countries until the twentieth century, despite its uneasy contemporary Arabic translation as ‘*alamāniyy*’ (Keddie 2003: 14–30; As’ad 2003: 206). On the other hand, the concept of ‘worldly’ or *dunya* occurs in the Qur’an and the hadith and is used by Muslims in Indonesia and Malaya. The worldly is differentiated from the hereafter or *akhirah*. In calling for work in this world, Muslims also cited, ‘But seek, with the (wealth) which Allah has bestowed on thee, the home of the hereafter, nor forget thy portion in this world’ (Q.28:77). A Javanese Muslim, for example, demanded that the Dutch colonial government not intervene in ‘religious and private affairs’ such as marriage and attendance at mosque and its management, but recognised colonial policies in matters considered ‘secular’ or ‘public’, such as the government, security, transportation, economy and commerce, as long as these did not hinder religious life. Malay sultans and reformers generally accepted the British policy of non-intervention in religious and cultural affairs, but they sometimes accepted the British interference in these affairs. As a concept, secularisation has multiple meanings: religious decline, differentiation, and privatisation (Casanova 1994). In this book, secularisation, as an analytical term, concerns mainly the differentiation of the domains of life and the privatisation of the religious

domain, as understood and imposed primarily by the Dutch and the British administrators but also as tolerated by the ruling elite and some Muslim reformers. The Indonesian-Malay world witnessed no religious decline even under colonial rule.

Muslim reformers pushed to modernise political domains, often creating and sometimes crossing the religious–secular boundaries. Because Islam can be expressed in different forms in the domain of politics or *siyasah*, disputes about the interpretation of symbols and ideas and about the control of the institutions that sustain these ideas have often generated political conflicts (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 5). Although not itself new to Muslims, articulations of *siyasah* in Indonesia and Malaya were influenced by their interaction with Islamic reform, colonial policies, global and local circumstances. To address matters of *siyasah* means to be modern. And to be politically modern was to be actively involved and organised in objectives and agendas. Muslim politics took the form of non-cooperation or cooperation with the colonial power. Many Muslims rejected Western ideologies, but other Muslims used Western vocabularies and ideas in rejecting the ideologies deemed harmful to Muslims. Some cooperated with colonial institutions, but in other times they rejected them, and still in other cases they worked autonomously without colonial intervention.

In terms of political discourse, an increasing number of Muslims in colonial Indonesia and Malaya began to engage with a wide range of Arabic ideas such as *ummah* (community), *qawm* (nation), *watan* (country), *jama'ah* (union), *khilafah* (caliphate), *'imara* (leadership), *jihad* (struggle), *shari'ah* (law), *fiqh* (jurisprudence), *hukum* (regulations, law), and *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (abode of war). Muslim reformers derived these foreign, Arabic ideas from scriptures and authoritative texts, but reinterpreted these concepts in the new socially and politically engaging environments of the time. Thus, they also talked about *negeri* (S. country), *bangsa* (S. nation), *demokrasi*, *recht* (D. law) and others. While some were interested in shaping political institutions and seeking independence from colonial powers, most generated socio-religious movements with the goal of building a country and a nation, thereby changing Muslim relations with the Dutch authorities. Muslim reformers and political activists in the East Indies defined *shari'ah* as Islamic law, but interpreted it and applied it in different ways to the

domains that they aspired to reform (Hallaq 2005; Feener 2007). In Malaya, Muslims sought to increase political awareness through the English-like clubs and periodicals, retaining the sultanate while criticising its weaknesses and promoting the ideas of nation and country (Roff 1967; Milner 1994; Milner 2003). They transmitted ideas and institutions from outside to their communities but they, too, invented new conceptions and institutions, creating and crossing the religious–secular and the private–public boundaries. In the Indonesian–Malay archipelago, colonial modernisation and secularisation were rarely separate from religion, tradition and the processes of localisation.

### **Locating and Localising *Agama* and *Adat***

World historian Marshall Hodgson has argued that colonial attempts to modernise the societies they governed often disrupted aspects of local practices (Hodgson 1977: 417). I agree with Hodgson, but there are many cases where European administrators were conscious of the need to recognise, tolerate and even preserve the customary matters and to proceed carefully as they introduced their modernisation projects. For example, in the treaties by which colonialism was extended over the Malay Peninsula, the British left ‘religious and cultural matters’ to the respective sultans and religious scholars, as both an outcome of the British fear of native resistance and a source of the Malay elite’s willingness to cooperate with them. While Europeans often criticised *adat* as obsolete, impractical, parochial or immoral, they preserved this as part of colonial histories and cultural practices. In some cases, the British even supported Islamisation indirectly through their research and publications as well as administrative, legal and educational assistance. The Dutch power, too, admitted the role of Islam in modernising local culture and even invited the Western nations to help Muslim reformers engaged with the modern world. Colonial administrators and scholars appropriated the ‘non-modern’ culture and reformist Islam in order to help stabilise local order and maintain their modernisation projects, which did not necessarily jeopardise much of the Muslim agendas of reform.

In Indonesia and Malaya, Islam was associated closer to tradition than with modernity. The Malay sultans spoke of ‘*adat* and *agama*’ – ‘custom and religion’ – in the same breath, and Europeans used the phrase in the treaties that they made with Malay rulers (Roff 2009: 179). By the same token, an

Islamic association in South Sulawesi had a unit dealing with affairs of '*adat* and *agama*'.<sup>2</sup> It is a historical construction, rather than given. Because of this connection, some Muslim reformers attempted to reform some aspects of *adat* and preserve other aspects of *adat* while they wanted to conform to their Islamic boundaries.

The terms used to understand 'religion' are the Arabic word '*din*' and the Sanskrit word '*agama*', which has become an Indonesian and Malay term. *Din* has several layers of signification: 'the way', 'the law' and the moment of final judgement. *Din* can be defined as religion. Islam is a *din*, but Islam is deemed broader and more comprehensive than other *dins*. In the Qur'an, Islam is depicted and interpreted as the *din* of God, the religion of all prophets. Another term, '*agama*' (S.), has multiple meanings, too. *Agama* is used for scriptures in Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism. In the colonial time, the Dutch and Muslim modernists described 'religion' in different terms: '*agama*', '*godsdiens*'. Modernist H. Agus Salim (1884–1954) used *godsdiens* in its scriptural religion connotation. He defined it as 'the system of duty and obedience with respect to the regulations given by god to people through prophets with teachings and examples'.<sup>3</sup> Another modernist Javanese Muslim, A Haanie, in response to Hendrik Kraemer's view of Islam, used *agama* for Islam, but he defended Islam from Kraemer and other Westerners' call for separating *agama* and politics (and other worldly matters). Islam for him was a religion that should be distinguished from Western Christian conceptions of religion (Haanie 1930: 85).

For anthropologist Talal Asad, religion is a modern Western construct and therefore is not an adequate concept to describe Islam (Asad 1993: 28), but some Muslim modernists appropriated *religion*, *godsdiens* and *agama* to refer to Islam with different meanings. The 'religion of Islam' or *agama Islam* began to be popularly used despite its different meanings and implications. Asad criticises the hegemonic use of the Western constructions of religion as being an 'autonomous essence' without understanding and recognising the multiplicity and complexity associated with it. I agree with Asad partially in that Islam and religion are not identical, but I would disagree with him in that the broad and narrow understanding and practical manifestations of Islam as *religion* did occur among Muslim societies themselves, in colonial (and postcolonial) Indonesia and Malaya. Muslims's understandings of Islam

as *agama*, *godsdiens*t or *religion* differed but could also coincide with Western constructions of Islam as *agama*, *godsdiens*t or *religion*. This is particularly due not only to Western impacts on Muslim life, but also to Muslims' own agency within their specific histories.

Tradition also denoted multiple meanings: tradition as local customs and culture (for example, Javanese, Malay and Bugis); tradition as collected and codified as *adat*recht mentioned earlier; and tradition as classified into different dimensions, such as history, language, ethnicity, food, clothing, wedding, arts, literature, and religion. Local culture was sometimes deemed more tolerant toward Westernisation.

From an anthropological angle, Islam has been conceptualised as a 'discursive tradition' because it has its styles of reasoning derived from the scriptures that instruct practitioners regarding the 'correct belief and practice', related conceptually to a past and to a future through a present (Asad 1986: 14). 'Tradition' can include *adat*, conceived of being outdated, or still relevant and important to a modern community. Over the centuries there has also been an acculturation of Islam and *adat*, which has blurred the distinctions between Islamic identity and ethnic affiliation. In other similar contexts, elements of European culture and religious elements of local court were juxtaposed and mixed. A social harmony between multiple traditions (for example, Islamic, Javanese and even Dutch) could exist for surviving domination and preserving cultures (Sumarsam 1995: 80–1, 240–1).

In this discussion I am conscious that there can be 'multiple traditions', for tradition has layers of signification and uses according to actors and context, and according to scholars. In local usages, religion and tradition are often closely related because religion has become part of a long history of the people in the region. For most Muslims, tradition could mean the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, or *sunnah*, recorded as the hadith. It can signify the interpretations of the Qur'an and the hadith, accumulated for generations that later became part of a Muslim heritage (*A. turath*). World historian Marshall Hodgson, for example, juxtaposes 'the Islamic heritage' and 'the modern conscience' within the context of contemporary Muslims facing the challenges of the West (Hodgson 1977: 411). Yet Hodgson recognises that Islam, as part of the 'pre-modern heritages', should provide 'the widest resources for new vision' (431). Islamicist William Graham would have

agreed with Hodgson's idea of 'the Islamic heritage', as Graham discusses 'Islamic traditionalism', which emphasises Islam's sense of connectedness to the past (Graham 1993). But, for Graham, Muslims would never be entirely 'modern' if that means compromising the Qur'an, the hadith and other transmitted traditions considered unchanging and authoritative even if these do not conform to the Western modern. Egyptian Muslim philosopher Hasan Hanafi also discusses the difficult way in which Arab nations deal with their 'old heritage' (A. *turath qadim*), 'Western heritage' (A. *turath gharby*) and human reality (A. *waqi bashir*) in pursuing renewal (Hanafi 1991: 12–13). By the turn of the twentieth century, Muslim reformers in the Indonesian-Malay world had to address their 'old heritage' (local custom or *adat*, which could be Hindu, Buddhist, indigenous), Arabic and Islamic heritage, and Western heritage, and human reality in articulating and pursuing their reform.

*Adat* did not remain unchanged under the influence of the Islamic and Western ideas and institutions. Tradition persists and changes, and complex factors explain why and how it persists, strengthens or weakens. A living tradition, Alasdair MacIntyre says, is a 'historically, extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition' (MacIntyre 2007: 222). Islam as an *agama* or religion is not separate from other ideas and practices regarded as *adat*. Islam can be analysed as a living tradition, and yet it is also a modern force in Indonesia and Malaysia. This book highlights the process of locating *adat* and *agama* within multiple conceptions of tradition and modernity during the colonial time. Tradition should not be understood as a primordial, static culture, but as 'the ensemble of practices and arguments that serve the social bond and provide cohesiveness to human communities of varying scale' (Salvatore 2009: 5).

Despite their adoption of Islam, the dominant ethnic groups of the Indonesian-Malay archipelago – Malay, Javanese, Sundanese, Acehnese, Minangkabau, Bugis and Makassarese – have been regarded as traditional unless they followed the path of the West. However, beginning in the early twentieth century, European colonial authorities and Muslim activists employed similar means to forward their modernisation projects. One shared strategy involved locating and identifying local customs or traditions as *adat* within their frameworks. On the basis of experience and research, colonial

authorities identified *adat* as the indigenous, the customary or the local, often distinguished from Dutch or English modern cultures, and often differentiated from the Islamic. They clarified their interpretations of *adat*, most clearly exemplified in the Dutch codification of *adatrecht*, customary law, which they distinguished in particular from Islamic *shari'ah* law, although in practice interacting with it (Hadler 2008: 29). Dutch administrator Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, for example, regarded *adat* elite as more easily 'modernised' than Muslim leaders whose religious faith made them more resistant. British administrator Wilkinson, on the other hand, considered much of the Malay *adat* as particularly resistant to change, and yet was very keen to educate Malays to be modern.

European modernisers judged which local practices and institutions belonged to *adat* and which ones could be productively Westernised because they saw them as either relevant or irrelevant for their modernisation projects, or could be left intact as part of local cultural identity and inheritance – and their Western colonial achievements. In these instances, colonialists positioned *adat* not merely as being a non-modern object of research and preservation but also as an integral part of their modernisation projects.

Muslim reformers, too, appropriated the Western modern in pursuing their agenda. They were often critical of *adat*, especially beliefs, rituals and lifestyles they considered forbidden, using such Islamic categories as *shirk*, *bid'ah* or *haram*. Yet they saw the preservation of certain *adat* as important in sustaining their claims and projects, as well as in contesting foreign customs and ideologies that they rejected. They did not deny that ethnic groups now embracing Islam had the right to maintain their language and cultures. Muslim scholars, writers and teachers who conceived of Islam as a religion that integrated and influenced all domains of life made an effort to explain the faith to people in their local languages, using familiar symbols and expressions to communicate their message, and adapting some Islamic ideas so that they were compatible with the *adat*. For the most part they refrained from attempting to change *adat* practices that did not violate the tenets of Islam.

## **Islamising and Colonising the Indonesian-Malay World: A Brief Overview**

In the first half of the twentieth century different names were used for these countries, including East Indies, or Hindia Timur, and Netherlands Indies, or Hindia Belanda. From the early 1920s the name 'Indonesia' became increasingly popular. The peninsula was called 'Malay land', or Tanah Melayu, and the 'Federation of Malaya' was adopted in 1957 at the time of independence from the British. The name 'Malaysia' was adopted in 1963, including Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak. Because of its location on the maritime routes between China and India, the region we call broadly the Indonesian-Malay world has long been a crossroads for long-distance trade and the world religions and philosophies (Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Confucianism) that moved among these pathways. For centuries Arabs, Indians, Chinese, and later Europeans travelled through the region, largely by boat. The islands of Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi (Celebes) and Kalimantan (Borneo) could all be reached by sea from the Malay Peninsula, and local (especially coastal) peoples travelled extensively and sometimes settled far from their places of birth. For example, many Bugis from Sulawesi lived in Kelantan, proudly claiming it to be 'the Verandah (I. *serambi*) of Mecca' and Selangor on the Malay Peninsula, while a Malay community was well established in Makassar in South Sulawesi, proudly labelled as 'the Verandah of Medina'.

Carried along trading routes, Islam has been in the Indonesian-Malay region since at least the fourteenth century. Although rulers who adopted Islam sometimes used force to spread the faith among their subjects and among neighbouring kingdoms, the expansion of Islam has been largely peaceful: through trade, marriage and *da'wah*. Among the earliest forms of Islamic organisation were Sufi orders, expressions of mystical Islam that gained widespread influence from the twelfth century onwards. Under the guidance of a Sufi master, their ultimate goal was union with the Divine but they addressed a variety of matters, including Islamic beliefs, ethics, law, philosophy and metaphysics, in relation to spiritual life. One of the theologians and Sufi masters influential throughout the Southeast Asian world was Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), a 'religious genius who created a new synthesis

between the two poles of the religious consciousness by rebuilding the structure of orthodox theology upon the foundations of personal religious experience' (Gibb 1947: 20). Through the vision of Al-Ghazali, transmitted by Sufi teachers who travelled through the Indonesian-Malay archipelago, local Muslims could observe a combination of spirituality and law, religion and the worldly that came from different places, including Arabia, North Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and other parts of the Indonesian-Malay archipelago (Pelras 2010; Chambert-Loir 1985). Sufi scholars addressed the idea of textual revelation (the Qur'an), intuition (A. *ilham*) and illumination (A. *kashshaf*), and the idea of a 'perfect human being (A. *insan kamil*)' (Abdullah 1997: 50–61). Being influenced by Al-Ghazali and other Sufis, local scholars regarded themselves as 'reformers' of Muslim societies and nations, emphasising the cultivation of the heart and communion with the Divine without necessarily denying the importance of other dimensions of Islam that they believed to be sacred and universal. Sufi orders were trans-local because the mobility of teachers, students and followers in search of learning spread their teachings far beyond geographical boundaries. While teachers and scholars arrived from India and Arabia, Muslims from Southeast Asia also travelled to Mecca and other centres as pilgrims and as students to further their knowledge of Islam.

In 1511, the Portuguese conquest of the powerful city-state of Malacca on the Malay Peninsula was intended to open the route to the Spice Islands in eastern Indonesia, but was justified by the goal of acquiring converts to Catholicism. Surrounding Muslim rulers mounted several campaigns against Portuguese Malacca and there was continuing conflict in eastern Indonesia as well. Indeed, some scholars have seen the hostility between Muslim kingdoms and the Portuguese and their allies as the result of a 'race' between Christians and Muslims to gain more converts. An example of the kinds of antagonisms that developed are evident in the writings of Shaykh Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658), a Gujarati-Acehnese scholar, whose work *Al-Tibyan fi Ma'rifa al-Adyan* ('Explanation on the Science of Religions') in the Jawi (modified Arabic) script was probably written from 1634 to 1644. In separating truth from falsehood, Al-Raniri classified Christians and Jews as non-believers (A. *kafir*) and therefore purveyors of falsehood. He saw them as rejecting the truths of Islam, rather than as 'people of the book' (A. *Ahl al-Kitab*) who

were differentiated from *mushrikun*, those associating partners with God. Shaykh Yusuf (1626–99) travelled from Makassar, to Yemen, Mecca, Patani, Makassar, Aceh and Cape Town (Hamid 1994: 73–139, 158; Cummings 2002: 54).

By the late seventeenth century outright conflict between Muslims and Christians was less apparent. The Catholic Portuguese were displaced by the Protestant Dutch East Indies Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC)) and other Europeans, who were mainly concerned with maximising trade opportunities. Nonetheless, there were occasional calls for Muslims to unite against European intervention. In 1772, for example, the Sumatran scholar Abdul Samad Al-Palimbani (1704–89) wrote a letter from Arabia inviting Javanese rulers to wage *jihad* against the ‘enemies of Islam’, quoting Qur’anic passages (2:154 and 3:169) and the hadith that implied that Muslims who were killed in the struggle would be rewarded in heaven (Azra 2008: 14). For the most part, however, local scholars began focusing internally on separating ‘orthodox’ practices associated with *shari’ah* from ‘heterodox’ practices associated with Sufism and local and foreign customs and ideas.

Although colonisation itself proceeded in a piecemeal fashion, many Europeans saw the spread of ‘civilisation’ as a moral responsibility that justified continuing involvement in the region. For example, the East India Company official Thomas Stamford Raffles stated that he not only wanted to increase free trade in the region, but also to do ‘something for [the] advancement’ of the ‘Asiatic’, by which he meant the peoples of China, Siam, Javanese and Malays, among others (Winstedt 1948: 81). A new chapter in the relationship between Europeans and Indonesian-Malay societies began with the signing of the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty between Britain and the Netherlands, which formally divided the Dutch and British ‘spheres of influence’ down the Malacca Straits. The Malay Peninsula (including Malacca) and Singapore was deemed to be a British domain, while islands south of Singapore, including Java and Sumatra, became the preserve of the Dutch (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 125). Through the nineteenth century and the early twentieth the Dutch spread their control through Indonesian archipelago, often by force, and the British slowly solidified their dominant position in the Malay Peninsula.

With the advent of steam power and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, sea trade and travel between Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe expanded. The numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims making the pilgrimage to Mecca grew (Tagliacozzo 2013); many of them also travelled to attend Al-Azhar University in Cairo, where they studied with reformist scholars. The Arab immigrants and diaspora communities (A. *hadhramis*), too, transmitted reformist ideas in the Indonesian-Malay world by ways of trading, intermarriage, preaching, writing and organisation (Mobini-Kesheh 1999; Eliraz 2004: 48–54). In South Sulawesi, for example, a number of Hadhramis from southern Yemen came and lived in the island of Salemo where they established Islamic centres.<sup>4</sup> Graduates from Salemo established a branch of the Jakarta-based Arab-descent association called Jami'atul Khair (Association of the Good) in Barru, South Sulawesi.<sup>5</sup> Shaykh Mahmud al-Jawwad fled Medina, Saudi Arabia, and came to Java and migrated to Luwu, South Sulawesi where he met another Arab, Shaykh Hassan al-Habshi. The king of Luwu welcomed both shaykhs who later married local women and established a school Madrasah al-Falah (the School of Success) in 1923. In this madrasah, both taught Sufism well as the *shari'ah*, assisted by some local teachers. Being well known, they were invited by the king of Bone to teach the court (Safwan and Kutoyo 1980/1: 85). These shaykhs and others claiming the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (*sayyid* (A. 'lord')) became a socio-religious status distinguishing them from others, the non-descendants (*'ajam*, non-Arab, sometimes also called Jawi), local Muslims, despite intermarriages and alliances (Saransi 2005: 47–51). Being an Arab or a non-Arab remained a social marker in the Indonesian-Malay world. The Arabs established mosques, such as the Arab mosque in Makassar. There they delivered sermons in Arabic in a predominantly Arabic congregation. The Muhammadiyah activists, for example, were concerned about the emerging schism among the Arabs.<sup>6</sup>

Besides the Sunni Arabs, there were some Shi'ite Arabs, such as Sayyid Jalaluddin al-Aidit, who came from Arabia through Aceh and Banjar (Kalimantan) to Cikoang (South Sulawesi) in the seventeenth century. Jalaluddin al-Aidit was said to have come to Cikoang rather than to Makassar because of the dominance of the Sunni Shafi'i legal practice in the latter as in other parts of the archipelago. One of the Shi'ite practices in these villages

has been the annual celebration of the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (*maulud Nabi*) in a manner different from that of the rest of the Sunni Muslims in the region. The influence of the Al-Aidit family in Cikoang indicates the network of the *'ulama* between Mecca, Aceh, Banjar and South Sulawesi, but also that of some Shi'ite unbroken line of influence in South Sulawesi from the seventeenth century, to the colonial time, and even to the present day.<sup>7</sup>

The establishment of Muslim communities was, in the words of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, 'hardly a matter of Arab incursion and settlement'.<sup>8</sup> Local Muslim preachers, teachers and activists in the East Indies came from diverse races, ethnicities and localities, demonstrating global and local characters of Islamic knowledge and its networks. Global experiences through pilgrimage, travel and study in the Middle East significantly influenced these *'ulama*-activists to feel the need to reform Muslim societies. The Arabs, as well as returning non-Arab pilgrims and students from Mecca and students from Cairo, played a crucial role in the dissemination of diverse forms of Islam in the Indonesian-Malay world. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Dutch and British scholars observed that more than 85 per cent of the population of the Netherlands Indies professed the religion of Muhammad and that Islam had been established in Malaya for several centuries (Winstedt 1947: 33). Meanwhile, the Muslim leadership previously offered by the Ottoman Empire declined, the Saudi Wahhabi Islam did not attract most Muslims and European imperialism was increasingly encroaching upon Muslim-majority countries.

### **A Comparative and Cross-cultural History**

This comparative history focuses on the forty years roughly between 1901 (when a new 'Ethical Policy' was initiated in the East Indies) and 1941 (when the Japanese invaded and occupied the entire Malay-Indonesian archipelago). In this formative period Europeans stepped up their attempts to modernise many domains of their colonised subjects' lives. Concerted efforts were made to eliminate practices deemed contrary to a modern state, such as slavery, headhunting and piracy, and despite the abuses that accompanied economic exploitation, colonial subjects were now being 'forced into a more modern age' (Ricklefs 2001: 189). Yet Muslim reformers in the region were

not passive and their articulation of reform coincided with, coexisted with and even reinforced modernisation agendas.

My aim is not to separate Islamic and European reforms and influences, but to juxtapose and contextualise them by comparing two colonial administrations (the Dutch and the British) and two Muslim local areas (the East Indies, or Indonesia, and British Malaya). This comparative history emphasises common and parallel features among diverse forces for change, although not at the expense of variation (Kocka 2003: 39). It narrates multiple ways of becoming modern, and also compares and contrasts the notions of rationality, the desire for advancement and progress, the use of print media, the need for organisation and effectiveness, the rule of law and justice, the seeking of knowledge and literacy and concern with the material, worldly life.

I have drawn upon a variety of Islamic religious, colonial and local texts. Primary local materials included newspapers and magazines, sultanate and council notices and regulations, school curricula, official reports, collected *fatwas* and sermons, and autobiographical works by local authors. These texts were written in a variety of languages, including Arabic, mixtures of Persian, Arabic and Malay (that is, the Jawi script used in Malaya; Bahasa Indonesia, a version of Malay written with the Latin alphabet) and less widespread languages spoken by the Bugis and the Makassarese in South Sulawesi. Transmission of writings in Arabic, Islam's common language, and their local translations are part of the longer process of adopting the foreign within an indigenous and familiar framework (Ricci 2011: 1–20). In Java, Islamic scholars and teachers also used a Javanese-Arabic script called *pegon* in transmitting Islamic religious knowledge to the people (Umam 2011). Some Buginese and Makassarese scholars used the Bugis-Arabic script called *serang*, although this did not become as popular as the Jawi script in other parts of the Indonesian-Malay world. My focus is on expressions of becoming modern in Dutch and British documents and in the writings of local Muslim reformers that became the prime medium by which Muslims could begin to think of themselves as devout and simultaneously modern.

By the late nineteenth century, despite low levels of general literacy, print technology had become widespread in the East Indies and Malaya. The use of print technology, new to most people in the region, became a key element in the transmission of ideas. The circulation of printed material, as

Benedict Anderson has shown, made it possible for rapidly increasing numbers of people to think about themselves and relate to others in profoundly new ways that helped create a new, imagined community of nationhood (Anderson 1991: 33–6, 44–6; Adam 1995; Laffan 2003: 10). As literacy gradually improved, print technology became an important medium of communication for Muslim scholars, teachers, students, writers and readers in the Indonesian-Malay world. It created information flows that reached out to local audiences and connected Muslims to one another and to non-Muslims in many parts of the world. Periodicals promoting different interests flourished. *Fadjar Indonesia* ('The Dawn of Indonesia'), published in Sulawesi, presented progressive views and tolerant attitudes toward internal schism in Islam. Journals competed for readership in Malaya and beyond. The Kelantan publication *Pengasuh* ('The Bearer') was written in Jawi; *Kenchana* ('The Balance'), was published in Singapore using the Latin alphabet.

Texts generated by specific individuals and organisations are also used to exemplify different attitudes and agendas. The Dutch scholars Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) and Hendrik Kraemer (1888–1965) were selected as emblematic of different colonial ideas about Westernisation, Christianisation and Islamisation in the East Indies. Their discourses and policies are compared to two British scholars and administrators in Malaya, Sir Richard James Wilkinson (1867–1941) and Sir Richard Olaf Winstedt (1878–1966). Wilkinson was more interested in historical, literary and cultural aspects of Malay society than in studying political aspects of Islam. Winstedt, like Wilkinson, was a colonial administrator and educator, but he paid greater attention to the practice of Islam within the larger context of Malay beliefs and culture. Muslim scholars such as Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1923), the founder of Muhammadiyah (1912), and Tahir Jalaluddin (1869–56) identified themselves with the collective Muslim enterprise, as did Hasyim Asy'ari (1871–1947), one of the founders of Nahdlatul 'Ulama (Revival/Awakening of Religious Scholars) (henceforth NU), which was established in 1926. Another Javanese figure, Western-educated Muslim Tjokroaminoto, mentioned earlier, represents the perspective of Islamic socialist and political activism, which once struggled 'under the protection of the government', but became critical of capitalism and imperialism, and opposed to cooperation with the colonial regime. The Muslim reformer and

leader of Sarekat Islam (Union of Islam) (SI), Agus Salim (1884–1954) represents an eclectic figure as he was educated both in an Islamic, Minangkabau-Malay cultural environment and in Dutch schools. Muhammad As'ad (and his As'adiyah school in South Sulawesi) presents a little-studied example of a 'traditionalist' reformer.

Political organisations such as SI and socio-religious movements such as Muhammadiyah and NU in the East Indies did not emerge in Malaya because the political situation under British rule was quite different. Malay modernists joined literary and cultural clubs similar to English clubs, such as the Kelantan's Putera Club, which demanded that the British and the sultan provide better access to education for all Malays but did not pose a threat to British modernisation. Tok Kenali (1869–1933), who studied in Mecca, promoted progress for Malays in Kelantan through writing, education and activism.<sup>9</sup> Although he wrote in Arabic and Jawi script, he encouraged English and Malay literacy in schools. Tok Kenali and his fellow *'ulama* established the Council of Religion and Malay Custom in Kelantan (Majelis Agama Islam dan Adat Istiadat (henceforth MAIK) that stressed the teaching of Arabic and religious knowledge and supported English and science as modern subjects.

The European modernisation project involved efforts to categorise and enumerate not only the people who they sought to dominate, but also events, ideas and practices. As different ethnic groups increasingly related to one another under the colonial umbrella, Muslims also began to think more specifically of their religious and ethnic identities. Historian Frederick Cooper discusses the importance of treating the 'process of identification' of self with others as a category of practice rather than using 'identity' labels as obvious categories of analysis (Cooper 2005: 59–60, 113–49). Alert to these nuances, I nonetheless treat the mutable identities of people in the Indonesian-Malay region as categories of analysis at times and as categories of practice at other times, depending on the context. In many cases, although aware of their contingency, I have given labels to historical actors (such as 'Muslim reformers', 'traditionalist reformer' and 'socialist Muslim') because they are part of my critical terminology (see also Cooper 2005: 59–77). In other cases, I use local terms such as *kemajuan* (I. progress, improvement, advancement), *muda* (I. young), *moderen* (modern, modernist), *terbelakang* (I. backwardness), *tradi-*

*sionalis* (traditionalist), *tua* (I. old) and *kolot* (I. conservative). The narrative thus reflects the interplay between these two frames of reference: the language of analysis and the language of practice.

In a similar vein, when discussing tradition and modernity, Alasdair MacIntyre invites us to consider multiple notions of justice, multiple notions of rationality and other similar ideas (1988: 1–11). His stress on the competition and rivalry between key ideas will be evident in my discussion of the use of *kemajuan* by Muslim reformers and the colonial deployment of the term *progress*, and in the Muslim idea of *akal* (reason) and the colonisers' rationality. Simultaneously, a major theme of this book concerns the overlaps and collaboration as well as tension and conflict between Western colonial regimes and Islamic reformers in defining and promoting these ideas. In parallel with Europeans, Muslim scholars consciously constructed identity labels for themselves or for others that incorporated evolving analytical vocabularies relating to the modern and the traditional, the political and the apolitical, the private and the public, the socialist and the capitalist, the orthodox and the heterodox, and the religious and the worldly or secular. It will become evident that the conversations by which Islamic and colonial modernities in Indonesia and Malaya were developed, shaped and defined involved many voices, echoes of which can still be felt today.

Writing on the Dutch in Indonesia, Indonesian historian Taufik Abdullah discusses interchangeable periods of cooperation, partnership in progress, cultural accommodation, and peaceful coexistence as well as competition, conflicts and wars, and subordination (Abdullah 1994). Dutch Islamicist Karel Steenbrink explores cases of antagonistic, accommodationist and neutral relationships between Indonesian Islam and Dutch colonialism (Steenbrink 2006). Even Indonesian Muslim modernist Hamka, discussed in several places in this book, expresses his thankfulness to 'the Dutch writers and researchers for their historical writings on Islamic kingdoms in detail' and who 'introduced theories and facts', while being critical of the colonial and Christian missionary interests (Hamka 1950: 3). Michael Laffan examines more closely the way in which the Sufi image of 'Indonesian Islam' was made primarily by European colonialists, and became appropriated by Muslim reformers who promoted 'modern Islam' (Laffan 2011). Dutch Islamicist Nico Kaptein explores Sayyid Uthman and his partnership with

Snouck (2014). This present book offers a study of the parallelism and connections between Islamic reform and European colonialism in the modernisation of Islamic organisation, politics and government, law, and education in Indonesia and Malaya.

This comparative historical study is intended as a contribution to Islamic Studies and Southeast Asian Studies, especially to current scholarship on *historical* Islam, empire, colonialism and postcolonialism in Southeast Asia and the broader Muslim world. A historical analysis of Islam as interpreted and practised in global and local contexts provides an avenue for developing a critical Islamic Studies that draws upon religious disciplines or *ilmu agama*. The research on the Qur'anic interpretation, the hadith, *da'wah*, *siyasah*, *shari'ah* and *tarbiyyah* may be advanced by offering colonial views and programmes in local contexts. The study on Orientalism, government, law, and education, may be advanced by offering Islamic views and agendas in local contexts. These studies can help to expand historical studies of religion, colonialism, and modernity. By reading the myriad voices and languages of Muslim reformers and European colonialists critically, rather than hierarchically, it is hoped to develop the comparative study of Islamic societies, of colonialism and of modernity.

Postcolonial theorist Gyan Prakash, for example, proposes the 'shaking of the history of colonialism and colonialism's disciplining of history from the domination of categories and ideas it produced' (1995: 5). Rather than shaking the history of colonialism as such, this book juxtaposes European colonialism with Asian Islamic reform in articulating reform, progress, legality and rationality and in forming organisations and institutions in their own ways as well as in relation to one another. The idea that colonial administrators and Muslim reformers differed but often coexisted and sometimes even collaborated in the drive for progress and modernisation should be of interest to students and scholars of secularisation as well as postcolonial and subaltern studies.

### **Outline of Chapters**

The historical narrative presented here is topical rather than chronological. Related events and trends are discussed in terms of what they meant to various actors within circumstances that were variously constraining or lib-

erating. The book is divided into four main parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first part examines the organisations and intellectual institutions that Indonesian and Malay Muslim reformers and Dutch and British colonial officials put in place to advance different agendas in the region. The next three parts each compare Islamic and colonial modernisation efforts around politics and government, law, and education.

*Part I: Making Islam Modern* is divided into two chapters. Chapter I, 'Organising *Da'wah* and Spreading Reform', deals with the way that Muslims who were influenced by Muslim reformist movements in Mecca and Cairo began to construct Islam as a progressive religion and build faith communities in order to pursue progress. Chapter II, 'Colonising the Muslim East and Reinforcing Culture', explores the different approaches to Islam and local traditions as they were expressed in Dutch and British writings and research institutions.

*Part II: Modernising Politics and Government* is also divided into two chapters. Chapter III, 'Building *Siyasah* and Reforming Sultanate', describes the diverse political orientations and activism among Muslim groups in the East Indies and among sultans and '*ulama* in Malaya. Chapter IV, 'Controlling Politics and Bureaucratising Religion', examines the ways in which colonial governments distinguished private from public matters and modern from traditional government, allowing religious or cultural practices to continue and flourish while controlling political activities and managing the secular, public domain.

*Part III: Modernising Law* is comprised of two chapters as well. Chapter V, 'Integrating *Shari'ah*, *Adat* and European Laws', focuses on Muslim articulation of evolving ideas about *shari'ah* in terms of law and its relation to *adat* and European laws. Chapter VI, 'Formalising Legal Plurality', investigates how Dutch and British administrators and scholars, who often criticised Islamic and customary laws for their lack of compatibility with their Western laws, were compelled to develop centralised, if not actually pluralistic, legal systems in the colonies.

*Part IV: Modernising Education* has two chapters. Chapter VII, 'Teaching *Agama* and the Secular', focuses on Muslims' definitions of knowledge and education in terms of faith and progress, and the ways that they distinguished worldly from religious (*agama*) subjects and promoted the teaching

of both. Chapter VIII, 'Secularising Education', examines the way in which Europeans distinguished religion from secular science and yet promoted vernacular languages and cultures while tolerating the private teaching of Arabic and Islamic knowledge.

The conclusion summarises the argument that Islam and European colonialism have been less confrontational in recent history than is generally assumed. In colonial Indonesia and Malaya, the processes of Islamisation, localisation, Westernisation and secularisation frequently operated in parallel and sometimes even together to modernise organisational, political, legal and educational institutions. In today's popular media and scholarship, Islamic ideas are often interpreted as hostile to modernisation, while Western modernity is deemed antithetical to Islam and custom. History, however, reveals a more nuanced picture. Moving beyond binaries such as Orientalist versus Islamic and modernity versus Islam, this book offers historical evidence and theoretical engagement with Islamic reform and European colonialism in particular, and with religion, modernity and tradition in general. An escape from the essentialisms of European modernities versus Asian anti-modernities is possible by laying out fields of historical interaction against the grains of European colonial histories, Asian national histories and even Islamic histories. Ultimately, it is my hope that this book will encourage scholars, students and the general public to adopt a more nuanced understanding of Islam, European colonialism and modernity.

## Notes

1. Hasan, Haji Idris bin, 'Rukun Uagama Islam', *Pengasub*, No. 3, 1918, 3–4.
2. *Pemberita Makassar*, No. 26, 31 January 1940.
3. My translation from Dutch. Haji Agus Salim, 'Godsdienst', from his book 'Tauhid', No. 1 (*Sumber Ilmu*, 1935), in Salim (1954: 245).
4. There was an increase in the Arab population in the Netherland Indies, from 8,909 (1860) to 27, 399 (1900) to 71, 335 (1930). In Sulawesi alone, the Arabs numbered about 33 (1860), 1,022 (1900) and 7,424 (1930). *Indisch Verslag*, 1935, II. Statistisch 1934 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1935), 43; Interview with Abdul Kadir Ahmad, in Makassar, 26 June 2005.
5. Interview with Drs. Abdurrahman, Universitas Islam Makassar, 24 June 2005.
6. 'Perpjtjahan Kita', *Tentara Islam*, No. 1, June 1931, Year 1.

7. My visits to Cikoang in 2006 suggest a strong Shi'ite influence in their annual celebrations of the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. Amansjah, 'Mazhab Sji'ah di Tjikowang', *Bingkisan*, No. 11, Year II, July 1969, 27–39.
8. Geertz, 'The Near East in the Far East: On Islam in Indonesia', unpublished paper No. 12, December 2001, the Occasional Paper of the School of Social Science, presented at the Sabbagh Lecture on Arabic Culture at the University of Arizona, Tucson in February 2000.
9. Kenali, 'Kemanusiaan', *Pengasub*, No. 1, Year 1, 14 July 1918, 1–3.



————— PART I —————

**MAKING ISLAM MODERN**





## Organising *Da'wah* and Spreading Reform

Although we are divided into nations, we human beings are one. In order for us all to live in prosperity and happiness we should unite our hearts . . . and should try something new and different, instead of merely following our own customs.

(Dahlan cited in Mulkhan 1986: 7–9)

I became very eager and hoped that in this Malay Peninsula there would be a journal, a magazine, or a newspaper owned by the people of our country, which would wisely command us to gather together and unite in all tasks to bring about public goodness [maslaha] to the country [watan], the community [bangsa], and the religion [agama].

(Kenali 1918: 2)

The *da'wah* movements that emerged in the late nineteenth century and in the early twentieth came in the wake of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and attempts by the Wahhabi Saudi Government to become the new caliph of the Muslim world.<sup>1</sup> Muslims in the Indonesian-Malay world were exposed to these issues and the concept of reform or *tajdid* through their engagement with intellectual networks in Mecca and Cairo and by interaction through the Indonesian-Malay world. When the Ethical Policy was instituted in 1901, an increasing number of Indonesian-Malay Muslim students and pilgrims had been involving themselves in the call for cultivation and renewal of Islam. Upon returning home, Muslims from all over the Indonesian-Malay world preached and taught in mosques and *pesantren* or *pondok* schools where they encountered very low levels of literacy and understanding of various branches of Islamic knowledge. Regarding themselves as part of a globally imagined *ummah*, they were soon dissatisfied with the

number of people they could reach by teaching in mosques or in their homes. Having decided that a pan-Islamic caliphate would be ultimately unfeasible, they began to coordinate their activities, create organisations (A. *jam'iyah*) and publish sermons and articles for newspapers and periodicals in order to further the objectives of reform.

Muslims who had travelled abroad to study or to make the pilgrimage were not necessarily from privileged backgrounds, but the status that they acquired through study at prestigious institutions overseas gave many the opportunity to preach and teach Islam. A number of the returning students and pilgrims published their ideas in foreign and local languages in newspapers and periodicals that were now available due to technological innovation that came with colonialism. The more literate authors and speakers appropriated Arabic, Dutch or English terms to convey their messages, selectively utilising these new vocabularies when they found it meaningful for addressing other local people.

While drawing on established texts, the reformers simultaneously viewed Islam as a modern religion. In particular, they felt that the lives of local Muslims – viewed as humiliated, poor and divided – would be improved by greater attention to the basic teachings of Islam. They sought reform to ensure dignity, unity, prosperity and progress as they defined them, advocating reform in order to rectify both the perceived and real stagnation of Muslim society in the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. Some labelled their orientation *modernist*, *Islam moderen* (modernist Islam) or *kaum muda* in contrast with *Islam kolot* (traditionalist Islam) or *kaum tua*. Traditionalist Muslims responded to the modernists by establishing separate community organisations where they held fast to older *madhhab* (A. school of legal thought) and the scholarly consensus (A. *ijma*). Other Muslims, regarding the modern–traditionalist differences as trivial, called for unity, but in that sense created their own factions. Reform was intended to bring Muslims together, but the result was greater plurality in Islamic thinking and action.

This diversity can be seen in the varied responses to external, particularly Western, influences and local beliefs and practices. Despite the criticism of Christian missionaries and colonial officials that many Muslim leaders expressed, others were more accommodating, and an increasing number of Muslims involved in local Islamisation adopted new or modern tools, such as

emulating Western organisational methods. While remaining loyal to local traditions, they framed their commitment as both 'Islamic' and 'modern', and as both 'religious' and 'worldly'. Using the phrase 'modernist Muslim movement', Indonesian scholar Deliar Noer made a distinction between the educational and social movement on the one hand and political engagement on the other, but defined 'modernists' as those who recognised Western methods and techniques (Noer 1973: 306). However, although regarded as religiously conservative by the modernists, Muslim traditionalists adapted new models to reach their communities. This chapter traces the modernist and traditionalist reform efforts in the East Indies and in Malaya, while highlighting connections and disconnections, similarities and differences between them. One of the key differences is that while Indonesian reformers sought to reform society through organisations, their Malay counterparts primarily used publications to reform the Malay nation.

### **Making Islam Modernist in Java: Ahmad Dahlan and Muhammadiyah**

By the turn of the twentieth century, as the Ethical Policy was introduced, the Dutch colonial government widened its administrative and economic penetration in the East Indies to include the central Javanese sultanates of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. The native elites and the younger generation received some Western education, whereas the Islamic schools (I. *pesantren*) continued to teach Islamic disciplines – for them still highly relevant. However, with the return of students and pilgrims, urban youth became exposed to different sources of information and knowledge through newspapers, journals and meetings, which became conduits for a new 'modern' vocabulary, including words such as 'progress' (*kemajuan*) and 'movement' (*pergerakan*). Muhammad Darwisy, later known as Ahmad Dahlan, was born in 1868 in Yogyakarta, Central Java. He was raised in the milieu of the Yogyakarta sultan's Grand Mosque where his father was the *imam* and also served the palace, an *abdi dalem*. As a youth Dahlan learned Arabic from his father, receiving his education in a local *pesantren* and then making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Here he studied for twelve months with *'ulama*, including some from the Indonesian-Malay world, and met other students from all over the East Indies, as well as other Muslim countries (Azra 2004: 152; Laffan 2003: 109–13; Burhani 2004: 55).

Dahlan exhibited a strong sense of reformist mission in promoting a renewed faith and organised action. In Mecca one of his teachers was the ‘traditionalist’ Shaykh Ahmad Khatib, known for his opposition to heretic Sufi practices and *adat*, the expansion of Christian influence and Dutch colonialism. Nonetheless, Dahlan was exposed to other influences, notably the writings of the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) in *Kitab Taubid* (A. ‘The Book of Divine Unity’) and *al-Islam wa al-Nashraniyyah* (A. ‘Islam and Christianity’) and transmitted through the reformist journals *Al-Manar* (A. ‘The Beacon’) in Cairo and *Al-Munir* (A. ‘The Radiant’) published in West Sumatra, 1911–16 (Salam 1963: 35–7; Hamka 1950: 60; Laffan 2003: 168). Muhammad Abduh sought to revive the Arabic language and the Islamic sciences, and to correct the deviations of the Egyptian government. Abduh spoke against the Muslim rulers who were ‘giving a free hand to foreigners to carry on the affairs of their states and even of their own houses, and fastening foreign rule upon their own necks’ (Adams 1968 [1933]: 59). As a modern *salafi* (the modern follower of the early generation of pious Muslims), Abduh produced newspapers, established schools, and adopted and adapted some European models to achieve his ends, and argued that the real cure for Egypt’s ills was a return to the pure form of Islam as practised during the early caliphs and first three generations of Islam. He learned from Europe in order to find ways to fix Muslim backwardness (60).

However, Abduh influenced his audience to varying degrees and in different ways. For Javanese Muslim teachers like Dahlan, Arabic as such needed no revival and the foreign colonial power was not necessarily the enemy. Abduh was a man of pen and a man of action and Dahlan was more a man of action than a man of pen; Dahlan hardly recorded his thoughts in writing. He was more concerned about the insidious nature of feudalism, illiteracy and poverty among Javanese, and their general lack of understanding of fundamental Islamic teachings such as helping the poor and orphans (Q. 107). After returning to Yogyakarta, Dahlan earned his living as a *batik* (J. textile) merchant, but also spoke out against certain beliefs and practices he considered were out of alignment with Islam. Having studied astronomy in Mecca, he argued that the *kiblat* that indicated the direction of Mecca in the mosque of the Yogyakarta Palace was incorrect. Although the controversy was short-lived, in 1909 Dahlan pursued his reformist goals by join-

ing a new Javanese organisation, Boedi Oetomo (I. 'The Good Action'). Promoting literacy and Javanese culture, its members were drawn from the aristocracy (J./I. *priyayi*), who felt the need to respond to aspects of Western culture that were undermining the Javanese heritage. Dahlan's goal, however, was to influence other Javanese members whom he regarded as being nominally Muslim. Encouraged by supporters, in 1912 Dahlan established a new Muslim organisation, the Muhammadiyah, which he registered with the colonial government in Batavia, and thereby gained official recognition. Besides his leadership in Muhammadiyah, Dahlan was one of the commissioners of the Sarekat Islam, the Central Committee of which was located in Surakarta. However, Dahlan's role in the increasingly politicised SI was overshadowed by his involvement in the Muhammadiyah (Shiraishi 1990: 51).

Dahlan and the Muhammadiyah he founded offer an example of a modern organisation with an Islamic agenda, emphasising the need for schools to teach Islam and secular subjects (see Chapter VII), and use meetings, public speeches, publications and socio-religious activities to relay the message of Islamic renewal (Nakamura 1983: 47). The Muhammadiyah started as a small but dedicated group, rather than attempting to speak to the native population at large, and in this sense reinterpreted the Qur'anic concept of *ummah* in terms of association using such terms as *jam'iyah*, *persyarikatan* or *perkumpulan*. Although a worldwide *ummah* remained the ultimate goal, the immediate concern for Muslim reformists like Dahlan was to make Islam meaningful in Java and the wider region of the East Indies. To this end they were involved with charitable institutions – schools, hospitals and orphanages – modelled on those established by missions and the colonial government, in the belief that in this way they could serve their fellow believers more effectively. Muhammadiyah speakers reminded their audiences that Muslims were part of a community that 'should enjoin good and forbid evil', but the driving force was the promotion of social improvement and *tajdid* at home. The goal was to enable 'the teaching and learning of Islam in the East Indies to flourish and develop a Muslim life in accord with the will of Islam' (Muhammadiyah 1923: 9). Dahlan believed that 'even though Islam would not die out in this world, it could die out in Indonesia if the *ummah* did not defend it' (in Hamka 1955 [1939]: 78).

It was possible for Muslim communities to envisage prosperity in the

East Indies. Dahlan said, 'Although we are divided into nations, we human beings are one. In order for us all to live in prosperity and happiness we should unite our hearts . . . and should try something new and different, instead of merely following our own customs' (Dahlan cited in Mulkhan 1986: 7–9). He believed that oneness of God should mean oneness of humankind and it was through the unification of hearts and reasoning that prosperity and happiness could be attained.

Like Abduh, Dahlan advocated independent reasoning (A. *ijtihad*) in order to form individual opinions on Islamic matters, rather than unquestioning emulation (A. *taqlid*) of the opinions of authority figures. *Tajdid*, *ijtihad* and *jihad* all come from the same Arabic root *jabhada*, but each has a different connotation. For example, *jihad fi sabilillah* means 'to struggle in the path of God'; the struggle can be physical or non-physical, intellectual, spiritual or material, as long as it is in service to God. Abduh did not emphasise political jihad in his writings, but stressed *ijtihad*, the intellectual endeavour to understand God's message in order to improve society. Likewise, Dahlan preferred to address social problems through interpretations of the Qur'an and the hadith instead of relying first on the *madhhab*.

While the *madhhab* were consulted for comparative purposes (Noer 1973: 95–8), Dahlan believed that reason (A. *aql*) was essential for understanding the Qur'an and the hadith and for addressing practical problems that faced the Muslim community. Common sense (I. *akal sehat*), defined as 'reasoning that can make choices after careful consideration (I. *cermat dan pertimbangan*) and can lead one to stay firm to these choices' (Dahlan cited in Mulkhan 1986: 11), should be employed in seeking goodness in this world and happiness in the hereafter. In the same vein, he argued that any aspect of *adat* that contradicted the God-given human faculty of reason should be regarded with suspicion.

At the same time, while Dahlan regarded reason as a necessary educational tool, it was not necessary for comprehending the divine. He contended that reason could not grow without being watered by knowledge, but that all effort to water reason with knowledge should be aligned with the will of the Almighty (Dahlan in Mulkhan 1986: 11). In keeping with this view, Muhammadiyah advised its followers that belief was the most important factor in understanding matters related to the essence of God and his quali-

ties and that reason was limited in comprehending these.<sup>2</sup> In matters of belief and worship (A. *ibadah*), Muslims should simply follow the Qur'an and the hadith (in a manner that the Dutch termed 'orthodox'). However, independent reasoning (*ijtihad*) and the creation of guidelines based on the Qur'an and the hadith were allowed and even encouraged for dealing with problems for which analogy (A. *qiyas*) could be used by referring to the existing texts.<sup>3</sup>

Dahlan neither encouraged nor prohibited the study and teaching of *tasawwuf*, although his main objective was active engagement within society. Other Muhammadiyah members seemed to condemn local mysticism, magic and other practices considered *shirk* or *bid'ah*, but not *tasawwuf* as such. Some members translated Al-Ghazali's *Ihya Ulum al-Din*. Other members, such as Haji Abdul Malik Amrullah or Haji Rasul from Minangkabau, wrote an article '*tasawwuf*' for the 1932–3 Muhammadiyah Almanac (Drewes 1959: 281), and his son, Hamka (1908–81) wrote a book *Tasawuf Modern* (1955 [1939]) in which he sought to modernise Sufism by focusing on spirituality (happiness) without neglecting the worldly or the material (Hamka 1955 [1939]; Riddell 2001: 218). Hamka used a variety of sources, such as the Qur'an, the hadith, Sufi literature by Al-Ghazali, Muhammad Abduh's works, as well as texts by the Russian writer Leo Tolstoy (1828–1908) and British philosopher Bertrand Russel (1872–1970). The Arabic word '*din*' was to surrender and to worship. The equivalent word was '*agama*', a Sanskrit word that had become popular usage, meaning the outcomes of belief in the forms of ritual and action. The religion of Islam is a religion that calls its adherents to work and explore the causes of dignity and greatness of nations (Hamka 1939: 14, 24–5, 63–4). On progress (*kemajuan*), Hamka criticised religious leaders who held that progress was an infidelity (*kufri*) and others who said that religion was ignorance (*kebodohan*). Hamka asserted that religion was not the enemy of progress: it guided progress to achieve the well-being and peace of humankind, citing several Quranic passages sanctioning all the good (A. *khair, hasanah, thayyibah*) (96–7).

Interestingly, Hamka did not make any reference to the Dutch colonial ruler in the East Indies. But when he discusses what 'keeping dignity' means, he mentions the word '*penjajahan*' (colonisation): 'To colonise others' country is to the coloniser a dignity, but to the colonised it is a humiliation; to resist colonisation is, to the colonised, redemption for dignity and to

the coloniser it is a treachery. So what is the definition of dignity?’ (74). Hamka recognised European progress and Muslims suffering from confusion and blindness: ‘In the past Europe had religious fanatics but today it has freed reason and will. The Prophet Muhammad taught Muslims to free their reason from ignorance but today Muslims are suffering from the same disease [as the old Europe]’ (93).

### **Accommodating Colonial and Christian Organisation**

Modernist organisations selectively borrowed from Cairo and Meccan forms of organisation and from Dutch colonial and Christian organisations. The Muhammadiyah adopted Dutch and Christian models of organisational structure and vocabularies that they considered useful and practical for defending the faith and carrying out their mission (Noer 1973: 306). For example, it became common to use the Dutch terms ‘*verslag*’ (organisational report), ‘*hoofd-bestuur*’ (central administration), ‘*voorzitter*’ (headman), ‘*statuten*’ (rule, statute) and ‘*kweekschool*’ (native school for teachers), among many others (Muhammadiyah 1923: 16–20). Meetings distinguished between those that were held outdoors (*openlucht*), indoor meetings open to the public (D. *openbaar*) and those that were closed (D. *besloten*). The same terminology was sometimes applied to preaching (A. *tabligh*), described as *openbaar tabligh* during the colonial time. Muhammadiyah leaders were careful to operate within colonial constraints, submitting requests, for instance, for conducting outdoor meetings. One example of an application letter demonstrates that Muslim reformists realised the necessity of following colonial law, since it specifies that speakers at outdoor meetings must ‘speak politely, have good character, courage, and clarity and should not speak things against the law’ (Mangkoeto 1936: 12–13). The letter refers to relevant Dutch laws, including Article 153: ‘Anyone who by conscience expresses ideas in words, written or in images, by insinuation, implicitly, interfering public order (I. *tertib umum*), or resisting the authority of the Netherlands or Netherlands Indies or inviting others to do so shall be subject to imprisonment for at most 6 years or to a fine of at most f 300.’ Clearly concerned that its leaders and spokespeople did not violate Dutch regulations, the letter also reminds readers of Article 154: ‘Anyone who expresses hatred and enmity towards the Netherlands Government or Netherlands Indies Government in the public

arena, shall be subject to imprisonment for at most six years or to a fine for at most f 300.' The public should be aware that Dutch law mandated a minimum age of eighteen for Muhammadiyah membership and restricted any activity regarded as infringing public security. Meanwhile, through courses and printed publications, Muhammadiyah members were made aware about their legal rights, including that of organising and conducting meetings, since only those held outdoor required a governmental permit. The 1856 Press Act had stipulated that 'the publication of ideas and sentiments by the press and the admission of printed matter from outside the Netherlands must not be submitted to any restriction except such as needed to ensure public order' (Adam 1994: 33).

Writing on *da'wah* in the 1930s, a Muhammadiyah author linked the desire for an Indonesian renaissance (I. *kebangunan*) to political, social, economic events and to Islamic movements in both 'the East and the West'. He noted that even though an ocean separated Indonesia from the rest of the world, the country could feel the waves of global influences. It was necessary to respond to these changes by replacing *adat*-based strategies and techniques (A./I. *kaifiat* and *siasat*) with new, effective ones, particularly in dealing with the law of Netherlands Indies and the different forms of *adat* in Java and the outer islands (Mangkoeto 1936: 5–7, 20–7).

While Muhammadiyah leaders often used their publications and speeches to criticise *adat* elites as an impediment to progress, and derelict in their duties as Muslims, they also defined Islam in relation to other religions, especially Christianity. On the other hand, despite the use of the Qur'anic term '*kafirs*' to identify non-Muslims, Christians as such were rarely confronted as enemies. Christian missionaries, however, were the object of criticism because they were believed to be actively working to win new converts among Muslims (Muhammadiyah 1923: 8–9, 1927). Another source of resentment was the financial support that Christian missionaries received from colonial administrators and foreign agencies, since Muhammadiyah members were struggling to finance their activities through voluntary *waqf* and *zakat*. They felt that it was important to establish Muhammadiyah schools and mosques to prevent 'Christianisation', given missionary efforts to attract converts through Christian churches, hospitals, orphanages, schools and libraries. Muhammadiyah activists believed that by also establishing these

institutions among Muslim communities, Islam would become strong. Yet, Muhammadiyah publications included information about Christian holidays as well as Islamic and Dutch imperial ones, which indicates recognition of the presence of native Christians and colonialists (Muhammadiyah 1931: 6).

Some scholars have seen conflict as a dominating theme in Muhammadiyah-Christian missions (see Shihab 1995), but the interaction was multifaceted and dynamic. Dahlan himself had conversations with priests, pastors and theologians and that he also turned to Christian doctors to help him with his health issues.<sup>4</sup> Although undocumented, his reported conversations with theologians, mystics and Christian missionaries in Java also helped to strengthen his belief that reform of *adat* was necessary.

Muhammadiyah preachers referred to Christians (along with Jews) as the adherents of other religions, sometimes as the People of the Book, since they had scriptures that came from the same God as Muslims. Although they sought an internal Islamic unity, there were Muhammadiyah preachers who promoted the idea of mutual respect toward the prophets (Muhammad and 'Isa al-Masih or Jesus Christ) and invited collaboration in social activities (*A. mu'amalah*). Muhammadiyah preachers pointed to a shared belief in a creator God; one Muhammadiyah speaker, Mas Mansoer, then the head of the Surabaya branch, asked Christians to 'return to a belief in one God and respect prophets and to work together and help the activities of Muhammadiyah because the outcome will be for everyone in the country regardless of religion' (Mansoer 1936: 10).

As one may expect, the Muhammadiyah had its opponents. For example, Dahlan was criticised for using tables, chairs and blackboards in classrooms like a foreigner, and some Islamic teachers called him a *kiyai kafir* (infidel teacher) and others called him a Christian Muslim leader (I. *kiyai Kristen*) or, recalling the fact that he had made the pilgrimage, an infidel *hajji* (*haji kafir*). Dahlan dealt with such criticism by arguing that fundamental faith could be derived from any techniques or technology, even those originating among the kafir. He is reported to have asked a man, 'When you came here from Magelang [a city in Central Java], did you walk by foot or take a train?' The man answered, 'I took a train.' Dahlan replied, 'Then when you go home, you'd better walk . . . [because] if you take a train you would be using the means of the kafir' (Salam 1963: 77–8).

The influence was evident in the Muhammadiyah's attitude towards the inclusion of women and girls in the movement, as in the Christian missionary organisations and schools. Dahlan created a unit initially called Sapa Trisna (J. 'the one who loves') to address women's rights and responsibilities. In 1917 the name was changed to Aisyiyah, after Muhammad's wife Aishah, who was considered a model for women in their dual roles as wives and thoughtful Muslims. Muhammadiyah also created a special unit for girls called *Nasyi'atul Aisyiyah* (A. Builder of the Aisyiyah). Among the first women organisations founded in the Indonesian-Malay world, Aisyiyah increasingly played a significant role in reforming and modernising the life of Muslim women in Java and later in the outer islands. In Makassar, a branch was established in 1926 (Rusin 1979: 28–30; Doorn-Harder 2006: 78–81).

### **Bringing People in South Sulawesi into Modernist Islam**

From its base in Central Java, the Muhammadiyah movement spread to the other islands of the Indonesian archipelago, where a branch had been established in 1926.<sup>5</sup> At a national congress held in Yogyakarta, in 1931, the Muhammadiyah leader H. Hasjim called on Muhammadiyah members everywhere to follow the Qur'anic injunction to establish an association in order to 'enjoin good and forbid evil' and affirm a united community of Muslims who could consult with one another (*musyawarah*) in order to achieve dignity (*kemulyaan*) and well-being (*kesejahteraan*) in this world and goodness in the afterlife (Hasjim 1931: 10–11). The following year about six thousand people from all over the East Indies came to attend the Muhammadiyah's annual conference, on this occasion held in the city of Makassar. The speakers, from Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi, and a Chinese Muslim, all exhorted attendees to work for the progress of Islam and Islamic law in the East Indies.<sup>6</sup>

By 1906, through a combination of force and treaty arrangements, the Dutch had imposed colonial control in South Sulawesi. Islam's spread here had come relatively late, with the major conversions occurring in the early seventeenth century, but in the ensuing years it had become important in connecting the three major groups, Bugis, the Makassarese, and the Mandarese, as well as Arabs and their local descendants. Despite their differences in

language and *adat*, and despite the persistence of many indigenous influences, Islam was a marker of shared identity even as local distinctiveness was retained (Paesa 1960/1: 134).

The first reformist organisation founded in South Sulawesi was probably Al-Jam'iyatul Mardhiyah (A. The Blessed Organisation) founded by Arab-descended (*hadhrami*) traders and preachers probably in 1913, according to a reference concerning this organisation's meeting (D. *vergadering*) held on 1 February 1914. The establishment was influenced by the similar Arab-descended organisation in Jakarta: Jam'iyatul Khair (A. The Association of the Good) and its branch on Salemo Island. Like other organisations in the East Indies, al-Jam'iyatul Mardhiyah created a *bestuur* (D. management): president, secretary and commissaries, using Dutch terms. Several of the figures also became the advisor and secretary of another organisation: Sarekat Islam (SI) for the branch of Makassar.<sup>7</sup> Sarekat Islam, founded in Solo, Java (see Chapter III for further), founded its branch in Makassar on 17 April 1914.<sup>8</sup>

Years afterwards, the Muhammadiyah also penetrated South Sulawesi. Among the first Muhammadiyah figures to gain prominence in Sulawesi was also an Arab-descended trader and preacher, Mansur al-Yamani, who came from Surabaya, East Java, and opened a shop in Makassar, in 1922. In cooperation with Bugis preachers and traders, he founded a branch of the Muhammadiyah in Makassar in 1926, where a local association, Shiratal Mustaqim (A. The Straight Path) had been founded three years earlier.<sup>9</sup> The founders of Shiratal Mustaqim, Haji Abdul Razak and Haji Abdullah, were former Sarekat Islam members who wanted to focus more on Islamic propagation and education than on politics. Shiratal Mustaqim was organised along modern lines, with a president, vice-president, treasurer, secretary and assistants (Bosra 2003: 150),<sup>10</sup> but the leaders were split into a traditionalist line represented by Haji Abdul Razak and a modernist, led by Haji Abdullah. Although Haji Abdullah later became active in the Muhammadiyah, Shiratal Mustaqim continued to operate, but was soon overshadowed by the greater resources and experience of the Java-based Muhammadiyah. While the two organisations originally shared similar reformist ideas, disputes developed over aspects of belief and practices, such as the date for celebrating the Eid festival and the Eid of Sacrifice (I. Gerebeg Besar), and as Shiratal Mustaqim

became associated in the popular mind with *kolot*, a more conservative form of Islam.<sup>11</sup>

In Makassar and the surrounding areas the Muhammadiyah was introduced to the people through an open, public gathering (D. *openbarevergadering*), new for the time, as indicated by the vernacularisation of the Dutch term *vergadering* as *parahadele* (Bosra 2003: 167). The local branch was under a committee, headed by a *voorzitter* (D. chairperson) and a *vicevoorzitter* (D. vice-chairperson), and thus structurally set apart from the more traditional Shiratal Mustaqim and the As'adiyah school in Sengkang (see below) and from the Khalwatiyyah Sufi order. Apart from sponsoring annual local and national congresses that debated the issues facing Muslims, the Makassar branch established a modern Dutch school (Hollands-Inlandse School) that also gave some religious instruction, and the Islamic elementary Munir School, built hospitals and orphanages, a boy scouts organisation known as Hizbul Wathan, as well as other organisations for women and girls (Radjab 1999: 20–1).

The 'newness' of Muhammadiyah reformists was visible on different levels, most obviously in the fact that they wore trousers rather than a sarong and prayed without the turban. It was in the domain of religious praxis, however, that Sulawesi Muslims were most clearly confronted with reformist innovations. Muhammadiyah members prayed on Fridays with one call to prayer instead of two, and preachers gave sermons in Bugis, Makassarese or Malay-Indonesian rather than Arabic. In the month of Ramadan, the additional prayers (known as *tarawih*) were accompanied by bowing eleven times rather than twenty-three times, believing that the Prophet only bowed eleven times despite his later caliphs performing more times. They began the Eid prayer at the end of Ramadan in an open field in the city. They did not recite the Qur'anic chapter Yasin during a funeral, as was traditional. Their female teachers were encouraged to wear headscarves (I. *tudung*) (then covering the greater, not yet whole, part of the hair), despite resistance among some teachers. All of these beliefs and practices were considered new, and were therefore either attractive or dangerous to many in South Sulawesi (Radjab 1999: 8–78). With the influence of reformist ideas, a wide organisational network and links to Java and Sumatra, Muhammadiyah gradually became an important anchor of religious-social identity for an increased number of people

in Sulawesi.<sup>12</sup> South Sulawesi witnessed the emergence of newspapers and periodicals,<sup>13</sup> and in local publications the label ‘*Islam moderen*’, for example, began to be used in opposition to ‘*Islam kolot*’ in the press.<sup>14</sup>

Muhammadiyah preachers stressed the need for *kemajuan* (progress) if Muslims were to catch up advanced nations, and follow the Qur’an in ‘competing in goodness’ (quoting a Qur’anic passage ‘*fastabiq al-khairat*’). A preacher called Muslims in the East Indies to emulate other Muslims who had travelled all over the world, to China, India and Europe, seeking the ‘foreign knowledge’ that included modern science (see Chapter VII). This could then be used to improve conditions at home (Hasjim 1931). During the twenty-first Muhammadiyah Congress, held in Makassar in 1932, six speakers addressed attendees from all over Indonesia, with speeches given in Malay, Arabic, Dutch and Buginese. Muslims were again exhorted to work toward becoming the best possible *ummah* by embracing progress based on Islam and *wetenschap* (D. science).<sup>15</sup>

Although Hindu and Buddhist beliefs were hardly present in this region, unlike in Java, certain local beliefs and practices deemed ‘animistic’ or ‘mystical’ were subject to *da’wah* (Paesa 1960/1: 132–49). The Muhammadiyah message on the oneness of God (*tauhid*) had particular relevance in South Sulawesi because of the concern to eliminate *shirk* (polytheistic) beliefs in the *tomanurung* (divine beings who descended to Earth, linked with community origins) and in the powers of sacred objects and regalia associated with the *tomanurung* and the nobility. Muhammadiyah leaders invited preachers and teachers from Java and Sumatra, the most famous of whom was Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, or Hamka, as mentioned earlier. Hamka stayed in South Sulawesi for several years (1932–4), establishing good relations with Haji Abdullah, the Bugis vice-chief of the Makassar Muhammadiyah.<sup>16</sup> Haji Abdullah was an activist-preacher, ‘whose speech in Bugis was poignant, but appealed to the heart, and whose movement was smooth like an eel, like an old hero of the Gowa Kingdom’.<sup>17</sup> He frequently confronted the Bugis tradition and Dutch attitudes he believed to be contradictory to Islam, emphasising the need for spiritual reform – ‘Woe to men who merely pay attention to outer clothing when their inner part has no clothing.’<sup>18</sup>

Notwithstanding its expansion, the Muhammadiyah encountered resistance, since people thought that they were introducing a new type of religious

teaching, or supported 'Wahhabism', a Saudi strand of Islam that condemned local and Sufi practices, or was emulating Dutch Christianity (Moentoe 1931: 60–4). A mosque led by a Muhammadiyah imam who did not use a stick during the sermons and preached in Malay/Indonesian rather than Arabic was labelled '*masjid moderen*' (modern mosque) or '*masjid Muhammadiyah*'. The *kolot* people who were not members of the Muhammadiyah felt that they could not use the mosque.<sup>19</sup>

In the wider Sulawesi world, Islamisation occurred by means of warfare, trade and intermarriage. The newly reformed Muslims among Buginese and Makassarese interacted with Christians such as the Torajans and other Muslims deemed more accommodationist toward local *adat*. The establishment of the Muhammadiyah in Palopo in 1930, four years after its presence in Makassar, received resistance from the traditional ruling elites led by Bone and became subject to Dutch control. In Luwu, Muhammadiyah was able to conduct its programmes and build schools, and on a dispute regarding the collection and administration of the mosque funds, won the approval by the Netherlands Indies Advisor for Native Affairs in Batavia, against the traditional *qadi* of Luwu. Yet, among the Torajans, Bugis became associated with Islam, and ethnic difference became an important reason why Islam did not take a strong hold among the former (Bigalke 2005: 118–21).

The Muhammadiyah became increasingly involved in the larger movement that had spread across the East Indies, aided by a multi-layered organisation that included numerous committees devoted to such matters as socio-political issues, women's affairs, youth affairs, scouting for boys, education, library and archival resources, economic development and issuing religious opinions (Peacock 1978: 50). Positioning itself within the Dutch colonial framework, Muhammadiyah public presence was strengthened through the publication of sermons, speeches, and reports of congresses. It became increasingly not merely an association (I. *persyarikatan*), but a movement (*gerakan*). In Makassar, an editorial in the local *Fadjar Indonesia* commented that an association is where people just meet, like a marketplace, whereas members of a movement are working together to move forward, with a firm belief in the need to change society. Both leaders and members of the Muhammadiyah aimed to open the way for a new awareness (I. *kesadaran*) of Islamic spirituality as well as rationality, progress, and equality.

Muhammadiyah writers and activists called on their fellows to pay attention to policies that had worked and those that had not worked: ‘where are Muhammadiyah now heading?’ asked the editorial. ‘Have they already fulfilled the needs of religion, the economy, industry, agriculture, trade, and other matters?’ Islam should conform to the age of progress, the editorial asserted.<sup>20</sup>

While Islamic reform was often defined ‘through its opposition to Western cultural and political hegemony . . . at the same time [it] made use, where appropriate, of Western knowledge and technology to drive forward its purposes and came to be fashioned in part by its interaction with it’ (Robinson 2008: 2–3, 21). But their motives and the sources they used for reform were primarily Islamic. The Muhammadiyah reformers in Sulawesi, male and female, sought to improve the conditions in local society, employing modern means of sustaining progress by reading newspapers and by the establishment of schools, mosques, orphanages, clinics and congresses.<sup>21</sup>

In many cases, Muhammadiyah preachers, teachers and activists coexisted and even worked with the *adat*, Dutch colonial institutions and other Muslim groups. In Sengkang, Wajo, in 1938, Muslims celebrated the Eid al-Fitri (Festival of Returning to Purity after Fasting) attended and joined by local headman and Dutch officials including controller Wesseling and his wife.<sup>22</sup> In 1941, the Muhammadiyah of Sulawesi held its annual congress in Sengkang, Wajo, where the *zelf-bestuurders* attended and supported the event. In becoming inclusive of Muslim diverse groups, the Muhammadiyah planned to conduct a *tabligh* event involving preachers from the As’adiyah Pesantren, the Khalwatiyyah Sufi order, newly convert Muslims, as well as the Muhammadiyah.<sup>23</sup>

Formulating *Islamic* reform and modernity was not only the agenda of the ‘modernists’, however. It is sometimes forgotten that in their own way many individuals whom the modernists disparaged as ‘traditionalists’ also aimed at reforming Muslim society. For the traditionalists such as the Nahdlatul ‘Ulama in Java and As’adiyah in Sulawesi, Islamic reform did not entail rejection of teachings propounded by earlier scholars nor was it against all local customs. Like the modernists, they also selectively employed modern features – especially organisational methods and educational strategies – but within a framework of maintaining old ways that they considered still crucial

and relevant. We now turn to consider the alternative paths they took in the quest to become 'modern'.

### **Making Islam Traditionalist: Hasyim Asy'ari and Nahdlatul 'Ulama in Java**

For *Islam kolot*, which local press used in order to refer to the conservative or traditional Muslim groups, being modern was also intimately related to the goal of reforming Muslim society. This was to be achieved without compromising the religious authority of the past as expressed in the writings of the revered scholars, Imam al-Shafi'i (767–820 AD) and Abu Hasan al-Ash'ari (874–936 AD). The traditionalists believed that these interpretations had been carefully extrapolated from the Qur'an and the authentic hadith and they trusted the piety and discipline of the early scholars. They, too, embraced aspects of modernity that suited their reform goals and purposes, primarily through organisations that did not substantially differ from those of *Islam moderen*.

The establishment of the NU in 1926 was a response to the fall of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1923, and to the penetration of the 'puritanist' Wahhabi doctrine coming from Saudi Arabia. This impetus followed an incident in which the Saudi Government (that was attempting to establish itself as the Islamic caliphate) barred a representative of a stream of Islamic thought of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah in Java from attending the Caliphate Conference because it was not an official organisation. However, the NU was also founded as an alternative to the encroaching modernist organisations, the Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam, which traditionalists believed undermined the *madhhab* and long-standing Javanese religious practices. Studies of the early years of the NU have given particular attention to the leadership of Wahab Chasbullah (1898–1971), who has been considered more receptive than his peers to the incorporation of modern organisational methods, schooling, and intellectual forums (Bruinessen 1994: 28–38). In the following, however, I focus on Hasyim Asy'ari (1871–1947) and on his contribution to the modern, organisational aspect of the NU.

A Javanese *kiyai* (religious teacher) and a graduate from Mecca, Hasyim Asy'ari became the chairman of the new NU association in 1926 when it met in Surabaya. He was appointed to this position in preference to the

teacher-activist Wahab Chasbullah because he was well-known to both the NU leadership and the *kiyai* of *pesantrens* throughout Java. Asy'ari was born in Jombang in Central Java, where his grandfather had founded a *pesantren*. After returning from Mecca, in 1899 Asy'ari established another *pesantren* in neighbouring Tebuireng, in part to preserve the theological teaching of Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah ('The People of the Way of the Prophet and the Community of Muslims) (Muzadi 2006: 6–7). The colonial government categorised Hasyim Asyari and his group as 'strictly orthodox', and considered that they were reacting against the reforms advocated by the Muhammadiyah and other modernists, and against the Wahhabis, who had attacked the *madh-hab* and had demolished holy graves in Mecca. According to a Dutch report of the NU Congress held on 13 October 1927, 'the orthodox *ulama*, when questions of religious finesse are not involved, are realists and practical conservatives who have a really classical ability to portray the existing situation as legal' (cited in Penders 1977: 270–2). According to this governmental report, speakers at the congress praised colonial religious policies and demanded that 'the freedom of true Islam without interfering in the actual religious aspects' be maintained. They also were critical of others who 'misused religion for political purposes'. With their focus on the religious sphere, leaders and members of the NU were as critical as modernist Muhammadiyah members of *bid'ah*, which they feared may be heretic, although they differed in judging which practices should be prohibited (Effendi 2008: 79–80).

While concentrating on the *pesantren* and religious leaders in Java's rural areas, NU also sought to reform Muslim communities by adopting modern institutions: cooperatives, small businesses (A. *syirkah*), waqf, orphanages, and schools teaching both Islam and science, albeit not to the same extent as the Muhammadiyah. The NU also wanted to help 'backward, ignorant and poor' farmers gain more access to education, and thus provide them with opportunities for greater prosperity.<sup>24</sup> Many Islamic teachers in Java were also involved in farming and trade besides preaching and teaching in their *pesantren*, and were therefore personally aware of the economically and spiritually deprived lives of rural Javanese.<sup>25</sup>

The NU conducted its early meetings in Arabic, while adopting an organisational structure that was relatively new for that time. This structure comprised the Consultative Board (A. *shar'iyah*, *shuriyyah*), which included

the chairman (*A. ra'is*), vice-chairman and various secretaries, assistants and advisors as well as an Executive Board (*A. tanfidhiyyah*), which also consisted of a chairman, a secretary, a treasurer and commissioners. The organisation was registered with the colonial administration on 30 February 1930. Like the Muhammadiyah, the NU understood that it needed to operate within the legal framework of the Dutch Government (Ismail 2003: 25–8). In the official registration document, the NU Board outlined its efforts: to create connections between the *'ulama* and the recognised *madhhabs*; to ascertain that Islamic books used in schools were in accordance with the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah; to disseminate Islam through theologically and legally correct means; to increase the number of Islamic schools; to focus on matters related to mosques and schools, orphans and the poor; and to establish institutions in order to advance agriculture, trade and business without contravening Islam tenets (Feillard 1999: 12–13; Muzadi 2007: 62).

The more conservative members of NU questioned this modern organisation, concerned that they were heretic innovations that did not exist during the Prophet's time. In response, the NU Consultative Board stated that the organisational structure adopted was a tool for sustaining Islamic theology, rather than the objective itself, so that Muslims would affiliate with Islamic organisations rather than becoming members of others that were 'non-Islamic'. If membership of any organisation harmed Islam, it would be prohibited (*haram*); if it benefited Islam, it would be permitted (*halal*); and if it neither harmed nor benefited Islam, it would be permissible (*A. mubah*) (Masyhuri 1997: 205). The statements of NU leaders thus showed some degree of flexibility, both in their intentions and in their judgements about the advantages and disadvantages of implementing new social practices. For them, formal or modern organisations were simply instruments (*alat*) for reaching their religious and social goals. The NU became associated with 'traditionalist' Islam primarily because of its emphasis on the *madhhab*, the leadership of religious scholars and the educational traditions transmitted through *pesantren* (Dhofier 1995). In this context, 'traditionalist' thus refers to a process of making an authoritative religious heritage relevant for addressing contemporary problems. In NU eyes, the discipline, piety and tradition of past scholarship was considered sufficiently authentic, coherent and elaborated to provide a moral guide in addressing new problems (Masyhuri 1997:

137). The NU religious traditionalism did not mean rejection of reform and modern means.

Like Muhammadiyah, NU sought to disseminate the Islamic faith and values among Javanese people before moving out to other parts of the East Indies. In keeping with other Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah followers, NU scholars followed the Islamic legal-moral traditions of the past in assessing those new ideas and activities that were mandatory (A. *wajib*), recommended (A. *mandub*), permissible (A. *mubah*), reprehensible (A. *makruh*) or forbidden (A. *haram*) (Dhofier 1995). These categories offered them a 'sophisticated yet handy tool of orientation of moral action accessible to all practitioners [that] facilitate[d] determining the degree of permitted creative interpretation versus undue innovations' (Salvatore 2009: 20).

NU resembled the Muhammadiyah in its wariness towards religious innovation, but there were differences in the way they interpreted specific changes. NU members worked to preserve early texts that had been produced in accordance with the Prophet's Tradition as recorded in the hadith (A. *ahl al-sunnah*) in order to forestall and trend for Muslims to turn to 'religious innovation' (A. *ahl al-bid'ah*). Asy'ari collected Arabic books on various issues, such as differences in belief (A. *iman* versus *kufri*) and ethics (A. good versus bad *akhlaq*). One *fatwa* listed four types of *kufri*, defined as 'concealing the truth', or disbelief: 1) the disbelief of rejection (A. *kufri inkar*), meaning one who knows God but rejects Him as the God; 2) the disbelief of denial (A. *kufri jhubud*), meaning one who knows God in his heart, but does not admit it verbally; 3) the disbelief of stubbornness (A. *kufri inad*), referring to one who knows God in his heart and says so, but does not practise His law; and 4) the disbelief of hypocrisy (A. *kufri nifaq*), meaning one who claims belief verbally, but not in the heart (Masyhuri 1997: 61–2). From this standpoint, the term *kufri*, sometimes used to label the Dutch and other Christians in the East Indies, was neither a monolithic nor a simple concept.

Beyond the question of belief, Muslim reformers framed Islam in terms of ethics. Hasyim Asy'ari thus stressed the moral values of the pious early followers of the Prophet, which incorporated courage, trustworthiness, love of action, love of knowledge, solidarity, equality and justice. He and other NU scholars also issued *fatwas* on various subjects, including the ethics of learning and teaching, maintenance of theology, marriage, fasting, the observance

of Muhammad's birthday and the importance of following the teachings of the *salaf* (the earliest generation of Muslims) (Asy'ari in Hadziq 2007). NU scholars also issued fatwas regarding the legitimacy of Sufi orders: whether or not particular Sufi orders were authoritative. Other NU *'ulama* addressed a wide range of issues of the time, including the permissibility of drawing animals, playing musical instruments for entertainment and reading books authored by *kaafir*. One of these fatwas, issued in response to a question as to whether a woman could give a speech before a male audience, laid down that this was permissible because the human voice does not issue from a part of the female anatomy that should not be exposed (*A. aurat*) (Masyhuri 1997: 116). What characterised the NU's responses to new predicaments was the fact that their fatwas were based on a combination of reason and scriptural authority.

No women played a part in the early NU leadership until the meeting of Muslim women in 1938 and the establishment of NU Muslimat in 1946 (Doorn-Harder 2006: 81). From 1938, a number of NU women began to promote participation and involvement in the NU programmes; they articulated the ideas of progress in this world and reaching happiness in the hereafter. The rise of an NU women's organisation may be attributed to a number of factors: the emerging ideas about equality of men and women in teaching and learning Islamic knowledge; the rise of mixed-sex schools and courses for girls and women; the rise of women working outside of the household; and the rise of women's organisations demanding rights to the colonial power and male authority. Wahab Chasbullah and Hasyim Asy'ari supported the creation of this organisation (P. P. N. U. 1979: 39–42).

By the mid-1930s, as NU expanded beyond East Java, the NU had had, approximately, some 90 branches, with 400 *kiyais* and 67,000 members. During the colonial period the number of branches increased to 120 (Bruinessen 1994: 48). However, individual NU members from Java had visited South Sulawesi since 1930.<sup>26</sup> The NU's late arrival in the outer islands can be partly attributed to the focus on East Java, and a relative lack of interest in expanding the organisation beyond the *pesantren*, which were mostly in Java. In addition, the Shafi'i *madhhab* and the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah theology were quite well-established in the outer islands and there appeared to be no immediate need for strengthening through new organisations.

### **Making Islam Traditionalist in South Sulawesi: Muhammad As'ad**

In South Sulawesi the traditionalist Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah doctrine was transmitted by a Bugis teacher, Muhammad As'ad (1907–52), who founded an Islamic school, the Madrasah Al-Arabiyyah al-Islamiyyah (A. Islamic Arabic School (MAI) that represented 'traditionalist reform' due to As'ad's emphasis on teaching and the giving of the Friday *khutbah* in Arabic. As'ad preserved the *manggaji kita*, which involved memorising and reciting Arabic books. But, gradually, his school in Sengkang followed a classroom system, in addition to the *manggaji kita*, in part as a response to the penetration of the Muhammadiyah organisation and schools. As'ad students later expanded educational network and organisation to the eastern part of Indonesia.

Muhammad As'ad (locally known as Haji Sade) was born in Mecca (called Tana Marajae among Bugis or Butta Lompoe among Makassarese) in 1907 to Bugis parents and received an Islamic education, studying at different madrasah, including Madrasah al-Falah and the mosques in Mecca and Medina. When As'ad moved to Sulawesi in 1928, he took up residence in the small town of Sengkang, where his preaching and teaching introduced local society to his reformist ideas. He then began working towards a programme of Islamic preaching (A. *jama'ah tabligh*) (B. *tabale*) and establishing a madrasah for different elementary and secondary levels (see further Chapter VII). The traditionalist reformists like Muhammad As'ad, who had grown up in Arabia, 'wore a turban and dressed like an Arab'.<sup>27</sup> As a preacher, As'ad challenged a number of traditional customs: for example, he prohibited Muslims from paying a fee as a substitute for a missed obligatory prayer, and denied a noble family's request to bury their father's body inside a mosque. While he concentrated primarily on preaching and teaching, As'ad also wrote several short treatises, some in Arabic and some in Bugis, concerning aspects of Islamic faith, the life of the Prophet, ritual, Qur'anic exegesis, ethics, and Arabic (Manguluang 1990: 1–15). In his Arabic works<sup>28</sup> he censured the modernists who translated part of the Friday's sermon into non-Arabic languages, but was equally critical of some practices of the Tariqah Khalwatiyyah and of local Sufi leaders deemed inauthentic (Bosra 2003: 228–9). It is thus apparent that while the modernists have been regarded as the major critics of Sufi orders (Laffan 2011), their religious legitimacy was also questioned

by some traditionalist reformers such as NU scholars in Java, As'ad and his students in South Sulawesi.

As'ad was also concerned about some contemporary religious issues, particularly the lack of Islamic propagators at a time when he believed that 'other religions and nations' (presumably Christianity and the Dutch) were hostile towards Islam. He was convinced that one way to sustain Islam was to preach solely in Arabic not only on Fridays but on other occasions as well. In this he was clearly opposed to other preachers, including Muhammadiyah modernists, who delivered their Friday sermons in local languages. Conversely, As'ad used Bugis script to reach local audiences and defend his views, making reference not only to the Qur'an and the Prophet's sayings, but to reformist scholars such as Muhammad Abduh. Citing Abduh, As'ad argued that Arabic had universal applicability and questioned those who promoted non-Arabic Friday sermons. Muhammad Abduh, As'ad argued, had helped spread Islam in Europe by giving his Friday sermons in Arabic rather than in a local, European language. It was not necessary for translations to be provided, for the Friday sermon, he said, was a ritual (A. *ibadah*), not an ordinary form of advice (A. *nasihah*). While delivering Friday sermons in a language other than Arabic was a 'modern practice' (I. *perbuatan moderen*) at odds with the consensus of both early scholars and their contemporary successors, sermons partly in Arabic and partly in another language was also religious innovation, which merited disapproval although not categorical prohibition (As'ad 1940: 1–18, 35–43).

Like many other NU members, As'ad believed that the consensus (A. *ijma'* or *mufakat*) of Muslim scholars was essential for the path of true believers (*mu'min*). Humankind had enjoyed the 'best time' during the life of the Prophet, with the time of his companions and their followers ranked only slightly below. As a follower of the Shafi'i school of thought (rather than, for example, Shi'ism, Khawarij or Mu'tazila), As'ad cited past scholarship to argue that anything that appeared at odds with the Qur'an, the hadith, scholarly consensus (*ijma'*) or the *atsar* (the Prophet's companions' sayings) was an unacceptable religious innovation. By contrast, a good act that conformed to the teachings of past religious authorities was an accepted innovation (*bid'ah hasanah*). School and organisation were thus deemed *bid'ah hasanah*. Muslims should follow the authoritative schools of thought because they had

little capacity to extrapolate laws by themselves from the Qur'an and hadith (As'ad 1940: 74–8). His views on the use of Arabic in Friday sermons are a prime example of his insistence that ritual had to remain in accord with the ways of the Prophet, his companions and the consensus.

As'ad's emphasis on preserving Arabic on Friday sermons, his constant reference to scholarly consensus and religious authority and his Arab style of dress made him *kolot* in the eyes of the *moderen* Muhammadiyah activists, but he was also a keen educational, social and religious reformer whose reputation reached well beyond Sulawesi. He was reported to resist the 'traditionalist–modernist' dichotomy, stating: 'We recognize neither *kolot* (traditional) nor *moderen* (modern); what we need is truth and goodness wherever found. Our goal is to raise the religion of God and to guide the people to follow His path' (Nawir 2000 [1999]: 82). Such views found support among other Muslim outlets; an editorial in the local newspaper, *Fadjar Indonesia*, concerned about the tension among Muslims, also stressed that 'we know in Islam neither *kolot* nor *moderen*'.<sup>29</sup>

While Islamic reform suggests an 'assault on the authority of the past, jettisoning much of the scholarship of the Islamic world' (Robinson 2008: 9), traditionalist reformers such as As'ad and his students did not necessarily view it that way. They used modern tools selectively and endorsed the teaching of modern skills that they saw as useful and relevant in reforming the community. Despite their adherence to the past scholarship, not all new practices were rejected. For example, As'ad and other teachers in his Sengkang school adopted print technology for disseminating their ideas in Arabic and local languages. In its development, the school adopted the teaching of science and a new organisation. One of his students, Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle (1900–96), created a new organisation called Dar al-Da'wah wal-Irsyad (A. the House of Mission and Guidance) in 1947. Ambo Dalle refused to join or establish a branch of the Java-based 'traditionalist' NU, although they too belonged to the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah.<sup>30</sup> He then introduced the teaching of science (considered modern), in addition to the Arabic language and traditional Islamic studies.<sup>31</sup>

Ahmad Dahlan and Hasyim Asy'ari in Java and Muhammad As'ad and his students in South Sulawesi exemplify some of the early voices of Islamic reform and modernisation in Indonesian-Malay Muslim communities. They

used modern organisational structures, and new vocabularies to offer different ways of interpreting the Qur'an and the hadith and early Islamic literature. They drew on both faith and reason in judging what new practices and technologies would be considered lawful or unlawful, good or bad. They upheld colonial law and accepted the necessity of maintaining certain forms of social order while promoting reform.

While Malay graduates of Islamic Studies in Mecca and Cairo formed connections to their peers in the East Indies, and were likewise inspired to promote reform and modernisation, activities took on a different character in British Malaya as compared to Dutch-ruled areas. This was partly because reform in Malaya was not undertaken by community-based organisations like the Muhammadiyah and the NU and partly because sultans and the *'ulama* worked together under British protection. From the 1910s until the 1930s, Malay reform movements developed in mosques and schools and through publications that generally accepted the reality of collaboration between the British and the Malay elite. Although Muhammad Abduh and other reformers were influential in Malaya, this influence was expressed in quite different ways from Java and Sulawesi.

More than their counterparts in the Dutch Indies, Malay modernists and traditionalists in Malaya relied much on print technology and focused on publishing newspapers, periodicals and books. The Indian press was under tight surveillance after the Indian Mutiny, when the Vernacular Press Act of 1878 was passed to control any challenge to British rule, but similar measures were not adopted in Malaya (Adam 1994: 31–3). As a result, periodicals and newspapers flourished, established both by modernists and the traditionalists (Adnan 2003: 47–62). The story of these ideas, which primarily were produced through writing and circulated through publication of journals and newspapers, is the focus of the next section.

### **Making Islam Reformist in Malaya: Tahir Jalaluddin and Syed Al-Hadi**

A number of Malay scholars were identified with the modernists, the so-called *kaum muda* (young faction). Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin (1869–1956) and Syed Shaykh Al-Hadi (1867–1934) were regarded as among the pioneers of the *kaum muda* generation in the Malay world because they advocated *tajdid* of Malay society by returning to the fundamental creed but also by

using *ijtihad* to deal with matters unmentioned in the Qur'an and the hadith (Hassan 1973; Aziz 2003: 1–3). Abduh and other Egyptian reformers influenced Malay reformers. Like the modernists in the East Indies, the Malays stressed the importance of literacy and education, but they did not create mass organisations like the Muhammadiyah to establish schools, clinics and orphanages. Nor did they mirror NU in working to consolidate the *'ulama of pesantren*. Some built religious associations centred on mosques and schools, but these remained limited to particular local areas and did not develop into large organisations with branches in other parts of Malaya.

Tahir Jalaluddin was born in 1869 in Ampek Angkek, Minangkabau (West Sumatra). He attended a Dutch school for natives for three years in Minangkabau, and then he studied Islam in Mecca and astronomy (*A. ilm al-falaq*) at Al-Azhar, Cairo, before moving to Malaya in 1899. When Snouck was in Mecca, he noticed that Jalaluddin was one of the non-Arab prayer leaders (*A. imam*) in the Grand Mosque. He described Jalaluddin as 'a person of Minangkabau origin regarded by the *Jawi* community in Mecca as the most talented and the most knowledgeable among them. All the pilgrims from Indonesia visited him in Mecca' (Steenbrink 1984: 140; Zakaria 2006: 140). Jalaluddin was influenced by the teachings of Muhammad Abduh and befriended the influential Egyptian scholar Muhammad Rashid Ridha (1865–1935), as well as making contact with other Malays and Javanese, such as Ahmad Dahlan discussed earlier (Roff 1967: 60).

Jalaluddin became a *mufti* (*A. foremost scholar who gives authoritative fatwa*) in the state of Johor, and, in 1911, he accompanied Sultan Idris to the inauguration of King George V in London (Ramli 1980: viii). He is probably best known, however, for his editorship of a new Singapore-based journal, *Al-Imam* (*A. 'The Leader'*), published from 27 July 1906 until 25 December 1908. Modelled on Cairo's *Al-Manar* (*A. 'The Lighthouse'*), *Al-Imam* aimed to disseminate reformist ideas and information, and sought to 'remind the mindless, wake the sleeping up, show the deviant, and invite the good with wisdom' (Ton 2000: 157–66, 181). Tahir Jalaluddin, Syed Al-Hadi and other *Al-Imam* writers were critical of Malay rulers, the aristocracy, and Malay Muslims more generally, but they were not interested in creating or supporting a global Islamic caliphate to unite all Muslim communities, especially those now living under European rule.

Like Abduh, Jalaluddin used reformist language and terms to address problems of 'Malay backwardness' and promoted the need for change by writing about 'progress and freedom of the *ummah*'.<sup>32</sup> He used Christian sources selectively in order to support the idea of liberation, and even referred to Martin Luther in making his point about the necessity for reform within the Islamic tradition. Like Dahlan, Jalaluddin was an advocate of *ijtihad* on contemporary matters. This was part of a broad effort on the part of *kaum muda* to change Malay attitudes and move beyond internal disputes about non-essential matters (A. *furu'iyah*), such as whether people were allowed to read prayers or were required to memorise them and whether or not it was obligatory to give alms for the building of mosques. One particular example concerned religious regulations regarding dog saliva. Traditionalists, for whom dog saliva was unclean, said that any contact required an individual to ritually purify themselves by rubbing the place with dirt seven times. Some *kaum muda*, however, contended that this was totally unnecessary, since dogs were ritually clean and could even be kept as pets (Musa and Kelantan in Roff 1974: 153–69).

As mentioned in the Introduction, Arabs or *hadhramis* played a crucial role in the Islamisation of the Indonesian-Malay world. Syed Al-Hadi (1867–1934), born in Malacca, to an Arab (*hadhrami*) father and a Malay mother, was a prominent figure in Malaya's *kaum muda* faction. Unlike Tahir Jalaluddin, who studied for long periods in Mecca and Cairo, Al-Hadi travelled to Riau, Singapore, Terengganu and other parts of Malaya, merely visiting Cairo and only going to Mecca for the hajj. In Singapore he was closely involved with *Al-Imam*, where he established from 1906 a reputation as a prolific writer of essays and novels. As the owner of the Jelutong Press, he founded another journal *Al-Ikhwan* (A. 'The Brethren') in 1926, which published articles on the need to purify Islam, pointed to the reforms and progress of more advanced Muslim countries and stressed Islam's flexibility in adjusting to modern conditions (Bakar 1994: 75). Al-Hadi also founded another journal, *Saudara*, a Malay/Sanskrit word for 'the Brethren' in 1928 in Pulau Pinang. Like Jalaluddin, Al-Hadi shared Abduh's ideas about Islam, but he was more of a 'scholar' (A. *alim*) and his writings were so forthright that he has been termed a polemicist (Roff 1967: 63). Having witnessed economic and political development in Singapore and Pulau Pinang under

the British, in contrast to economic backwardness and political conservatism under the Malay sultans, Al-Hadi reiterated the message that Europeans were progressing while Malays were regressing, but under the law of God, progress was possible for any society where people worked hard and acted according to reason. He argued that if Malays wished to move forward, they should emulate European attitudes and methods:

They [Europeans] make progress everyday, and as they progress faster towards the richness and glory of life, the natives descend further into poverty and humiliation. Indeed, there is nothing wrong with the actions of the European nations. They are just pursuing the demands of a God-given human nature, common to all human beings, which is to demand superiority. The Qur'an chapter 30:30 suggests that such is the natural instinct that God has implanted in mankind. This human nature is what the philosopher Darwin called the law of competitiveness . . . in the promotion of their lives . . . which God has instilled in all humans, the will to achieve progress and attain perfection. (Al-Hadi cited in Gordon 1999: 214)

For Al-Hadi, prosperity and dignity were not the property of any particular nation or race, because the law of nature was divine and universal. Since Europeans had advanced in many domains of life, the Malays should follow in this shared path. It was not Islam or the Qur'an that made the Malays poor, backward and illiterate, but their conservatism, by which he meant the lack of rational interpretations of sacred texts and understanding of the natural law decreed by God. Al-Hadi accused the *kaum tua* of accepting the opinions of Islamic scholars (expressed verbally or in books) in the assumption that these were based on the Qur'an and the hadith. The *kaum muda* position was that no individual opinions were sacrosanct, and only the Qur'an and hadith were indisputable. When a difference in opinion occurred, it was obligatory for Muslims to examine the truth of the Qur'an and from this base develop their own independent reasoning (in Gordon 1999: 201–2).

Al-Hadi showed generally positive attitudes toward the British in Malaya. But he showed at times ambivalent attitudes. On the one hand, he praised the British modernisation of Malaya. On the other hand, in an article published in *al-Ikhwān*, al-Hadi wrote, 'for if we are conscious and still possess the faculty of thought, then how can we allow another people to rule over us, to

be our guardian in our beloved *watan*?' He also criticised the prosperity of the British and European capitalists in Malaya when most Malays remained backward and poor (Al-Hadi cited in Alatas 2005: 266–7). Yet al-Hadi was critical more towards the Malay sultans and '*kaum tua*' '*ulama*' who resisted a rational understanding of Islam. One of his criticisms was directed to the *kaum tua* '*ulama*' of Kelantan who banned his periodicals *Al-Ikhwan* and *Saudara*, writing 'which through the implementation of British justice, has just emerged from barbarism into the modern world and in which it seems there are still people who believe in the words of the religious authorities who have never opened their eyes to the dawn of modernity and freedom of thoughts such as we have under the protection of the three colored-flag' (Al-Hadi cited in Alatas 2005: 265).

For Al-Hadi, religion and rationality were compatible. Even ritual in Islam should be rationally understood and should benefit the practitioners. Thus, the five pillars of Islam were not merely an *ibadah* for the hereafter, but for this world and the good in this world; to be good in this world was the only way to gain blessings in the hereafter. The religion of Islam, Al-Hadi believed, was the true and eternal religion, compatible with the rationality of all ages. Syed Al-Hadi reconciled revelation (*wahyu*) and reason (*akal*) to the extent of arguing that all Islamic rituals (such as the five pillars) had to be rational and beneficial to the well-being (*sejahtera*) of people in this world, not merely in the hereafter as many '*ulama*' believed. Quoting Qur'anic verses, Al-Hadi argued that Islam honours reason because without it no one would recognise Allah, and because Allah asks human beings to use their reason and condemns those who do not. In interpreting the verse 'no compulsion in religion' (a verse that Snouck Hurgronje quoted but for a different purpose), Al-Hadi said that one should only accept a rational religion. He believed that Islam protected religious freedom (I. *kebebasan 'itikad*), for the Prophet Muhammad had showed compassion and kindness to people and societies who followed other faiths. Thus, for example, Islam allows Muslims to marry kafir women of the People of the Book (A. *kafir kitabi*), and in these cases Muslim husbands should give religious freedom to their wives (Al-Hadi 1931: 13–14, 23–5, 41–2).

Syed Al-Hadi maintained that when non-Muslims were subjects of Muslim rulers, they paid taxes for their own protection but felt that in return

they should be given religious and cultural freedom. Islam, Al-Hadi continued, combined goodness in this world and in the hereafter in the same way: One was not better than the other. Islam comprises the material and the spiritual, incorporating faith, ritual, laws, and ethics. From this perspective Al-Hadi and other reformers were critical of the lack of the 'Protestant work ethic' in Malay society. By emphasising that Islam and reason were compatible, Al-Hadi emphasised a rational and individualistic approach to religion (Al-Hadi 1931: 45–6, 50–60).

Kelantan, however, had its own reformist journal – *Pengasuh* – written in Jawi and other periodicals written in Latin script. *Kaum muda* publications, such as *al-Urwat al-Wuthqa* (A. 'The Strong Bind'), *Al-Imam*, *Saudara* (M. 'The Brother') and *A-Riwayat* (A. 'The Story') and, in Kelantan, journals such as *Pengasuh* and *al-Hidayah* (A. 'The Guidance') were associated with the *kaum tua*, but they, too, reinforced the message of the urgency of reform if the Malays were to advance (Roff 1961; Bakar 1994).<sup>33</sup> The editor of *Pengasuh* emphasised the importance of publishing: 'Among advanced nations, newspapers are like food and clothing that they used . . . perhaps just as the Malays eat rice with fish'.<sup>34</sup> One of the founders of *Pengasuh* was Tok Kenali, who may be regarded by some as *kaum tua* due to his emphasis on the Arabic language and Jawi script, but he was indeed a keen reformer of Malay Islam through schooling and writing.

### **Making Islam Reformist in Kelantan: Tok Kenali and *Pengasuh***

Muhammad Yusuf bin Ahmad (1869–1933), known as Tok Kenali, assumed an important role in reforming the Malay educational system and society. He was born in Kota Bharu, the capital of Kelantan, in 1868, his father being an impoverished rice farmer. After an education in Arabic and Islamic knowledge in the mosque in Kota Bharu, Kenali studied for twenty-two years in Mecca and visited Cairo for several years. Several of his teachers, including Shaykh Ahmad Khatib from Minangkabau and Shaykh Ahmad al-Fatani, taught other students from the East Indies and Malaya, but he was also influenced by the writings of Muhammad Abduh, apart from his study of Sufism. Tok Kenali was influenced by Abduh's promotion of modern education and cooperation with sultans while being critical of foreign intervention in Muslim affairs. From his background and his early involment

with the teaching of Arabic in *pondok*, Tok Kenali has been later categorised as belonging to the *kaum tua* but his involvement with the modernisation of educational curricula and his engagement with socio-political issues has made him associated with *kaum muda*. A contemporary scholar considered him a reformist (Bakar 1997: 50–64).

Tok Kenali returned to Kelantan in 1908, just as the British and Siamese governments were discussing the state's transfer from Siamese overlordship to the British. His teaching and activism in Kelantan marked a new age of reform for Muslim education in Kelantan, now subject to British colonial control (Daud 1996: 265). There is no direct reference to the West or Western influences in his writings. Although Kenali never directly criticised the British-Sultan collaborative administration in Kelantan or in Malaya more generally, he did emphasise the Qur'anic doctrine of equality of rights, which he believed to be inherently Islamic. Kenali believed that all human beings were equal and had the same rights and responsibilities, citing Qur'anic passages such as 'we have created the children of Adam in dignity' (Qur'an 17:70) and 'we have created human beings in the best form' (Qur'an 95:4).<sup>35</sup> He was also indirectly critical of the foreign rules – first the Siamese and then the British – in Kelantan (see Chapter III).

In the early twentieth century some Malay reformists tried unsuccessfully to establish unions (*M./I. perhimpunan* or *kesatuan*) that would help improve the conditions of their community, arguing that 'the weak will become strong if they organize, and the poor will become rich if they unite' (Othman 1906: 141). However, in December 1912, a religious scholar wrote to the 'British Adviser for the State of Kelantan', requesting permission to establish the *Jam'iyatul Khairiah* (A. 'Association of the Good'), which would be primarily educational in orientation and would aim at 'bringing benefits to seekers of knowledge'. The Adviser, J. E. Bishop, replied positively, writing that 'this government has no objection to the formation of the proposed association for the objectives set out in your letter', but 'the association must be prepared to agree not to employ any teacher of Mohammedan religion or law who may appear to the Highness the Sultan an unsuitable person to be so employed'. In his next letter, after the sultan had given his approval, Bishop agreed to the appointment of a Malay teacher.<sup>36</sup> The permit to publish journals seemed to be easier than the permit to create organisations. The sultan

and the British, however, collaborated in acting as patrons for the creation and dissemination of religious ideas and secular information in Kelantan and other parts of Malaya.

Tok Kenali built on this initiative by urging Malays to develop associations and publications that would serve the community and the Islamic religion. Invoking the Qur'anic passage 'human beings are created weak', Kenali argued that working in an association would lead to strength. Creating a union or providing opportunities to gather together was a collective obligation (A. *fard kifayah*) for those who had intellectual abilities (M. *orang yang berakal*) and wanted to benefit their community and their people (M. *bermanfaat bagi bangsa dan kaum*).<sup>37</sup> Thus, in 1924, he established an association called Al-Jam'iyyah al-'Ashriyyah (A. Modern Association) in Kota Bharu, where people could pray, study and discuss current issues affecting the Muslim world (Yusoff 2010: 76). But typical of Muslim organisations in Malaya, this association did not last long or expand to other parts of Malaya, and in this sense represents a contrast to developments in the East Indies.

Malay reformers focused on writing and publishing literary works and teaching and Tok Kenali himself acted as chief editor for the journals *Pengasuh* and *Al-Hidayah*. In the inaugural publication of the *Pengasuh*, the only British Malaya journal sponsored by a sultan, Tok Kenali reported that it would 'be published every half month' in order to 'serve the Islamic community in the Malay peninsula, particularly in Kelantan . . . giving them compassion and love [to support their] outer material and inner spiritual needs'.<sup>38</sup> His statement of his vision was unequivocal:

When I realized that no one else would become a messenger or medium [M. *utusan*], who would strive to unify our children of Malaya, I became very eager and hoped that in this Malay Peninsula there would be a journal, a magazine, or a newspaper owned by the people of our country, which would wisely command us to gather together and unite in all tasks to bring about public goodness [A. *masalah*] to the country [A. *watan*], the community [M./I. *bangsa*], and the religion [M./I. *agama*].<sup>39</sup>

In order to spread Islamic knowledge, Tok Kenali felt that it was important to publish essays about a variety of contemporary topics relevant to Malays. He believed that transmitting information through print media

would also serve his religion and society more generally by improving Malay literacy and understanding of both religious and worldly matters. He would refuse to die, he said, until he saw 'a new and beautiful change' (Mahmud 2010: 172–3). Like Al-Hadi, Kenali pointed to European nations that had advanced because they were able to adapt to change. His essays in *Pengasuh* repeated the view that every person was born with the same potential to achieve dignity and greatness: 'If we look at men in the past and today who achieved greatness in life and could conquer the seas and lands, we know that they had no additional bone or muscle: they were the same as us. They had a great desire for achievement and persevered to reach their desire.'<sup>40</sup> Malay Muslims needed to reform themselves, but change must occur in balance with this world and that of the hereafter. He warned against overdue concentration on spiritual life, because the Qur'an itself showed that knowledge, material well-being and action in the present were as important as looking to the hereafter.<sup>41</sup> In his interpretation of the hadith, he contended that Malays should understand the history of Muhammad and his caliphs, who had served both the religion of Islam and the material world.

One issue discussed in *Pengasuh* was the implications of the term 'Melayu', especially in the colonial context. Kenali observed that for some *'ulama* it was associated with weakness and backwardness, and should therefore be changed. He argued that reform should not be concerned with the changing of a name, but should focus on changing Malay attitudes and worldviews.<sup>42</sup> Another contributor argued that 'the Malay land should be for Malays', but that it was not necessary 'to get rid of the foreign people in the Malay Peninsula, only to protect Malay rights from being removed by these foreign people'. Although most Malays were religiously ignorant (*A. jahiliyyah*), they nonetheless increased in number every year and so deserved a better place in their own land – presumably a reference to the increasing numbers of Chinese and Indian migrants who serviced the colonial economy. Malays, he said, should protect their ownership rights and improve their capabilities; this would enable them to progress and eventually triumph.<sup>43</sup>

A related matter concerned Malay language as a vehicle for reaching a larger public. For instance, should journals and newspapers publish in *Jawi* (an Arabic script) or *Rumi* (a Romanised script), or use both in the same journals and newspapers? *Pengasuh* editors advocated the retention of

Jawi, which should be developed still further in preference to Romanised Malay.<sup>44</sup> *Kenchana* (M. 'Gold'), which was published in Singapore, used the Romanised Malay. The editor of *Kenchana* disagreed with the *Pengasuh* editor, who had argued that the fall of the Turkish Uthmani was due to their moving from using Arabic to Roman script as promoted by Kemal Ataturk: 'Turkey became a strong Islamic state by shifting from the Arabic that was used by the lazy, luxury-loving sultans to Roman script.'<sup>45</sup> The editor of *Kenchana* contended, 'The *Pengasuh* mind is conservative [*kolot*], narrow, and not far-sighted', due to their use of Jawi script.<sup>46</sup> Here *Pengasuh* was regarded by other Malays as being conservative, although the former aimed at reforming Malays by using Jawi. Another periodical, *Al-Hikmah* (A. 'The Wisdom'), saw no contradiction between Jawi and Romanised script, since both disseminated 'general [not specifically religious] knowledge and information' and targeted both Malay and non-Malay audiences.<sup>47</sup> Another issue was whether more effort should be devoted to translations. Editors of local journals such as *Al-Riwayat* felt that translating Arabic, English and even Siamese works into the Malay language would be useful for Malay readers who could 'take lessons and make mirrors for living a safe journey on the ocean of life by selecting the good from the bad and by acting accordingly' (Umar 1938). This self-conscious awareness of being 'Malay', of speaking their own language and of belonging to their own place or homeland, was emblematic of increasing 'modern' preoccupations (Benavides 1998: 200).

An editor of *Al-Riwayat* praised the support given by the sultan to a journal that would 'give the people goodness in this world and goodness in the hereafter and protection from the hell' (Umar 1938). A more obvious target for criticism was British colonisation and its effects on Malay society, but it was often implicit and indirect and did not lead to movements against the British. One *Al-Imam* author wrote: 'We, the children of this nation, have become wicked and dangerous. The wolves have been trained to watch and eat their prey. Therefore, we people in this colonised land [M. *tanah jajahan*] should be aware and consolidate our power and energy. If we do not help each other then we, the *ummah*, will be destroyed and lost' (cited in Ton 2000: 244). Yet, despite calls to be aware of the contemporary situation, such words of warning in writing did not lead to anti-British organisations or political parties during this time, primarily because of the careful efforts of

collaboration between the colonial administration and the Malay sultans in public matters.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has shown that the traditionalists or *kaum tua* and the modernists or *kaum muda* agreed on the need for reforming Muslim communities in their particular locations, although they understood the ideas of 'advancement' and 'modern' in different ways and used different sources and different approaches to authority. European colonialism, the decline of the Caliphate, a sense of internal crisis and Islamic reform movements were important contexts for raising awareness in bringing ideas of reform to their societies. They believed in revelation and adopted Meccan and Cairo forms of organisation and publication, but they also promoted the use of reason and made use of European, Christian organisational structure, vocabularies and technology as they deemed fit, albeit to varying degrees and in different ways. They asserted that Islam was a modern religion, which could be critical of *adat* and religious practices deemed harmful to the fundamentals of Islam but that could also selectively borrow useful ideas and institutions.

In the East Indies, urban 'modernists' were generally more prepared to adopt Dutch colonial or Christian models of organisation and new technical concepts. Nonetheless, the predominately rural 'traditionalists' also gradually accommodated new organisational forms, while maintaining the consensus opinions of early scholars whom they regarded as authoritative and effective. In a time of far-reaching social changes, the traditionalists sought to preserve the Arabic language for use in ritual and sermonising, but they saw the practical advantage of using local languages in other religious and social contexts. Both modernists and traditionalists built organisations to manage their schools, preachings, and other social agendas. The Dutch intervention in native affairs (as will be discussed next) stimulated East Indies Muslim leaders to respond by a 'culture of movement' through organisations that spread through the East Indies. In contrast to the more geographically unified and more homogenous Malay society of the peninsula, the geographical separation between islands and the ethnic diversity of the East Indies contributed to the need for strengthening connections.

In Malaya, reformists took a greater advantage of print technology by

producing periodicals and newspapers and focusing their efforts on these. A Malay writer, Za'ba, for example, wrote: 'What we wanted to do, like them (Indonesians), was to write, and to help our people raise their standard of living' (cited in Roff 1974: 155). By prohibiting movements that could turn against the establishment, the sultan, established *'ulama* and Malay intellectuals played a significant role in Islamising and reforming *bangsa Melayu* through publications than did the aristocrats and *'ulama* in Java or South Sulawesi. Yet, despite these differences, throughout the Indonesian-Malay world the widening literacy and expanding flows of knowledge and information played a significant role in the circulation of ideas that introduced a new chapter in the history of modern Islam in Indonesia and Malaya.

In becoming modern Muslims, Indonesian and Malay reformers showed ambivalent attitudes toward European rule and modernisation. Indonesians showed more varied responses to the Dutch than the Malays toward the British but the Indonesians, too, did not always show their direct resistance when they selectively borrowed from Dutch (and Christian missionary) vocabularies and organisations and when they competed with them in pursuing reform. Malay reformers directed their criticisms toward the traditional rulers and *'ulama* rather than towards the British modernisers.

## Notes

1. On Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92) and Wahhabism, see 'Attar (1972) and Rippin (2007: 19–23).
2. Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 'Kitab Iman', *Himpunan Putusan* 1967: 12.
3. Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah, 'Kitab Masalah Lima', *Himpunan Putusan* 1967: 278, 313.
4. Some suggest that Ahmad Dahlan wrote booklets on the Obligation of a Living Being (*kewajiban orang hidup*) and on World Solidarity (*persaudaraan dunia*), but these were unpublished (see Muhammadiyah 1923: 9; Salam 1963: 55–7).
5. The 1930 congress, for example, reported 112 branches and groups with approximately 24,000 members. This membership increased to in the region of 250,000 in 1938, maintaining 834 mosques and small mosques (*langgar*), 31 public libraries, and 1,774 schools, with 5,516 male and 2,114 female preachers (Noer 1973: 83).

6. 'Congres Moehammadijah ke-21: 30 April 1932, Makassar', *Tentara Islam*, No. 1, 1932, Year 1.
7. *Pemberita Makassar*, No. 29, 4 February 1914.
8. *Pemberita Makassar*, No. 64, 17 April & No. 65, 18 April 1914.
9. Other sources suggest that there was no Shiratal Mustaqim branch in Makassar until 1939. Interview with Hashim Aidit, Makassar, 3 July 2005; 'Acciraathal Moestaqim (A.M.)', *Pemberita Makassar*, Friday, 5 January 1940.
10. 'Acciraathal Moestaqim (A.M.)', *Pemberita Makassar*, Friday, 5 January 1940.
11. Beudeker, *Memorie van Overgave van de Assistant- Resident van Makassar*, the period between 1 September 1946 and 12 June 1948, 102–6; 'Pemandangan dari fihak neutral soal Idoel Fitri dan Gerebeg Besar', *Pemberita Makassar*, No. 15, 18 January 1940.
12. 'Soeara dari Koeboer: Mohammadija di Celebes Selatan', *Tentara Islam*, No. 6, 1932, Year I.
13. Colonial periodicals in Dutch and/or Indonesia included *Pemberita Makassar*, *Sinar Matahari* and *Makassaarch Courants*. The Dutch played a crucial role in publishing these, but the Chinese and natives joined the flowering of the periodicals. The Chinese published *Chau Sing*, *Njaring* and *Sin Hwa Po*, and newspapers in Indonesian such as *Pewarta Makassar*. 'Native publications' included *Anak-Kontji*, *Barisan Kita* (Perserikatan Celebes), *Berita Baroe* and *Fadjar Indonesia*. *Lijst van inde Inheemsche Talen verscgijnende Bladen, in Inlandsche Pers Overzicht*, 1928 and 1939, KITLV; Katalog Perpustakaan Nasional, Jakarta.
14. *Fadjar Indonesia*, No. 1, 7 October 1930; *Pemberita Makassar*, No. 15, 18 January 1940.
15. *Tentara Islam*, No. 1, June 1932, Year I.
16. Interview with Abu Hamid, Universitas 45, Makassar, 5 July 2005; Steenbrink (1991).
17. 'Congres Moehammadijah ke-21: 30 April 1932, Makassar', *Tentara Islam*, No.1, 1932, Year 1.
18. 'Moetiara', *Tentara Islam*, No. 1, June 1932, Year I.
19. 'Dari Medja Redactie', *Fadjar Indonesia*, No. 4, 15 January 1931, Year I.
20. 'Satoe Kesadaran dalam Kalangan Moehammadijah', *Fadjar Indonesia*, No. 1, 7 October 1930.
21. 'Celebes: Moment actie Pemoeda Moehammadijah Rappang', *Pemberita Makassar*, 5 January 1940.
22. Image title 'Ontvangst te Wadjo ter Gelegenheid van Idoel Fitri', circa 1938,

collection of J. J. Wesseling, [http://media-kitlv.nl/all-media/indeling/detail/form/advanced?q\\_searchfield=wadjo](http://media-kitlv.nl/all-media/indeling/detail/form/advanced?q_searchfield=wadjo), accessed 14 March 2015.

23. Amangkasiriji, 'Conferentie Moehammadijah Daerah Selebes jg. Ke 16 di Sengkang', *Adil*, No. 30, 26 April 1941.
24. Nahdlatul 'Ulama (NU) (n.d.), *Khitthah Nahdlatul Ulama*, Pengurus Wilayah Nahdlatul 'Ulama, 10–30.
25. *Berita Nahdlatul Ulama*, vol. 6, No. 16, 15 June 1937.
26. Early NU figures in Makassar included Abdul Hamid Daeng Magassing and hadhrani Arab Sayyid Hussein Saleh al-Segaf (Abdurrahman 2002: 9–10; Bruinessen 1994: 49).
27. Interview with Mustari Bosra, Makassar, May 2005; Bosra (2003: 15–16).
28. As'ad wrote *Idharul Haqiqah* (A. 'Revealing the Truth'); *Assirat al-Nabawiyah* (A. 'The Prophet's Life'); *Kitab al-Aqaid* (A. 'The Book of Faith'), *Ilmu Ushul Fiqh* (A. 'The Science of the Fundamentals of the Jurisprudence'), and *Ajwibatul Mardhaiyyah* (A. 'The Blessed Answers').
29. 'Dari Medja Redactie', *Fadjar Indonesia*, No. 4, 15 January 1931, Year I.
30. Interview with Drs. Abdurrahman, Universitas Islam Makassar, 20 June 2005.
31. Interview with Musafir Pababbari, UIN Alauddin Makassar, 21 June 2005; Bosra, 'Peranan Kiai Haji Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle dalam Dinamika Masyarakat Islam Tradisionalis di Sulawesi Selatan', paper presented at the 65th Anniversary of Dar al-Da'wah wal Irsyad (DDI), 30 December 2003, Mangkoso, Barru; Said (2002).
32. Jalaluddin, 'Membetulkan Perjalanan Agama Islam atau Peraturan Perjalanan Kaum Agama Islam', *al-Ikhwani*, 1, 16 November 1926, 44.
33. Djamily, 'Penerbitan Buku2', *Kenchana*, Year 3, September–October 1949, 6–8.
34. 'Orang Melayu dengan Surat Kabar', *Pengasub*, No. 291, 30 March 1930; 'Setua-tua Surat Kabar dalam Dunia', *Pengasub*, No. 295, 28 May 1930.
35. Kenali, 'Kemanusiaan', *Pengasub*, No.1, Year 1, 14 July 1918.
36. Archive m62, m209, 1912, ANM.
37. Kenali, 'Kemanusiaan', *Pengasub*, No.1, Year 1, 14 July 1918.
38. *Pengasub*, No. 1, 14 July 1918.
39. *Pengasub*, No. 1, 14 July 1918.
40. Kenali, 'Kemanusiaan', *Pengasub*, No. 1, Year 1, 14 July 1918, 2–3.
41. Kenali, 'Seruan', *Pengasub*, No. 3, Year 1, 1918.
42. Kenali, 'Kalimah Melayu', *Al-Hidayah*, No. 3, Year 1, 1923.
43. 'Semenanjung Tanah Melayu bagi Anak2 Melayu atau Bumi Melayu bagi Melayu', *Pengasub*, No. 302, 8 September 1930.

44. 'Siapakah yang menghancurkan Bahasa Melayu', *Pengasuh*, No. 301, 25 August 1930.
45. Dari Meja Pengarang: Pengasoh dan Kenchana, *Kenchana*, No. 7, Year 3, November–December 1949, 1.
46. Apa Kata 'Pengasoh', *Kenchana*, Year 3, September–October 1949, 6–7.
47. One of its covers pictured Britain's King George VI with his queen; the text praised their leadership during the world wars. *Al-Hikmah*, No. 277, Year 6, 4 January 1940.



## Colonising the Muslim East and Reinforcing Culture

It would be a great satisfaction to me if my lectures might cause some of my hearers to consider the problem of Islam as one of the most important of our time, and its solution worthy of their interest and of a claim on their exertion.

(Snouck 1916: 150)

The Malay cares nothing for consistency; he does not exchange old customs for new; he keeps both the new and the old. He is indeed afraid to give up the old.

(Wilkinson 1925a: 64)

Scholars have suggested that one of the professed aims of European colonisation was ‘to inscribe the colonized in the space of modernity’ (Mbembe cited in Cooper 2005: 143; Scott and Hirschkind 2006: 291). ‘Colonial modernity’, as a category of analysis, was manifested partly in the act of knowing their colonial subjects and engaging them in the modern world. Much as Muslim reformers attempted to strengthen the faith and modernise local Muslim communities by establishing new forms of voluntary association and communicating ideas through print publications, Dutch and British colonial administrators and scholars studied the colonised as ‘object-like’, published information on them and ‘re-ordered’ them bureaucratically (Mitchell 1988: 33). As believers and natives, Muslim reformers talked about what ought to be done and many in the East Indies were generally involved in ‘movements’ and many in Malaya wrote essays in pursuit of progress, whereas Europeans became interested in Islam and local culture in order to bring them into the modern world. Islam and local culture influenced the ways in which European colonialists viewed and acted toward Muslim-majority colonies as well as toward their self-perceptions of the West and modernity.

In this chapter, I explore the way that European colonial administrators and scholars became interested in Islam and studied its textual, theological, historical and contemporary cultural expressions in the colonies. The colonisers were influenced in their discourses about the East by their observations of Islam and Muslim subjects as well as by their Christian background knowledge of Christianity and Western culture. In turn, readings of Islam and interaction with Muslims in the colonies shaped their views of the modern. Although some European scholars recognised scriptural, doctrinal and historical links between Islam and Christianity (and Judaism), they tended to conflate Islam with the East and traditionalism, and Christianity with the West and modernity. Their discourses would not necessarily become colonial policies, depending on a variety of factors such as their colonial position, large and disparate geographical location and individual preferences. Their impacts on the local life were not necessarily immediate or direct, but the colonial literature they produced shaped the reinforcement of religion and culture in the East Indies and Malaya.

Like Muslim reformers who associated Islam with being progressive and therefore in opposition to that that they deemed non-Islamic, traditionalist or backward (as discussed in the previous chapter), European colonisers positioned Western modernity against things that they considered non-modern, using terms such as ‘traditional’, ‘ancient’, ‘medieval’, ‘religious’ or ‘customary’ (see Mitchell 2000). Dutch scholars Snouck Hurgronje and Hendrik Kraemer and British scholars Wilkinson and Winstedt were critical of some aspects of Islam and Muslim practices, but they were also appreciative of other aspects and encouraged ‘mutual understanding’ and ‘exchanges of ideas’. They attempted to identify few modern elements in Islam, but they framed these in terms of Western, implicitly or explicitly Christian, paradigms. They compared the West and modernity in relation to Islam, the East and *adat* traditionalism. They used such terms as the ‘Muslim East’ and ‘Muhammadanism’, but located these in the framework of the ‘modern age’ and they contributed to intellectual encounters between Europe and Asia and between Christians and Muslims. The key difference between the Dutch and British Orientalist views and agendas toward Islam and Muslims is that the former were increasingly concerned with the political manifestation of Islam in Indonesia whereas the latter quite consistently addressed the cultural expressions of their Malay subjects. The Dutch scholars served as ‘Islamicists’

in the sense that they explored the various dimensions of Islam as a world religion and a local practice in the East Indies whereas the British seemed to serve as ‘culturalists’ whose main preoccupation was to preserve Malay culture, of which Islam became one of the main elements. They would have varying impacts on the studies of Muslim politics and culture in Indonesia and Malaya.

### **Colonialising and Christianising the East Indies**

Changes were especially evident in the Netherlands Indies after the enactment of the ‘Ethical Policy’ (D. *ethische politiek*), introduced in 1901 because of widespread criticism of the profits made in Java and Sumatra by Dutch capitalists and the exploitation of indigenous labour. In her speech from the throne, Queen Wilhelmina (r. 1890–1948) said that the goal of the Ethical Policy was to share the benefits that the Netherlands had derived with the colonised population. The Dutch had a moral obligation to develop economic and social projects, particularly education (Locher-Scholten 1981: 176). In emphasising that colonial rule should bring benefits, the queen’s speech implied the conflation of Dutch capitalism and Protestant ethics. More particularly, she emphasised her support for Christian converts: ‘as a predominantly Protestant nation, the Netherlands has a duty to improve the condition of native Christians in the Indonesian archipelago, to give Christian missionary activity more aid and to inform the entire administration that the Netherlands have a moral obligation to fulfil as regards the population of those regions’ (cited in Kroef 1953: 53).

The Dutch Government maintained an office for missionary activities in the East Indies, but many churches worked independently of the colonial state. Others were sometimes financially supported, sometimes morally encouraged or respected, and at other times restricted from activities for different reasons (Jongeling 1966; Schumann 2010). Christian missionaries played an important role in educating and modernising the natives in the East Indies, including Sulawesi. The Protestant mission had been present in the archipelago from the mid-nineteenth century, although it did not expand until the early twentieth century (Jong 1995). From 1905, different Protestant mission bodies in Holland formed an alliance with the idea of advancing missions in many parts of the East Indies. Christian missionaries

tried to avoid conflict with the Islamic teachers and Muslim communities and their influence therefore became stronger in the mountain areas where 'animists' were still dominant, like the Toraja areas in the Sulawesi highlands. Some converts became preachers themselves, or sponsors of Christian activities. Although Dutch colonialists were largely Protestant, Catholic priests and teachers also worked in the East Indies, including Makassar. Protestant and Catholic churches, hospitals, welfare organisations and schools contributed to the modernisation of education, health services, orphanages and social work in the East Indies.

### **Associating the Muslim East with the Medieval World: Snouck Hurgronje**

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje was a theologian-scholar who contributed to the Western study of Islam in relation to Dutch colonialism and the development of colonial policies in the East Indies. A student of philology, Snouck was educated in Arabic languages and literature in Leiden after earning a certificate in theology.<sup>1</sup> Methodologically, Snouck's approach to Islam was eclectic: textual and contextual, doctrinal and historical, as well as ethnographic. He visited Mecca, arriving on 28 August 1884 and remaining inside the mosque for research until 1885. During his visit, Snouck adopted an Arabic name – *Abd al-Ghaffar* (The Servant of the Forgiving God) since only Muslims were allowed to stay inside the mosque (Koningsveld 1989). Snouck was 'a Muslim – a fact accepted by his fellow Muslims – though most likely not a true believer' (Laffan 2003: 62). Despite this ambiguity, Snouck wrote about the everyday life of Muslims in Mecca in a way that no one ever had before.<sup>2</sup> His main purpose was to understand Islam and Muslims in their 'medieval milieu', and how the 'Muslim East' could be integrated into the modern world. England, France, Holland and other countries governing Muslim populations were, in his estimation, striving to find ways to incorporate their Muslims subjects into their own modern civilisation. Snouck became concerned about how the Muslim world was to be associated with modern thought. He saw the gap between 'the whole civilized world' and 'the whole world of Islam', which according to him, should be bridged (Snouck 1916: 146). From this perspective, Islam was the non-civilised other that needed to be civilised through the efforts of Muslims

themselves and with the help of the civilised Europeans. Because he left the East Indies in 1906, Snouck did not witness the rise of modernist and traditionalist reformers in Java after 1912, the date of the founding of the Muhammadiyah. Thus, according to G. F. Pijper (1893–1988), a student who later became another administrator, Snouck saw Islam as the religion transmitted by previous generations, not that of the reformers (Laffan 2011: 177).

As an academic in Holland, Snouck continued his writing and lecturing. In a lecture to an American audience in 1914 (about eight years after he left the East Indies), about the origins and development of ‘*Muhammadanism*’, Snouck felt honoured to have the unique experience of being a ‘modern man’, an ‘Orientalist’ and ‘a student of Islam’ in the heartland of Islam, Mecca. Here, he said, he could observe ‘the mentality of people learning those things not for curiosity, but in order to acquire the only true direction for their life in this world and the salvation of their souls in the world to come’ (Snouck 1916: 178–9). He differentiated between modern Islamic scholars and those whom he regarded as predominantly ‘medieval’. To be modern was to be curious and objective in approaching subject matters. In his view, for Muslims to be modern meant a transformation of the ‘medieval’ mentality and an acceptance of Western objectivism. Muslims could only become modern by following the West.

Concerned to bring Islam to the Western world while bringing modernity to the willing Muslims, Snouck invited scholars to see the ‘problem of Islam as one of the most important of our time, and its solution worthy of their interest and of a claim on their exertion’ (Snouck 1916: 150). He tried to explain to Westerners why Islam should be of interest. First, the previous Dutch discourse regarding Islam was based more on ‘sound conviction’ than on ‘historical knowledge’ (Laffan 2011: 75). Snouck wanted to historicise rather than ideologise Islam. Second, it would be more constructive for the West to have some knowledge of Islam because ‘Islam is next akin to Christianity’ (Snouck 1916: 146). He urged all of the nations participating in the global exchange of material and spiritual goods to recognise the importance of understanding Islam. For Snouck, ‘Islam . . . was indeed a familiar enemy encountered now in a new part of the world’ (Laffan 2011: 84), but while this vision of conflict was certainly salient, some notions of human and

religious kinship between Christianity and Islam were also articulated, albeit at times ambiguously.

Snouck stressed the misunderstanding of Islam in the West, citing negative and partial European representations of Islam, the Qur'an and Muhammad. Tracing the ways in which Europeans viewed Islam, he urged them to allow Muslim authorities to speak for themselves as well. He thus criticised European authors such as Voltaire, author of the play *Le Fanatisme, ou Mahomet*, for its 'superficial, prejudicial, and fictitious knowledge' of Islam drawn only from secondary sources. He called for Europeans to use the Qur'an as the main text in understanding Islam because all Islamic sects and parties had the same text, despite 'its errors and defects', and that any changes were 'without intentional alterations or mutilations of real importance' (Snouck 1916: 20–8). The hadith were developed during the first centuries of the *hijrah* and therefore reflected a conflict of opinions in this formative period. The hadith could be distinguished from later biographies (*sirah*) and various pious accounts. In other words, Snouck believed that scriptural or textual approaches to Islam would help the West gain 'real knowledge' of Islam. Two hundred million people, he commented, called themselves the followers of Muhammad, basing their faith on the common belief in God and Muhammad (Snouck 1916: 30–2).

Regardless of its diversity and material manifestations, Islam combined both 'religious and spiritual essences' – although he did wonder if this spiritual essence would survive the fall of Islam's material and political power in the modern era. For Snouck, spirituality was associated with the essence of religions, and because spirituality persisted, it became conservative, whereas materiality was progressive. He recognised the need for Muslims to revive their spiritual potentiality but felt that they needed to change their mental attitudes and move forward in the material domains of life. Muslim reformers had made efforts to conserve and revive the spirituality, but should be more willing to use the necessary instruments to also progress materially. With his notion of 'the Muslim East' characterised primarily with spiritualism, Snouck can be read as playing a role in maintaining the Orientalist notion of a 'mystic East' (King 1999: 4), in opposition to the materialist West.

Snouck was talking about spiritualism as the 'essence' of Islam, but he also discussed Islamic spiritual orientation associated with *tasawwuf* and

*tariqah*. Snouck's attitudes toward *tasawwuf* and *tariqah* were ambiguous: often critical, but sometimes sympathetic. Snouck 'agreed that the *tariqahs* were the leftovers of a bygone age of Indic-inspired ignorance' (Laffan 2011: 235), but he nonetheless acknowledged the spiritual essence of Islam and *tasawwuf*, alongside theological discourse (*kalam*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*) as belonging to 'orthodox Sunni Islam'. He observed how *tasawwuf*, *kalam* and *fiqh* had been fully recognised since Al-Ghazali, an influential figure in the Indonesian-Malay world, forming 'the sacred trio of sciences of Islam': 'the Law offered the bread of life to all the faithful, the dogmatics are the arsenal from the weapons must be taken to defend the treasures of religion against unbelief and heresy, but mysticism shows earthly pilgrim the way to Heaven' (Snouck 1916: 78). He noted that both 'true' and 'false' mysticisms were resolved by Al-Ghazali, generally recognised as orthodox (Snouck 1916: 84). For Snouck, Sufi practices belonged to the past but the Islamic essence of spirituality should survive the material political decline and thus remain relevant in the present.

Beyond *tasawwuf* and *tariqah*, Snouck discussed the theological connection between Islam, Judaism and Christianity in order to make the point that Islam should not be 'strange' for Westerners. He used Christian, Western vocabularies in the words 'Mohammedan Catholicism', 'protestant elements of Islam', 'conservative Islam' and 'liberal Protestantism of Islam' in order to better communicate with the Western, Christian audience. However, he implied that although Muhammad derived many of his ideas, rituals and laws from Jews and Christians, he had long departed from them (Snouck 1916: 81–2). Islam was doctrinally linked to Christianity, and had progressive doctrines, but Snouck also asked why it had not modernised in the same ways as Christianity. He argued that Muslims were not ready to move forward because they sought to preserve their doctrines at the expense of embracing historical changes. The possibility of reform from within the Muslim world was therefore doubtful, primarily because Muslims saw their lives as subject to God's eternal message.

On the other hand, he recognised few cases of 'modernist Islam' in Cairo, Egypt, where Muhammad Abduh promoted the idea of 'adapting Islam by all means in the powers to requirements of the modern life'. For Snouck, 'modern Islam' was different from the Wahhabi reformers in Mecca who a

century earlier had attempted to restore Islam's 'original purity'. He noted approvingly that European professors, both Christian and Muslim, worked together in the university in Egypt (Snouck 1916: 141), but the efforts of these 'progressive Muslims' and their Western patrons were bound to fail.

While pessimistic, in the latter part of his lecture Snouck expressed reserved optimism that progress could be made in parts of the Muslim world. Muslims themselves should be left to 'reconcile the new ideas which they want with the old ones with which they cannot dispense'. On the other hand, Western nations could help Muslims in 'adapting their educational system to modern requirements', and provide 'a good example by rejecting the detestable identification of power and right in politics which lies at the basis of their own canonical law on holy war as well as at the basis of the political practice of modern Western states' (Snouck 1916: 148). More importantly, in order to be associated with modern thought, Muslims needed to distinguish the 'progressive' from the 'conservative' elements in their religion. There were elements in Islamic dogma, law and mysticism that could be compatible with modern thought, although there were also other Islamic doctrines and practices (Snouck mentioned polygamy, slavery and 'holy war') that were incompatible with the modern world. All nations, he told his audience, should 'collaborate in their efforts to be modern – whatever their religious conviction might be' (149).

While Snouck recognised that his background and perspective was Western, he saw hope for engagement, friendship and collaboration with Muslims. He expressed his pride about his project of association in the East Indies where 'the thirty-five millions of Muhammadans lived under Dutch guardianship'. Quoting poet Kipling – 'East is East and West is West, and Never the twain shall meet' – Snouck argued that his own experience showed the possibility of building relationships with 'Muslim Orientals' and of creating mutual understanding between Islam and the modern world. 'To Kipling's poetical despair', he argued, 'I think we have a right to prefer the words of a broad-minded modern Hindu writer: "the pity is that men, led astray by adventitious differences, miss the essential resemblances"' which for him applied to Islam as well (Snouck 1916: 149–50). Studying Islam and the Muslim world was the strategic way for bridging the divide between the East

and the West. Albeit pessimistic, he nevertheless wanted an end to Islamic–Western antagonism. He wished to bring Islam into the modern world (see further Chapters IV, VI and VIII).

### **Muslims Responding to Snouck’s Views of Islam**

Western modernity was regarded not necessarily as Christian or as harmful to Islam, but it was deemed a real challenge for the Muslims to move forward and educate and liberate themselves. Sayyid Uthman (1822–1914), a Batavian *mufti* of Arab origin, was appointed by Snouck to be an honorary Adviser for Arab affairs from 1891 to his death in 1914. Sayyid Uthman was among the *hadhrami* diaspora whose title ‘*sayyid*’ implied a descendent of the Prophet Muhammad. The government usually regarded Arab-descent people as ‘foreign Orientals’. Uthman was critical of certain Sufi orders that he thought lacked knowledge of Islamic law and deemed a threat to colonial law and order in Java. He received a government’s allowance (albeit discreetly paid by Snouck Hurgronje instead of there being open cooperation as a result of his position of *mufti*) (Kaptein 2009). Snouck regarded Uthman as ‘a friend of the Netherlands’, and as ‘more valuable to us than any number of liberal wine-drinking regents’. Uthman called himself ‘the *mufti* of Islam to the people’ when writing about Islamic belief, ritual, law and socio-political issues concerning *jihad*, *bid’ah* and *tariqah*. For example, he charged the Muslim *hajjis* who rebelled against the Dutch in Cilegon, Banten and Java in 1888 as a ‘misunderstanding of *jihad* by ignorant people’. He wanted to support law and order and prevent political disruption. His collaboration with the Dutch colonial government resulted in an accusation of him being ‘a Dutch spy’ (Azra 1995: 16). Uthman’s collaboration with Snouck suggests mutual relationship between a Muslim traditionalist reformer and a colonial moderniser (Kaptein 2014).

Snouck received appreciation particularly among some Muslim modernists. Snouck assisted Muslim modernist Agus Salim to be a staff in the Dutch consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, before returning to a civil service position in the Department of Education and Culture and later the Department of Public Works. For Salim, his fellow Muslims had been left behind and they had to catch up with the modern West, not by imitating the West in its entirety, but by creating their own civilisation based on Islam and Eastern

character (I. *watak bangsa Timur*).<sup>3</sup> Salim discussed Snouck's essay on the role of women in Islam and discussed it using some Qur'anic verses and hadith to address what he viewed as Islamic regulations concerning sexual relationships. According to Salim, Snouck was the 'most popular European expert on Islam'.<sup>4</sup> In this regard, the Dutch presence shaped the self-identification of the Eastern-ness of Islam and the Indies, among friendly but critical Muslims like Agus Salim and among hostile Muslims like a writer of *Het Licht*.

In the periodical, an activist of the Union of Muslim Youth (*Jong Islamiten Bond*) in Makassar, South Sulawesi, wrote a short essay questioning the Islamic identity of Snouck:

Dr Snouck did not believe in the revelation of God sent down to Muhammad and it is his disbelief that has led to his false charges against Muhammad, that Muhammad hated the Jews and Christians because they did not accept his prophecy. Dr. Snouck's accusations against Muhammad are simply the legacy of his Christian predecessors. His accusation was not unusual because many propagators of Bible's religion (*penjebar-penjebar agama indjil*) in the past similarly attempted to weaken Islam in order for Christianity to prevail. Dr Snouck wanted the spread of Christianity rather than Islam in the East Indies.<sup>5</sup>

This particular case indicates distrust toward the motives of Dutchmen studying Islam. There was also an association of colonialism with Christianisation. Here colonial modernity was regarded as harmful to Islam and Muslims in the country.

The intellectual impact of Snouck among Muslims was not immediate due to the natives' inaccessibility to his works in Dutch at the time. The immediate impact of Snouck in the East Indies became institutionalised through the Office for Native (and Arab) Affairs, where he served as the first Adviser to the government. He befriended Sayyid Uthman. Snouck played an important role in directing Dutch colonial policies toward the Muslim subjects in the East Indies, although not all of his suggestions were implemented since he was succeeded by other Dutch officials after he left for Holland in 1906. Nonetheless, he continued his academic career until his death in 1936.

### **Administering Colonial Subject: The Office for Native and Arab Affairs**

The Dutch Government established an Office for Native and Arab Affairs (D. *Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche en Arabische Zaken*) in 1889, which operated in Java and Madura, but later had branches in the outer islands. It was created to study Muslim beliefs, institutions, and cultures in the East Indies and to give advice to the governor-general when requested. The first Adviser was Snouck himself. While the original title suggests the importance of the Arab population in Dutch eyes, it was also called the Office for Native and Muhammadan Affairs (D. *Het Kantoor voor Inlandsche en Mohammedanische Zaken*), which indicated the conflation of Arab-ness and Islam as well as native-ness and Islam. This colonial institution played an important role in constructing a 'modern understanding' of Islam as both a universalised religion but also a racial and native category. In 1907, it was decided to change the name to the Office for Native Affairs, because it then implied 'Javanese' and other traditions not necessarily Islamic. The Dutch Government appointed a scholar to head the Office, but there were often miscommunications and problems because he was separated from the governor-general and other civil servants.<sup>6</sup>

The Office played an important role in other respects. The Dutch attempted to find an alternative source and repository for knowledge that was distinct from the existing independent Christian missionaries and the information that they may have gathered from converts. This alternative concerned predominantly Muslim subjects and their myriad activities. As Snouck put it, '[K]nowledge of the situation in the Mohammedan region here, of the spirit and influence of Mohammedan education, of the scope of the so-called mystical societies, etc., is as necessary for government and legislation as one's daily bread' (Laffan 2011: 147–8).

The Office for Native Affairs became scholarly and political in orientation as new native movements and political parties emerged. According to the goals articulated in 1907, the Office had the task of investigating local language and ethnography, with the help of Arab-descent or Javanese native assistants. In 1931, the Office developed more tasks: to conduct research on religious and political movements among the natives, to investigate and seek information about movements among the Arabs and spiritual movements in Islam, to pay attention to the natives' pilgrimage to Mecca, and to study

languages and ethnography when deemed necessary, also creating contacts with Dutch representatives abroad, such as in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), Turkey, Cairo, Calcutta and Singapore (Suminto 1986: 102–6). The Office began to produce knowledge about the language, religion, law and culture and later became more concerned about political ideas and movements in the East Indies.<sup>7</sup>

While constructing Islam in modern terms through the religious–cultural and secular–political differentiation, the interests of the Office shifted from the religious to the political. Here again the influence of Snouck became apparent. The Office increasingly responded to the modernising, politically orientated Islamic movements. Although division of Islam into religious and political later became a subject of debate among native Muslims, the historical survey of Islam and its doctrines as they had evolved from Muhammad to the present covered a vast range of subjects, and was considered invaluable for research by both Dutch and non-Dutch, and both Christian and Muslim scholars alike.

This research and publication institution also helped in allocating governmental funds for various subjects. However, the fact that the Office supported research about religion suggests two opposite tendencies: one, secularisation, in the sense that it was differentiating between the religious and the secular and two, governmental interference, through funding, intellectual preference and technical and office support. In addition, colonial employment of local Arab and native assistants points to some collaboration between Dutch scholars-administrators and Muslim elites in constructing modern categories pertinent to the ‘Muslim East’.

### **Making Islam a Missionary Problem: Hendrik Kraemer and a Muslim Response**

A critical, sometimes negative, sometimes ambiguous representation of Islam can be found in Hendrik Kraemer (1888–1965). Kraemer was a student of Snouck. He became a Protestant priest and scholar sent by the Dutch Bible Society to study Islam in the East Indies. Kraemer later served as a professor of the history of religions at Leiden University. He worked primarily on sixteenth-century Javanese literature, but he supported Snouck’s general idea of association of the native into the modern world. Kraemer viewed Islam

as a religion (D. *godsdiens*) – and a problem that Protestant missions in the archipelago needed to address.

In a book on the religion of Islam – *Agama Islam*, translated into Indonesian, by Cornelis Taroreh under his guidance and published in 1928, Kraemer wrote that he employed a descriptive approach based on secondary literature authored by European scholars studying Islam from Islamic scholars.<sup>8</sup> The book was initially meant as instructional material for Christian teachers, students, and leaders of congregations, but it was also read by Muslims and others. Kraemer argued that his book was ‘neutral’ because it looked at both broad and specific aspects of Islam, and aimed neither to criticise Islam as a religion nor to give an outsider’s perspective, either of a particular philosophy or of another religious perspective (Kraemer 1952 [1928]: 5–7). Kraemer said that it was not for him to judge whether a person was a ‘true’ Muslim – that was the task of Muslims themselves, through examining their conscience and with the consensus (A. *ijma*) of religious scholars. He tried to offer a brief narrative of pre-Islamic Arabia, the life of Muhammad and his successors, an overview of countries with a Muslim majority, the pillars of Islam, the pillars of faith and finally an account of the spread of Islam in Indonesia. Kraemer traced Islam to the time of Jews and Christians in Medina, although he did not particularly link Islam to Jewish and Christian doctrine as Snouck did. He noted that Muhammad aimed to reform *adat* of the Arabs of his time whom he regarded as ignorant and uncivilised. Some indigenous Arabs, Kraemer wrote, considered Jews and Christians who lived in Medina to be ‘more civilized and higher in their cultures’ because they had their own scriptures: thus, they called them also ‘the People of the Book’ (A. *ahl al-kitab*) (Kraemer 1952 [1928]: 217–18). Kraemer implied that even early Islam had to follow Christians and Jews in order to be civilised. But, for him, Islam’s origins were distinctly Arabic and it later became a missionary religion penetrating other races and cultures, including those in Asia and Africa.

In discussing the religion–state relationship, Kraemer contrasted contemporary Islam with Christianity in terms of ‘old’ and ‘modern’ nations, of non-Europeans and Europeans (and Americans). Kraemer recognised that the Popes of the medieval age had integrated the Church with the State, but this integration was criticised and eventually dissolved in the Protestant

world. The Muslim world, he argued, exhibited a very different situation – a theocracy – due to Islamic historical and doctrinal factors (Kraemer 1952 [1928]: 47–50). While Christianity became modernised in the form of Protestantism, Islam had not taken the same path. While Christianity reformed the world, Islam governed the world through laws and prohibitions, he said (Kraemer 1952 [1928]: 95).

Kraemer therefore translated jihad as a holy war (*D. heilige oorlog*). Following the popular hadith, he described the greater jihad as the ‘great holy war’, meaning the struggle against human passions. The lesser jihad, he tried to explain, referred to the military and the political fight against non-Muslims. This distinction, he argued, did not exist initially because everyone had been aware that Muslims sanctified war in order to achieve political and religious power. Kraemer claimed that only in the modern world had jihad come to mean a struggle in the spiritual and other-than-war sense (Kraemer 1952 [1928]: 218–19). In this way, his explanation of jihad was an attempt to contrast Islamic worldliness with Christian spiritualism. For him, Christianity did not aim to take over politics, whereas Islam essentially was political through jihad. He wished Islam to be much like spiritualist Christianity.

Kraemer recognised that Muslims regarded *tasawwuf* or Sufism as an orthodoxy through the scholarly consensus or *ijma*. He admitted that *tariqah* or Sufi orders had been very influential in the Muslim world (Kraemer 1952 [1928]: 92). But in another book he said that Sufi orders were an ‘alien growth’ in Islam and its ‘most degraded form’ (Kraemer 1938b: 357).

After surveying Islam in its dimensions, Kraemer described Islam in Indonesia. He contended that traders and travellers, primarily from India, were responsible for the propagation of Islam, like Hinduism and Buddhism, in a peaceful manner without wars or the use of force. But, he continued, the peaceful propagation in Indonesia did not result in a complete conversion of the people because they retained their pre-existing traditions. To convert to Islam, Kraemer explained, an individual would simply declare *shahadah* (there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah). It was only later that the convert may acquire some religious education (Kraemer 1952 [1928]: 108). Kraemer noted that many beliefs and practices associated with Sufi Orders and local *adat* were not Islamic but this fact was appreciated

by only a few Muslim scholars and most Muslims in the East Indies saw themselves as following accepted usage (110).

Unlike Snouck, Kraemer had more time to observe and interact with 'modernist' Islam associated with Muhammadiyah and other movements such as the Jong Islamieten Bond. Kraemer noted that Muslim modernists were critical of 'un-Islamic' *adat* and sought to purify Islam and Islamise the tradition. These 'Muslim missionaries', Kraemer observed, sought to improve the faith of the people, including 'pagans', Hindus and Buddhists through schooling and preaching. However, he deemed the Muslim modernist mission to be a failure for several reasons: the mission was independent of political power, it faced strong old religions and it encountered relaxed attitudes among the people. In short, Islam was incompletely observed in the East Indies (286). For Kraemer, Muslim reform had proved unsuccessful. Here, on the one hand, Kraemer criticised Islamic theocracy, but, on the other hand, he argued that only through such theocracy would Islam be completely embedded in Indonesia.

Kraemer was also critical of modernist Muslims who merely became modern in their way of organisation and not religiously. He noted that from the nineteenth century 'Westernisation' had led to the emergence of a group of Indonesians 'influenced by the West' (I. *pengaruh Barat*). The influence of the West was first evident among Javanese *priyayi* and then among the youth who 'did not have a strong faith in Islam or religion in general', like the activists of the Budi Utomo (Good Morality) association, the first native political society founded in 1908 in Java. But from the early twentieth century, this influence affected other Muslims as well. These 'new Muslims' felt threatened by the people who did not respect religion and who argued that Islam was not transmitted from ancient times. This assertion paved the way for Muslims to create movements and encouraged a sense of national consciousness (I. *keinsafan kebangsaan*) in Indonesia in keeping with perceptions of Asia as embarking on a new era. Muhammadiyah had been inspired by Islamic reforms from Egypt, and in Kraemer's view other modern organisations were more influenced by European ideas of nationalism. The effects of this influence were generally apparent merely in the organisation and administration (I. *cara bekerja*), rather than in religious worldviews (Kraemer 286–8). Muhammadiyah followed Western models in terms of organisation

and developing their Muslim community without embracing foreign religion or ideology. Efforts to strengthen and reform the Islamic faith, he argued, would not lead to significant changes in Muslim religious paradigms. In this sense, Kraemer implied, Islam – and not only its adherents – remained predominantly ‘traditional’ in the modern world.

Kraemer noted that Muslims saw Christians as the enemy to conversion, whom they could attack in order to gain religious and political power. He also commented that many people saw the Dutch and Christianity as identical, although he noted that some Muslims separated the two. Furthermore, he said, there were Muslims, including Muhammadiyah activists, who were not hostile to Christians – they regarded them as competitors in working for goodness (*fastabiq al-khairat*), quoting the Qur’an (2:148).<sup>9</sup>

In another work, Kraemer compared Islam with Christianity in terms of the East–West paradigm. Islam, for Kraemer, was a ‘little complicated religion’, although he felt that ‘the contours of Islam as a system of law and learning are clear and simple. Some simple and great thoughts maintain the unity of God and humanity through the prophets’ (Kraemer 1938a: 3–4). He argued that the theological content of Islam was poor, but he saw the power that it had over its followers.

Unlike Snouck, Kraemer offered an explicit evangelical approach to non-Christian religions. He held the view that both the West and the East faced a crisis due to relativism, secularism and the penetration of the West in the East, but rejected stereotypes that portrayed the East as inherently spiritual and the West material. Christianity, he said, was essentially spiritual and ethical, unlike Islam, which remained legalistic and political (1938b: 4–55).

But, like Snouck, Kraemer felt that the problem of modernising Islam involved coming to terms with *shari’ah*, religious law, since it regulated and sanctioned a medieval society on the basis of revelation. Modern Islam was a ‘secularized theocracy’ characterised by ‘religious imperialism’, as demonstrated through the concepts of *dar al-Islam* versus *dar al-harb*. In many respects, the penetration of Western civilisation and the resulting conflicts had played havoc with Islam, but this had not yet generated a ‘really religious awakening’ because modernist reactions were ‘vindications of Islam’ in the face of contemporary life. Islam’s ‘defensive attitude’ strengthened rather than diminished its ‘unjustified feeling of superiority’ (1938b: 222–6). To

Kraemer, Eastern Islam clashed with Western Christianity; it also clashed with the modern West, with modern scientific civilisation and with European colonialism. Muslim modernists were merely ‘defensive apologists’ who paradoxically perpetuated these confrontations (270–1).

Kraemer’s theological criticism against Islam can also be seen in his discussion of the thought of an Indian Muslim thinker Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), whom he deemed one of the modern apologists of Islam. Seeing himself as a ‘critical non-Moslem observer’, Kraemer appreciated Iqbal’s remarkable mind, but critiqued his ‘reconstruction of Muslim thought’, deeming it harmful to Islam itself. Kraemer affirmed his conviction that Islamic and European modes of thinking were radically different – subjective versus objective, deductive versus inductive, and psychological versus empirical. Muslim scholars such as Iqbal, instead of a re-vindicating of Islamic thought, destroyed its essence, which was ‘the real religious habitus of mind in Islam’ (Kraemer 1939: 150).

Javanese modernist Muslims who read *Agama Islam* became critical of what they saw as a negative representation of Islam. For example, a Muhammadiyah author, A. D. Haanie, published a response to Kraemer’s *Agama Islam*. Haanie pointed out that Muslims understood their faith very differently. The Prophet Muhammad, according to Haanie, had established ‘a strong *ummah* capable of displaying the flags of knowledge, civilization, dignity, freedom, equality, brotherhood, and compassion among all human-kind whose conditions are disorderly, foolish, and low in morality’. Haanie similarly rejected Kraemer’s interpretation of the word ‘Islam’, which he had translated as submission to God, while criticising some Javanese Muslims who defined Islam as peace (A. *salam*, I. *damai*). While Haanie pointed out that Islam and *salam* came from the same root, he also disagreed with Kraemer’s representation of Islam’s preoccupation primarily with worldly practices and worldly issues (I. *adat kelakuan duniawi*). Kraemer had claimed that Muhammad was so concerned with worldly matters that Islam lost its spiritual essence, but Haanie replied that Islam was not like Christianity, which only stressed the spiritual, the hereafter and death. Islam, Haanie argued, concerned the inner and outer life of this world, including politics, incorporating both religion (*agama*) and law (*shari’ah*, which includes politics and the state). Haanie also took Kraemer to task for presenting Islam as

religion focused on 'holy war'. War, Haanie wrote, was only conducted to defend Islam against its enemies; Islam spread its message through a peaceful mission. Islam was religious-tolerant, for, in the words of the Qur'an: '[Y]our religion belongs to you, and my religion belongs to me.' Haanie saw the West, Christians and Western imperialism as operating in conjunction with some of their 'trained children' in the East, and together opposing Islam. 'Islam is great', he wrote, 'but it is sleeping.' Western imperialism had 'undermined the sense of belonging to Islam [by introducing] ideologies that are non-religious and cultures (*adat*) that are against religion (*mak-siat*).'<sup>7</sup> Haanie contended that Islamic movements would not destroy, but rather advance science, philosophy and civilisation (Haanie 1930 [1929]: 91). Haanie's response to Kraemer exemplifies one way in which a modernist Muslim rejected the idea that Islam was backward and overly concerned with the spiritual and neglecting the material world, but it also reflects a more general feeling that Muslims themselves were best qualified to comment on Islam because they were the believers.

Kraemer warned Christians that expressions of superiority, like those expressed by some Muslims, were dangers. The science of comparative religion should exclude all feelings of superiority; it required recognition of common humanity with adherents of other religions (Kraemer 1938b: 215–22). Since Muslims were 'stubborn', preoccupied with 'group-solidarity' and resisted any effort that may involve change in religion, Christians should be reminded of the importance of obedient faith. While Christianity and Islam were 'acquaintances from the very beginning', Islam had become antagonistic towards Christianity, because of the theological emphasis on the Trinity, and belief that a resurrected Jesus Christ was the Son of God. If Muslims accepted Christianity, it would imply explicit recognition of the error of Islam (Kraemer 1938b: 357).

These exchanges obviously occurred primarily with regard to theological differences, but Kraemer's writings did not contain a mere confrontation. Kraemer's juxtaposition of Islam and Christianity did not necessarily convey a consistent message of criticism. Kraemer asked Christians to learn from Islam, which was 'the teacher of patience', and should regard Islam itself not with 'fear, disgust, or hatred' but with 'faith, hope, love, and endurance' (Kraemer 1938b: 352–4). Christians should therefore treat Muslims

not as non-Christian, but as fellow human beings ‘with the same fundamental needs, aspirations and frustrations’. He believed that true human and religious contact would be possible with them because the mystical concentration on ‘God and the soul’ had removed ‘the axis of religious life from group-solidarity to communion with God in the purely religious sense of the word’ (1938b: 357). More than Snouck, Kraemer was critical of various theological aspects of Islam and Muslims’ practice in the East, but both emphasised the spiritualist essence of Islam that should survive modernity. They believed that Islam, alongside Christianity, could offer its spiritual and moral ethos to the modern world.

### **Civilising Mission: The British in Malaya**

In Malaya, British imperial powers saw economic gain – or ‘the Great Market’ – as their foremost motive in colonialising other parts of the world (Woodruff 1940). However, the economic motive was often difficult to separate from the religious and moral because of the distinction made between ‘civilised’ and ‘primitive’ peoples – often also in terms of Christians and non-Christians. Many statesmen of Victorian England sought to enlarge the British Empire by making its colonies part of the British ‘civilisational’ project.<sup>10</sup> Although specific references to Christianity were muted, belief in its innate superiority to other religions did influence the way that British officialdom dealt with the world. Lord Alfred Milner (1854–1925), an influential British colonial administrator, described himself as a ‘British race patriot’, and a ‘nationalist’. As a believer in the ‘law of human progress’, he argued that ‘the competition between nations, each seeking its maximum development, is the Divine order of the world, the law of life and progress’ (McLeod 1999: 60). Echoing the views of Raffles a century earlier, Milner believed not only in British racial superiority and nationalism, but also in obligation to spread ‘civilisation’ to the rest of the world.

Unlike the Dutch Queen, the British authorities hardly expressed explicit support for Christian converts in the British Empire. While the Dutch colonial government saw Christian missions and schools – especially in remote areas and non-Islamic regions – as an ally, the British Government did not provide mission in Malaya with financial assistance. In most cases, British administrators sought to distance themselves from Christian missionaries

and while they may have talked of ‘civilisation’ they never saw themselves as evangelisers (Greenlee and Johnson 1999; Veer 2001; Cox 2002). The Malay Peninsula was predominantly Muslim, and experiences in India made the British very aware of possible resistance from Muslim subjects. In consequence, the overseas endeavours of the various mission societies, such as Bible translations, were independently financed and conducted essentially without government financial aid (Etherington 2001: 304–5). Yet, although colonial administrations neither supported nor hindered Christian missions, in Malaya as elsewhere in the British Empire, the expense of welfare responsibilities for the native population was avoided because Christian missions became the main providers of ‘modern’ educational and health services.

In British Malaya, there were no figures like Snouck and Kraemer in terms of knowledge of Islam. According to historian William Roff, no British scholar could compare to Snouck in Arabic and in his encyclopedic knowledge about Islamic history and doctrines. The most prominent authorities in Malay culture were Richard Wilkinson (1867–1941) and Richard Winstedt (1878–1966). In fact, Wilkinson and Winstedt cited Snouck on aspects of Islam and Islam in the East Indies (for example, Wilkinson 1906: 4–5). While Winstedt wrote prolifically, Wilkinson was ‘the most perceptive of early British administrators in colonial Malaya’ (Roff 2009: 97). Unlike Snouck and Kraemer, Wilkinson and Winstedt related British imperial interests to the Malay population, rather than to global and historical Islam.<sup>11</sup> Wilkinson and Winstedt produced works on the various aspects of Malay history and culture, and their contribution to shaping policies had a far-reaching impact on British colonial attitudes to Islam and Malay governance.<sup>12</sup> Both scholar-administrators reinforced the conceptualisation of Islam as inseparable from Malay religion and cultural identity, and clearly distinguished from Christian theology and from Western modernity. In another departure from the attitudes of Snouck and Kraemer, Winstedt and Wilkinson approached Islam primarily as a cultural, Malay phenomenon. They displayed little interest in the theological content of Islam and its political manifestation in the context of the Anglo-Malay collaboration. They contended that Sufi orders were considered old-fashioned, but they recognised that aspects of Sufi teachings were deeply embedded in Malay religious practices – and in some cases, could still be relevant as Malays encountered the modern world.

### Observing Practical Islam: R. J. Wilkinson and Malay Heterodoxy

R. J. Wilkinson was born in Greece, but educated at Trinity College in Cambridge where he learned European languages (French, German and Spanish). He joined the Straits Settlement Civil Service and then became a cadet in 1889, acquiring both Malay and Hokkien, a widely spoken Chinese dialect. He was appointed as acting director of education in Penang, acting inspector general of schools in the Straits Settlements (Singapore, Penang, Malacca and Province Wellesley), and then British Resident of Negeri Sembilan, before he became colonial secretary in the Straits Settlements. He became a 'keen moderniser' in the field of education, establishing the Malay Training College in Malacca in 1900 and founding the Malay Residential School, later known as the Malay College Kuala Kangsar (MCKK).

One characteristic of the scholarship of Wilkinson was the categorisation of Islam into orthodox ('correct' belief and practice) and heterodox, to some degree reflecting a similar categorisation among Muslim reformers who used *kufir*, *shirk* and *bid'ah* to label 'outside Islam' or 'heretic'. Wilkinson maintained that although Islam and Malay identity became closely connected, ordinary Malays were predominantly heterodox. He did not see that Malay Muslims were enthusiastic about a global, universal Islam, despite increased pilgrimage and the growing number of students in Mecca and Cairo. Orthodox Islam, for him, was differentiated from older beliefs such as the invocation of local spirits. He also contrasted the West, embodying 'the spirit of skepticism' (skepticism was the 'main feature of modern man') with the 'Far East', which could include 'several irreconcilable faiths at one and the same time'. A locally born Chinese, for example, could venerate 'the Virgin Mary, the Prophet Muhammad, and all the ghosts in Singapore' (Wilkinson 1906: 1).

Like Snouck and other contemporaries, Wilkinson used the labels 'Muhammadanism' and 'Islam' interchangeably. Wilkinson claimed that 'Muhammadanism' was inherently 'intolerant', because it judged rival faiths as future inhabitants of hell. Islam, he wrote, would punish a renegade as a murderer, and would reject any belief borrowed from competing religions. If rival creeds surrendered to the Muslim world, the missionary zeal of the Muslims was willing to grant great concessions. However, in peninsular

Malaya, the Muslim environment was dotted with sacred localities wherein 'old Hindu and Indonesian divinities' were still worshipped under other designations. The Malay Muslims who reject such 'heterodox' practices, however disguised, were in the minority. Although the five pillars of Islam constituted the doctrinal and ritual that were central for Muslims, Malay Muslims were predominantly non-observant.

Wilkinson described Malay Muslims as formally belonging to the Sunni theology and Shafi'i legal school of thought, but they appeared unaware of the existence of 'rival Mussulman sects and of the divergence of their (Malays) creed from the truer Sunnite beliefs' (Wilkinson 1906: 2–3). Wilkinson's contribution to British understanding of Malay Islam was his recognition of its interaction with local beliefs. He recognised that other Europeans had often based their ideas of Islam on a perusal of the Qur'an alone, overlooking aspects such as the social conditions and local context. He was critical of the notion of an 'ideal Islam' that did not exist in real life. For him, to approach Islam fairly was to judge 'modern Islam by what is actually believed by its votaries and preached in its mosques' and to try to understand 'its missionary work by studying arguments that appeal to its proselytes and not by those that would carry weight with us' (3). Wilkinson placed more value on what he called 'practical Islam' because he believed that it had more application in Malay life than 'ideal Islam', which he equated with orthodoxy. He thus saw some value in ideas that Malay Muslim reformers would deem as backward and heterodox.

For Wilkinson, the place of Sufism was ambiguous. It was one of the integral, orthodox dimensions of Islam, and Muslim Sufi saints and jurists had provided knowledge and civilisation that was 'far above the moral, spiritual, and intellectual level of the average modern Malay' (6). On the other hand, local Sufi orders could also become 'heterodox', for spirit reverence was a controversial issue that divided the orthodox, or 'true' Muslims studying religion, Arabic, Malay and accepted forms of mysticism from the heterodox, lax Malays, focusing on divination, invulnerability and magic. Orthodox Malays believed in One God, Omnipotent and Eternal, but, in general, ordinary Malays were superstitious, syncretistic and ignorant of Islamic theology (18–19). Although they were open to new ideas, Malays were 'afraid' to set old traditions aside. 'The Malay cares nothing for consistency; he does

not exchange old customs for new; he keeps both the new and the old' (Wilkinson 1925a: 64).

### **Preserving Local Culture: The Committee of Malay Studies**

In 1906 the colonial government established the Committee for Malay Studies with an aim to oversee research and publication of studies on Malay history, religion and culture.<sup>13</sup> The government appointed Wilkinson as chair and other British staff and several Malay assistants. With Wilkinson as the general editor, the committee published pamphlets and books on Malay life and customs, including Islam. It printed previously unpublished manuscripts, such as the Pasai Kings history (M. *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai*), the Malay Annals (*Sejarah Melayu*) and the history of the Kings of Riau (*Hikayat Raja-raja Riau*), applying a uniform system of Romanising Malay. While the Arabic-Malay script (Jawi) was retained for many manuscripts produced in Malaya and others transmitted from Arabia and elsewhere, others were published in Romanised Malay. Wilkinson advocated a policy based on 'conservation combined with development', as part of what came to be called the 'pro-Malay campaign' aimed at protecting Malay history and culture (Burns 1971: 2–3).

An important series comprised the 'papers on Malay subjects', divided into various topics: Life and Customs, Malay Literature, and Law. 'Life and Customs' consisted of several parts: 1) the Incidents of Malay Life, 2) the Circumstances of Malay Life and 3) Malay Amusements. 'Malay Literature' was also divided along lines that made sense to a Western reader – Romance, History, and Poetry.<sup>14</sup> This new grouping of Malay 'life and customs' into different topics was intended to serve as a textbook for the examination of colonial officials and to meet the needs of out-station officers whenever they needed fuller information than some simple explanation from a Malay informant (Wilkinson 1924: vi–viii). These papers could be consulted in colonial offices and reference libraries, which were established for the benefit of scholars and students working in Malay history and culture in order to 'promote a better knowledge of this country and of its people'.<sup>15</sup> By transmitting 'tradition', Malay culture would be better equipped withstand the advance of outside influences. Concluding his work on Malay life and customs, Wilkinson wrote, 'It would be a pity if Malay custom was allowed to

perish unrecorded' (1925a: 74). Because Islam was considered a key element in the sense of being Malay, the committee looked beyond Malaya to collect Islamic literature, which was pertinent to Malay culture. For example, they received and preserved copies of the 'Manual of Muhammadan Law' by al-Imam Nawawi (d. 1278), a 'medieval' Shafi'i scholar, who had by that time become popular in Malay schools and mosques. They also discovered an English translation of the Arabic book *Minhaj al-Abidin* (A. 'The Path of the Worshippers') published in London. Copies of this work were distributed to British officials because it was thought that it would be useful in some ways, especially in the courts.<sup>16</sup>

The Dutch Office for Native and Arab Affairs affected the study of various ethnic cultures in the East Indies, whereas the Committee of Malay Studies singled out Malay ethnic culture and history. The diversity of Islamic movements as discussed earlier influenced the way in which the office expanded their understanding of the colony. The relatively homogenous Malay culture perpetuated the colonial understanding of a Malay ethnic identity and culture, despite the various Malay sultanates. Both offices had few native assistants in conducting administration, research and report, thus suggesting some degree of collaboration in a new form of study, research and publication.

### **Reinforcing Malay Culture: Richard Winstedt and his Contributions**

Richard Winstedt served as an education officer for about thirty-two years before being appointed Reader at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in the University of London. A graduate in English literature at Oxford and trained by Wilkinson, Winstedt focused on studying and publishing studies of Malay language, literature, culture, history, economics, arts and crafts, law, and religion. In these categories he saw different degrees of Islamic elements. As inspector of schools in Perak, then as assistant district officer in Tapah, and then as assistant director of education in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, he made a 'revolutionary' contribution to education in Malaya and in the view of one authority, was 'the last and greatest of the British "colonial" scholars in Malaya' (Bastin 1964: 9). His works on Islam were limited, but unique, and no less important than Wilkinson's. He saw Malay culture as multi-layered, which had over the centuries incorporated many influences. Winstedt wrote, 'Anyone who surveys

the field of Malay literature will be struck by the amazing abundance of its foreign flora and the rarity of indigenous growths. Malay folklore, even, is borrowed, most of it, from the vast store-house of Indian legend, an early crop garnered in the Hindu period, later in the Islamic' (Winstedt 1969b [1940]: v).

Winstedt wrote short essays about the rise of Muhammadanism in the Malay Peninsula and archipelago (1917), the Arab Yemen descendants of Perak and Siak (1918), 'the early Muhammadan missionaries' (1920), 'some Malay mystics, heretical, and orthodox' (1923), and 'notes on Malay subjects', including mysticism in Malaya (1947) (Bastin 1964: 1–23). When reviewing Malay beliefs and religion, Winstedt used a chronological and topic mode of organisation: first 'primitive', second 'Hinduism' and last 'Islam'. The 'primitive' Malay culture was characterised by belief in many spirits, shamanism (intermediary between spirits and humans) and sacrifice of animals as a form of propitiation. Indian Hinduism and Buddhism had then penetrated Malaya, evident through the use of Sanskrit terms (such as '*agama*' for 'religion', '*puasa*' for 'fasting', '*surga*' for 'heaven' and '*neraka*' for 'hell') and through Hindu literature (especially the epic story of *Mahabharata*). In the last section, he described how Islam reached Sumatra in the thirteenth century, encountered Hindu courts and customary laws, and developed in the Indonesian-Malay archipelago. In noting that Muslims numbered only about 85 per cent in the Netherlands Indies, but 100 per cent in Malaya he confirmed the general idea that being Malay was inseparable from being Muslim.

Regarding Sufism, Winstedt observed that 'Malay Muhammadans' faced conflicts between 'theologian orthodoxy' and 'Sufi heterodoxy': 'There has been the recurrent conflict between the transcendentalism of orthodox theologians, for who God is in heaven, and popular mysticism, which starting from animism inclines towards a pantheism that finds Him closer than the veins of one's neck' (Winstedt 1947: 38). Winstedt studied Sufism and magic in 1925 and did not publish it until 1951. He tried to demonstrate magic as a combination of primitive, Hindu, Sufi and Muslim beliefs. In his view, 'Malay magic' was neither unique nor indigenous because it incorporated foreign ideas and terms. What others may see as 'original' was 'primitive'. For its part, Malay Islam not only tolerated the spirits and gods of older faiths (Hinduism and primitive beliefs), but introduced the Malay to the

Islamic devil or *iblis* and brought new methods of divination and amulets. Linguistically and culturally, the acceptance of Islam meant that Sanskrit terms were replaced by references to Adam, Allah and Muhammad, along with genies (jinns) and angels (Winstedt 1982 [1951]: 81).

In his account of Malay Islam, Winstedt referred to Muhammad Abduh's 'modernism', which he described as a 'puritan ideal of religion freed from superstition and its advocacy of a scientific education for the transformation of djinns into microbes'. He noted that Malays had become aware of the Muhammadiyah movement in the Netherlands Indies, 'the party that would interpret the Kuran [*sic*] in the light of modern knowledge and aim at the physical and intellectual advancement of the race' (Winstedt 1947: 44). However, he was uninterested in the spread and influence of this modernism in Malaya, which he saw as having little relevance to 'Malay culture' as he conceived it. Much like Snouck, Winstedt showed little optimism in modernising Islam in Malaya.

On the personal level, Winstedt found the Sufi understanding of spirituality particularly appealing, rather than 'orthodoxy and the idea of Paradise versus Hell'. As he put it: 'The thought seems presumptuous and even impious: God is nearer to me than the muscles of my neck, says the Sufi mystic, and surely that ought always to be the attitude of the religious ... At present I find so much to fascinate me and hold me to this colourful life' (Winstedt 1969a: 186).

The Malays' responses to the Malay studies were generally positive, probably because the studies focused on language, history and culture, rather than on theology and politics. As a response, Malay author Za'ba, who praised a 'cordinal relationship' between the British and the Malays, expressed his appreciation of R. J. Wilkinson's contributions, and especially Winstedt's 'deep and broad contributions' to Malay studies, although these demand further research. Wilkinson's works on Malay grammar in Latin script was used in Malaya from 1901 onwards. Winstedt's works on Malay language, literature, culture, religion and history, were used in Malaya from the time of publications onwards. According to Za'ba, in 1921 Winstedt planned to write a book on a 'history of the "Muhammadan thought" among Malays' but in the event did not actually write this work – for reasons that are unclear. In contrast to Snouck, Winstedt was able to make only few references to

Islam in his works. This was because Za'ba sought to improve Malay literacy and attain progress through writing. He initiated a Malay Literary Society, whose main aim was to unify Malay spelling and advance Malay literature (Roff 1967: 185). Wilkinson helped Malays reach the goal.

Zaba also recognised that the British introduced the use of Arabic terms '*tarikh*' and '*sejarah*' for a history of the Malays in the strict meaning of the rendering of the past based on reliable sources and 'rational' methodology, such as '*Tawarikh Melayu*', '*Sejarah Negeri Johor*' and '*Sejarah Tanah Melayu*'. 'God gave language to Malays, but Sir Winstedt gave them grammar!', he wrote (Za'ba 1964: 337). Along with Wilkinson, Winstedt played a crucial role in reinforcing Malay identity and culture.

## Conclusion

The Dutch and the British shared imperial goals but they acted differently in relation to Christian missions in the colonies. Generally speaking, some Dutch colonialists became more supportive of Christian missions in the East Indies than the British attitude toward the Christians in Malaya, although they tried to avoid clashing with majority Muslims. In their efforts to 'know' their subjects, the Dutch and the British drew upon their own cultural traditions in order to know and understand Islam and local customs in Indonesia and Malaya, either to control them or to bring them into the modern world. In turn, Islam and local culture influenced their ideas about the relationship between the West, Christianity and modernity as well as the development of Orientalists, missionaries and Western modernisers. By the early twentieth century, when Muslim reformers in the Indonesian-Malay world were preoccupied with organisation and writing about Islam in pursuing 'progress', European administrators and scholars were critical of various aspects of Islamic doctrines and practices, but they, too, saw Islam as a potential ally in drawing local peoples towards the path of modernity laid out by the West. The Dutch explored Islam as a global religion and a local practice in different parts of Indonesia, whereas the British were interested in Islam in terms of its association with Malay culture.

The four 'Orientalists' described certain qualities associated with 'progress' – rationality, science, capitalism and materialism – that they did not see in the 'Muslim East'. As scholars, missionaries or colonial admin-

istrators, they treated Islam as an object of study or as a ‘problem’; they showed varying degrees of interest in Islam and Muslims depending on their educational background and colonial positions. There was no unified, monolithic ‘Orientalism’. Snouck was a self-proclaimed Orientalist who studied Arabic texts and other sources of Islamic history in addition to contemporary dimensions of Islam. He viewed all religions as conservative, but thought that the overwhelming majority of Muslims had a medieval mentality. But he was optimistic about Muslims being able to modernise because he felt that Islam shared some ‘essential resemblances’ with the modern world and that examples of ‘modernist Islam’ already existed. The missionary Kraemer approached Islam from a comparative theological perspective, describing Islam for Protestant missionaries working in Muslim contexts. Although he believed that Christianity faced challenges from secularism and materialism, he considered that Islam represented a challenge due to its spiritual strength and the zeal with which Muslims pursued spiritual and especially political powers. Islam was widespread and a political Islam was emerging in the East Indies, but its encroachment had been checked by mysticism, *adat* and European penetration.

Wilkinson and Winstedt were less concerned about Christian missions and theological questions in Malaya than were Snouck and Kraemer in the East Indies. Approaching Islam as a practical, living tradition, Wilkinson defined it as a communal religion. He claimed that most Malays were formalistic, although not orthodox, in their Islamic practice. Like Wilkinson, Winstedt approached Islam from a literary and historical viewpoint and considered the Islam practised in Malaya to be unorthodox. He recognised that Arabic had transformed Malay vocabulary as Islam had replaced the older Hindu-Buddhist religiosity, although not completely, and like Wilkinson, Winstedt concluded that Malay Muslims were culturally ‘eclectic’ despite their formal conversion to Islam. Both Wilkinson and Winstedt believed that Malays would not give up older beliefs and practices even when overlaid by new ideas, but their influence also shaped the official British colonial view of Islam as the foundation of Malay religion and culture. Based on their Western desires for knowledge and order, they were able to preserve and document information about Malay culture, which they saw as a coherent and ultimately knowable product.

They expressed criticisms of Islam and Muslims, but they also recognised certain aspects: Snouck apparently converted to Islam and called for mutual understanding between the Christian West and the Muslim East; Winstedt became attracted to the mystical, cultural Islam; Wilkinson respected Malay Muslims for their strong sense of identity; and Kraemer attempted to write about Islam without wanting to offend Muslim sensibilities.

Indonesian Muslims' responses to the Dutch studies of Islam seemed to be more diverse than the Malays' responses to the British studies of Malay language, history and culture. Kraemer's theological work in particular received criticism by the modernist Muslim author Haanie, whereas Winstedt's works on language and culture were regarded as a significant contribution to the study of Malay cultural identity.

Edward Said's (1979) Foucauldian argument regarding European colonial knowledge and controlling power is particularly helpful in understanding the Dutch and the British views of Islam and the East. However, it is important to recognise the diverse backgrounds, approaches and positions discussed in this chapter and other chapters. It is also helpful to consider the variety of Muslims' responses to the colonial views of their religion and cultures discussed in this chapter as well as in other chapters.

## Notes

1. Snouck was a student of a Leiden professor and the chief editor of *The Encyclopedia of Islam*. Arabist and philologist, Michael J. de Goeje (1836–1907), *Overgedrukt uit de Nederlandsche Spectator*, 1881, 51. KITLV.
2. Snouck's conversion to Islam in Mecca has been a contentious topic (Witkam 2007: xiii).
3. Salim, 'Mana Jang Harus didulukan?', *Neratja*, 24 January 1918, No. 17, Year 2, in Salim (1954: 36); Salim, 'Benih Pertjederaan', *Neratja*, 7 January 1919, No. 4, Year 3, in Salim (1954: 45).
4. Salim, 'De Sluiering en Afzondering der Vrouw', *Madjalah Het Licht*, Year 2, 1926, in Salim (1954: 167–75).
5. 'Snouck Hurgronje dengan Islam', bag. IV, *Het Licht*, No. 6, Year 7, August 1931.
6. The advisers for native and Arabic affairs were as follows: Snouck Hurgronje (1899–1906), G. A. J. Hazeu (1907–13 and 1917–21), D. A. Rinkes (1914–16), R. A. Kern (1921–2 and 1924–6), E. Gobeë (1923 and 1927–37) and G. F. Pijper (1937–42). Laffan (2011: 209–32).

7. This Office later developed into *Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken*, or *Kantor Agama*, Office for Religious affairs (*Kantor Agama*) and then became the Department of Religious Affairs (Balai Penelitian Lektur Keagamaan) in 1946 created by Muslim nationalists. Noer (1978).
8. Kraemer uses works by Western scholars such as his mentor Snouck Hurgronje, Duncan Black Macdonald, A. J. Wensinck and Reynold Nicholson, and Muslim authors such as Syed Amir Ali, Maulana Muhammad Ali, Hamka and Mohammad Natsir.
9. The verse is 'To each is a goal to which God turns him; then strive together as in a race towards all that is good. Whoever ye are, God will bring you together. For God hath power over all things.'
10. Archive No. 4/1940, Education Office of Kelantan, 8/40, ANM.
11. Sir Richard Winstedt published the following books among others: *Malaya, The Straits Settlements and the Federated and Unfederated Malay States*, 1927; *An English–Malay Dictionary*, 1939; *Britain and Malaya, 1786–1941*, 1944; *Malaya and its History*, 1948; *The Malay Magician: Being Shaman, Saiva, and Sufi*, 1951; and *A History of Classical Malay Literature*, 1969.
12. My correspondence with the late William Roff (d. 2013), then a retired professor at Edinburgh University who lived in St Andrews, 20 March 2011.
13. 'Memorandum on Malay Studies', 5 August 1911, ANM.
14. Wilkinson (1924, 1925a, 1925b, 1929, 1932).
15. 'Memorandum on Malay Studies', 5 August 1911, ANM.
16. 'Manual of Muhammadan Law by Mahmudin Abu Zakaria ibn Sheri Nawawi translated by E. C. Howard into English', No. 24, 1915; High Commissioner's Office, Singapore, 29 December 1914, the British Adviser, Kelantan Government, Kota Bharu, ANM.



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PART II

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**MODERNISING POLITICS  
AND GOVERNMENT**





## Building *Siyasah* and Reforming Sultanate

The Sarekat Islam has been criticized for showing hatred (*I. permusuhan*) against the government and the Dutch people in the East Indies, but our leaders work hard, sincerely, and truthfully so that such negative comment against our movement may be avoided, and that the government could put trust on Muslim people and our movement because what we aim is what all aim: to reach progress (*I. kemajuan*).

(Partondo 1914)

Indeed, the English are an army of God, the Lord of the worlds, who has ordered them to come here to free us from darkness, the prison of ignorance, injustice, wickedness, and cruelty of our own rulers.

(Al-Hadi 1926)

**P**olitics comprises various kinds of leadership in theory and in action, in educational, economic and social and even household policies. In 'Politics as a Vocation', Weber focuses on the political association of a state (1958 [1921]: 77), but he also observes that 'an essentially political character marked all the main ordinances of Islam', because of Islam's interest in challenging enemies, regulating sexual behaviour, prohibiting usury, supporting the poor and even in proclaiming that God is one and Muhammad is his messenger (1993 [1922]: 263–4). For Snouck (a contemporary of Weber), Hendrik Kraemer and other colonialists, 'religion' was different to but inseparable from 'politics' in Islam. Snouck, for instance, observed that Muslim political authorities needed to keep the community in the right path in its life and doctrine (Snouck 1916: 84–5). However, Snouck did not address how Muslims disagreed on the meanings and means of politics. In Malaya, Muslims used politics and *siyasah* sometimes interchangeably alongside other

terms for leadership and government. The Arabic term ‘*siyasah*’ has no exact equivalences in the Qur’an and the hadith, but Muslims have used it to mean ‘politics’ both in theory and practice (see Ayubi 1993; Qardhawi 2007; Martin and Barzegar 2010). This chapter examines how Muslim reformers in colonial Indonesia and Malaya articulated politics, and how they related to the caliphate, the colonial state and the traditional governments. Mostly uninterested in supporting or renewing the caliphate, many Indonesian Muslims began to appropriate and build politics, some cooperating with the Dutch and others not, whereas many Malay reformers sought to reform the Malay society, without rejecting the British-sultan modernisation projects.

### **Building Politics beyond Caliphate: Serving *Ummah* and *Negeri***

In the Indonesian-Malay world, those Muslim reformers who divided Islam into the political and the religious, based on Qur’anic concepts of *dunya* and *din* matters, considered politics to be an aspect of worldly affairs and a means for making progress in the material world of the living. The old kingdoms and sultanates remained, but they were transformed into a colonial system of government. Beyond the internal politics among the Dutch power and the local kings, and between local kings themselves, Muslim reformers became cooperative or non-cooperative toward the Dutch colonial government and native officials. Others, being influenced by Russian and Chinese socialisms, became critical of Dutch colonialism and capitalism, but used Dutch vocabularies and institutions. They were motivated to change social conditions and transform attitudes, through the medium of political associations (Shiraishi 1990: 27).

The global context for this diverse Muslim political environment is the same: at a time when European colonial powers consolidated their hegemony in Muslims and non-Muslim countries, the worldwide leadership of the Islamic *ummah* was declining, culminating in the abolishment of the Ottoman Empire and caliphate in 1923 in Turkey. However, the ideas and activities of Muslims were predominantly localised and as result they were politically divided.

Muslim reformers began to debate what politics means. For example, in an essay entitled ‘What is *politik*?’ a local contributor to the periodical *Anak Kontji* in Makassar characterised *politik* as the ability to lead with commit-

ment, to take care of the affairs of others, to follow a straight path, to exercise self-control and to employ correct speech.<sup>1</sup> Politics was for him a moral force. In another case, in West Sumatra, politics was defined as a secular, non-religious matter when a dispute arose between a local headman and a preacher concerning the content of Friday sermons. The headman reported to the Dutch controller that the *khutbahs* in a booklet 'Contemporary Khutbahs' were political and therefore unsuitable in mosques. *Khutbahs* should be strictly religious, and concern prayer and remembrance of Allah and preparation for life in the hereafter. He was critical of preachers who made political speeches in the mosques intended to foment social movements or support political parties. Indeed, such political preachers often took Friday sermons as an opportunity to criticise other Muslims for being backward, for irrational or merely symbolic religiosity and for maintaining a tradition of ignorance (*A. adat jahiliyyah*). They also criticised unjust rulers and those who accumulated wealth without taking care of the poor. They talked of knowledge and progress, the struggle against religious innovation and unlawful acts, while exhorting listeners to love their nation and the country. The local headman regarded all of these issues as political and irrelevant to the religious character of the Friday *khutbahs*.<sup>2</sup> This understanding of what is political is different from the one demonstrated by the modernist Muhammadiyah author A. Haanie who criticised Hendrik Kraemer for depoliticising Islam discussed in the previous chapter.

In Malaya the major players were the modernists and the traditionalists (who could be either critical or indifferent to the British and royal authority); Malay nationalists (who tended to be critical of colonial policies, but were largely accommodating); and, unlike the East Indies, the predominant role of the sultan or traditional elite (allied to the British). There was a strong feeling among Malays that traditional sultanate should be maintained, but reformers displayed a new understanding of politics and spread a new political awareness (*M. kesadaran baru*). New identities were created on the basis of territories (*negeri*), peoples (*bangsa*) and faith community (*ummah*), thus transforming the old sultanate (Milner 1994: 7; 2003). Under British colonialism, the *kaum muda*, who could be products of Arabic, Malay or English schools (see Chapter VII), became increasingly politicised as they found the traditional government unable or unwilling to pursue reformist goals (Roff

1967: 254). Some of the Malay activists were well informed about the activities of their Indonesian brothers as well as with those in Cairo, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, through travels and through reading news and periodicals.

While Muhammadiyah reformers spoke publicly about the worldwide *ummah* and the necessity to struggle in the path of God, they rarely talked about a caliphate or Islamic political unity. Ahmad Dahlan, discussed earlier, seemed uninterested in promoting either a pan-Islamic unity or anti-colonial nationalism. Dahlan himself did not openly oppose Dutch rule, and because there was no attempt to adopt an anti-Dutch stance, the organisation was able to operate within the colonial system until the Japanese invasion of 1941.

A significant development during this period was a discussion of the concept of *Negeri Islam* (I. Islamic country). In response to the question of whether Indonesia was a *negeri Islam*, the NU *fatwas* referred to the three kinds of ‘house’: 1) the Abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) where Muslim rulers applied Islamic law, partly or completely; 2) the Abode of War (*dar al-harb*), the non-Islamic or *kafir* domain; and 3) the Abode of Peace (A. *dar al-sulh*) where Muslims were allowed to apply Islamic law or had a peace contract with the *kafir*. NU’s 1936 annual congress reasserted that Indonesia was part of the Abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*), or an Islamic country or region, *daerah Islam*, rather than the Abode of War (Khuluq 2000: 84–5). In a response to a question ‘Is our country Islamic?’, NU issued a *fatwa* stating that ‘our country, Indonesia, is an “Islamic country” because it has always been ruled completely by Muslims. Even though it’s now being ruled by a *kafir* colonizer, it has remained an Islamic country now and will do so forever.’ References were made to the NU translation of an Arabic book of *fatwa* published in the early twentieth century, *Bughya al-Mustarsyidin* (A. ‘The Desire of Guided People’), by a Shafi’i scholar, Abdurrahman Ba’alawi. As long as Muslims were able to observe Islamic law even partially after coming under *kafir* rule and if Muslims had been rulers at some point, a nation could be regarded as Islamic, *dar al-Islam*. The mention of Batavia (I. *Betawi*) and Java (A. *bilad al-jawa*) in the *fatwa* points to the Islamic associations of nation and country (in Masyhuri 1997: 138). They reinterpreted the opposition between *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb* in light of the fact that they were Muslims living in their own lands but ruled by Europeans. Thus they found the idea of *dhimmi*,

the protected non-Muslim minorities, and the application of *jizyah*, a poll tax required from the dhimmi for Muslims' protection, irrelevant. From the 1920s, the name Indonesia as well as *Hindia Timur* (East Indies) had been sometimes used to refer to this *negeri Islam*.

Many called their country *bilad al-jawa*, or a country of Jawa. In a 1937 speech, Hasyim Asy'ari emphasised the unity of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah doctrine, with specific reference to Jawa as a 'country'.

O, all people, before you stand infidels who deny God. They fill every corner of the country. Who [among you] is ready to engage in dialog with them and guide them to the right path? Indeed our religion is one! Our legal allegiance is one: the Shafi'i! Our region (*tanah air*) is one: *Jawa* [Java], and we are all of us *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah*. (Asy'ari cited in Mul Khan 1986: 16–20)

As this call for unity suggests, Hasyim Asy'ari realised that Muslims were disunited and he therefore called for Muslims, both modernist and traditionalist in the *bilad al-jawa*, to 'maintain brotherhood, unity, and harmony and to uphold virtue in order reach prosperity' (Asy'ari cited in Khuluq 2000: 62–3, 72). This goal of unity was problematic, however, because the symbol of the Muslim *ummah*, the Ka'ba in Mecca, was under Wahhabi-Ibn Saud rule, which considered many Sufi and local practices heretical. The rejection of Saudi Wahhabi leadership by Muslim traditionalists in the East Indies had led to the creation of NU, and SI gave up its pan-Islamic voice in favour of Indonesian nationhood. At the General Islamic Congress in Jerusalem in 1931, the only Indonesian present was a 23-year-old Al-Azhar student, Kahar Muzakkir. Due to the increasing ideological division in the East Indies, no representative was sent to attend the Congress of Caliphate in Cairo. As the goal of electing a new caliph faded, Jawi Muslims became increasingly concerned about the immediate problems in their homelands (Bruinessen 1995).

A native group that accepted Dutch colonial government while confronting the ideology of imperialism and capitalism was Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI), which would become Sarekat Islam (Union of Islam) (SI). Later this would become a political party (Partai Sarekat Islam) (PSI) and then Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII). With its new form of organisation, SI

has been considered ‘Indonesia’s most spectacular anticolonial movement, although it was complex and many-faceted . . . spanning old and new in a variety of ways’ (Bastin and Benda 1968: 104). SI first aimed at challenging Chinese economic forces and unifying Muslim traders, but was separated into different factions with different orientations – Islamist, nationalist, and communist – orientations and categories that were not necessarily exclusive of one another.

### **Making Islam Socialistic and Political: Sarekat Islam in Java**

The first nationwide movement in the East Indies combining Islam and economic concerns was Sarekat Islam, founded on 5 April 1909 as the Islamic Trade Union (Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah (SDI) by R. M. Tirto Adhi Soerjo (1880–1918) in Bogor, West Java. Tirto envisaged SDI as a movement by free people (I. *Kaum Mardika*, D. *Vrije Burgers*), such as merchants, peasants and other workers, who were unified by Islam (Pramoedya 2003 [1985]: 150). He himself was born to a *priyayi* family, received a Dutch education and before founding SDI established the first ‘Indonesian’ press, *Soenda Berita* (‘Sunda News’) in 1903, which published *Soeloeh Keadilan* (I. ‘Justice Guidance’) and *Medan Prijaji* (I. ‘The Field for Aristocrats’). He was involved in an association known as Perhimpunan Oost en West (I./D. Union of East and West). He believed in education for native women, and viewed the Dutch language as a valuable acquisition. Critical of aristocratic attitudes of superiority, he studied Islam by himself in order to understand the minds of the Muslim people. His inclusive ideas about religious belief are evident in his idea that God, Tuhan and Allah are identical, but he was also an advocate of modernity (Toer 2003 [1985]: 59, 168). The SDI document stated: ‘the present time is considered the age of progress. Our watchword thus must be that striving for progress should not remain idle sound . . . The organization aimed to create brotherhood, foster solidarity and mutual help among Muslims, by any means that are not in conflict with the laws of the country and the Government’ (Shiraishi 1990: 42; Toer 2003 [1985]: 170). Here liberation was understood not in terms of anti-Dutch law and government.

In 1927 activists changed the SI into a political party: Partai Sjarikat Islam Hindia Timoer (the East Indies Muslim Union Party), renamed Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Party of Muslim Union) (henceforth

PSII) in 1929. This change in name and orientation reflected its changing leadership and agenda. During these years, the agenda shifted from improving the economy and the social condition of Muslim natives in reaction to Chinese economic domination, to advancing Islam in Indonesia and then to promoting Islamic nationhood. In documents and correspondence, PSII leaders used various sources – Russian and Chinese Marxism, the Qur’an, the hadith and Islamic history and literature – in order to address a number of issues, including a refutation of imperialism and capitalism.

A second influential SI leader was H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto. Born in Madiun, he attended OSVIA (D. Opleiding School Voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren), the Dutch school for training civil servants, and began to work as a civil servant (1902–5) before he left and became a writer and activist. In one of his early speeches, unlike other SI leaders, Tjokroaminoto was initially reluctant to question colonial domination, and did not believe in direct confrontation. A speech in 1914 thus explained that being Muslim means being native and that Muslims should obey the laws of the Netherlands: ‘Even though the anti-SI group is getting bigger and bigger, and seems to be obstructing our movement, we will not give up making mighty efforts, under the protection of the Government, to advance and elevate the lot of the Natives’ (Tjokroaminoto in Shiraishi 1990: 61). However, as time passed he became increasingly Islamic and ‘radicalized’, in part because of the growing friction among the SI leaders, and demanded, for example, that self-government be granted soon or in the near future (104).

For Tjokroaminoto, *siyasa* or politics was an obligation for Muslims with clear objectives: freedom of the Islamic *ummah* and implementation of Allah’s commands stipulated in the Qur’an. To achieve these objectives, an Islamic political party was crucial for transmitting political knowledge and promoting political education according to Islamic teachings and for preparing their future government in their own country (Tjokroaminoto 1958 [1931]: 76–7). Tjokroaminoto’s concern at the general poverty and backwardness of Muslims made him a firm advocate of progress and prosperity, couched in both religious and worldly terms. For him, Islam was not only progressive, but, more importantly, it was also anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, and thus represented the antithesis of Western values. He and other SI leaders promoted socialist ideas through organising, speaking, writing and publishing, often using the Dutch

language in which they had been educated. Tjokroaminoto regarded Western capitalism as the cause of Muslims' ills because it drove the Dutch to colonise Indonesia and institute national slavery (I. *penghambaan kebangsaan*). Because of their wrongdoing, capitalists would be 'punished by God, both in this world and in the hereafter'. By contrast, Tjokroaminoto talked about Islamic socialism, citing Qur'anic passages that forbade usury (A. *riba*) and that obliged Muslims to give zakat to the poor. But poverty, he recognised, was a global problem, and he referred to the German Socialist Party's challenge to capitalistic enterprise in Europe, the United States and in the Netherlands Indies (Tjokroaminoto in Amelz 1952: 31–7). Tjokroaminoto's writings were influenced by his readings of the Qur'an, the hadith and other reformers around the world, including Indian Syed Ameer Ali through his book 'the Spirit of Islam' (1891), another Indian Ahmadi author Maulana Muhammad Ali's through his book *Muhammad the Prophet* (1924) and other Muslim authors living in Western countries (Tjokroaminoto 1955 [1931]). He learned from Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, but he criticised their historical materialism and social Darwinism that recognised no God. Tjokroaminoto elaborated what he called 'Islamic socialism' in terms of such concepts as freedom (I. *kemerdekaan*), equality (I. *persamaan*) and fraternity (I. *persaudaraan*) citing the Qur'an, early stories of Islam and Western works (Tjokroaminoto 1950 [1924]: 25–7, 33–8). For example, he wrote:

The Prophet Muhammad created his government for his country (*negeri*) in a truly socialistic way. His successor Umar ibn Khattab implemented the Prophet's socialism even in a more advanced way because Umar ruled peoples from different races and nations and treated them in equality. Umar's imperialism – if we can say that – was based on socialism, very different from egoistic and materialistic imperialism of the twentieth century. (Tjokroaminoto 1950 [1924]: 68)

Conceptualising the Islamic socialist community would mean acting through nationalist movements in the East Indies (Hindia Timur), rather than calling for political pan-Islamism. Tjokroaminoto employed the Indonesian and Arabic phrase '*kemerdekaan ummat*' and Dutch phrase '*Nationale Vrijheid*' as identical. He called his political party PSII to change the condition of all Muslims in Indonesia, citing a Quranic passage: 'God

will not change the condition of a nation (*qawm*) unless they themselves change it' (Q. 13:11) (Tjokroaminoto 1958 [1931]: 19–20).

To Tjokroaminoto, Islam endorsed societal values (I. *kerakyatan*) as well as those of the individual (I. *pribadi*). Nonetheless, individuality should be subservient to the needs of the society, because individualism could fuel capitalism, which undermined the sense of community.<sup>3</sup> He wanted Islam to be implemented in its fullest sense, encompassing the individual, the familial, the social, the national, the material, the moral, the intellectual and the spiritual. Islam had once been successful in establishing civilisation (I. *kesopanan, peradaban*) in Mecca and Medina, but this was not sustained after Muhammad died. Therefore, today, he affirmed, Islam should unify all Muslim organisations because national freedom could not be achieved without the unity of Muslims (Amelz 1952: 39).

In his exploration, Tjokroaminoto borrowed ideas from many socialist thinkers, such as German author Rosa Luxemburg through her work *De Akkumulation des Kapitals* (1913) in condemning Western capitalism (Tjokroaminoto 1958 [1931]: 52–4). In his explanation of the Party's principles and programmes, he defined politics as the strategy of governing a country or managing a state in both theory and practice: 'In order to practice politics on the basis of Islam, one should remember these Dutch wisewords: "the present is in the past and the future is in the present"' (*In het verleden ligt het heden, in het nu wat worden zal*) (71). He wrote in the same booklet that the party would not intervene with political bodies and councils created by the colonial government but would protest any political act, laws and regulations harmful to the country and the people (78).

Although SI activists were distressed at the fall of the caliphate in 1923, and promoted the idea of revival, like other Muslim activists they were increasingly focused on the immediate problems in their homelands. When the Grand Shaykhs of Al-Azhar in Cairo called for a global meeting to elect a new caliph, some Muslim groups in the East Indies, such as Muhammadiyah, SI and the Arab-descended group Al-Irsyad attended the Congress of Islam in the East Indies, but disagreed on ideology and strategy. SI, for example, was divided into the red faction, advocating communist socialism in the pursuit of Islamic goals, while the white faction pressed for a caliphate that would provide Islamic leadership in both spiritual and worldly affairs. One

individual who regarded himself as both Islamic and communist (the Red SI) is Haji Misbach (1876–1926), who left the Muhammadiyah because of its capitalist orientation, and was equally critical of the SI. In 1923, when he established a branch of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia) (PKI) in Surakarta, he argued that both Islam and communism were inherently compatible. He regarded those who professed themselves communists but pressed for abolition of Islam to not be true communists, while those who professed Islam but rejected communism to not be true Muslims (Shiraishi 1990: 267–8, 285).

After Tjokroaminoto's death in 1934, the new SI leader, Agus Salim, mentioned earlier, was critical of the Dutch, but he was generally more cooperative than Tjokroaminoto in his relations with the Dutch modernisation. He was born in West Sumatra and raised in a Dutch-influenced family (his father was a prosecutor in Riau's High Court, and received the highest civilian award from Queen Wilhelmina). Agus Salim was one of the few Indonesians to study at the *Europese Lagere Scholen* (Elementary European School) (ELS), from whence he went on to the *Hogere Burger Scholen* (Senior High School) (HBS), where he mastered not only Dutch, but knew French, English and German. Salim served as an assistant in the Dutch consulate in Jeddah and then a civil servant in the Department of Education and Culture and later the Department of Public Works. He went back to his village and there created the Dutch-Native School (HIS). He then went to Batavia, where he served as director of a Dutch-language native newspaper, *Neratja* (S./I. 'Balance'), and then as chief editor at the Commission for Peoples' Literature (D. Commissie voor de Volkslectuur) (later known as Balai Pustaka). Both were subsidised by the colonial administration as part of the Ethical Policy discussed earlier.

For Agus Salim, Western progress and Eastern progress were quite distinct, and yet the path for Indonesians toward true, authentic progress was to embrace the good from the West with their own heritage. In so doing, Salim saw no reason for Indonesians to wage war against colonialism, since the Dutch had superior forces. The best way to achieve progress, Salim argued, would be through peaceful means. Indonesians had to unify themselves in pursuit of the same goals. They should demand equality of dignity, rights and laws for all people in the Indies, as well as the right to become involved in

political meetings in order to express their views on how the country should be run.<sup>4</sup>

Salim observed that too many people were standing outside politics and that existing political parties had no solid or clear programmes and organisation. For Salim and his political party ‘Consciousness Movement’ (I. *pergerakan penyadar*), it was more beneficial than harmful for people to be cooperative with the colonial power. According to Salim, the native population was not aiming to overthrow the Dutch: instead, they wanted to improve the people’s right for freedom, through consultation and agreement (I. and M. *musyawarat dan mufakat*) as part of the democratic demands. They would be able to express their ideas about improving the economy and government by joining the *volksraad*. Salim calculated the pros and cons of such cooperation, even as he hoped, as a Muslim, that God would grant his movement the best outcome. Progress exists, Salim asserted, and ‘in this country we are striving to attain progress among the people, with the people, and for the people, in an orderly, safe, and peaceful manner’.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the inception of the Ethical Policy, Salim observed, many Indonesians were still living in poverty, an injustice that many Dutch politicians themselves acknowledged. Salim contended that the Ethical Policy was motivated by Dutch self-interest, rather than by real concern to improve the life of Indonesians. Therefore, Indonesians would attain progress and pull themselves out of poverty only after building unity and obtaining freedom. He also believed that Dutch educational regulations offered more disadvantages than advantages to Indonesians because they knew little about the real situation of the people, because Western progress was only concerned with material matters and not with feeling or emotion (I. *rasa*, D. *gevoel*):

What is good from the Dutch has to be studied and followed. However, we are convinced that much of Western progress [I. *kemajuan Barat*] is false, as is proved by the wars [among Westerners]. We are also convinced that the best [form of] progress for our nation is one based on the principles and heritage of our past. Our path is to improve and perfect our heritage while taking the good from Western education. True progress accords with the character of Eastern nations [I. *bangsa timur*] which does not reach for material [goods] at the expense of feeling.<sup>6</sup>

Despite his contention that the Dutch tried to alienate elite Muslims from Islam, Salim was also critical of fellow Muslims in the East Indies. As Adviser to the Jong Islamiten Bond, he expressed a modernist approach to politics. Salim believed in Islam as the religion of both material progress and spiritual enrichment, as contrasted with the materialistic and divisive West. He claimed that Western scholars had very little knowledge about Islam as a complete system, and as a religion that could eliminate enmity, humiliation and backwardness in this world and in the world to come.<sup>7</sup>

Muslim political activists did not necessarily reject the Dutch colonial government and its laws, but they rejected interventionist and discriminatory policies. Being present-minded was to be engaged with contemporary economic and political issues – including imperialism, capitalism and socialism – in defence of one’s religious and communal interests and goals. Some Muslims as well as some native Christians favoured being religiously neutral and liberal, and during the 1920s and 1930s the tension between the Islamic faction and what some termed the secular nationalist faction was obvious. For the secularists, being Westernised and modern would mean that the pursuit of freedom and progress would entail critical engagement with the West and its culture.<sup>8</sup>

### **Making Islam Socialist in South Sulawesi**

The ripples of conflicts and cooperations that occurred in Java often extended to South Sulawesi, albeit within local contexts. Many of the organisations established in Java expanded to the outer islands, and Makassar in South Sulawesi became a gateway to enter other cities and islands in the eastern archipelago. Muhammadiyah had already reached South Sulawesi, while Sarekat Islam established a branch in Makassar in 1914, to be followed by Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI) (renamed PSII in 1929) in 1918. But leaders of these new organisations had to tread carefully. For example, Soekarno’s PNI (The National Party of Indonesia) (Partai Nasional Indonesia), formed in Makassar in 1929, was soon banned by the Dutch because of its anti-colonial stand. Some of its members then joined the Partai Indonesia Raja (Party of Greater Indonesia), but this was also banned (Pelras 1996: 278–9). Others created their own local groups. Some reformers addressed political issues through *fatwas* and *khutbahs* (sermons), while others established branches of

the Javanese mass movements and disseminated their views in journals and speeches.

Like their Javanese fellow countrymen, Bugis and Makassarese Muslim activists turned their gaze more directly on colonial policies and attitudes, criticising those that they viewed as being interventionist or discriminatory. They also demanded more governmental intervention in providing and improving education for the people, contending that the Dutch administration paid more attention to colonial schools and Protestant churches and schools than to Muslim mosques and schools. In Makassar, for example, some activists asked the colonial administration to protect mosques, since churches were guarded.<sup>9</sup> At times such criticism could become a call for direct opposition. During a congress in Parepare, while demanding an end to forced labour, the PSII promoted the idea of non-cooperation with the Dutch Government. But the relationship between PSII leaders and the colonial power was not always adversarial. For example, Muhammad Abduh Pabbaja (1918–2009), a student of Muhammad As'ad and an engaged member of PSII, remembered that Dutch colonial rulers did not really hinder his religious-political activities, and for him personally there was no confrontation.<sup>10</sup>

In the SI first meeting in Makassar in 1914, a speaker from the Java SI Raden Partonto spoke to an audience that included hundreds of people from Makassar and Java, as well as several Arabs, Indians and Chinese. While he explained the reason for establishing an SI in Makassar, namely working towards progress for all, he also made it clear that SI did not advocate open opposition towards the colonial government. The Makassar SI then asked for the governor-general's approval, which enabled it to expand to other districts in South Sulawesi.<sup>11</sup> In Makassar and other regencies in South Sulawesi, Sarekat Islam first served as a socio-religious movement by creating schools and conducting social works from its early penetration to the mid-1920s when Sarekat Islam began to become a political organisation. The split of Sarekat Islam into the religious and the political was one of the main reasons why some of the Bugis members and leaders such as Haji Abdullah and Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle quitted the party and created other organisations or became members of the existing organisations (Bosra 2003: 136–43).

The PSII in South Sulawesi (as in Java) became associated with

non-cooperation, and this led to tension with Muhammadiyah activists, who focused on educational and religious issues, and did not favour confronting the Dutch. The tensions in Java had local ramifications as each group defended their own strategies. In South Sulawesi this was manifested also in their periodicals: *Al-Wafd* by PSII with the editor H. A. Mawengkang, from North Sulawesi, a Muslim convert from Protestantism, and the Muhammadiyah *Tentara Islam*, with the editor Mansur Al-Yamani from Surabaya, Java. The Muhammadiyah activist Hamka (from Minangkabau) thus criticised PSII activists for only talking on the podium rather than taking any real action, while the *Al-Wafd* editor challenged Muhammadiyah willingness to receive Dutch subsidies for schools (343–6).

This increased politicisation can be seen in later SI meetings, when opposition to the Dutch became more pronounced. Indeed, it can be argued that SI was directly responsible for increasing a new religious political awareness in Sulawesi. For example, disappointed with the lack of support for the caliphate, one SI speaker quoted the Qur'an: 'Do not feel that you are powerless, and do not feel sad; you are the highest if you truly are believers' (Q. 3:139–42) and the Prophet's saying: 'Don't be afraid and don't be sad; your position will be highly respected if you believe (in God).'<sup>12</sup> This speaker told the audience that Muslims had become slaves because they felt powerless under the imperialist unbelievers who had used them as a tool for maintaining domination. He said that Muslims should be empowered and should become powerful, as their religion taught them.<sup>13</sup> In his opinion, Islam should not merely be a belief but, more importantly, a political ideology – an ideology that should challenge capitalist imperialism.

There are around 400 million Muslim people [*ummah* Islam] in the world today, many of them suffering from a sense of being enslaved [D. *slavengeest*] because they feel lower than other communities who do not share one God, one scripture, one prophet, one *ka'ba*. These other communities have raised their dignity using other people's knowledge and skills, but the Muslim people have become an easy tool for them to use in reaching their objectives. The Muslim soils have become fertile for *imperialisme* and *kapitalisme*. We have not forgotten how the Congress of Islamic Peoples in Jerusalem and the Caliphate Congress in Egypt did not address *siyasah* on

which we should work together, especially in Asia where many [people] are Muslim.<sup>14</sup>

He referred to the colonial government as *kafir*, quoting a Qur'anic verse (2:191): 'If the unbelievers fight against you, then you should fight against them',<sup>15</sup> and therefore called for political action among Muslims everywhere. The speaker understood *siyasa* as both a discourse and a practice of addressing political concerns. He was particularly disappointed that even the caliphate congress did not really plan a worldwide Muslim political unity. He was imagining a global Islamic *ummah*, but he was an activist of a political party implanted in the soil of the East Indies.

Beyond SI and PSII, in Makassar, the newspaper *Fadjar Indonesia* critically addressed Islam, politics, the economy and worldly affairs. Many Muslims, about 3.5 million of them in Sulawesi, a contributor to the newspaper wrote, became anti-Islamic because they had little knowledge about their religion. In Islam, politics and *agama*, the writer said, should be connected. The enemy of Islam increased; secular nationalists became critical of the *hajj* to Mecca and of the position of women in Islam. And the *volksraad*, the people's council created by the government, was merely a place for talking rather than delivering the needs of the people.

In addition, in 1930 the world was suffering from great depression or malaise. This affected the colonial government, private companies and the Muslims in Sulawesi.

We, the Islamic *ummah*, are suffering from many crises: bad things are happening to Palestinians and Berber. The world is suffering from malaise, in addition to volcanic eruptions. Consequently, the government is lacking funds so they had to reduce the number of officers. Companies are firing their employees. We are now in the beginning of 1931. We are demanding that governmental regulations which are not in line with our time be ended. Religious regulations which do not conform to our age, including subsidies given to Christian missions, be removed. We hope that the people regain their dignity and welfare. We have to maximize our efforts using our money and ideas for the sake of the dignity of our nation, country, and religion. There is no strength nor power except with Allah (A. *La haula wa la quwwata illa billah*).<sup>16</sup>

Thus, colonial-Islamic encounters contributed to the rise of divergent modern ideas and movements and their competing and compromising agendas and identities. Local Muslim responses to certain colonial policies deemed discriminatory or interventionist created the political and non-political, cooperative and non-cooperative, critical and indifferent attitudes among Muslims. Muslims responded to these as well as to wider, global Islamic reformist ideas and events in Mecca, Egypt and Turkey and in their homelands. In defining and promoting progress, they made references to the Qur'an, the hadith and other authoritative texts. They defined *ummah* as a global Islamic community to be built through organisations, but they showed little interest in a political pan-Islamism, although some called for unity in division. They saw Islam as not separating religion and politics, but they did not necessarily want to overthrow the colonial state, return to the old government and replace the existing order with an Islamic constitution.

### **Building *Siyasah* without Movements in Malaya**

In Malaya, the views and attitudes toward politics and the political establishment were quite different. The alliances between the British and the Malay Sultans had reduced the possibility of non-cooperative political movements. Historian Anthony Milner noted that in colonial Malaya, a new discourse of politics, in the sense of new awareness, was invented in terms of three confronting, albeit dynamic, ideological orientations: loyalty to the *kerajaan*, or sultanate, represented by the *hikayat* literature; loyalty to the Islamic community, or *umat* (*ummah*), represented by the journal *Al-Imam*; and loyalty to the Malay race, or *bangsa*, represented by the journal *Utusan Melayu*. Terms such as '*siyasah*' or '*politik*' did not appear until the early twentieth century. Milner argued that nationalism was not a hegemonic voice among diverging Malays, and the key Islamic voice – the *shari'ah*-minded group – was anti-nationalist and anti-liberal. However, some Muslim writers, indirectly influenced by Muhammad Abduh and the Cairo reformist network, and in response to European thinking, began to use words such as '*akal*' to mean 'reason', and '*tarikb*' to mean 'history'. Milner further suggested that the Arabic concept of '*watan*' (motherland) was of European origin and thus antagonistic to Islam. In other words, Malay politics was to a large extent

a derivative discourse, a product of post-Enlightenment Western thought (Milner 1994, 2003: 169–91).

Here, however, I contend that while this observation is well-articulated, some Muslim reformers referred to terms of debate from within the Islamic tradition. Moreover, Malay politics was not merely a discourse; it also concerned policies and activities. Malay Muslims invented politics: literary politics, represented by writers and journalists, sultanate Islam, represented by the Kelantan Council of Religion and Custom in Kelantan, and British-like social clubs critical of the *kerajaan*/sultanate and establishment *‘ulama*. Their discourses included invitations to increase awareness of *ummah*, *watan* and *bangsa*, which were not necessarily seen as contradictory loyalties.

Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad, or Za’ba, a Malay reformist writer mentioned earlier, called for Malays to be loyal to both *watan* and *bangsa*, reducing the loyalty to sultan or raja. Tok Kenali of Kelantan encouraged knowledge of *siyasa* as well as that of religion, and was critical of British colonisation while embracing English education for the sake of unity and progress. The Sultan of Kelantan was able to integrate allegiance to Malayness, Islam and *kerajaan* with the practicalities of British collaboration and occasionally intervention in Islamic affairs, despite official policies of non-intervention. Thus, at its core Malay politics was not only about a new awareness but also about leadership and a shared, bureaucratic administration of the *kerajaan* and religious and cultural matters. With these independent voices and officialdom, Malays did not feel the need to create mass movements or political parties until the last years of the British rule.

The Muslim reformer Tahir Jalaluddin did not directly confront the British in his writings, although he was fully cognisant of European dominance in the Indonesian-Malay world. He seemed to show ambiguous positions regarding the Dutch and the British. Concerned about the Dutch in the East Indies, he referred particularly to the 1824 Anglo-Dutch treaty that divided the Indonesian-Malay world into British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies (Ramli 1980: 2). In one of his poems, Jalaluddin expressed his sentiments about progress and colonialism, although without any call for political activism: ‘O nation! Enter the path of progress; Then your fame will reach to the clouds; Then we fear looking at you; Like a slave for a seizure; So they entered our country; They owned all the earth and property; They made

us slaves like camels; They swallowed our blood whenever they wished it' (Jalaluddin cited in Aziz 2003: 80).

Elsewhere, however, Jalaluddin praised British non-interference in Islamic affairs: 'the great government, which provided this eastern country, does not like to interfere, far less to change, the religious law and custom of the native people' (Zakaria 2006: 206). He also supported teaching English in Malay schools when others saw it as the language of the kafir (Ibrahim *et al.* 1993: 24, 29). Interestingly, when he was in Sumatra in 1923, Jalaluddin publicly criticised Dutch intervention in native affairs without any adverse repercussions, but four years later, when he visited Sumatra again, he was arrested for accused involvement in a communist conspiracy against the Dutch. Sentenced to gaol for six months, he was released for lack of evidence and returned to Malaya. Jalaluddin was also politically engaged, as when he showed sympathy to the Turkish Kemal Pasha and expressed his dislike of Syarif Hussain of Saudi Arabia (Hamka 1950: 77–9). Jalaluddin neither rejected the gaining of material wealth nor condemned Western skills and technologies – as long as Muslims were able to obtain security and freedom. He also learned some Dutch and English when he was in Mecca (cited in Zakaria 2006: 205). He wrote about the political history of Muslim nations and in his homeland, but did not create any political movement in Malaya.

Syed Al-Hadi, mentioned earlier, pointed to Muslims' subjugation to the West, but he considered the West a challenge rather than an enemy: 'Then came to our eastern countries the Europeans from the north winds . . . and what happened to all of us here? We were all silent. We surrendered to them our dignity, our laws, and our properties and national pride.' Yet Al-Hadi could still associate the British with God's army, bringing about blessings to the Malay people: 'Indeed, the English are an army of God, the Lord of the worlds, who has ordered them to come here to free us from darkness, the prison of ignorance, injustice, wickedness, and cruelty of our own rulers'.<sup>17</sup>

Here, like Sayyid Uthman in the East Indies, Al-Hadi was critical of the traditional elite and conservative '*ulama* rather than the British modernisers. He saw a positive British impact on the Malay economy through the creation of banks that extended credit to Malays, in contrast to the Malay rulers. Malays should improve themselves, not by blaming the British, but by emulating their modern ways. In an essay 'The Real Cry', Al-Hadi said:

Do not be deceived by the wealth and prosperity in your country for these are the result of good government by the British which has attracted European capital and opened banks to enable other people to purchase saddles to place on your backs that you may hoe and rake your very own land for their profit . . . Leave behind those who grumble about politics and complain about politicians, but themselves know nothing about politics. What is appropriate now is for you to be grateful for the British government's intervention which has benefited you in that you have been released from the serfdom of your leaders, and you have been given laws which will not prevent you from seeking the road to progress and a better life. (Al-Hadi cited in Gordon 1999: 186–7)

Al-Hadi called for the creation of an institution in the Malay Peninsula that could collect and distribute zakat and oversee other religious matters in the way that Islam required, not through the now impossible goal of resurrecting the caliphate, especially since caliphs were no longer assiduous in observing their religion, as in the early time of Islam (Al-Hadi 1931: 111–12).

Another reformer, Za'ba, was concerned about the poverty of Malays in many aspects: economic, educational, intellectual, moral, cultural and religious: '[T]heir outlook on life is poor and full of gloom; their religious life and practice is poor and far removed from the pure original teachings of the Prophet.' In short, the Malays cut poor figures in every department of life (Za'ba cited in Roff 1967: 151–2). In his reply to Al-Hadi's essay above, Za'ba said:

Our fall into the hands of foreigners [the British], and our fall before the Chinese and others are because of our own fault. It is that fault that we have to rectify; don't talk about the fall, when the causes for the fall have been extirpated, we will rise again without having to discuss that we had once fallen and were enslaved by others, so work! Work! Do work! It is not enough to laze about and just shout and scream. (Za'ba cited in Gordon 1999: 191)

Za'ba supported Al-Hadi's criticism against the traditional elite and the conservative '*ulama*' but he wished that Al-Hadi acted more. Za'ba asserted that it was honourable to love one's own country but in doing so one should

not create hatred or ignore the rights of other people; regardless of race, all could love a wider motherland (A. *hub al-watan*) (Za'ba in Gordon 1999: 193).

Several cases of resistance against British policies were sporadic and shortlived and did not have a widespread impact. The prime example was the uprising in 1915, led by a Kelantan trader-teacher named Haji Nik Hassan (1853–1915), popularly known as Tok Janggut because of his long beard. Tok Janggut, who turned against the establishment, represented Malay awareness of the socio-economic problems in a local area. Tok Janggut studied Islam in Mecca but he was also master of the Malay martial art *silat*. He saw the loss of the traditional power in Kelantan as being due to British presence. He invoked some Islamic references such as Allah is the Greatest (A. *Allahu Akbar*) and a Qur'anic passage: 'Fight them, and Allah will punish them by your hands, cover them with shame, help you to victory over them, heal the breasts of believers' (Q. 9:14), which carried a religious tone to his resistance. But the uprising resulted from land reforms and imposition of taxes, rather than by British attitudes toward Islam as such, although it received some additional impetus from the 1914 global *fatwa* regarding jihad issued by Ottoman Turkey's Grand Mufti, Shaykh Khairi Effendi, against England and France. This led the British authorities in Malaya to issue an enactment prohibiting local Malay papers from disseminating information about the war and forbidding any show of sympathy or support for the Ottoman cause (Hassan in Mahmud 1999: 25–39).

In order to convince the Malay sultans that they were not waging war against Islam, the British colonial government enlisted the aid of the Aga Khan, a Shi'ite leader in India. He was asked to write a letter to the Malay rulers that would state that the war was not religious and that criticised the alliance between the Muslim Ottoman Empire, Germany and Austria. William Langham-Carter, then British Adviser in Kelantan, asked for Sultan Muhammad IV's support. Accordingly, the sultan and the Council of Religion sided with the British and in November 1914 the *mufti* even wrote to the British authorities affirming that he prays 'to Allah the Almighty that the Majesty King George will remain powerful in Europe and will get victory in this war'. The eventual execution of Tok Janggut in the same year led the British to modify some tax policies, since they regarded the rebellion

as a socio-economic rebellion rather than a religious war (Mahmud in Roff 1974). In consequence, the sultan and the British were able to maintain their collaborative relationship.

### **Bureaucratising Religion and Custom: MAIK in Kelantan**

Some scholars have argued that British colonialism left the pre-colonial Malay sultanate existing in symbolic form (Milner 2003; Hamid 2004). In Kelantan, however, the British kept and even reinforced the sultanate and religious establishment. Sultan-backed councils of religion and English-like clubs and associations became venues for conducting literary, social and religious activities, but they were strikingly not anti-British, regardless of some critical views expressed towards the ruling elite. For various reasons, Malay criticism of the British was less harsh than that of the Indonesians towards the Dutch, as the case of Kelantan clearly exemplifies.

This alliance between the British and the sultan is evident on many different levels, even to the royal titles bestowed on British Residents and Advisers, such as *Yang Berhormat Tuan H. W. Thomson Pemangku Penasehat Inggris bagi Kerajaan Kelantan* (M. The Honourable H. W. Thomson, English Adviser to the Kingdom of Kelantan).<sup>18</sup> For their part, British administrators were punctilious in addressing the sultan as His Highness the Sultan or His Supreme Majesty.<sup>19</sup>

In Kelantan, political divisions also became less possible from 1915 because of the establishment of the Council of Religion and Malay Custom (Majlis Ugama Islam dan Istiaadat Melayu Kelantan) (MAIK). Several *‘ulama*, including Tok Kenali, proposed a department in charge of religious and customary affairs. The official *‘ulama* and the British Adviser readily approved the establishment of this Council, which included the ruler. The latter had been on the throne since 1900 as Tuan Long Senik but adopted the title of Sultan Muhammad IV from 1910 when Kelantan was transferred from Siamese to British control and he accepted a British Adviser. In the view of the sultan, MAIK would raise Kelantan to a status consonant with that of other advanced states.<sup>20</sup>

MAIK became a vehicle for modernising efforts in Kelantan as a whole. By advanced states, the sultan meant the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States – and probably European states, too, since he knew them as

well. The sultan would have agreed with a Malay writer who categorised nations as developed (M. *yang maju*), developing (M. *yang akan maju*) and underdeveloped (M. *yang mundur*) and who labelled America the Crown of the World (M. *mahkota dunia*).<sup>21</sup> He would also have been in agreement with another writer who spoke of nations that are advanced and civilised today (M. *umat-umat yang berkemajuan dan bertamaddun zaman sekarang*) and that could be used as useful models for service to both religion (*ugama*) and the country (*tanah air*).<sup>22</sup>

In his effort to advance the state, the sultan defined Islam as a religion that did not necessarily contradict local custom and ethnic affiliation. Religious oversight referred to all matters pertaining to *agama Islam* that may bring benefit to the people of this state and increase the welfare of Kelantan. He described Malay custom as any style and custom that may properly be preserved according to time-honoured usage (in Roff 1974: 101). This difficult balance between religion, custom and modernity was facilitated because of the willingness of the British Advisor, sultan and the reformist *'ulama* to work together. It is obvious that the sultan did not see Islam as a political ideology or a factor for anti-British nationalism.

With this alliance, it was not difficult for the state to support the building of mosques, schools, *zakat* management, the pilgrimage and any effort not specifically religious in order to accomplish the shared mission of modernisation. For example, the state treasury gave financial assistance to the Grand Mosque, Masjid Muhammadiyah, which had been erected in 1867 in the capital, Kota Bharu.<sup>23</sup> As a centre for preaching and learning, it also served as the centre for the religio-political authority of the sultan and *'ulama*. In 1931 Sultan Ismail (r. 1920–44) took over its management and made it the official state mosque (*Masjid Negeri*). With this status, preachers at the mosque became Great Teachers, and were appointed and paid by the state government. Because of this centralisation, religious authority reached down into the villages. The Council of Religion drew up a list of mosques as well as prayer leaders and other mosque officials in order to determine their duties and rights. *Surau* officials could collect *zakat* and perform marriages and receive the fee,<sup>24</sup> but they could also have various secular functions, including supervision of produce taxes and collection of poll tax, which under the Siamese had been the responsibility of the village headman (Roff 1974: 104–5).

Although British Advisers focused on secular affairs, they were often asked for administrative advice on such Islamic affairs as the hajj to Mecca. On one occasion MAIK received a notice from the British Adviser stating that the government could not issue travel permits to pilgrims because the Indian Government lacked sufficient ships to board those Muslims who planned to undertake the hajj.<sup>25</sup> Careful attempts by Kelantan's British officials to appease the sultan and the established *'ulama* received a positive reaction in the form of praises and support, which were themselves reciprocated. In practice, therefore, the non-interference of the British Adviser in religious and customary affairs was fluid, especially when technical advice or financial support was deemed necessary. Making administrative functions regular and regulated was what the British attempted to do, and the sultan, too, found that both useful and desirable. Issues of superiority and inferiority did not really matter where pragmatic aims were expected to be fulfilled.

### **Building Malay Politics in Kelantan: Kenali, Adabi and Clubs**

In Kelantan, the sultan and the established *'ulama* hardly resisted British modern administration. Although at times critical, scholars like Tok Kenali together with the sultan agreed on the necessity of preserving Malay religion and reforming their culture amidst the pressing challenges posed by the Chinese, Indians and even Arabs – even local-born Indian and Arab Muslims – without necessarily being anti-British. Criticism took the form of special pleas for continued Malay privilege, not of anti-colonial nationalism (Roff 1967: 236). Nor was this expressed in pan-Islamic political terms, as discussed earlier. The formalised association between the Muslim religion and the Malay culture was a crucial political project of the sultans, strengthening the ties between Islam and Malayness.

Kenali believed that one could be patriotic without necessarily confronting the British. In one of his poems, Kenali spoke about strengthening both religious and *siyasa* knowledge. He realised the need for proper government in Malaya: 'High or low, a government is dependent upon its executive; if the fox should become king and the rat is permitted to be his minister, then there will be government, but in noisy disarray' (Salleh cited in Roff 1974: 97–9). Yet though he was concerned more with promoting an awareness of their position among Malays themselves, he also realised that Malays had

gained few benefits from foreign rule: 'It is a pity that the children of the Malay nation [M. *anak bangsa Melayu*] have lived a life no different under the shadow of the ears of the elephant [Siam] from the one now under the chin of the tiger [Britain]. The Malays remain passive and silent, like those hammering the sky with a nail to make it immobile when the world is actively changing.'<sup>26</sup> He nonetheless focused on education, preaching and writing, rather than involvement in political action.

Kenali used the Arabic concept of *siyasah* as a tool for improving the overall condition of Malays, but he did not specify any desirable form of government, and discussed leadership and authority in general, substantive terms, rather than in relation to party politics or resistance to the British Government in Malaya. He talked about *siyasah* in the sense of strengthening the role of Islam and the Malays in the pursuit of progress. Kenali did not seek a separation of *din* and *siyasah* although he differentiated between the two. As his biographer put it: 'Islam brought by Muhammad was unlike the Christian religion which teaches the state and society, including morality to the state and religion to the Church. The Church has no responsibility to warn the government and moral decadence happening due to the separation between religion and politics.'<sup>27</sup> But Kenali did not talk about the integration of the state and the religion, nor did he see the need to create such a structure in Kelantan. For him, it would be sufficient for Malay Muslims to have two different authorities working together. Quoting a hadith, Kenali pointed to the need to have religious scholars and rulers in order to establish a good society, but he conceived of both authorities as serving different functions.<sup>28</sup> What he advocated was progress in religious development and worldly affairs: 'Open schools, build roads, and open lands', Kenali responded to the sultan when asked his advice (Salleh 2002: 137–43). So the sultan would take care of the worldly affairs and the *'ulama* the religious affairs. And during this time it was inevitable that the sultan functioned with British advice and assistance.

Some educated Malay activists created British-like clubs or associations, and were interested in talking about socio-cultural and particularly educational issues. A club was understood as comprising any association of people who held meetings with rules, chapters, offices, advisers, presidents, vice-presidents, treasurers, secretaries and members.<sup>29</sup> Organised along British

lines, some were associated with the sultan and British Advisers, such as the Kelantan Club (1911), while others were for sports and social activities. A number focused on social and cultural ideas. The students of the Madrasah Muhammadiyah, the school established by MAIK, formed the Kota Bharu Club and The Setiawan Belia Club. The Kota Bharu Club ran extra-curricular academic and sports activities and included the sultan and British Advisers on its advisory board. Yet another club, the Mohammedan Union Club, worked in support of the sultan and the British Adviser (Ahmadi 2001: 25–6).

The clubs conducted seminars, or talks, sometimes with guest speakers from both inside and outside Kelantan. The Setiawan Belia Club invited people to speak about contemporary issues, including Malay unity and education for girls: ‘Do girls now deserve an English education?’ (Al-Ahmadi 2001: 30). One of the objectives of the Setiawan Belia Club was to gather the Madrasah Muhammadiyah students and interested youth to carry out good and useful activities, such as learning how to speak in public (*M. pidato*), how to dance in traditional and modern ways, how to perform drama and how to write articles and study literature (Ahmadi 1994: 89).

Rarely, however, did any of these clubs reject the British–sultan alliance in regard to modernisation. Abdul Kadir Adabi and others formed Putera Club (the Youth Club) in 1928. Questioning the authority of the *‘ulama*, members criticised the *‘ulama* who, in their view, manipulated religion for their own interests, such as being polygamous (marrying up to four women) – but were very ready to divorce their wives when it suited them. Which *‘ulama*, they asked, were the successors of the Prophet? (Noor 1996: 8). The Putera Club accused the State of Kelantan of discriminating against many Malays by not providing equal access to education, although taking care to stress that it was not rejecting English education or the British rule as such. Rather, they requested that the government open new English schools in Kelantan. Members were, however, critical of land reform because they would lose part of the ownership to capitalists and on one occasion sent a petition to the British Adviser asserting that Malays would not give up even an inch of their land to foreigners in any of their towns – not in Kota Bharu, Pasir Puteh, Pasir Mas or Bachok. In response, the government refused to meet their demands, banned the club and prohibited government officials from joining. The Putera Club was even accused of links with the Indonesian

Communist Party (Hamid 1971: 54). Because of the ban and the arrest of its leaders, the Putera Club did not continue its activities, although some of its members shifted their activity to a less political club, Setiawan Belia Club, in order to avoid confrontation with the British (Noor 1996: 8–11).

Adabi advocated increased awareness of the Muslims outside Malaya. Writing in the local periodical *Warisan Kelantan*, for example, in response to a letter he received from the Islamic Youth Committee in Baghdad regarding the French Government's harsh attitude toward Muslims in Magribi, Adabi urged Malay readers to support their fellow Muslims. In another article, Adabi invited Malays to follow Javanese who protested against certain Chinese newspapers, which allegedly published negative statements against Prophet Muhammad. Presumably aware of the growing non-Malay presence on the west coast of the peninsula, one reader responded that Malays should be united because otherwise their existence and their Islamic faith would be increasingly endangered by the Chinese and Indian peoples (Al-Ahmadi 2001: 31–3). Adabi looked to the Sarekat Islam in Indonesia as a model for a Malay-based organisation, and his contemporary Haji Taha Abas in Singapore also called on Malays to establish a Persatuan 'Ulama Setanah Melayu (M. Malay Religious Scholars Union) by following Indonesians who created an association for the religious scholars (NU) (Al-Ahmadi 2001: 22–49).

Beyond the clubs, a manifestation of the desire to foster unity of feeling, thought and action was an organisation called Kesatuan Melayu Semenanjung (Unity of the Malay Peninsula). In order for their voices to be heard and respected by those in power, these new intellectuals sought to build centres in different areas of the Malay Peninsula and publish newspapers in Malay and in English so that their message would reach a wider audience.<sup>30</sup> In the late 1930s and early 1940s the Persatuan Melayu Selangor (Selangor Malay Union) aimed for general advancement of the Malays, with British support. Although the Union aimed to assert the Malays' position against others, most of its members came from the ruling elite, educated in English schools. Backing Britain whole-heartedly during the First World War, they even asked Selangor *imams* to pray for victory (Roff 1967: 238–42). Not surprisingly, the Persatuan was regarded as an elite organisation and never really reached ordinary people (Shamsul 1986: 52). Mass movements like the

Muhammadiyah, NU and Sarekat Islam never developed in British Malaya, and in the Malays' writings there was hardly criticism against the British administration in Malaya.

### **Conclusion**

In Indonesia and Malaya, by the turn of the twentieth century, Muslim reformers became interested in politics: some became engaged in politics when many others stayed away from it. They meant different things by 'politics': they demonstrated cooperative, non-cooperative or ambivalent attitudes toward the colonial state and its policies. Some were socialist and others non-socialist. Others articulated politics within the framework of the Arabic concept of *siyasah*, which connoted political ideas, strategies and techniques pertaining not only to Muslims but also beyond. Muslim reformers attempted to raise public awareness about contemporary issues by writing for periodicals and newspapers and demonstrated their desire for progress, dignity, unity, freedom and prosperity. They started to offer alternative views to the sultanate or kingship. They created new notions of race and community, such as *bangsa*, *ummah* and *negeri*, drawn from Western, Islamic and local sources. I agree with Milner (2003) who argues that a new conception of politics, the territorial understanding of *negeri* and a written constitution of *undang-undang* emerged in a response to colonial encounters, but I would also argue that the sources that some used were not confined to the Western or colonial.

Moreover, in the Dutch East Indies, Muslim politics did not necessarily entail being anti-Western or pro-caliphate. Nor did it necessarily mean blind emulation of the concepts of the Abode of Islam versus the Abode of War, since some defined the former as *negeri Islam* even under colonial rule. Critics of Dutch imperialism adopted Dutch terminology to describe their political ideas and socialist agendas while selectively borrowing Dutch organisational structures to pursue their objectives. Others were opposed to Dutch policies that they regarded as discriminatory and unjust or irrelevant in monitoring internal, religious or private affairs. Many in South Sulawesi were influenced by Java-based political parties, but others had their local concerns and activities by creating their own organisations.

In Malaya, Muslim reformers worked especially through writing and cultural clubs without confrontation against the sultan-British modernisation

projects. Under the British protectorate and advisory system, the sultan and the established *'ulama* became religious-cultural bureaucrats. While some sultans thanked the British for helping them improve literacy and development, Malay reformers preferred the colonial authority to the often arbitrary nature of traditional rule. Like the East Indies, Malays did not aim to join a caliphate movement. Malay sultans and reformist *'ulama* instead worked with the British to preserve and even reinforce Malay religion and culture and to promote the unity and progress of Malays facing internal crisis and external challenges by other nations. Unlike the East Indies, the sultans, establishment *'ulama* and the British played their role in integrating Malayness and Islam with the state. The political consciousness of Malay Muslims was partially born out of their complex relations to Europeans and other ethnic groups residing in Malaya. While there was a common goal of building the *ummah* and serving the *negeri*, the early reformist political movements in Java soon spread across ethnic and demographic boundaries in the East Indies, creating and reinforcing 'Indonesia' as a nation, whereas Malay reformers sought to appeal to a wider Malay population scattered across the sultanates in the peninsula.

Talal Asad sees the hegemonic perception of modernity in the Muslim contexts as singular (in Scott and Hirschkind 2006: 292) but the cases in this chapter suggest differences among Muslim reformist movements. Muslim politics was not a mere imposition by the colonial power, although the latter shaped its emergence and dynamics. Political modernisation of the Indonesian-Malay world involved unprecedented debates on a number of ideas and programmes – secularisation, democracy, unity, freedom, justice and leadership – so that modernity could present multiple faces. Contesting both the interpretation of symbols and control of institutions, Muslim agents expressed both discontent and aspiration, and organised their resources for sustained activity, in keeping with aspects that can be regarded as the modern political (see also Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 5; Walzer in Zubaida 2009: 63). Under colonial rule, with all its opportunities and constraints, Muslim politics was diverse, hybrid and multi-focal, and yet, although Indonesian-Malay Muslim reformers were aware of wider Islamic preoccupations, their own activism for progress was localised and immediate.

## Notes

1. 'Apakah Politik itu?', *Anak Kontji*, August 1921, Year 2.
2. It was reported to the Contrôleur at Fort de Kock, Bukittinggi, on 15 December 1934. 'Pendahoeloean dan Risalah Djoem'ah oentock kitab Choetbah Djoem'ah', *R. A. Kern Collection*, KITLV, H 797, inventaris No. 473.
3. Islam: Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling van de PSII, 2.10.36.15, inventaris No. 53, mailrapport 136, NA, Den Haag.
4. Salim, 'Kemajuan diperoleh dengan usaha', *Neratja*, Thursday, 11 October 1917, No.71, Year 1, 'Kemajuan Perempuan Bumiputera', Tuesday, 4 September 1917, No. 45, Year 1, in Salim (1954: 19–29); Kahfi (1996: 39).
5. Salim, 'Pergerakan Politik Indonesia', in Salim (1954: 137).
6. Salim, 'Benih Pertjederaan', Tuesday, 7 January 1919, No. 4, Year 3 in Salim (1954: 45).
7. Salim, 'Persatuan Islam', *Dunia Islam*, 23 March 1923, in Salim (1954: 7).
8. *Tentara Islam*, No. 1, June 1932, Year I.
9. The mosques were in Kampoeng Boetoeng, Kampoeng Melajoe, Kampoeng Baroe, and Kampoeng Malokoe in Makassar, South Sulawesi. Hamid, 'Sama Rata Sama Rasa', *Anak Kontji*, No. 5, 20 December 1920, Year I.
10. Interview with Muhammad Abduh Pabbaja, 9 July 2005; Amal (2003: 201). Pabbaja was a preacher, teacher and activist of the Islamic political party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Party of Unity and Development).
11. *Pemberita Makassar*, No. 65, 18 April 1914.
12. Prophet Muhammad was said to have thus assured his loyal companion Abu Bakar on their emigration from Mecca to Medina.
13. *Al-Wafd*, No. 1, January 1933, Year 2.
14. *Al-Wafd*, No. 1, January 1933, Year 2.
15. *Al-Wafd*, No. 2, February 1933, Year 2.
16. '1930–1931: Malaise dan Nasib Kita', *Fadjar Indonesia*, No. 4, 15 January 1931, Year 1.
17. Al-Hadi, 'Teriak Yang Benar', *Al-Ikhwān*, October 1926.
18. *Pengasub*, No. 43, 20 March 1920 (1338 H).
19. The 1935 Annual Report of the Department of Education, BAK, 1936, ANM.
20. The authority and rules of MAIK began to be set out in 1916 and were later altered according to changing situations. Malay scholars were appointed as assistants to the British Adviser, working in cooperation with MAIK. Anonymous,

'Penolong Tubuh Tuan Penasehat', *Pengasub*, No. 309, Sya'ban 1, 1349/21 December 1930.

21. Zaman, 'Masalah Kemajuan Dunia', *Pengasub*, No. 295, 28 May 1930.
22. Luthfi, *Majalla al-Riwayat*, No. 2, Year 1, 15 November 1938.
23. Government contribution towards mosques in Tumpat, *BAK Tahun 1911 (Kelantan 'm')*, 172, file 183/11, ANM; a letter from Jemagar Bagat Singh, petition for the government contribution toward the building of a new Sikh temple, *BAK Tahun 1911 (Kelantan 'm')*, 177, file 1988/11, ANM; Hony.Secy.Majelis Ugama.KB, asks that the government may erect a building for Majlis Ugama Islam Office, *BAK (Kelantan 'm')*, 72, 73/17, ANM.
24. The Mufti Kota Bharu, List of Imam in Kelantan, *BAK Tahun 1911 (Kelantan M)*, 158, file 166/11, dated 16 July 1911, ANM; Mufti Kota Bharu, List of *Surau* Officials under the Kathi, who are exempted from payment of taxes, *BAK Tahun 1911 (Kelantan M)*, 199, file 212/11, ANM.
25. 'Naik Haji Ke Mekkah al-Mukarramah', *Pengasub*, No. 2, 24 July 1918.
26. 'Soal dan Jawab', *Pengasub*, No. 4, 22 August 1918, Year I.
27. One Malay author briefly described major religious denominations in America, and emphasised freedom of religion and its Constitution, including the clause of the First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of a religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 'Ugama-ugama di Amerika', *Pengasub*, No. 208, 1 June 1950.
28. A hadith by Abu Nu'aim in *Hilyah al-Auliya*. Salleh (2002: 136).
29. *Pengasub*, No. 99, Year 5, 22 June 1922, 2-4.
30. 'Kesatuan Melayu Semenanjung', *Pengasub*, No. 309, 21 December 1930.

# IV

## Controlling Politics and Bureaucratising Religion

Today, there are petty princes in East India under Dutch sovereignty who decorate themselves with the title of khalif [Caliph], without suspecting that they are thereby guilty of a sort of arrogant blasphemy.

(Snouck 1916: 111)

Malays saw the desirability of British interference with their religion and custom.

(Winstedt 1948: 102)

European colonialism was a force for political control and secularisation in the East Indies and Malaya. European colonial governments had to coexist with the political reality of Muslim colonies, however, which was a more complex situation than could be solved by either integrating or separating the religion of Islam from the colonial state. They sought to employ modern bureaucratic distinction between private and public realms in this context. By distinguishing religious and private affairs from political and public matters, they influenced the transformation of politics and administration of religion in Indonesia and Malaya.

In the East Indies, Islamic reform movements and colonial modernisation projects often collided in the domain of politics and government. The Dutch had to respond dynamically to the different forms of Muslim political activism discussed earlier. In a lecture on Muslim views of the church-state relationship, Snouck outlined the political history of Islam. Snouck argued that whenever Muslim lands were conquered by *kafir*, Muslims would migrate to a Muslim country. Once relocation became impractical, however, Muslim legal scholars conceded to necessity and began permitting and even recommending that Muslims resign themselves to being ruled by *kafir*.

Snouck told his colonial audience that, following the view of Al-Ghazali, while submission to non-Muslims was always to be regarded as temporary and abnormal, Muslims would not resist a foreign ruler just because the ruler was a kafir, so long as their religious needs and their sense of justice could be guaranteed (Snouck 1916: 114). Dutch colonial administrative attempts to govern their predominantly Muslim subjects fell in line generally with Snouck's suggestions. They included religious freedom, freedom of the press and freedom of association in their political charters. They allowed religious and cultural practices to continue and even flourish, while keeping political activities under control. At the same time, although the Dutch interfered in the Islamic political activities they, too, helped facilitate the management of certain Islamic matters in the East Indies, particularly through the work of native officials or regents (*D. zelf-bestuurder*).

In Malaya, colonial administrators collaborated with the sultans and introduced a new form of governance, thus transforming the sultanate considered incompatible with modern, effective government. Although the British stressed non-interference in religious and cultural matters, they collaborated with the sultan and the *'ulama* in administering aspects of Islamic religion and culture in Malaya according to their common interests and particular circumstances.

As this chapter describes, these changes in systems of government, combined with diverse interpretations of politics by Muslims, led to the development of eclectic, hybrid governing systems comprised of various complex official roles and departments in the East Indies and Malaya.

### **Secularising Government and Bureaucratising Religion**

In the East Indies in 1900, there were, approximately, 250 Europeans, 1,500 indigenous civil servants, 16,000 Dutch officers and 26,000 native troops hired to serve 35 million colonial subjects (Vickers 2005: 15). The Dutch therefore sought to centralise power, by creating *volksraad* or the People's Council in 1916. This was also in response to the natives' movements emerging to allow Indonesians some voice in policy debates. The governor-general nominated half of the 38 members for the 1918 to 1921 period, and the other half were elected by the municipal and residency councils. It consisted of Dutch and native members. As for the native members, 'colonial

authorities valued them as spokesmen for the indigenous population and they seldom said anything to upset the Dutch' (Sutherland 1979: 100). In 1920, for example, the members were Dutch, Javanese, Sumatran, Ambonese and others, including a Buginese teacher Nuruddin Daeng Magassing.<sup>1</sup> The *volksraad* had no formal legislative power but it served as a forum of debate on various matters pertaining to the colony. In 1927, its powers were extended so that *volksraad* approval was required in order to pass the budget and internal legislation. Agus Salim and other members of the commission recommended changes in the political structure, promoted limits to the Netherlands interference in the colony, sought a wider authority of the members of the *volksraad* and suggested its electoral procedures.

The *volksraad* barely debated affairs specifically Islamic in the East Indies. However, the Dutch Constitution guaranteed all peoples, including Muslims, the right to establish associations and the right to hold meetings, the exercise of which was in the interest of public order. It was not necessary for natives, including Muslim groups, to request permission from the colonial government to establish an association or hold a meeting as long as they did not have secret objectives or harm public security and order.<sup>2</sup>

Colonial administrators intended to govern effectively but they had different levels of knowledge and degree of skill and different circumstances on the ground. Colonial bureaucratisation encountered the existing ways of governing society that were deemed traditional and irregular, and being without clear separation between public and private. The colonial administration may have fit with what Weber calls bureaucracy characterised by fixity and regularity (1958 [1921]), but in the colonial state it is more aptly bureaucratisation, as it did not take a well-established form as in Europe, nor it was implanted without the prevailing traditional system of government. The implementation was situational and complex.

The Dutch introduced a military force, which functioned to control the existing rulers, but also ensured law and order (*D. rust en orde*) when riots and crimes such as robberies occurred. Apart from the military administration used for protecting the colonial apparatus and pacifying native resistance (Poelinggomang 2004: 11–12, 107), the hierarchy of civil administration governed various other domains. The new taxation, the use of money and its spending, the ownership of land and its use, and the need for special training

of the new employees had to confront the traditional way of owning and cultivating the land, of transactions, and of doing other activities. The Dutch Government created departments: administration, land and taxation, the courts, commerce, industry, transportation and communication, education, knowledge and sciences, religion, and charitable funds.<sup>3</sup> This bureaucratisation meant rationalising rules, means and ends; and secularisation meant differentiating the domains of the life. Regularity and fixity and new methods of doing official tasks were based on written documents, in addition to the traditional oral order and prohibition. The Dutch administrative ‘technicalization’ (Hodgson 1977: 417) had to be adapted to the local condition. Fixed rules were considered an integral part of colonial modernisation, but in practice fixation was mixed with flexibility and confusion.

Although Muslim leaders focused on the socio-religious domains, the Dutch administration created the Department of Education and Religion, apart from the Office of Native and Arab Affairs discussed in Chapter II. The Dutch Government included the section Muhammadan religion (D. *Mohammedaansche Eeredienst*), alongside Roman Catholicism and Protestant Christianity.<sup>4</sup> Annual reports included a section on ‘*Mohammedaansche Eeredienst*’ that contained information about ‘Muhammadan clergy’ and Islamic native schools.<sup>5</sup>

In governing Muslim society, the colonial government often faced tensions and problems. Although the Dutch rarely showed interest in converting natives to Christianity, they faced some apparent dilemmas: first, between supporting and showing neutrality toward their fellow Christians and converts and, second, between supporting and showing neutrality toward diverse Muslim individuals and groups.

### **Accommodating Religious Holidays, Managing *Masjid* and *Zakat***

Article 119 of the 1919 amended Dutch Constitution stipulated that every Dutch citizen had the freedom to adhere to a religion, as long as he or she did not cause public disorder or violate laws. It also specified that the government should not forbid observance of religious duties.<sup>6</sup> The colonial government understood ‘religious’ in a narrow sense – that is, belief and ritual. Thus, for example, they granted religious holidays to Christians, Chinese and Muslims, as they considered them ritualistic and non-political (meaning not a threat to

colonial order), as well as the celebration of the birthdays of the Queen and princesses. Muslims were free to celebrate holidays, such as the Night Journey and the Ascension of the Prophet, the Birthday of the Prophet, the Eid al-Fitr concluding the fasting month of Ramadan, the Eid al-Adha, and the first day of the month of Ashura. Although these religious festivals could have political meanings, the Dutch Government saw them as ‘religious’ activities.<sup>7</sup> The colonial government would consider these ceremonial or ritualistic, and therefore private, requiring no prohibition (see also Asad 1993: 55–79).

In some cases, the Dutch required a letter for the construction of a new mosque from *zelf-bestuurder*, detailing the land, the founder and its purpose in order to determine that the mosque was being used for worship.<sup>8</sup> Some Dutch officials who served as Advisers to the *zelf-bestuurder* had the right to prohibit the building of a new mosque for the sake of public good.<sup>9</sup> The *zelf-bestuurder* had to watch the local imams to ensure that they did not violate colonial law and that no religious teacher would misuse their religious authority against the people. The *zelf-bestuurder* would make a list of the numbers and addresses of local mosques.<sup>10</sup> There were several cases where colonial administrators tried to ban mosque activities and this created some tension. For example, a colonial attorney general asked the PSII to withdraw copies of a *khutbah* intended for a large gathering at the end of the fasting month because he believed it accused the colonial government of favouring Christianity.<sup>11</sup>

Regarding the position of the *masjid* within the colonial administration, the situation was quite complex. Mosques played a central role in Muslim life, but many of the functions and the roles they played were situational. A local mosque administration consisted of the head of the mosque, the preacher, the caller to prayer and the staff, either appointed or a volunteer (Snouck 1924). Most mosques operated independently and privately through the tradition of *waqf*. The finances were locally managed. The mosque executive board collected and distributed *zakat*, revenues from the *waqf*, and managed payment for Muslim marriages, deaths, and other services for rites of passage (Bousquet 1939: 26).

In other cases, however, Dutch colonial officials allowed mosques considerable freedom. Colonial administrators even facilitated the performance of religious obligations among native officials by coordinating schedules for

secular activities and religious events. In 1918 one governor expressed the hope that every Muslim official would be given the allocated time (from 11 am to 2 pm) to attend the Friday prayers and sermons. If the time proved inconvenient, the officials could rearrange their schedule with co-workers in order to be able to attend Friday sermons without disrupting their duties.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless, despite such Dutch assistance, Muslims argued that support for mosques was far less than that provided for Christian schools and churches. For example, in the official report of 1939, Protestantism received the subsidy of f. 844,000, Catholicism f. 335,700 and Islam f. 7,600 (Bousquet 1939: 26; Noer 1973: 170).

Colonial intervention in religious matters was also evident in the collection of alms or *zakat*, where Dutch officials tried to prevent coercion by *'ulama* and the practice of using *zakat* to subsidise the *'ulama*'s income. One regulation, for example, stated that a *zelf-bestuurder* was responsible for preventing *'ulama* from forcing people to donate funds for the establishment of a mosque.<sup>13</sup> The Dutch maintained careful oversight of mosque funds in order to maintain accountability and prevent corruption (Fauzia 2008). Snouck advised colonial officials to protect individual autonomy from any pressure in collecting *zakat fitrah*, in determining their amount or in choosing the agency that will allocate those religious funds (Salim 2008: 121). Permission for construction was granted only when it could be proved that no compulsion was used. Despite Dutch oversight, however, many *imams* actually managed to collect mosque funds without colonial control or support. For instance, in South Sulawesi, one local *imam* visited different places to collect donations for repairing existing mosques and establishing new ones without the knowledge of colonial officials.<sup>14</sup> In other cases, the *zelf-bestuurder* approved the building of a mosque and appointment of an *imam* recommended by local people. Dutch or native officials may also replace an *imam* who they deemed unsatisfactory. Old mosques were renovated with Dutch financial help, like that at Kampung Lajang in Makassar, rebuilt in 1902 after villagers asked to have their own mosque.<sup>15</sup>

### **Controlling the *Hajj*, Political Parties and Sufi Orders**

Guaranteeing freedom would mean scrutinising actions considered public. For the Dutch, Islamic politics was characterised by distinguishing religion

from its political expressions (Pijper 1961: 209–22). Politics meant the techniques of controlling Muslims' expressions in the public realm. Snouck advised the Dutch Government that they should not act recklessly by banning religious practice in the colony. He urged the government instead to treat both Christian and Islamic missions fairly and, more importantly, to distinguish the religious from the political expressions of Islam (Snouck 1994a [1906]: 57–8). Colonial authorities should show tolerance toward Islamic religious life but exercise vigilance toward its political movements (Benda 1958b). He thus advocated a policy of circumspect intervention, which would deal pragmatically with Islam. Although some Dutch politicians in the Netherlands regarded him and other officials as too tolerant and even too supportive of Islam, others praised Snouck for his ability to reach a workable compromise with Muslim culture (Wertheim 1956: 204–5).

For Snouck, the caliphate movement was a doctrine uniting the whole world under a centralised Islamic authority, an idea familiar to Christian ecumenicalism. But, in the case of Islam, in his judgement it was more importantly a factor constraining the assimilation of Muslims with modern, Western civilisation. Snouck saw pan-Islamism as an obstacle to accepting the idea of nations as the desire to be together, and an impetus for Muslim anti-colonialism. He observed that in the Muslim daily press the Netherlands was frequently derided as the enemy of Muslims, and in geographical textbooks used in Turkish and Arab schools the Netherlands was indicated as a power unfamiliar with the principles of tolerance, under whose yoke millions of Muslims suffer (Snouck 1994b [1909]: 73; Reid 1967).

The colonial fear of the caliphate emerged particularly during the later part of the nineteenth century. Although not in any way a Muslim rebellion, the Indian Mutiny of 1857 aroused considerable fear among Dutch colonial officials. In response, the 1859 Pilgrimage Ordinance (*D. Hadji Ordonantie*) aimed at regulating the requirements, travel arrangements and transportation for prospective Muslim pilgrims from the East Indies.<sup>16</sup> The government sought to control Muslim networks between the Netherlands Indies and the Middle East by requiring all pilgrims to obtain permits from their own regions and to present these passes to the Dutch General Consul once they were in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.<sup>17</sup> Snouck in fact saw this procedure as helpful for the pilgrims: the General Consul, assisted by native officials, was the

representative of the Dutch Government and judge in the East Indies, so when the native pilgrims encountered any difficulty they could meet the Consul for assistance and advice, like Algerians and Tunisians having the French Consul and Indians and Malays the English Consul (Snouck 1994b [1909]). The Hajj Ordinance did not reduce the number of Muslim pilgrims going to Mecca, and the actual number of pilgrims increased annually, except during the period of the two World Wars.<sup>18</sup>

Snouck was aware that in the Netherlands itself there was considerable apprehension regarding the *hajj* to Mecca and religious study in Mecca, which was thought to create an opportunity for global connections between Muslim teachers and students that would fuel pan-Islamism – and thus anti-colonialism. In response to calls for the impositions of bans, he explained that Muslims were obliged to perform the *hajj* during the Zulhijjah month at least once in a lifetime if it be possible, but that financial and personal restrictions meant that it was only performed by relatively few Muslims, since the return journey could take as much as three years. Added to this was the fact that under certain conditions the Shafi'i *madhhab*, to which East Indies Muslims adhered, even allowed a waiver from ever performing the *hajj*. The increase in the number of pilgrims (roughly 2,000 East Indies pilgrims from 1852 to 1858) from a population of approximately 35 million people could be explained by various reasons: strengthening one's religiosity to gain prestige, because of disappointment in the worldly life and to seek religious knowledge in Mecca. Snouck explained that the returning pilgrims were not priests as the government had called them, because Islam did not have priesthoods or sacraments. Nor were they necessarily spiritual leaders of the community just because they had performed the *hajj* or wore an Arab turban. He pointed to a colonial regulation stipulating that the aristocrat elite and regents had the task of watching native Muslim spiritual leaders, rather than Christian priests, and to the 1859 Pilgrimage Ordinance. In his view, colonial opinion about the adverse effects of the pilgrimage was unfounded. The government had claimed, for instance, that it wanted to prevent natives leaving their family at home without financial security since many died on their way, and to prevent fraud by those who may claim the title *hajji* without having reached Mecca. Rather than seeing a connection between pilgrimage and the spread of pan-Islamism, Snouck argued that Muslims who stayed in Mecca for some time

could learn about Islamic unity through education and interaction (Snouck 1994b [1909]: 178). Those who were influenced by pan-Islamism, Snouck said, came home with it hoping for a political change ending the domination by the *kafir* ruler. They saw a false government or suffered from economic difficulty so they resisted the Dutch, as in Cilegon, Java, 1888. This resistance, Snouck continued, was not because of the *hajj* experience. He did not see pan-Islamism taking a strong hold among native Muslims in the East Indies. Furthermore, the caliphate was in no way to be compared with the Catholic Papacy because Muslims had never regarded caliphs as their true spiritual head. Even the sultans of Istanbul could not think of restoring the authority of the caliph over the whole Muslim world (Snouck 1916: 110, 113). There were many local kings and princes that to have one true spiritual leader would almost always be impossible.

In sum, Snouck argued, not many *‘ulama* were fanatic or anti-Dutch. He sought to remove what he considered to be a myth among some Dutch governors that *hajjis* would necessarily be rebellious against the colonial government. In his view, administrators of Islamic law were the lower-level Muslim officials, more influenced by *adat* and more loyal to their rulers than to any strict Islamic theology and ideology (Benda 1958b). Snouck saw that Muslims were in political decay under Western domination. Many local aristocrats and Muslims influenced by animism and Hinduism were not excited about pan-Islamic ideas. He believed that such a syncretic Islam was hardly a threat to Dutch colonialism. By 1920s onwards Muslim reformers were uninterested in the caliphate and focused on homeland politics and society as discussed earlier.

Snouck's division of Islam into the religious and the political was in line with the Muslim division of the religious non-political and the political that started in the 1920s, of those who worked on the social and the educational and those who had joining the *volksraad* and had created political parties such as SI (Sarekat Islam) mentioned earlier. For example, Snouck advised that the SI movement needed special attention because SI activists held different activities in different places.<sup>19</sup> He believed that SI leaders would not be difficult to deal with and that they could adapt to Dutch colonial power. He argued that Christian missionaries could actually work together with SI leaders as long as everyone was sincere and fair (Snouck 1994c [1915]:

166). The Dutch Governor-General A. W. F. Idenberg (in office 1909–16), saw the Sarekat Islam as an expression of the native's self-awareness, contending that Javanese never demonstrated a 'fanatic Muhammadanism', and hardly showed an anti-governmental character (Laffan 2011: 199). However, according to Agus Salim, people could not stay out of politics because they encounter colonial policy. At first, Salim said, SI was not political, but it soon became aware of the need to engage with politics, since its activities were motivated by hunger for national unity and progress, as discussed earlier (Penders 1977: 257–61). The shifting nature of the SI–Dutch relationship supports the argument that there was no monolithic and static relationship between Dutch and Muslim politics in the East Indies.

Sufi orders were even willing to seek Dutch assistance in dealing with internally Muslim disputes. Such a case occurred in 1924, when Muhammadiyah activists in the province of Bone in South Sulawesi issued a *fatwa* of heresy against the Tariqah Khalwatiyyah Saman (popularly called Tarekat Haji Palopo, after its leader). They claimed that the Sufi followers emphasised a close relationship with God without a 'proper' understanding of religion and the *shari'ah*. This Sufi order, they claimed, was 'exclusive' and 'isolated' from the surrounding community and endorsed the 'heretical' idea that humans could become one with God, as found in the doctrine of al-Hallaj (d. 922): 'I am God' (Hamid 1983: 424). In response to these accusations, Haji Abdullah, the son of Haji Palopo, tried to separate the followers from accusations of heresy, relying on the idea that even those who reached the highest state of knowledge would never say, 'I am God.' In asserting the links between his *tariqah* and earlier *tariqahs*, such as Khalwatiyyah Qadiriyyah and Aflawiyah (Ubaedillah 2011: 170), he tried to convince Muhammadiyah leaders that his Sufi practice did not reject 'orthodox' Islamic ritual and law.<sup>20</sup> Ultimately, Dutch authorities decided that the dispute was 'spiritual', 'religious' and 'private' and that it did not harm public order and therefore did not merit an official prohibition.<sup>21</sup> Another Sufi order, the Tariqah Khalwatiyyah Yusuf, also demanded and later obtained official approval in 1933 from the Dutch (Abdullah 1978: 31). Sufi orders requested Dutch officials to accord them official recognition in order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis critics.

### Establishing *Hadat* Council in South Sulawesi

In South Sulawesi, before colonialism, the local nobility *karaeng* functioned as the ‘bureaucratic elite’ (Sutherland 1979: 1) dealing with the secular and cultural affairs. They decided on matters of conflict and protected the region from enemies, but also became leaders in religious and cultural ceremonies at times of harvest and others (Poelinggomang 2004: 59). These local aristocrats were in a strong kinship relationship (*siri*) (see Chapter V) and in a patron–client relationship, a relationship between lord and followers (Pelras 2000). The traditional elite also had sacred objects (*gaukang*), which they needed to preserve as their cultural bond and authority symbol, respectively (Poelinggomang 2004: 53). Despite the structural changes brought about by Dutch colonisation, the traditional patronage and cultural symbols had not disappeared. Patrons lost a few of their previous functions but they now had new functions such as social prestige, local leadership and economic success (Pelras 2000).

Colonial bureaucratisation had to meet with and make use of the native form of the traditional rule of aristocracy – and in some cases also of the Muslim scholars. Dutch colonial government, with the capital Batavia, had to control the vast territory and population of Java, Madura, and the outer islands, including Sulawesi. For example, in Sulawesi, under the so-called indirect rule, the Dutch Government divided them into different levels of administration: the *afdeeling* was an administrative area headed by an Assistant Resident; under that was *onderafdeeling*, which was headed by a controller; and then there was the local region (*adatgemeenschap*); and then, the village, or *kampung*. In the city of Makassar, the colonial government appointed a governor, an assistant governor, an Assistant Resident and a controller. They appointed local traditional elite or aristocrats as the administrative head (*regent*), and local headmen (*hoofd, penghulu*) were appointed through the *hadat* council. They also appointed native administrative officials or *zelf-bestuurder*. This multi-level administrative system indicates modification of the traditional system of *gaukang* (village) and *bori* (a smaller polity led by nobles (*karaeng*)). The Dutch administration appointed Dutchmen and the local aristocracy because they needed them to communicate and help reach the rest of the people. The main requirements for the native elite to be

government officials were that they should come from aristocracy and show readiness to cooperate with the Dutch (Poelinggomang 2004: 5–6; Chabot 1950: 102–3).

Among those who collaborated with the Dutch were members of the Hadat Council. The chief of the Hadat Council (Hadat Tinggi), for example, gave a speech to the effect that he praised the Dutch modernisation and interference in native government even three years after the declaration of Indonesia's independence in 1945:

We recognize that democracy is a new thing, but the principles of democracy had long prevailed in our tradition as shown in the traditional chronicles (*lontaraq*). Kings respected the people; and contracts were made between the kings and the people spelling out each party's rights and responsibilities; if any of the two parties failed in their responsibilities then there would be disaster. If democracy were defined not merely as a Western practice (the government from, for, and by the people), but also as a government headed by a king with contract with his subjects then democracy should not be foreign to us. However, in this modern era, our customary tradition is not adequate. We can say that this modern time begins in 1905 when the Dutch government interfered with our local government which resulted in change in economic and political affairs. Our local self-governments were educated by the Dutch officials to modernize local administration; they became adjusted to the demand of the modern time. At the same time, we have to maintain our basic social life, but we have to adjust to the demand of the modern time. We value our cooperation with the Netherlands, and thank you, Netherlands.<sup>22</sup>

The Dutch thus contributed to a process of a conceptual and institutional separation between the public and the private, between the political and the non-political and between the traditional and the modern. This liberal European idea was also embedded in the Dutch Constitution as a church–state separation. Yet, because the Dutch governed Muslim subjects, compromises were necessary, and in many cases this involved interference in Muslim rituals and everyday life, as discussed earlier.

Moreover, *adat* was not necessarily against modernity because it could serve as the source for modernisation. Historian Christian Pelras has argued

that the customary laws of Bugis society did not necessarily conflict with modern conceptions of law. He points to the sayings in the *lontara* of the Kingdom of Wajo that could be interpreted in modern terms. For example, the Hadat Council's decision prevails over the rulers; the people's leaders' (*anang*) decision prevails over the council's; the people's decision prevails over the people's leaders. The other says: the People of Wajo are free (*maradeka*); their only master is law (*ade*) (Pelras 2010: 373).

### **Showing Little Interest in the *Hajj* and Pan-Islamism in Malaya**

Like the Dutch, the British recognised the political and religious freedom of its citizens as well as the people under their protectorate. As mentioned earlier, the 1874 Treaty of Pangkor though stipulating that British advice must be asked and acted upon, laid down that all matters touching Malay religion and custom were under the sultan's authority (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 158, 160–1). Nonetheless, despite this official policy, the British did interfere with aspects of Malay religion and culture. Most obviously, unlike the Dutch East Indies, colonial law formalised the conflation of Islam and Malay ethnicity and culture. The Malay Reservation Act, originally intended for addressing agriculture, land holdings and other practical purposes, redefined a Malay as any 'person belonging to the Malayan race who habitually speaks Malay or any other Malayan language and who professes the Moslem religion'.<sup>23</sup>

The Act introduced a race-based categorisation of people (despite some difficulty determining whether Muslims from Arabia, India and China could be Malay), and also the construction of religion and culture. The British introduced this religion-based race categorisation in response to local circumstances rather than to the diverse understandings of Islam by many races across the archipelago (Willer 1975: 78–9; Yegar 1979: 17–18). Indeed, they themselves recognised the difficulty in differentiating Islam from Malay custom in practice. Winstedt believed that Malays saw the desirability of British interference with their religion and custom when it assisted government (Winstedt 1948: 102; Willer 1975: 86), and when the elite raised no objections. For Malay society generally, however, this variation created some tension regarding the extent to which the British were able to intervene in local affairs.

Unlike the Dutch, British administrators and scholars generally did not

express a strong interest in topics such as a pan-Islamic caliphate, the impact of the pilgrimage, Sufi orders, and the potential threats that these could pose to the British rule. Some British administrators and scholars associated the word 'Muslim' or 'Muhammadan' with fanaticism, but, for Winstedt, fanaticism was not natural among Malays. The British alliance with the sultans effectively ensured that British power did not become a target of antagonism (Roff 1964: 75–90). Certainly, some British officials feared pan-Islamism because they thought that it may pose a threat to the Empire, as in the 1919–24 caliphate movement, which was regarded as the greatest anti-British protest since the 1857 mutiny rebellion. Further impetus had been given to pan-Islamism by the conquest of Arabia by the Wahhabi ruler Ibn Saud in 1924, and by the attempt to revive the caliphate and to organise a rejuvenated Islamic world. However, the proposed Islamic World Congress, to have been held at Mecca in 1926, failed (Roff 1962: 172). Among the three possibilities that Malays and Indonesians discussed (that is, pan-Islamism, pan-Malayanism [union between Indonesia and Malaya] and anti-colonial nationalism), pan-Islamism was the least realistic in political terms, and the shortest lived.

In Malaya the colonial government saw no need to control pilgrimage traffic, and therefore issued no regulations as the Dutch did in the East Indies. Wilkinson, for instance, viewed the pilgrimage primarily as a ritual, albeit a global one, but one that carried no political significance, even though some Malays claimed that they were proportionately sending more pilgrims to Mecca than were Indians, Persians, Moors or Turks (Wilkinson 1906: 11–12). Although Wilkinson wrote about the concept of Islamic unity, he did not conceptualise this in terms of political unity under a caliph. Islam, for the Malays, he said, was a noble type of character, a freemasonry or bond of union between all who profess it. He wrote, 'More than a faith, more than a philosophy and thought, it is a great quasi-political force, a militant brotherhood, a definite type of civilization of which all its members are extremely proud and with which inferior races delight to associate themselves.' It aims at the conquest of the world for God and for Muhammad, he said. Islam thus offered Malays a missionary zeal that makes converts swell the community of Muhammad and so render more possible its conquest of the world. In theory, he argued, all the Muslim world was to have constituted a single nation under one caliphate. The destruction of the different ideals of the

different Muslim states created a desire for making Islam once more a great world power. However, that was in the minds of some, not many, Malay Muslims. Political differences were being effaced by the gradual subjection of the various Muslim princes whose powers distracted from the recognition of the Caliphate of the Sultan of Turkey (Wilkinson 1906: 8–9, 18).

Thus Wilkinson became more interested in studying and recording how pan-Islamic writings, when they existed, may have influenced Malay literature, rather than their political implications. He said that ‘if anyone wishes to learn the nature of the vain imaginings with which our philo-Turkish agitators try to delude the Malay public, he can do so at any time in the columns of the journal that calls itself *Chahaya Pulau Pinang* (‘The Lustre of Penang’), but ‘although pan-Islamic movement in the Straits would furnish material for a very interesting political study, it need only concern us at present in its literary aspects’ (Wilkinson 1924: 63).

Winstedt agreed with Wilkinson about the lack of influence of pan-Islamism among Malays. He maintained that the puritan Wahhabi movement, which allied with political ends, sustained the idea of pan-Islamism, but such notions of Muslim theocracy had little or no appeal to Malays whose loyalties were still parochial (Winstedt 1947: 42). This also explains why there were no elaborate, strategic British policies regarding Sufi orders and other emerging Muslim associations in Malaya. As discussed in Chapter II, Winstedt’s views of Sufism (*tasawwuf*) were focused on its spiritual and cultural aspect, rather than its political potentiality against the British. Thus, the British Government focused more on the administration than on dealing with Muslim politics.

The British sought to introduce a secular government, but they had to deal with the Malay sultans and scholars whose ideas and practices could contradict theirs. The adoption of Islam had drawn Malay rulers into a Muslim world and had introduced many to modern spiritual doctrines and techniques. The new modernity introduced by the British meant that the Islamised sultans had to adjust again.

### **Bringing the Old Sultanate to Modern Government in Malaya**

Like the Dutch, the British Government believed that their modern bureaucracy was superior to the traditional sultanate. The British attempted to

teach the Malays, in the words of Frank Swettenham (1850–1946), the first Resident General of the Federated Malay States, the advantages of good government and enlightened policy (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 174). The British took over the government but in accordance with the ‘indirect’ rule pattern established in India maintained the traditional Malay ruling class as a symbol of continuity. Yet the Sultan did play a role in religious and cultural matters, even when the administrative assistance of the British stepped more firmly into the domain of religion and custom.

After a meeting in Kuala Kansar in July 1897, Malay sultans sent a statement to the high commissioner: ‘We, the Sultans of the Malay States of Selangor, Perak, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan, by the invitation of Your Majesty’s High Commissioner, are met together, for the first time in history, to discuss the affairs of our States confederated under Your Majesty’s gracious protection. We desire to offer to Your Majesty our respectful and cordial congratulations on a reign of unexampled length and unequalled progress, and we pray for Your Majesty’s long life and the continuance of that protection which has already brought such prosperity to Malaya’ (Swettenham 1906: 288–9). The late governor of the Straits Settlements and high commissioner of the Federated Malay States Frank Swettenham wrote in 1906 that, ‘In Malaya . . . when you take the Malay – Sultan, Raja, chief, or simple village head-man – into your confidence, when you consult him on all questions affecting his country, you can carry him with you, secure his keen interest and co-operation, and he will travel quite as fast as is expedient along the path of progress’ (344). He wanted to ensure paying sufficient attention to Malay interests: ‘Time will not change the Malay character, or alter the fact that the Malays are “the people of the country” whose confidence we have gained by making their interests our first consideration’ (345).

Swettenham and other perceptive British officials understood the adverse effects of change. The influential Wilkinson, mentioned earlier, for instance, observed that ‘the sudden establishment of a modern settlement in an old world community is such as that the Malays brings about great social changes. To the people as a whole it brings a certain amount of economic prosperity. To some individuals it brings evil’ (cited in Roff 1967: 131). Wilkinson believed that the transition to a purely secular form of government created anxiety among the chiefs. In former times, Wilkinson claimed, religious con-

tributions could be misappropriated and that Malay Islam trusted a good deal to compulsion in religious affairs. However, the formal British policy of non-intervention was not actually implemented when colonial Advisers tried to reform aspects of Muslim activities, such as mosque fund management. Most officials saw this as an improvement. Thus, on the *zakat*, Wilkinson observed: ‘The British Government now stands in the place of the chiefs and has in that way come to represent the indigent and pious Moslem for whom the tithe was originally intended’ (Wilkinson 1906: 13).

At the same time, Richard Winstedt, discussed earlier, categorised old and new governments, but viewed the sultans as generally amenable to new influences. Winstedt depicted the political nature of Malay sultanates like Malacca and Perak as predominantly patriarchal. The kings were named *Yang Di-Pertuan* (He who is made Lord), or *Raja*, if retaining a more Hindu style, or *sultan*, his Islamo-Persian title. He described Malay rulership as hereditary, ceremonial, sacral and astrological – strangely enough to modern minds. The Malay ruler became the object of absolute obedience, so the penalties for offences against royalty were heavy. After conversion to Islam, the local ruler adopted the title sultan, as the ‘Shadow of God on Earth’ (*A. dhil Allah fi al-‘ardh*). The sultan became the servant of God, who pursued justice and righteousness (Winstedt 1947: 68–70). Winstedt’s view is clearly expressed in his description of a luncheon hosted by the Sultan of Perak, wearing ‘a dark blue European uniform’, ‘a sash of sacred yellow from waist to knee as became a good Muslim’, ‘a purple forage cap with the white ostrich feathers for a Civil Servant’s cocked-hat’, ‘a costume that made the best of all the worlds in which he and his forebears had lived, Hindu, Islamic, British’ (Winstedt 1969a: 71).

According to Winstedt, the old constitution, like the Malacca sultanate, detailed the procedure of appointment of the future ruler by the current ruler, of prime minister or commander-in-chief (*M. bendahara, orang kaya besar*), minister of police (*temenggong*), and other ministers (*mantri*). It mentioned the other positions, including the officer of the port (*shabbandar*), admiral (*laksamana*), religious dignitary (*Imam Paduka Tuan*), territorial magnates, and assistants. There was then no separation between the judicial and the executive authority because the ministers had various duties, such as collecting tributes or taxes, investigating the facts, knowing the law and

passing sentences. Winstedt suggested that Malay ministers had the task of directing an imperialist policy for the advancement of the royal dynasty and the expansion of the trade, which brought wealth to the ruler and to themselves in the shape of taxes and presents. They had no expenditure to build roads, schools, modern administration and the army. Winstedt contrasted the sultanate against the modern government. The only civil servants were police and tax collectors, and the only departments from which the peasant gained benefits were the 'department of religion and magic' (Winstedt 1947: 72–9).

Here, Winstedt used the Perak Laws to explain the old ways of governing, which he regarded as medieval with some important features being a degree of differentiation of function and territorial control among the chiefs and the fact that they were consulted by the sultan on important matters. In Winstedt's view, these two characteristics made it easy for the British to introduce State Councils and to reshape administrative structures. Old functions, such as Temenggong, resembled new functions, such as commissioner of police (Winstedt 1947: 79–80). With the advent of British colonialism the mixture of old and new was apparent; in the state of Johor, for example, the sultan created three councils modelled on the Privy Council of Great Britain and the Executive and Legislative Councils of British colonies.

Nevertheless, there were distinct changes in this hybrid system as new positions were created and new regulations promulgated. Thus, throughout the Malay Peninsula, the British Government introduced new divisions within the government, including the economy, banking, legislation, education, health, transportation, communication, post office, the military and police, markets, irrigation, land reform, labour, agriculture, mines, prisons, the press and publicity, currency, and electricity.<sup>24</sup> The annual report for the Federated Malay States, for example, showed these categories: financial, trade, customs and shipping, lands and survey, geology and mining, forestry, agriculture, legislation, police, prisons, medical, education, posts and telegraphs, public works, railways, cooperation, and general (Peel 1927). Differentiation of the domains became both conceptual and administrative.

These administrative categories were to be fixed but there was some overlap in documentation and implementation. For example, the British

Government introduced a new system of land tenure in Malaya, giving monetary value to land (that could now be bought, sold and taxed) but to appease the Malay ruling elite they kept the traditional position of local headman (*penghulu*) who would now have a fixed monthly allowance. The Malay Reservation Enactment of 1913 was partially intended to ensure that Malay felt a sense of ownership, but British capitalists also secured their own interests and restricted the peasantry from some cultivation rights (Shamsul 1986: 20, 28). The higher ranks of the technical departments were staffed almost entirely by European engineers, surveyors, foresters, doctors, agriculturalists and educationists, although in the predominantly Malay states such as Kelantan and Terengganu the small revenue left these technical departments still backward (Winstedt 1948: 94).

The British thus transformed what they called old government into a modern, civilised one, while still keeping some of the traditional functions. Yet, as the case of Kelantan shows, Malay society at large did not become 'modern' in the way that the British would have wished. Furthermore, despite the official policy of non-interference, the practicalities of implementation posed a dilemma as the British interacted with the sultans, *'ulama*, and local circumstances. In other words, the British envisaged non-interference but, in actual policies, they often felt compelled to interfere in Malay religious and cultural affairs.

The government documents in each state contained a dearth of information, including statistical data and annual expenditures, and liabilities and assets. While the supreme authority in each state was officially vested in His Highness the Sultan who presided over the State Council that included British Resident or Adviser (Peel 1927: 4), the association between the Malay ruling class and the British colonial authorities served to disguise the fact that real power ultimately resided with the British. British administrators doubted whether the sultans will ever learn to govern themselves, and felt that what was best suited to Malay society was a mild, just and firm despotism (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 177). Despite instances of miscalculation by Residents, Advisers and other officials, the British believed the traditional Malay elite were predominantly autocratic, impractical, and wealth-hungry (Wilkinson 1929: 1–6; Winstedt 1947: 63–81; Sadka 1964: 184–5).

### **Creating State Council in Kelantan**

The British obtained the northern Malay States (Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu) from the Siamese in 1909 in a transfer of suzerainty, protection, and administrative control. Kelantan became a British protectorate to the extent that the status quo would be preserved as far as possible and that any changes in the administration would be gradually and cautiously introduced.<sup>25</sup> Here economic considerations were not as prominent as in the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States, but the distinction between public and private (religious and customary) affairs was still significant. In 1911, two years after the transfer, the British adviser divided Kelantan's government structure into the following categories: revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities, legislation, administration, land and agriculture, education, health, courts, posts and telegraphs. The report included a Muhammadan Marriage and Divorce Enactment under the section Legislation, alongside Vehicles Enactment.<sup>26</sup> Obviously, these British domains bore only a slight relationship to the traditional system, but these included such family matters as marriage and divorce (see Chapters V and VI).

The State Councils became the sole legislative body of each state, usually consisting of ten individuals: sultan, selected princes and chiefs, a Chinese representation and the British Resident. Nonetheless, these councils operated very differently from traditional assemblies. Things customary and religious would go into the hands of the sultan, and other matters – the vast majority – were considered the responsibility of the Resident and ultimately the colonial government in Kuala Lumpur (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 175). Thus, more than the Dutch, the British introduced a stricter form of secularisation as they attempted to distinguish secular, civil affairs from religious, cultural affairs – although there was some variation in different states. In the three Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, British laws governed religious policies according to local circumstances, giving no special status to Islam. In the Federated and Un-Federated Malay States, the British helped Islam to gain special status and enabled sultans to receive official, prerogative recognition to safeguard the Muslim religion (Means 1978: 386).

The process of secularisation can also be tracked in British Malaya, albeit in a direction quite different from the East Indies, as the position of the sultan

and *'ulama* was reinforced. The British generally respected the aristocracy and the Islamic scholars but this favoured position, some argue, contributed to their becoming more religiously conservative. With British protection and advice, the sultans centralised Islamic organisation and essentially controlled religious life (see Chapters V and VII). British imperialism thus shared some characteristics with the Dutch in objectives, but there were basic differences in their strategy and policy towards Muslims and, accordingly, in the long-term consequences.

### **Conclusion**

Different forms of political and governmental secularisation prevailed in colonial Indonesia and Malaya. Secularism was not articulated as an ideology by the colonisers and the colonised, but a process of secularisation in the sense of differentiation of the domains of life (Casanova 1994) nevertheless occurred. One aspect of secular colonial administration involved limiting Islam to the religious sphere and locating it in its private place alongside other cultural matters. The introduction of a modern bureaucracy contributed to secularisation, as colonial powers bureaucratised the separation between public and private matters, with religion and cultural customs classified as part of the latter. They also differentiated between regularity and irregularity and fixity and flexibility in enacting administrative rules and training new officials (both European and native). Colonial administrations sought to maintain relatively uniform bureaucratic standards as directed by the Colonial Office (Sadka 1964: 184), but the diversity of colonial territories and their physical, racial and cultural variation led to the different dynamics in colonial–Islamic relationships.

Although these bureaucracies were central to colonial modernisation and to the process of secularisation, European attitudes to government in the East Indies and Malaya and their reactions to Muslim subjects reflects the differences between academic perceptions of Islam and its actual practice. Dutch colonial government, trying to strike a balance between their form of secularisation and Muslim efforts towards politicisation, faced a dilemma between maintaining governmental neutrality and intervening in Islamic affairs. Despite the official non-interference in Islamic affairs, the Dutch colonial government guaranteed the freedom of Muslims to celebrate religious

holidays, create organisations, and publish their writings but regulated any activities they regarded as political in order to maintain social order and stability. They only felt it necessary to become involved in supervising Muslim practices when they became of public concern or when they threatened the colonial or social order. The Dutch intervened more than the British in overseeing Islamic practices (that is, congregational prayers, mosque and zakat management, pilgrimages to Mecca) and in the oversight of Sufi orders and Islamic organisations when they were perceived to be a political threat, but left the content of Islamic beliefs and rituals unregulated. Muslim political activists appreciated the Dutch bureaucracy when it focused on progress, but they were critical of colonial policies they considered interventionist or discriminatory in comparison to the treatment of Christian missionaries and the *adat* aristocracy.

In contrast, British administrators officially claimed a policy of non-interference in Malay religion and culture, but did intervene when necessary in order to maintain Malay privileges, amidst other races' challenges. The British allowed the sultans and the *'ulama* to regulate Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy. Their collaboration with the sultan and official *'ulama* reinforced Islamic Malay identity. While the British hardly scrutinised political expressions of Islam, they saw them primarily as a cultural expression and thereby did not consider them an imminent threat to the British–Malay alliance. Instead, the British administration and the sultanate attempted to view each other as mutually supportive. Colonialism had created the situation where the British governed worldly affairs and helped preserve Malay and Islamic privileges amidst internal and external challenges. The British were quite successful in maintaining the sultanate symbolic power while modernising the public domains that the sultans and *'ulama* had little administrative capability.

Dutch interference in the religious and native affairs in the East Indies led to social organisation and political movements that were largely independent of the traditional ruling class. The bureaucratic separation of religion and custom from public affairs enabled Muslim reform movements to flourish and vice versa. The Dutch secularisation served as a control mechanism of native lives, but it did not necessarily undermine Muslim politics or destroy *adat*. The political relationship between colonial Europeans and

local Muslims became confrontational when their interests clashed and circumstances did not allow compromises or autonomies. When they shared common interests in reforming administration and maintaining order they could coexist and even support each other by dividing their labour to achieve their modernisation goals.

Colonial powers had to maintain power over the colonised in order to prevent resistance or rejection of their power. One of the ways that they achieved this was by secularising various domains as part of the modernisation process. In his attempt to create an anthropology of secularism, Talal Asad posed a question: 'Is "secularism" a colonial imposition . . .?' (Asad 2003: 21). This chapter and the previous chapter suggest a possible answer: in different, contingent ways secularism becomes one aspect of European colonialism, but Muslim reformers also played their crucial roles in limiting its power and in shaping its manifestations. Muslim reformist politics coincided with the loss of the sultanate power to the British in many cases, but, in some cases, especially in Kelantan, sultans and the *'ulama* demonstrated their symbolic and real authority in ensuring Malay orthodoxy and orthopraxy due to the British inactivity and the official policy of non-interference in religion and culture.

## Notes

1. 'Candidaat Lid Volksraad', *Anak Kontji*, No. 5, Year 1, 20 December 1920.
2. These articles in Dutch and Indonesian translations were also mentioned and discussed in local journals and books in the East Indies. Buys (1894); Mangkoeto (1936), 25: 5; *Al-Wafd*, Nos 9–10, September–October 1933, Year 2.
3. *Bijlagen van het Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal*, 1919–1920, Bijlage C. Koloniaal Verslag, 1919. KITLV.
4. Ministerie van Kolonien, Mailrapporten, 2.10.10, 1896–1899, 1902, NA, Den Haag; *Overgedrukt nit de Nederlandsche Spectator*, 1881, 51. KITLV; *Jaarverslad over 1931 van den Raadsman voor Studeerenden, Batavia*: Landsdrukkerij, 1932, 244.
5. *Regeeringsalamanak voor Nederlandsche-Indie, 1911*, Batavia: Ladsdrukkerij, 1911, 312–13.
6. Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur 1920: 6–7.
7. In 1925, the holidays included the Chinese New Year (24 January), the Ascension of the Prophet (Isra Mi'raj, 21 February), the death day of Confucius

(12 March), Tsing Bing (5 April), Good Friday (10 April), Easter Monday (13 April), Birthday of the Netherlands Prince (20 April), two days at the end of the fasting month (Idul Fitri, Garebeg Poesa, 24–5 April), Birthday of Princess Juliana (30 April), Ascension Day (12 May), Whit Monday (1 June), Day of Sacrifice (Idul Qurban, Garebeg Besar, 2 July), the First Day of Ashura' (31 July), Birthday of the Queen Mother (3 August), Birthday of the Queen (31 August), Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (Maulud, Garebeg Maulud, 3 September), Birthday of Confucius (14 October), Christmas Day (25 December) and Boxing Day (26 December). *Vaststelling van de sluitingsdagen voor Gouvernements-kantoren in verbend met de Mohammedaansche feestdagen*, 2.10.10, 1924, *mailrapport* 2593/24, NA, Den Haag; Gelezen het Schrijven van den Directeur van Justitie van 12 September 1924, A, 17/31/19, *mailrapport* 2593, NA, Den Haag.

8. Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur 1920: 39; Bousquet (1939: 26).
9. F. C. Vorstman, de gouvernor van Celebs en Onderhoorigheden, Makasser, 20 October 1923, Serie P: Zuid-Selebes, 41, *Gewestelijke Regelingen Nopens de Inheemsche Rechtspraak* (1923), *Adatrechtbundels*, vol. 31: Celebes ('s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1929), 156; Meulen (1983: 4–7).
10. *HT Damsté Collection* (1874–1955), D Or. 535, KITLV.
11. *Soera PSII*, No. 10, November 1940.
12. Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur 1920: 61.
13. Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur 1920: 36–59.
14. *Bijlagen van het Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1919–1920*, Bijlage C. Koloniaal Verslag, 1919, KITLV, 69.
15. Report by Matowa Lajang, named Kajang Djapar Dg. Manrapi bin Kamaluddin Ishak Dg. Mambani, in Makassar, Kampung Lanjang, 20 June 1948, in *Collectie H. Th. Chabot*, year 1932–1970, DH 1251, KITLV.
16. Jaquet (1980); *Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie: de Pelgrimsordonnantie-1922*, *Staatsblad* No. 286, 1927, *Stoomvaart Pelgrims: Nedere wijziging en aanvulling van d pelgrimsordonnantie-1922* (*Staatsblad* No. 698), in verband met de invoering van de *Schepenordonnantie-1927* (*Staatsblad* No. 33).
17. Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur 1920: 64–7.
18. For example, in 1905 there were 4,964 pilgrims from the Netherlands Indies; then from 10,994 pilgrims in 1910 to 14,805 in 1920, to 33,214 in 1930. *Laporan Resmi Hindia Belanda in Suminto* (1986: 222–3); Interview with Muhammad Abduh Pabbaja, 9 July 2005; Interview with Abu Hamid, Makassar, 5 June 2005.

19. Snouck, 'Prof. Snouck Hurgronje over de SI', A letter to Governor General of the Netherlands Indies, written in Leiden, 14 October 1913, KITLV.
20. Mededeeling omtrent de Tarequat Hadji Palopo, door Hadji Palopo's zoon Hadji Abdullah bin Abdul Razak, bijgenaamd Poeang Lompo', dated 24 May 1924, KITLV, Kern Collection, H 797, inv. No. 323.
21. 'Vrijdag te Palopo', *Collectie RA Kern*, No. 454.
22. 'Pidato S.P. Andi Petenteng (head of the Hadat Council)', *Pelantikan Hadat Tinggi Daerah Selebes Selatan: Pidato2 Jang Dioecapkan pada Tanggal 12 November 1948*, 1948: 29–31.
23. Government of Kelantan, *Enactment No. 5 of 1934, The Sultanate Lands Enactment*, signed by W. D. Barron as the British Adviser and the Sultan, ANM.
24. *British Military Administration, 1943–1947*, ANM, Kuala Lumpur; Swettenham (1942: 101); Andaya and Andaya (2001: 163–4).
25. There were twenty-four British Advisers to Kelantan, from J. S. Mason (1909–1911) to E. T. Williams (1939). See Talib (2003: 106, 225).
26. KAR, 1911, D.SUK 2/14/1, ANM.



———— PART III ————

**MODERNISING LAW**



# V

## Integrating *Shari'ah*, *Adat* and European Laws

You know better about your worldly affairs.

(Hadith cited in a Muhammadiyah *putusan*)<sup>1</sup>

Borrowing good things from a *kafir* would not be considered prohibited [*haram*] when there were no bad intentions and no negative impact on the person's faith.

(Nahdlatul 'Ulama *fatwa*, 1939)<sup>2</sup>

Allah will not change the blessing and the fate of a people until they themselves change their laws and regulations in accordance with the development of life.

(Q. 13:11; Al-Hadi 1931: 60–2)

In an article entitled 'The Concept of Progress and Islamic Law', Professor Noel J. Coulson noted that in classical Islamic theory, law precedes and is not preceded by society: 'If in Western systems the law is moulded by society, in Islam exactly the converse is true' (Coulson 1985: 203–4). This is only partially true because despite the belief in the universality of *shari'ah* for Muslims, its interpretations in the forms of *fatwas*, law, jurisprudence and rules were not necessarily immutable, being shaped by local and even Western colonial circumstances. In Indonesia and Malaya, Muslim reformers increasingly sought to spread legal interpretations by addressing and accommodating customary and colonial laws. In this chapter, I examine the way in which Muslim reformers and religious authorities began to formulate *shari'ah* not only in terms of *fiqh* and legal opinions (*fatwa*) but also promulgated and at times enacted it in relation to local custom (*adat*) and by accommodating Western colonial law. They made eclectic articulations of law using terms

such as *shari'ah*, *hukum*, jurisprudence, *wet* and *recht* drawn from the internal context of *fiqh* traditions and from Western law and local *adat*.

The institutional role of Islamic law became subsumed within the complex civil and customary legal system in the East Indies, which had unintended consequences, including the creation of an Indonesian school of legal thought (*madhhab*) or an Indonesian Islam in postcolonial Indonesia (Hooker 2003; Feener 2007). Under colonial circumstances, Muslim reformers in the East Indies tended to frame *shari'ah* in terms of faith, ritual and morality, rather than making it part of the European civil or common laws. Beyond the colonial co-optation of the traditional *qadi* and *penghulu* in charge of Muslim familial matters, there was no reformist idea or movement promoting Islamic law as part of the constitution of the (colonial) state. Meanwhile, in Malaya (discussed in the second half of the chapter), the Malay states and Muslim religious councils assisted by the British focused on formalisation of many aspects of Islamic law, encompassing belief, ritual, morality, personal and familial matters, because they had now more authority to do so and because the British allowed them to do so while modernising other matters considered public or secular. Muslims in the Indonesian-Malay colonies hardly changed the newly introduced colonial laws, so Europeans remained in charge of civil and common law.

There was tension between legal decentralisation and centralisation in colonial Indonesia and Malaya. There were also tensions and collaborations in the development of legal systems in these countries (Hooker 1983). Muslims generally did not distinguish Islamic law from *adat* but the colonisers reinforced the distinction between the two. In practice, Islamic law and *adat* were often mixed or juxtaposed. Still in other cases, some Muslim reformers compared Islamic law with Western, colonial law in order to stress the shared principles of justice and order.

As this chapter and the next chapter will show, Islamic reform and colonial modernisation influenced the way in which law became not only a distinct category separate from other domains but also served as a new mechanism for improving religiosity and social relations. Muslim reformers and colonial modernisers merged their goals and interests in some aspects of law but diverged in other aspects, reformulating Western law, Islamic law, and customary law, thus contributing to different kinds of legal plurality in the East Indies and Malaya. In the East Indies, some Muslim reformers criticised

colonial regulations deemed interventionist and discriminatory, but many did not reject colonial law as such. They hardly received administrative assistance from the Dutch colonial government in implementing aspects of Islamic law. In Malaya, sultans who received British advice and Muslim reformers who focused on formalising Malay Islam rarely criticised British rule of law.

### **Promulgating *Shari'ah*, Accommodating *Adat* and Dutch Law in Java**

The modernist Muhammadiyah focused on producing *fatwas* on internal Islamic matters, also without confronting colonial regulations. In 1927, in an effort to maintain unity and coherence among its community, the Muhammadiyah established a council called Majlis Tarjih (Assembly for Deliberation). The purpose of this Council was to discuss various opinions in dispute and to decide on the most acceptable solution (A. *marjuh*) according to their interpretations of the Qur'an and the hadith (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 1967: 276). In its collection of rulings (I. *putusan*), the Muhammadiyah emphasised five matters: *agama* (religion), *dunya* (worldly affairs), *ibadah* (worship), *sabilillah* (the path of God), and *qiyas* (A. analogy). They defined *agama* as the religion of Islam revealed to Prophet Muhammad in the Qur'an, succeeding the previous prophets, which contained commands, prohibitions and guidance for the well-being of humankind in this world and in the hereafter. They described *dunya* as all worldly affairs, quoting the hadith, 'You know better about your worldly affairs', affairs that were not part of the function of prophets, affairs left to the wisdom of human beings. Then *ibadah*, as they defined it, was being close to God by following His commands, avoiding His prohibitions and practising all that He permits, dividing it into the general and the particular. *Sabilillah* was described as the path that brought people to the will of God, comprising all the acts aimed at implementing His laws (Abdurrahman 2007: 201–2).

Instead of following the consensus of scholars (A. *ijma'*), the Muhammadiyah felt that *qiyas*, or analogy – or more broadly *ijtihad*, an independent reasoning – was an important method for judging the status of matters not part of worship (*ibadah*) and not explicitly or directly stipulated in the Qur'an and in the hadith.<sup>3</sup> The inclusion of *qiyas* or *ijtihad* was contrary to the traditionalists who regarded *taqlid*, following the authoritative schools of thought, as one of the references after the Qur'an and the

hadith. Also, the Muhammadiyah sought to emphasise the value of reason in understanding the Qur'an and the Sunnah and in making laws. Thus, for example, by assessing the reason for why an act was forbidden in the Qur'an, one should be able to judge if an analogous act was forbidden or not. This served to answer new questions and problems according to changing circumstances. The function of the Majlis Tarjih, therefore, was consultative, and its decisions were not legally binding (Tanfid Hoofdbestuur Moehammadjah 1938: 14) and so the *qadis* in the East Indies were not obligated to abide by its rulings. For example, regarding campfire rituals newly practised by the boy scouts, in 1932, after some debate, it was decided that participation was forbidden if the campfire was accompanied by certain ceremonies viewed as *bid'ah* (Noer 1973: 81). The decision was a guide for the members, and did not imply hostility to other opinions that were also based on the Qur'an and the hadith.<sup>4</sup> Other organisations, such as the PSII, created its Council of Shari'ah and Ibadah, offering *fatwas* intended primarily for its members.<sup>5</sup> These did not enforce religious decisions by imposing sanctions (*A. ta'zir*) such as payment of fees or jail sentences, introduced by colonial government, which were under the jurisdiction of the civil court.

The major impact of colonial rule was the strengthening of *shari'ah* and *adat* as distinct and separate legal systems. Before European presence, Muslim rulers in Java and Sulawesi formed the office of *shari'ah* (*parawe sara*) and the office of custom (*parawe ade*) to deal with different segments of the ruled. They appointed Muslim judges for *parawe sara* in charge of certain religious affairs, including punishment for religious offences and a local customary figure for the *parawe ade*. At least from the seventeenth century to the early twentieth, the *qadis* were in charge of implementing the penalty of amputation of the hands or legs for theft, for example, in Aceh and Banten (Reid 1993: 183; Bosra 2003: 91). Muslim jurists had to decide in which cases Islam was preferred, in which cases local customs were preferred and in which cases a combination of Islam and local custom were desired (Yakin 2013: 290–314).

Muslim modernists in Java and Sulawesi did not focus on changing the positions of *parawe sara* and the *parawe ade*; to the contrary, at times they were in conflict with these officials. In Sulawesi, the *parewa ade* and the *parewa sara* came from local nobility (*karaeng, daeng*) and officials appointed

by them. The *parawe ade* office was in charge of local, general administration, whereas the religious judge's office was in charge of religious laws such as ritual, *zakat*, mosque, marriage, and inheritance (Noorduyn 1964: 93; Bosra 2003: 248). Muhammadiyah and NU issued *fatwas*, or opinions of their owns, without codes of law produced by the judges. They worked independently of the *parawe sara* and the *parawe ade*.

For reformers such as Ahman Dahlan, legitimate law was superior to mere local customs, to ensure order and improve social conditions. *Adat* was defined as the old, the traditional, the past, to be judged on the basis of new laws.

Leaders should understand the behaviors, situations, and customs (*adat istiadat*) of the people whom they lead, so that they will be able to act according to their ability, without hurry, and understanding [what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour] . . . Human beings are commonly reluctant to accept things that seem new [*baru*] and different from what has been prevalent for a long time. They think that new [things] will lead to danger and difficulty, even though they know that others who do the new [things] appear happy about it . . . We should not rely on customs for our law (*hukum*) to determine [what is] good and bad, right and wrong. Instead, we should use legitimate laws (*hukum yang sah*) and our pure hearts (*hati yang suci*). (Dahlan in Mulkhan 1986: 8–9)

The law that was legitimate (I. *hukum yang sah*) implies Dahlan's recognition of the Dutch laws in the East Indies, while his reference to pure spirit highlights the importance he placed on Islamic faith and morality. The same reasoning was applied to the lawfulness of performing in the theatre and displaying portraits of individuals and pictures in one's home, a practice increasingly popular as a result of colonial influence (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 1967: 295–7). Dahlan's fears that the display of his own portrait would lead to unacceptable veneration proved unfounded. Embracing *tajdid*, Dahlan then contended that it was lawful to display a portrait depending on the purpose. If there was any hint of veneration of a portrait, display would be prohibited (part of the act of associating partners with God, or *shirk*), but it would be permissible for the purpose of teaching and simple demonstration (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 1967: 281).

Hasyim Asy'ari, the leader of NU, argued that it was an obligation for Muslims who lacked the capacity to conduct independent reasoning to follow (*taqlid*) the established schools of thought (*madhhab*). *Taqlid* was not merely following without knowing the reason and argument put forward by such scholar as Al-Shafi'i. The following of one *madhhab* was meant to avoid following only the easy opinions among different schools of thought (in Masyhuri 1997: 50–1). But this emphasis on *taqlid* was not regarding Sufi orders or *tariqah*. On their sixth annual congress in 1931, NU issued *fatwas* judging which *tariqahs* are legitimate (A. *mu'tabarab*) and which ones are not. They considered Sufi orders, such as the *Naqsyabandiyah*, *Syattariyyah* and *Qadiriyyah*, which could demonstrate lineage connection to the Prophet legitimate (in Masyhuri 1997: 81–4).<sup>6</sup>

Regarding the colonial law, since medieval schools of thought had not conceived of laws under foreign rule, NU leaders hardly included it in its *fatwas*. As discussed in Chapter I, the East Indies was conceptualised as an Islamic country (*negeri Islam*), in spite of being temporarily under foreign rule. Islamic law needed to be applied by Muslims even independently of the colonial rule and institutions.

However, a number of *fatwas* were issued concerning aspects of belief, ritual, and social interaction with *kafir* or non-Muslims. Although a *fatwa* was issued elaborating different kinds of *kafir*, some *fatwas* were concerning *kafirs* in general. Another stated that Muslims should believe in the coming of The Prophet Isa the Messiah at the end of the world, following the *shari'ah* of the Prophet Muhammad. A *fatwa* said that a Muslim who dies as a *kafir* deserves no Muslim funeral. Another one said that a *kafir* who dies reciting 'There is no god but God' (A. *Laa ilaa ha illallah*) deserves no Muslim funeral either because he or she was not known for proclaiming Muhammad's prophethood. Still another *fatwa* stated that the Jewish and Christian scriptures were not the same as the ones that the Qur'an recognises and asks Muslims to believe. In another *fatwa*, Muslims were prohibited to use a *kafir* as a witness in Muslim marriage. Other *fatwas* addressed the questions of buying things in a *kafir* store and reading books authored by a *kafir* (in Masyhuri 1997: 36, 111, 145–6, 181, 188–9, 194).

### Conflicting and Integrating *Shari'ah* and *Adat*: The Modernists in South Sulawesi

Unlike Java, Sulawesi recognised no Hinduism and Buddhism before Islam. *Adat* was conceived not as Hindu-Buddhist beliefs, but as the belief in the one god (B. *dewata seuae*) and spirits without prophets, as part of the *Pangngaderreng* cultural norms. *Adat* was an Arabic term for local custom, but its entrance to South Sulawesi was before the coming of Islam in the region and before Bugis people had long interacted with other Islamised or Arabised people in other regions. Local custom was rendered also as *beccik*, *laleng* or *pabbatang*. Rulers, for example, would receive advice from *adat* officers and could be removed from rulership due to their violation of *adat* (Rasdiyanah 1995: 107–9, 149, 217). One of the common rules was that custom could be used for law (A. *al-adat muhkamah*) when there is no clear prohibition in the Qur'an and the hadith (Al-Suyuthi (d. 1505)). This involves the process of making particular ideas and practices *adat*, which later becomes the object of one's judgement based on one's understanding of the Qur'an and the hadith.

*Adat* and *sha'riah* became differentiated and, despite some conflicts, became generally accepted as a cultural whole in the *Pangngaderreng*, Bugis-Makassarese customary law. South Sulawesi thus seemed to be somewhat between Java and Sumatra in this regard. *Pangngaderreng* originally consisted of *ade* (*adat*, customary norms in a narrow sense), *bicara* (justice norms), *rap-pang* (regulation) and *wariq* (leadership protocols), but from the seventeenth century *sara* (*shari'ah*) was integrated by Muslim rulers of Bone. People generally recognised the prevailing local custom and Islamic law (Rasdiyanah 1995; Yunus and Ya'kub 1977: 29).

The Bugis who had recognised the belief in one god either contrasted or integrated the previous belief with the new concept of one God in Islam. The emphasis on Qur'anic fundamental beliefs among the Muhammadiyah preachers was often understood as resistance against *adat* deemed harmful to the purity of the belief in one God, although local *adat* was sometimes included in the modernist curricula (Tanfid Hoofdbestuur Moehammadijah 1931/2: 124–33). The Muhammadiyah preachers recognised *shari'ah* as part of the Bugis-Makassarese *Pangngaderreng* cultural system, but they considered it insufficient in reforming the local elite and the people. A Muhammadiyah

preacher, for example, refused an invitation to attend a ceremony to mark the ruler's accession to the throne because he believed that the ceremony would involve appeasing local spirits through paying respects to the royal regalia (B. *arajang*) and the sacrifice of buffaloes, which he considered both *shirk* (polytheistic) and *munkar* (evil). He said that to believe in God should mean to respect Him alone. He based his decision to decline the invitation on his understanding of a hadith.<sup>7</sup>

Another Muhammadiyah teacher in Kajang, Sulawesi, refused to accept the traditional taboo of opening the regalia. The taboo had it that if one opened the regalia to view, he or she would immediately go blind or even die. The teacher intended to show that the taboo was false; he opened the regalia and nothing happened to him. He then became appointed the head (*voorzitter*) of the Muhammadiyah in Kajang.<sup>8</sup>

Other Muhammadiyah preachers were critical of invoking the spirits of trees, although they used sacred and revered Islamic utterances to strengthen the spell as recorded in local literature (*lontara*), oral and written. The literature advised the wood chopper to call the inhabitant of the forest: 'Hi spirit, give me your wood. I want to make it a house post. Then utter an Islamic greeting "*Salam*" (Peace be with you). When you proceed to feel timber, call out "my name is Adam, the tree is called Ali (the Muslim caliph), and God is sublime (*Allah ta'ala*)"' (Robinson 1998: 180). They rejected the belief and practice that the Qur'an and the banners of communities are smeared with blood to magically strengthen them (cited in Cummings 2002: 54). The Muhammadiyah believed that Muslims should protect themselves from beliefs and practices they deem *shirk* or *bid'ah* not sanctioned by the Qur'an and the hadith.

They were also critical of the important position of the traditional healer called *bissu*, traditional healer and spirit mediator, who sometimes also served as Adviser to the rulers and keeper of the regalia. *Bissu* had the task of performing the rites of passage that the nobles had to undergo during their lifetime as descendants of gods. *Bissus* played a central role in maintaining the existing power structure and they outlived Islamisation. As priests (according to one of the early Western reports) and male transvestites (*calabai*), *bissu* were shamans, as they became intermediaries between the world of humans and the world of gods and spirits (Pelras 2010: 343–54). When Muslim

reformers came to the region, they criticised *bissu* for being outside legitimate Islamic sexual categories – Islam, in their view, would not recognise a third gender as it was against human nature (433). After encounters with Muslim reformers throughout the centuries, *bissu* became less central, but they survived and became a marker of *adat* identity in an increasingly plural Bugis society. Some of the *bissu* tasks performed in the rites of passages were taken over by *qadi* and *imam*. Here the power of Islamic reform and Western modernity challenged the status of *bissu* in society (44). Yet, in other cases, *bissu* converted to Islam, and some even made the pilgrimage to Mecca, thus suggesting a case for cultural adaptation and Islamic reform. Reform in traditional values and practices was made possible through encounters (Lathief 2004: 68–9).

In other cases, Bugis Muslims differentiated but did not separate Islamic norms and local custom. A religious figure and a *bissu* coexisted in the *adat* ruler's presence. Also, in a royal wedding, the religious figure blessed the bride and groom, and the *bissu* performed a fertility ritual (Andaya 2000: 43). Still in other cases, the ritual specialist blessed the building of a house, reciting hybrid spells (*mantera*) containing Islamic and local elements. The village's religious figure (*imam kampung*) also served as the ritual specialist, *panrita bola*. When the two functions did not exist in one person, the village *imam* would ask advice from the ritual specialist regarding daily affairs (Saransi 2005: 39). These cases indicate either integration or assimilation of Islam and *adat*, and at the same time suggests the process of drawing a distinction between what is Islamic and what is customary, one of the ways of becoming modern.

For another example, Buginese and Makassarese Muslims negotiated a compromise between *shari'ah* and *adat*, such as in the norm of *siriq*, which was a Bugis normative concept of two seemingly contradictory meanings: shame and self-respect (Andaya 1982: 366–7). They believed that violation of the *siriq* norm would bring calamity to the region, such as drought and severe economic conditions. A runaway couple who married without familial consent was an example of *siriq* that should be paid off. The family is made *siri*, *tomasiriq*. To remove the shame, the family would be obligated to kill the one responsible for causing *siriq*. The Buginese and Makassarese have a saying: 'We Buginese and Makassarese, We declare our oath, to respect each

other, to show our solidarity' (Mulia 1988/9: 11). *Siriq* became a motivating and integrating element associated with a sense of dignity and social shame.

But *siriq* became an object of Islamic modernist understanding, too. Hamka, a Muhammadiyah activist from West Sumatra who stayed in Makassar, addressed *siriq* according to his understanding of Islamic norms. Hamka realised both the Islamic norm of dignity and the cultural importance of *siriq*. In a sermon, Hamka suggested that *siriq* could be compatible with Islamic norms. Dignity, he continued, should be based on true faith and moral moderation. Hamka quoted al-Ghazali, '[T]he best dignity is one that is moderate'. *Siriq* became extreme if it meant killing and violence in defence of dignity. He quoted an Arab poem that suggested the value of respect: 'If you do not defend your dignity then you undermine it, and others will undermine it even more; therefore respect yourself and if a place is too narrow for it, then move to another place where respect is possible.' Hamka further explained *siriq* by discussing some related Islamic terms, such as self-dignity (A. *maru'ah*), courage (A. *shaja'ah*) and shame (A. *haya*). An Islamised local norm of *siriq*, according to Hamka, was a reflection of individual liberty, freedom, fear of God only, and trust in God as the greatest protector. *Siriq* could also mean respect for women and the dignity of religion, he maintained. Hamka then quoted a hadith saying, 'Whoever is killed in defense of his property dies a martyr (*shahid*); whoever is killed defending his life dies a martyr; whoever dies because he defends his religion dies a martyr; whoever dies in defending his family dies a martyr.' He cited another hadith, '[S]hame is part of faith' (Hamka 1988: 66–74). To further support his interpretation of *siriq*, Hamka referred to the saying of another Bugis preacher, Haji Abdullah, who spoke at the congress of the Muhammadiyah in 1932 at Makassar: 'To die in the defense of the religion of Allah is to die in the most honorable way and to idealize the implementation of Islam in the country is to live meaningfully.' Hamka said that he was amazed by the bravery of the Buginese and Makassarese people in facing death over small things, but he called them to implement the norm of *siriq* in reaching higher goals, such as the dignity of country, nation and religion (Hamka 1988: 75–8). In this case, Hamka differentiated between Islam and custom, but aimed to integrate one with the other in Bugis-Makassarese society.<sup>9</sup> He was engaged in the process of Islamising custom and in the process of localising Islamic norm at the same

time. *Siriq* became a tradition that could disappear, but could also survive Islamisation through reinterpretation.

### **Adapting to Colonial Law and Foreign Customs**

Muslim reformers rejected Western customs deemed un-Islamic, but they selectively obeyed or encouraged others to obey the colonial rule of law. Ahmad Dahlan of the Muhammadiyah was not interested in formalising any aspect of Islamic law as the constitution of a colonial state, but encouraged Muhammadiyah members to focus on education, preaching and social service.<sup>10</sup> He defined the implementation of Islamic laws (*hukum-hukum Islam*) in the East Indies in broad terms, not specifically in legalistic terms. There is no source to suggest that Dahlan ever confronted Dutch control over civil law (such as taxation) or criminal law (such as fines and imprisonment) in the East Indies. He is reported to have said, 'One who is charged with a crime would fear prisons.' He reminded people that they must pay their taxes, although he realised that it was the Dutch who imposed them: 'Spend your wealth when you are in control. A time will come when the Dutch officials would control all your wealth, through taxes' (Salam 1963: 68, 70).

A Muhammadiyah author wrote that all the *adat* that is not in accordance with or in contradiction with the law and command of Islam should be avoided (Tanfid Hoofdbestuur Moehammadjiah 1938: 23). Other Muhammadiyah activists encouraged members to keep current with contemporary legal conditions. As sons of the soil (*bumiputera*), he maintained, the Muhammadiyah activists should recognise the colonial law that guaranteed equal rights in establishing associations and holding meetings. Muhammadiyah writers made reference to literature on Dutch law *ilmoe staatsrechts*, using such writings to argue that establishing organisations was a human right, a right given by Allah and by the law in Hindia Belanda (the Netherlands Indies) (Mangkoeto 1936: 5–7). Muhammadiyah leaders encouraged Muslims to follow the law in its broadest sense, including civil law. They also conducted their meetings following Dutch custom and law.<sup>11</sup> They made a general statement that all the heads and consuls throughout the East Indies should reexamine colonial regulations and local traditions (*adat*) in terms of Islamic norms (Tanfid Hoofdbestuur Moehammadjiah 1938: 23).

Muslim modernists showed their agreement on aspects of Dutch law that were not in contradiction with Islamic law. For example, an author asserted that the trade of women and slavery that the Dutch prohibited in their laws was also against the religion of Islam, against the view of the religious scholars and against the prevailing law.<sup>12</sup> Other Muslim activists called others to study various sources of law in order to understand the laws that had prevailed in their own country. If they did not know the current laws that the Dutch Government applied, they would not be able to lead and govern others. Learning from various sources was a way to follow the leadership of Prophet Muhammad who had learned about different sets of laws. Prophet Muhammad was reported to have applied a Jewish law for disputing Jewish people under his rule in Medina.<sup>13</sup> This suggests an awareness of some parallels between the principles of Islamic law and those of Dutch law.

Muslim reformers also engaged customs deemed modern or foreign. They addressed new cultural forms of the time, such as creating sculpture, composing and playing music, and singing songs. The Muhammadiyah teachers said that art (D. *kunst*; I. *seni*) and culture (D. *cultuur*; I. *budaya*) could be good and valuable in cultivating the heart. In a congress in 1941, one of the speakers emphasised that the Muhammadiyah called for members to pay more attention to crafts, music and songs and to promote them, as long as these are not performed contrary to Islamic morality.<sup>14</sup> Foreign, Western customs were examined from within the framework of the practices deemed indigenous, Eastern or Islamic. The Western customs became seen as law when they came from the colonial administration, an object for some Muslim reformers to address. The Dutch law became subject of judgement based on Islam and local custom.

An illustration of the way in which Muslim reformers could learn about Islamic ethics even from foreigners can be found in Hamka mentioned earlier. In his work on modern Sufism, concerning the value of 'being satisfied with what one has' (A. *qana'ah*), Hamka made a reference to the way that Dutch Queen Wilhelmina taught her princess Juliana about being content with one's life. He wrote, 'As the Queen taught her daughter Juliana about cooking and sewing, she told her: "Trust no worldly desires; today we are seduced, tomorrow we will be more seduced; we must be content with what

we have now and fear not what will come tomorrow” (Hamka 1955 [1939]: 185). Foreigners could teach Muslims about their Islamic values.

Asy'ari and other NU members addressed customary issues that resulted from colonial and more broadly global encounters, as discussed earlier. When asked whether wearing a tie, trousers, shoes, coat or hat was religiously accepted, he replied that it would not be recommended (A. *makruh*) if the person intended to imitate or follow the custom of the *kafir* in order to spread customs to others, nor was it recommended to wear such clothes while visiting other houses of worship (in Masyhuri 1997: 25). Another NU *fatwa* explained that wearing a cross or closing stores on Sundays were examples of how a Muslim follows a *kafir*. But, the *fatwa* stated, following good things from a *kafir* would not be inherently prohibitive (A. *haram*) – it would be contingent on intention, as well as on the impact of the person's faith (171–2).

### **Distinguishing Religious from Cultural and Civil: SI and PSII in Java**

Agus Salim, the SI leader discussed earlier, adopted varied attitudes toward *adat*, dividing it into three types: familial custom, social custom, and custom that the Dutch Government integrated into civil or criminal law. Matters of familial customs related to marriage and inheritance, for example, were no longer applicable for the modern world and for Muslims. Many customs that emphasised more specific kinship (*suku, keluarga*) could jeopardise a sense of individuality and the faith needed for movements aimed to change social, economic and political life. Ethnic ties could weaken the national unity between people of different ethnicities. There were customs imposed by the authority and the law of the East Indies government that undermined the law of common responsibility and the right of people to regulate their own lives. Regarding customs sometimes called native laws (*wet-wet Bumiputera, hukum Bumiputera*), or customary laws (*adatrecht*) that had been incorporated by the Dutch Government into civil or criminal laws, Agus Salim said that they were unfortunately rarely communicated to the people, let alone understood by the people. Salim urged members of the political party to be critical against these customary laws that had become civil law owing to uncertainty of what the crimes or violations were, the hierarchy of the laws (for example, which laws were superior to others), the court procedure in

dealing with the matters and the absence of law books in the Indonesian language that should contain all political contracts, letters, regulations, notices, and other legal matters. In principle, in all of these matters, he argued, law (*recht*) should be in agreement with the demands of the time. Both the old and new groups in Indonesia should work together because they faced the same reality and fate, he asserted (Salim 1954 [1934]: 176–89).

In dealing with the modern government, Muslim reformers also distinguished the religious from the civil affairs. For example, PSII activists distinguished religion from civil and customary affairs, and were therefore critical of colonial interference in the religious affairs of the Muslims, without promoting the overthrow of the Dutch Government:

Having paid attention to the debate on the regulations of the Colonial Government concerning Islamic marriage, the control of mosques, and the surveillance of Islamic education, we maintain that these regulations are contrary to Dutch Law and the Netherlands Indies Colonial Law regarding the freedom of religion for everyone in both the Netherlands and the colonies. Those regulations hinder Muslims from performing their religion according to their belief. The government's duty of maintaining order and security should not be carried out by intervening in and undermining the religious rights of Muslims. Here we would like to pose several questions to the government. First, what are the reasons for government intervention in Islamic affairs and for giving *adat* officials [*punggawa*] the authority to do so? Second, what is the nature and limits of this intervention? Third, given their different religions, can trust between the government and the people be maintained if the government does not provide full freedom to the people in matters of religion?<sup>15</sup>

PSII members pointed to the disparity between the ideal and the reality, between Dutch laws concerning freedom of religion and the actual policies. They criticised Dutch interference in what they regarded as internal, religious affairs, and blamed cooperative *adat* officials for such interference.

In response to critical Muslim voices, a colonial official – himself a native Javanese – explained in the local periodical that the colonial administration was not concerned with enforcing *shari'ah*. He pointed to the Marriage Law that gave *qadi* and *penghulu* the jurisdiction to register Muslim marriages. He

argued that the government aimed only to prevent inappropriate and illegal fees collected by some Muslim officials. These *qadi* or *penghulu* were obliged to obey Islamic law by registering and guiding the process only, not blessing the marriage, which was the task of the religious authority. He further reasoned that the marriage fund collected should go to the mosques and to the payment of *qadi* and *penghulu*, not to the colonial treasury.<sup>16</sup> For its part, the colonial government argued that it only regulated the public aspect of Muslim affairs, namely preventing mismanagement and public disorder.

### **Conflicting and Integrating *Shari'ah* and *Adat* in Malaya**

Although these Muslim reformers were concerned about various aspects of local and foreign customs, they did not seem interested in reforming or transforming the way that the court system functioned. Furthermore, many Islamic judges were not directly affiliated with reformist organisations. In Indonesia, ethnic ties could weaken a greater sense of nationhood, whereas in Malaya, Malay ethnicity was deemed critical in the Malay nationhood. In the latter, Islamic identity became closely connected to Malay identity and culture, supported by the sultan and the British, as discussed earlier. This became institutionalised in laws. Malay reformers were concerned with the relationship between Islamic and customary laws and between Islamic, customary and secular British laws. Some reformers became keen to embrace and incorporate British law.

There were two main kinds of Malay *adat*: *adat pepateh*, the matrilineal culture confined to the state of Negeri Sembilan in central Malaya, concerned with land holding, including inheritance, which could be related also to marriage, divorce and adoption; and *adat temenggong*, which is any other Malay culture beyond this matrilineal culture. *Adat temenggong* is thus patrilineal, primarily represented by written digests, but never applied as legal rules by past Malay kingdoms. *Malay adats* are not homogenous as has been generally assumed (Hooker 1976: 62–92). These two variants of Malay *adats* were often defined as distinct and subject of judgement by Muslim reformers as well as colonial administrators and scholars.

The official conflation of Malay religion and culture did not mean that there was no tension between the Malay interpretations of Islam and their views of *adat*. To become Islamic and modern meant to be critical of

ideas and practices deemed traditional and contradictory to Islamic norms. Like Javanese reformers such as Ahmad Dahlan and Hasyim Asy'ari, Malay reformers such as Tahir Jalaluddin and Tok Kenali were more concerned about local customary beliefs and practices than about reforming colonial laws, but, in many cases, Malays received the assistance of both the colonial government and the sultan in implementing the laws.

Tahir Jalaluddin saw the need to reform Muslim society by avoiding indigenous and foreign customs that contradicted Islam.

Rectification of religion does not entail changing the very teaching of Islam neither does it involve the introduction of foreign un-Islamic elements into Islam. Rather rectification and reformation of religion is a return to the original sources of Islam as practiced in the period of the prophet and early generation of Islam, unadulterated by the customs, practices, and beliefs that contravened Islam. (Jalaluddin cited in Zakaria 2006: 170)

Yet Jalaluddin interpreted the purification of faith primarily in terms of condemnation of local customs deemed superstitious, backward and weak. This local *adat* was judged on the basis of local understandings of Islamic moral law. As Hooker has shown, in certain Malay states, notably the matrilineal Negeri Sembilan, *shari'ah* law and Malay *adat* could clash, such as in cases of inheritance and succession (Hooker 1975: 112), a situation where the MAIK served as the Adviser. Malay *adat* in this instance was therefore defined as an indigenous practice that could contravene the Malays' understanding of Islamic morality.

### **Conflicting and Integrating *Shari'ah* and *Adat* in Kelantan**

Sultan Mansor of Kelantan prohibited the *makyong* in his court in 1898, and Hugh Clifford in 1927 told a story about *makyong* specialists fleeing Kelantan to Pahang. The established *'ulama* of the MAIK and local religious figures (*tok lebai*) issued an *fatwa* stating that *makyong* or *main peteri* healing performances linked to supernatural beings and healing practices were prohibited (*haram*) and part of the *shirk* because they called upon the spirits (*hantu*) and other supernatural beings rather than upon God. But other Muslim figures did not see them problematic. A healer (*tok peteri* or *bomoh*) recited and gave reverence to spirits and the unseen creatures (*jin*) as well as to prophets,

saints, and religious grand teachers (*shaykh*), while also praying to God, in order to gain more powers in healing the sick. The healing practice could combine local spells (*mantera*) with Islamic prayers (*do'a*). The healer recited for several hours accompanied by musical instruments. They argued that the more power they could accumulate the faster the sick would recover.<sup>17</sup> The *bomoh* and the *tok lebai* could coexist when they played different functions. The healer performed recitations as part of the shamanistic ceremony, while the religious preacher concluded it by praying to God. They received due respect from the audience who demanded both functions (Daud 1982: 110–12). In other cases, the same *tok lebai* was also the healer, acknowledging both the Qur'an and local spiritual powers (Firth 1974: 205–6). Thus, the *makyong* were deemed not necessarily un-Islamic, and Tok Kenali was known to be lenient in his attitude toward them (Winzeler 1975: 96). He asked the *makyong* to his *pondok*, inviting them to share a meal prepared by the people, hear sermons and perform daily prayers. He was more concerned with immorality, such as gambling and drinking (*minum arak*) (Salleh 1971: 4–5, 141).

Other Kelantanese authors interpreted some customs as being non-Islamic by making reference to 'pre-Islamic' practices. For example, a Malay contrasted people of light and people of darkness: 'God made three religious festivals for Muslims: Friday, *Eid al-Fitri*, and *Eid al-Adha* to remember God, whereas people in the era of ignorance (*jahiliyyah*) spent their holidays participating in playful and wasteful games.' During the *Eid al-Fitri* holiday, he reminded Muslims to exchange greetings, visit families and neighbours, shake hands (with those of the same sex), give alms and do good deeds (*khairah*), but not to engage in polytheistic, animistic or immoral practices.<sup>18</sup> Another author, a graduate from Mecca and of the English School founded by the MAIK, admitted that many local people still participated in cockfighting, a local custom he found contrary to Islamic morality (Daud 1996: 317).

Between the notions of *shari'ah* and *adat* in Kelantan there was often an aspect of Arabic custom not necessarily regarded as an integral part of Islam, but nonetheless regarded as beneficial. Malays believed that certain Arab customs were preferable as a way to emulate the Prophet and his companions. Some sought to differentiate Islamic doctrines and Arabic practices, but others saw some parallels. Tok Kenali commented on certain aspects of Malay life – such as dress and social behaviour – that should be distinct

from the ways of outsiders who came to visit Malay.<sup>19</sup> One issue of dress concerned the wearing of an Arab turban by Muslim Malay men. The *mufti* of Kelantan issued a *fatwa* stipulating that it was a recommended practice (*sunnah*) because it followed the Prophet Muhammad. An article was written to support this *fatwa*, suggesting that it would bring more benefit (A. *maslahah*) than harm (A. *mafsadah*) to the Malays.<sup>20</sup> Wearing the Arab's turban became part of Islamic Malay tradition, whereas wearing trousers was considered foreign. Beyond this clothing issue, Tok Kenali, however, encouraged Malays to move toward being intellectually and socially higher than the foreigners, or at least to be equal to them.

Other Malays considered some of the customary laws related to marriage and wedding, dressing, eating, drinking and other everyday practices deemed contradictory to Islamic ethics.<sup>21</sup> In their encounters with the British and other Asian nations, Malay reformers became concerned not only about clothing, but also about other issues, such as earning bank interest, eating pork, and drinking alcohol and the traditional *arak*.<sup>22</sup> They were concerned about the effects of 'Western custom' on Muslims. For them, to be modern and Islamic was not necessarily to be morally Westernised. At the same time as addressing and reforming Malay customary laws, they localised Islamic norms for the Malays. But modernisation also involved borrowing from and working within the British laws on matters they considered to be not contravening Islamic faith and law.

### **Conforming to British Law in Promoting Order and Justice**

Malay reformers were more critical of local Malay customs and its morality than of British laws. A *kaum tua* Malay author in *Pengasuh* introduced a history of British law, which he saw as contributing to Britain's modernity and global status. He commented that Kelantan and other states under British rule could learn something beneficial about British law and political science (*ilmu siyasah*) such as *hukum* (law), *adl* (justice), *ummah*, *hukumah* (government), aristocracy, *dimuqbrathi* (democracy), republicanism, and administrative law (*hukum dusturi*). The author noted that British law had become a model for legal systems in the US, Australia and other countries, and suggested that Malay states should follow their steps in order to be modern.<sup>23</sup>

Malay reformers contended sometimes explicitly and often implicitly

that the modernisation of British law coincided with the objectives of Islamic law, although their rationales may be different. Syed Al-Hadi maintained that British law did not prohibit the Malays from improving their life, and urged them to thank the British because they were better off now than they were beginning to achieve progress under British protection than when they were under feudalistic Muslim rulers.<sup>24</sup> He condemned the sultans and Islamic judges instead, who spent time in luxury and playfulness that did not benefit the nation, while neglecting their obligations.<sup>25</sup> It was under British rule, Al-Hadi affirmed, that Malay Muslims lived in justice, freedom and peace. He said that it would be a disaster for them to be left to govern themselves without the protection of the British because they would not be able to rule themselves. Quoting a Qur'anic verse (21:105), he said: 'Before this We wrote in the Psalms, after the Message given to Moses: My servants, the righteous shall inherit the earth.'<sup>26</sup> This time, he implied, the righteous were Europeans.

Al-Hadi praised the British scholars and administrators and criticised the official *'ulama* for not speaking the truth to the sultans. He argued that Western nations were able to dominate Muslims because they were ignorant, unjust and arrogant, and that God gave power to those who were deserving – those who had knowledge and skill.<sup>27</sup>

Moreover, Al-Hadi believed that European rationality and modernity were influenced by Islamic civilisation, so it would make sense for Muslims to adopt these features as authentically Islamic. The ideas of equality and justice were European and Islamic, too. Islamic law for Al-Hadi was divine, but it was rational and beneficial to human needs. Islam called for equality (M. *persamaan*) of humankind and justice (M. *keadilan*) for all (ruler and ruled, rich and poor, man and woman, literate and illiterate) in all responsibilities and capacities, quoting the Qur'an and the Prophet's final sermon. He believed that Islam protected security and prosperity for all humankind, criticising the pre- and non-Islamic *jahiliyyah*-era Arab customs of robbery, killing, revenge, enmity and wars, and criticised their Arab custom of schism and conflict even after conversion to Islam (Al-Hadi 1931: 30–40). Here Al-Hadi, an Arab-Malay descent himself, differentiated between Islamic values and Arabic customs and made his argument for following the European values that conformed to Islamic values rather than embracing Arabic and local traditions that contradicted Islam.

More than law in its narrow connotation, morality became the main concern of Malay reformers because morality was more substantive and universal. Ethical norms (*adab peraturan*), for Al-Hadi, would include telling the truth, being trustworthy and patient, not getting angry easily, forgiving, being united not divided, being kind to parents and family, keeping promises, helping in goodness and being compassionate to the weak, the poor, animals, women and *kafirs* who have converted to Islam or are in Muslim protection. Islam taught that Muslims should strive to work hard. These moral values did not necessarily differ from the moral qualities of the developed, European nations, he maintained (51–7). Al-Hadi also held the view that laws could change to meet the requirements of society – only belief and ritual (*ibadah*) was eternal and subject to no change after Muhammad (60–2).

### **Formalising *Shari'ah* in Kelantan: MAIK and the British Adviser**

Before the colonial era, sultans did not intervene in the judicial process, but when they became involved, they did so within standard, acceptable legal channels (Hallaq 2005: 190). In Kelantan, the sultan, the British Adviser and the *mufti* played their different regulatory roles, although in many villages (subordinate to the city of Kota Bharu, but relatively independent), the mosque imam and the *pondok* teachers remained the primary contacts for many ordinary Malays.<sup>28</sup> There was no independent or separate office for customary (*adat*) affairs as in Java and South Sulawesi due to the Islam-Malay identification strengthened by the British, the sultan and the people. The functions of the sultan and MAIK were deemed to be both in religious and customary realms. In the domain of law, the British secularised the administration of law (see the next chapter) and, consequently, the sultan and *'ulama* of the MAIK conflated and strengthened religious law and customary law.

In Kelantan, *fatwas* were not merely *fatwas* as in Java and South Sulawesi discussed earlier. *Fatwas* became laws enacted by MAIK, with the support of the sultan and the British Adviser. For example, the sultan and the *muftis* sought to ensure mosque attendance in Kelantan. The British Adviser made reference to the Mohammedan Laws Enactment of 1914 that dictated that any male person of the age of 16 years who, without reasonable cause or excuse, did not observe the Friday prayer shall be brought to the court and, if guilty, could be fined of an amount no more than fifty cents. This ruling also

stipulated that either dating or meeting unmarried boys or girls (A. *khalwat*) could cause one to be imprisoned for a month, with additional labour for the sin committed for the first time. The punishment would be imprisonment for three months for the second and subsequent times. Teaching *agama* without permission of the sultan or teaching heresy would receive a fine of twenty-five cents to be decided by the judge in court.<sup>29</sup>

As part of the authority allowed by the British and the sultans, the MAIK issued a mosque and *surau* regulation in 1916 that dealt with the power of *imam* and *surau* officials of both large mosques and small mosques.<sup>30</sup> The regulation stipulated that a *surau* official should be able to read the Qur'an in an acceptable manner and should know at least the pillars of the faith to be able to lead the people competently. It further detailed that the number of officials should not exceed six persons and should consist of two *imams* (mosque and prayer leaders), two *khatibs* (preachers) and two *bilals* (callers to prayer). It also contained that the minimum number of people for a Friday congregation should be forty, which is in accordance with the Shafi'i *madhhab*.<sup>31</sup>

The council entrusted senior *imams* with a number of duties and responsibilities. At the appropriate time, *imams* were responsible for collecting the rice *zakat* in their districts. The *imams* had the right to solemnise marriages, divorces and marriage reconciliations according to regulations and notices; to lead ceremonies dealing with the death of an individual; to encourage male Muslims to attend Friday service; and to regulate officials. They could fire junior *imams*, *khatibs* and *bilals* in consultation with the sultan and with the knowledge of the mosque chief. The duties and authority of senior *imams* of smaller mosques were more limited. They could officiate at funeral ceremonies and oversee the Friday service, but they were not to force or summon people to pray at the small mosques on Fridays. With the knowledge of the mosque chief, they could order people to repair the mosque and replace lower officials. During times of floods, illnesses, harvests, public holidays and the fasting month, people were exempt from penalty for not attending the Friday service.<sup>32</sup> The *surau* officials were also told to urge all those reaching puberty to observe the Friday prayer and to listen to the sermons. Those who did not follow these instructions were to provide reasons (such as sickness, or emergency) or face punishment determined by the court, such as carrying a certain amount of sand from a particular place to another.<sup>33</sup>

In 1917, the MAIK issued a decree requiring permission to teach and preach Islam in Kelantan, which meant greater authority for the sultan in regard to Islamic ‘orthodoxy and orthopraxy’. In the following quote, we can see how the sultan reacted against a Sufi practice considered harmful to the social order of the established Islam in the state. The sultan asked the council to be the authority in these religious matters and the Religious Court to be in charge of judging any suspected act for deliberation and punishment.

Because the matters of ritual or worship [A. *ibadah*] of God the Almighty and the teaching of religion are crucial, the Sultan hereby issues his decrees before the Assembly of the State of Kelantan as follows: 1. A Muslim should follow ways of worship that are correct according to the noble *shari’ah* and should avoid ways of worship that are deviant heresy [A. *bid’ah dhalalah*], such as reciting the names of God [A. *zikir*] too loudly or with excessive body movement because that brings harm to the person involved and his neighbors; 2. The acts of reciting the names of God in mosques, small mosques, in cemeteries, and other places at the occasion of the completing the reading of the Qur’an during the month of Ramadan should not be harmful [*mudharat*] and should conform to the ethics of *zikir* on every occasion; 3. Every person who wants to give a *fatwa* or teach Muslims about any subject or teach about the rituals [*ibadah*] and beliefs [*’itiqad, aqidah*] has to request official permission from the Religious Council; 4. The Religious Council shall have the authority to judge an application based on the Law of the Assembly of the State No.14/15; and 5. Everyone who violates the Law shall be forwarded to the Ecclesiastical Court [*Mahkamah Shar’iyyah*]. If someone is convicted, he or she shall be punished by being put on public display astride a cow or with a fine of no more than 200 cents (Strait dollars), or prison for no more than six months, or both a monetary fine and jail, or, after consultation with the State, by being deported from Kelantan.<sup>34</sup>

The sultan and official *’ulama* further sought to regulate the content of *khutbahs*. The sultan urged the *imams* and the preachers to give guidance to the people in seeking knowledge that was obligatory and useful for their lives so that they could observe the rituals as commanded by God and his Messenger and refrain from committing forbidden acts. The sultan asked *imams* to guard against other *imams* or individuals who preached knowledge

contradictory to the true path of religion and who performed the forbidden rituals and acts. The mosque official was to be watchful against those who taught knowledge contradictory to the path of religion, adhered to rituals and practices that were at variance with the *shari'ah* and issued opinions not based on the scripture.<sup>35</sup> The sultan also asked the council's members not to become involved themselves in doubtful and clearly un-Islamic activities.<sup>36</sup>

The sultan further issued a notice instructing the *surau* officials to maintain social peace and order. If a mosque official spoke or acted in a way that broke the mandate given by the government, leading to disobedience, hardship and loss, then the people of the district could report it or petition the MAIK or their *qadi*.<sup>37</sup>

The sultan, through the MAIK, also formalised office hours (the office to be closed on Fridays and public and religious holidays), provided paid leave for officers on certain days for the pilgrimage to Mecca, supported the celebration of religious holidays, prohibited drinking intoxicating liquor (*minum arak*) and created the rules of fasting during the month of Ramadan. The regulation stated that a Muslim who is found drinking *arak* shall be brought to Islamic court and, if guilty, shall be publicly carried and displayed in the city or be imprisoned for one month. It stated that a Muslim who does not fast, who smokes or breaks any rules of fasting during Ramadan will be brought to court. Anyone found giving a Muslim who is fasting during Ramadan food in the daytime shall be punished with two weeks of imprisonment in jail.<sup>38</sup> Imprisonment and fines were not recognised in *shari'ah* law before colonialism and here these were introduced (Schacht 1964: 176–207; Mackeen 1985: 234).

The MAIK regulated the power of these *imams* in officiating or solemnising marriages, although the British Adviser could assist the *imams* when the latter sought redress.<sup>39</sup> This shows that the sultan and the *mufti* sometimes made use of British presence in some religious affairs in Kelantan. In other cases, the British Adviser forwarded requests of religious matters to the sultan for his approval. For example, on an appointment of an *imam* who could not write, a *mufti* queried the British Adviser on the subject. The British Adviser replied that a person who could neither read nor write would be eligible to be an *imam* if he had an assistant who could read or write for him, but the next time such an appointment would not be recommended.

The MAIK introduced and implemented legislative reforms dealing with the position of a *mufti*, who issued religious opinions; with the people's conversion to Islam; with the administration of *zakat*; with the composition of the council itself; and with other Islamic matters.<sup>40</sup> Despite such judicial authority and autonomy, the council worked with the British Adviser in certain legal, financial, practical and religious matters. British Advisers were frequently asked by the *mufti*, *qadi* and other officials to provide financial and administrative assistance. For example, a Malay teacher, Muhammad Hanafi bin Haji Mahmud, was appointed the assistant to the British Adviser in Kota Bharu in 1930, working in cooperation with the MAIK.<sup>41</sup>

### Conclusion

The present chapter suggests that Muslim reformers in colonial Indonesia and Malaya played their role in differentiating between *shari'ah* and *adat* and regarding *adat* and *shari'ah* as being conflictual, although they defined them differently and sought to integrate them in different ways. They drew upon various concepts in interpreting *shari'ah* as Islamic law and introduced such practices of issuing *fatwa* and enacting regulations. The Muslim reformers who attempted to negotiate *shari'ah* in accordance with the demands of their changing lives framed Islamic law as simultaneously permanent and mutable. Other Muslim reformers who viewed Islamic law as in conflict with *adat* considered the latter to be inferior and subject to moral and legal judgement. Encounters with colonial law conditioned some Muslims to consider some aspects of the laws and legal systems to be beneficial and invited others to learn about and even embrace them.

Muslim reformers focused their activities on mosques, schools and religious associations, rather than the court system, which they saw as belonging to the Dutch colonial administrators and native aristocracy. Some tended to collaborate with the Europeans, while others became exposed to European cultures that would not harm their moral understanding. Many even appropriated *adat* norms as a source of law. Muslim reformers in Java tended to see *adat* and *shari'ah* as being more in conflict with each other than Muslim reformers in South Sulawesi. (Thus, Muslims in the latter who did not have a Hindu-Buddhist past preserved *Pangngaderreng* that was inclusive of *shari'ah*.) Muslim reformers in Java and Sulawesi, however, became more critical than

Muslim Malays in Kelantan towards aspects of their local customs (in the latter *agama* and *adat* were officially more closely intertwined than in the former despite the existing tension between the two).

With regard to colonial law, Malays did not reject the British secular legal system as long as they were permitted to preserve or implement Islamic and customary laws. In Kelantan in particular, the British indirectly contributed to the preservation of *shari'ah* and *adat*. Because of a shared desire for order, justice and equality, the sultan and Muslim reformers incorporated secular law. In the East Indies, their *fatwas* were not legally binding, nor were they directly connected to the civic or common laws introduced by the Dutch. In Java, Muslim reformers supported, criticised or became indifferent to colonial laws. In South Sulawesi, *shari'ah*-minded Muslim reformers criticised *adat* practices (such as *arajang* and *bissu*) and judged some Sufi practices due to their *shari'ah*-mindedness. They, too, were critical of *adat* and colonial institutions for interfering in Islamic domestic affairs but, at other times, they coexisted with the local norm of *siriq* and healing ritual. In Kelantan, however, some *fatwas* (concerning such ritualistic matters as prayer, sermon and Sufi practices) were part of the formal legislative system overseen by the Council of Religion and Custom, often with British assistance, although public and criminal laws still fell under British jurisdiction. In a number of cases, Islamic law coincided with Dutch and British legal administration in how it dealt with *adat*. Despite such intersections and integrations, the various laws became differentiated conceptually and bureaucratically. Civil or common law was for the colonialists, and domestic law and Islamic moral regulations was for the Muslims. Thus, Muslim reformers and the sultans contributed to the Islamisation and modernisation of laws, but also to the accommodation of secular laws in the East Indies and Malaya. Some Muslim reformers emphasised the substantive values of Islamic law such as justice and equality whereas other Muslims stressed the doctrinal and ritualistic aspects of Islamic law. These multiple processes had an impact on different forms of legal plurality in the region, all of which contributed to Indonesians and Malays becoming both Islamic and modern.

## Notes

1. My translation. Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah (1967: 276).
2. My translation. Masyhuri (1997: 171–2).

3. For Imam Al-Shafi'i, *qiyas* and *ijtihad* were similar. Some scholars have considered *qiyas* as more specific than *ijtihad*. Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah (1967: 276–8); Abdurrahman (2007: 85–94).
4. Hoofdcomité Congres Moehammadijah (1937), *Boeah Congres Akbar Moehammadijah*, ke 26, 31–2.
5. The organisational document was first written in 1933. Pasal 5: Madjlis Departemen Sjariat dan Ibadat. Putjuk Pimpinan PSII 1952: 33–4.
6. The 2010 edition added that members should study and follow the *shari'ah* before following a Sufi practice because '*tariqah* and *haqiqah* (realisation of the truth) without *shari'ah* will not be successful'. Even a saint (*wali*) should still follow the *shari'ah* as commanded in the Qur'an and the hadith or he is deviant.
7. The hadith is: '[I]f you see the evil, prevent it by your hand (authority); if you cannot do it by your authority then you should do it by your mouth (words); and if you still cannot do it, you can at the very least dislike it in your heart, although the latter is considered the weakest faith.'
8. *Tentara Islam*, No. 8, 1932, Year 1.
9. Contemporary Bugis scholars such as Abu Hamid (d. 2011) have argued that *siriq* could become part of religious motivation (*niat*) for social action. Hamid (1996: 173–5).
10. Tanfid Hoofdbestuur Moehammadijah (1931/2, 1938: 18–22).
11. *Pemberita Makassar*, 5 January 1940.
12. *Het Licht*, No. 6, August 1931, Year 7.
13. *Al-Wafd*, No. 1, January 1933, Year 2.
14. Mr. R. Kasman Singodimedjo, 'Kata Samboetan Tertoejoe pada Congres Moehammadijah ke 29 di Djogja', *Adil*, No.15, 11 January 1941, 15.
15. President W. Wondoamiseno wrote this letter to the Conference of the Islamic World in the East Indies (MAIHS) and published it in the journal *Soeara PSII* (the Voice of the PSII). Hoofd voor Mohammadansche Zaken, *Soeara PSII*, No. 1, 25 April 1937, Year I.
16. Djawab dan Sikap Pemerintah terhadap Moetie MAIHS, *Soeara PSII*, No. 1, 25 April 1937, Year 1; *Soera PSII*, No. 10, November 1940.
17. An example of the passage contains local terms such as *dewa* (gods), *bomoh* (magician), *Sri Mas Raja Jin* (the King of ghosts), and the waiting ghosts, as well as Islamic terms such as *bismillah* (in the name of God), *alhamdulillah* (praise to God), *assalamu'alaikum* (peace be upon you), Adam, and Muhammad. Awang A.R. & Hassan 1985: 297–303.

18. Haji Idris bin Hasan, Kelebihan Hari Raya dan Hikmah Fitrah, *Pengasub*, No. 1, 1918, 3–4.
19. Tok Kenali, *Pengasub*, 3 August 1918.
20. 'Hadari Kelantan, Keterangan dan Nasihat Berkenaan dengan Masalah Serban', *Pengasub*, nos. 295 and 296, 28 May & 11 June 1930.
21. 'Pandangan dan Pikiran Kita diatas adat istiadat Nikah Kahwin Bangsa Melayu ini', *Pengasub*, No. 303, 23 September 1930.
22. 'Hukuman Orang Mabuk Arak di dalam Negeri France', *Pengasub*, nos. 295 and 296, 28 May & 11 June 1930.
23. 'Tarikh: Kemajuan pada Peraturan – perundang-undangan Inggris', 4 parts, *Pengasub*, nos. 6, 7, 8, 9; 21 September, 6 October, 20 October, and 5 November 1918.
24. Al-Hadi, Teriak Yang Benar, *Al-Ikhwan*, October 1926.
25. Al-Hadi, Qada dan Qadar, *Al-Ikhwan*, November 1926.
26. Al-Hadi, Teguran, *Al-Ikhwan*, November 1926.
27. Al-Hadi, al-Sharaf, *Al-Ikhwan*, July 1927.
28. Graham, W. A. (1904) *Report on the State of Kelantan for the Year August, 1903, to August, 1904*, Bangkok: Government Printer, 16.
29. From the Mufti Kota Bharu, brings for B.A.'s consideration notices as regards mosque attendance in KB (Kota Bharu), and regulation of religious teaching in Kelantan, Archive M18, 1914, ANM.
30. Kerajaan Kelantan, Undang-undang dan Peraturan bagi Masjid dan *Surau*: Undang-undang, No. 10, 1916, ANM.
31. In this enactment, *masjid* is defined as the house or place endowed to be a mosque for prayer and other religious purposes. *Surau* is the house provided for Friday prayers and other religious services. *Nazir* is the chief who governs matters related to mosque and *surau* and their officials. *Pegawai* is comprised of an imam (leading the prayer), a *khatib* (giving the address), a *bilal* (calling the prayer) and a *siak* (the practical assistant). *Anak mukim* is the population living in a district (*mukim*). Kerajaan Kelantan, Undang-undang dan Peraturan bagi Masjid dan *Surau*: Undang-undang, No. 10, 1916, ANM.
32. Mosque and *Surau* Enactment No. 10/1916, No. 174, file 192/16, *Pejabat British Adviser Negeri Kelantan 1911–1919 (siri M)*, ANM; Datok Bentara Setia, Two notices regarding sembahyang jemaat dan kuasa imam *surau* kechik which the British Adviser wanted, *BAK 1911–1919 siri M*, file 62, 1914, ANM.
33. Datok Bentara Setia, Two notices regarding sembahyang jemaat dan kuasa imam *surau* kechik which the British Adviser wanted, *BAK 1911–1919 siri M*,

- file 62, 1914, ANM; *Fatwa* Majlis Ugama Islam Yang Tersiar, *Pengasuh*, No. 292, 1930.
34. Notes regarding the teaching of Muhammadan Religion: Kerajaan Kelantan 18 November 1917 Dato Bentara Setia, Kota Bharu, 95, 1917, ANM.
  35. Mosque and *Surau* Enactment No. 10/1916, No. 174, file 192/16, *BAK 1911–1919 (siri M)*, ANM.
  36. Enactment concerning the Majlis Ugama Islam dan Adat Istiadat Melayu Kelantan, in Rahman (2003).
  37. Dato Setia, Kota Bharu, notice No. 29/1916 requiring the mosques and *surau* officials to oppress the rayats, No. 204, 226/16, *BAK 1911–1919 (siri M)*, ANM.
  38. Notice regarding Forbidding Muhammadan from Taking Intoxicating Liquors and Observance of the rules of Fasting . . . Kerajaan Kelantan, Notice No. 12/1915, *ANM*, 83/M/9/15; State of Kelantan, *General Orders*, 1 July 1939, 4, 20–3.
  39. *BAK Tahun 1911 (Kelantan M)*, 53, file 54/11, dated 15 February 1911, ANM; The Mufti Kota Bharu, Imam and their powers to solemnise marriages, 86, file 154/12, 2/10/1912, ANM; Pejabat Kelantan Sekretariat, District Officer, Ulu Kelantan, Kuasas to the Javanese imamas of the mosques on Kenneth & Take *BAK 1915 (Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan: B.A. Kelantan)*, ANM.
  40. Dato Setia Kota Bharu, rules for the officers of the Majlis Ugama dan Istiadat Melayu, 217, file 239/16, 17 October 1916, *BAK 1911–1919*, Siri M, ANM; Hony. Secy. Majlis Ugama, KB, requests that Mohammadan death in hospital and prison be brought to the notice of Majelis Ugama, 62, 63/17, 1917, *BAK 1911–1919*, Siri M, ANM.
  41. Penolong Tubuh Tuan Penasehat, *Pengasuh*, No. 309, 1 Sya'ban 1349/21 December 1930.

# VI

## Formalising Legal Plurality

If there were a dispute between the religious figure and the *adat* figure or between the civil and military judges, the Governor General in Java would make a final arbitration according to the prevailing law.

(Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur, The Office for the Native and Muhammadan Affairs, 1920)<sup>1</sup>

Initially local judges ignored new laws, preferring former customs and personal interests. As time went on, however, most judges studied the laws and improved their knowledge of new procedures.

(Millington 1927: 12–13)

**B**oth bureaucratic organisations and legal systems were important instruments of modernisation in colonial states. Europeans sought to secularise colonial legal systems by separating the modern from the traditional. In order to regulate the diverse ‘races’ in their colonies, they promoted modern law as rational, formal, written, fixed, systematic and practical (Weber in Gerth and Mills 1946: 220; Moosa 2009: 158). Their accounts and policies emphasised these aspects of ‘modern law’ in opposition to both religious and traditional laws, which were deemed outdated, primitive, informal, irrational, impractical or dispersed (Burns 2004: 47). However, colonial scholars also considered aspects of customary and Islamic laws to be compatible with modern practices of law as long as they did not contravene the principles Westerners regarded as universal. In Indonesia and Malaya, the conceptualisation of *shari’ah* as a legal system was also a product of European influence. This chapter examines the ways in which colonial authorities interpreted laws and attempted to standardise legal institutions in the colonies, while exploring the ways in which these authorities influenced local Muslim conceptions and practice of law.

Dutch and British scholars and administrators simultaneously formalised and differentiated among legal systems operating in the colonies (Hooker 1976, 1978a, 1978b). They defined civil or common law as modern law, *shari'ah* as Islamic law or *hukum* and various local customs as *adat* law. They studied the integration as well as tensions between *shari'ah* as Islamic law and *adat*. Europeans tended to view native Muslims as heterodox, claiming that they were so preoccupied by static *adat* that they did not follow strict Islamic law in full.

Although European legal scholars and legislators tended to compare Western legal ideals with local practices rather than equivalent customary and Islamic legal ideals, they sought to preserve aspects of customary and Islamic laws by integrating them into the colonial legal systems. In Malaya the colonial authorities introduced British laws into matters they considered public and transformed prevailing Malay laws and customs by drawing on legal sources external to local histories and cultures (Peletz 2002: 17). In some cases, however, the British assisted on administering Malay justice and order even when they did not know or disagreed with the content of Islamic law. The structure and culture of colonial legal authority and the formation of political and religious hierarchies (colonial, customary and Islamic) thus became inextricably interwoven despite the autonomy of the varied cultural systems.

In the East Indies the aforementioned Ethical Policy and the emerging reformist movements both had an impact on legal discourses and organisation. In the first place, we see the creation of the *volksraad*, as discussed earlier. Second, the Dutch administration introduced a common police court (D. *landgeracht*) in 1914 and a unified criminal code in 1918, as well as rules of criminal and civil procedure (Hooker 1978a: 15, 56–7). These measures were intended to centralise the various customary laws existing in the East Indies, but influenced pressing for adjustment to local and Islamic contexts, and thus pluralisation in many other matters – such as family, economic transaction and social relations – remained strong.

### **Favouring European Law and *Adat* over *Shari'ah* in the East Indies**

European colonialists perceived their law as an autonomous, professional, coherent system and located above politics (Berman 1987: 177). Modern

law was seen not only as distinct, but also as superior to other legal systems, including the existing customary and *shari'ah* law (Hooker 1978a: 57), which they linked to traditional political and religious authorities.

Yet Dutch scholarly opinion was divided: those with an *adat* focus, such as ethnologists and anthropologists, were more interested in preserving *adat*, while those with an Islamic focus such as Snouck were more focused on the development of *shari'ah* (Lev 1972: 17). Although they agreed that Islamic law and customary law were distinguishable, the Dutch colonial administration ultimately favoured *adat* over Islamic law for two reasons: first, the Dutch feared political Islam, and, second, the native population did not convert only to Islam. In general, when Islamic and *adat* officials came into conflict the Dutch privileged the latter, even though Muslim officials attempted to reform *adat* when it conflicted with Islam.

In this context, the relationship between customary and Islamic law received particular attention. Although colonial scholars accepted the importance of *adat*, they also understood that Islamic law, as well as Islamic theology and mysticism, had played a central role in the development of colonised Muslim societies. On the one hand, colonial scholars knew that *shari'ah* law was believed to be sacred and set absolute standards for Muslims as interpreted and implemented by religious authorities. On the other hand, it was necessary for Muslim judges to be familiar with customary law as well as divine law, and in some cases even had to seek advice or further explanations from the ruler or the *mufti*. They were aware that different interpretations of the law were not uncommon, providing ammunition for those who argued that *shari'ah* law was not necessarily unified and was amenable to change. Snouck, however, seemed ambiguous. On the one hand, he maintained the medievalism of the *shari'ah* doctrines of slavery, polygamy and holy war. On the other hand, he asserted that it was possible for Muslims to reinterpret Islamic law so that it would be compatible with modernity (Snouck 1916: 73, 98–100).

While Dutch administrators understood *adat* as being primarily oral, they were aware that customary laws had been written in local languages. However, these indigenous compilations were viewed as both impractical and insufficiently systematic for application in a modern society and for a modern system of justice (Rasdiyanah 1995: 77–8). For the purpose of

administration, codification of law in accordance with Western standards was deemed necessary. Yet even after codification, *adat* law was not necessarily accessible to *qadis*, since the documents were either in a local language or translated into Dutch and stored in colonial offices. At the same time, in spite of these modifications and changes, colonial administrations helped preserve aspects of local custom. For example, in South Sulawesi the Dutch Government facilitated the storing of local sacred objects that were often used in the swearing of oaths of the seal of an official contract. These objects, which could take the form of a branch, a weapon or a stone, symbolised the soul of a local kingdom and of a territorial community (Hooker 1978a: 39–40). This had implications: when the Muhammadiyah modernist condemned the veneration of the *gaukung*, associating it with *adat* practices that should be superseded by Islamic judgements, the Dutch saw them as a symbol of local sovereignty or a religious or sacred object that deserves preservation.

A major controversy regarding *adat* versus Islamic law concerned inheritance. In 1937, a regulation originally proposed by Snouck led to the creation of an Islamic Appeals Court (I. Mahkamah Islam Tinggi, D. Hof voor Islamitische Zaken). The court heard a case in which an adopted son had been awarded an inheritance that bypassed the nephews and nieces of the deceased. This was based on the *adatrecht* from a Hindu village of Blambangan in East Java, but contravened the accepted tradition of Islamic law that gave no inheritance to an adopted son. Muslim judges banded together to resist this earlier decision (Lev 1972: 21–5).

Nevertheless, the Dutch themselves were not always consistent in regard to the position of Islamic and customary law, and Snouck himself offered ambivalent views. On one occasion, for example, he claimed that Islamic law had never really dominated culture nor answered the specific needs of local societies. Accordingly, he said, among Muslims in the East Indies *adat* became more widely practised than *shari'ah*, although he and like-minded scholars recognised that in practice each had its own domains in different contexts. The supremacy of *adat* in the East Indies, he believed, imposed limitations on the influence of *shari'ah* or *bukum*. While *shari'ah* had gained acceptance in the realms of marital and family law, in almost all other matters *adat* had prevailed (Benda 1958b: 338–42; Prins 1951). As a consequence, Muslim scholars would become less Westernised, leaving the *adat* elite to be

the best candidates for his ‘association’ politics that would integrate natives into Western civilisation. Snouck said, ‘They are all trained up in the doctrine that *adat* and *hukum* should take their places side by side in a good Muhammadan country. A very great portion of their lives is governed by *adat*, and only a small part by *hukum*. These *adats* are nowhere to be found set down in black and white’ (Snouck cited in Rigby 1929: 18–19). In other contexts, however, Snouck noted that Muslims tended to view *shari’ah* as separate from culture, but recognised that Islamic legal scholars could derive regulations based on *adat* as long as they did not contradict Islam (Snouck 1924: 19). From this standpoint he maintained that *adat* could be Islamised or could be integrated with Islam.

Other Dutch administrators reemphasised the supremacy of the ‘nominal’ Muslim influenced by *adat* over *shari’ah*-orientated Muslims. In late nineteenth-century South Sulawesi, Luwu was a stronghold of local culture, evident in the *bissu* in the local court, in the ritual surrounding inauguration of a ruler and in village weddings and other life-cycle ceremonies. The Dutch governor claimed that ‘Luwu people were only nominally Islamic; the Islamic judge in Palopo rarely went to the mosque to lead prayer, despite the existence of a mosque since 1610’ (Hafid 1992/3: 42, 52). By the early twentieth century colonial officials continued to note that *shari’ah* remained subordinate to *adat*, but that religious law and customary law could overlap. In some cases native government and *adat* leaders could serve as religious heads, while in other cases friction occurred between *adat* functionaries and religious Muhammadiyah figures who competed for both religious and cultural authority.<sup>2</sup> Perceptive observers also understood the ambiguities in the relationship between *adat* and Islam, and the shifts that were induced by changing contexts. Snouck’s student, Hendrik Kraemer, discussed earlier, was among those who stressed that many ordinary Muslims could not differentiate between which aspects of their tradition were Islamic and which were not, so that *adat* may contradict *shari’ah*, and it may not. In his view, the fact that ‘ordinary Muslims’ had remained ‘un-Islamic’ had been the impetus for renewed efforts of modernist Islamisation (Kraemer 1952 [1928]).

The Dutch introduced a new system, but modified the old system in such a way that modern, rational bureaucracy and the traditional (*adat*) elite – that had *parawe ade* and *parewa sara* – would not clash (Chabot 1950: 83–6).

The traditional patron–client relationship sometime became the context for newly coming Muslim reformers’ challenging the Muslim *qadi* representing the *parawe sara*, such as in the case of the debate between Haji Abdullah from Maros and Qadi of Gowa regarding the correct way of performing the Friday prayer (should the noon prayer, *zuhur*, be performed after the Friday’s prayers or not) (Perlas 2010: 421–44).

### **Preserving Customary Laws (*Adatrecht*)**

Institutionally, the Dutch Government established the Commission of Customary Law (D. *Commissie voor het Adatrecht*) for the purpose of researching, compiling, codifying and preserving the customary law of Indonesian societies. Approved by the Director of Justice and the Council of the Indies (*raad van Indie*), the first volume of *Adatrecht* was published in 1910, containing the early history of the ideas behind this initiative.<sup>3</sup>

*Adatrecht* was formally accepted as a permanent part of the Netherlands Indies’ legal system, but its implementation had been debated among the Dutch scholars since the late nineteenth century. The *doyen* of the *adat* law school, Cornelis van Vollenhoven, from Leiden University, played a crucial role in opposing the application of Western laws in the East Indies, and in promoting the research and implementation of customary laws. This school of legal thought posited a distinction between the laws of various races and elaborated a methodology for cases of conflicts and the principles for legal operations inside the colonial state (Hooker 1978b: 15–20). Van Vollenhoven introduced the formalisation of *adatrecht* because he saw in it ‘a body of uncodified rules enforced by sanctions’, meaning rewards and punishments. For Snouck, *adatrecht* was *adat* with legal consequences (59–60).

Colonial officials effectively created a map of social life in East Indies that privileged the specifics of *adatrecht* in particular cultures and contrasted them with ‘Islamic universal values’ (Bowen 2003: 6). However, the assumption of separation or tension between Islam and local custom requires qualification. The *adatrecht* collections contained much that was regarded as Islamic as practised by different local ethnic groups. Volume 31, for example, contained categories and information about societies, laws, literature, politics, economy and religious practices of Minahasa, Gorontalo, Toraja and parts of South Sulawesi. This volume included aspects of the ‘*Mohammedaansche law*’ con-

cerning marriage and the administration of justice (D. *rechtspraak*) as they operated in South Sulawesi.<sup>4</sup> What was part of the *adatrecht* could contain what was part of Islamic law and practices that had become integrated into the people's tradition probably for a long time. This implies that the Dutch actually played their part in preserving aspects of Islamic legal and cultural practices in the East Indies.

At the same time, in terms of categorisation, the Dutch referred to 'religious law and religious jurisprudence' (D. *godsdiensrecht en godsdiensrechtige rechtspraak*), and this extent reinforced the distinction between *shari'ah* and *adat*. In this complicated and ambiguous interaction colonial administration influenced the distinction between Islam and local culture, while recognising in some cases and ignoring in others the integral relationship between the two. With Dutch *adatrecht*, despite its inclusion of several aspects of Muslim laws and traditions, *shari'ah* became constructed as a distinct entity. The very processes of formalising and categorising created legal plurality and hierarchies that inevitably resulted in tensions that could not always be resolved.

### **Administering Hierarchical Justice**

In 1904, the Ministry of Colonies proposed a unification of civil law because they saw plurality in existing legal traditions between Natives, Foreign Orientals, and Europeans. In the Netherlands, two main options were put forward: one supported unification, arguing for the integration of the East Indies and the modern world of commerce and civil relation as well as the Western legal system; and the second, which rejected unification, contending that the cultural, linguistic and legal plurality of the East Indies were facts of life. Ultimately, this latter view prevailed, and the proposed unification never materialised (Hooker 1978b: 187–213). Because this attempt to create a centralised hierarchy for a colonial legal system failed, the reality remained pluralistic and disparate (Mutaqin 2012).

Conversely, the Dutch Government did create a new hierarchy in the justice system. They made legal matters under the Department of Justice, rather than the Office of Native and Cultural Affairs and the Department of Education and Religion. First, the European-style Netherlands Indies Justice Department was comprised of a High Court Bench, a council of Justice in Java-Madura and in the Outer Territories (including Sulawesi), a police or

criminal jurisdiction court and a residency court in Java-Madura. A second level, the 'Native Jurisdiction', included several locally based courts, which reached down to the village level. The colonial authorities did not intervene with the third level, the Indigenous System, which had its own autonomous tribunals and minor assemblies. Finally, religious tribunals were recognised in different forms throughout the Netherland Indies. These Islamic tribunals, or 'Priest Courts' (D. *priesterraden*), held residual authority, which meant that they only dealt with matters not clearly within the jurisdiction of other courts (Burns 2004: 153, 169).

The Dutch term '*priesterraden*' simplified Islamic legal traditions, which did not recognise 'priesthood' in the Christian sense but had different forms of religious legal authority: *muftis*, *imams*, judges, *penghulu* or *qadi*. However, these 'priest courts' working either independently or with the support of local rulers, were given jurisdiction in family matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. Non-religious or civil courts (D. *landraden*) were given jurisdiction in other matters, but they often came into conflict with the *qadi* and from the 1920s onwards with Muslim modernists such as the Muhammadiyah and the Sarekat Islam. Such tensions were exacerbated because civil courts could issue orders to execute contested decisions.

Dutch enactments in regard to Islamic judicial administration tended to reinforce *adat* authority, which aroused resentment among reformist groups. For example, in Java and Madura the 1929 Marriage Enactment for Muslims stipulated that the *penghulu* or *qadi* were government officials subject to the Regent's control. This strategy was intended to regulate the procedure of the marriage applications by preventing *penghulu* acting as unsalaried registrars from overcharging the registration of marriage, divorce and reconciliation. Registering one's marriage was viewed in accordance with the jurisprudential tradition of the Shafi'i school (Hisyam 2001). Two years later the *priesterraden* were replaced by courts where a *penghulu* (who were often independent of the local nobility), presided, and thus became the only religious courts. But the colonial government did not provide for sufficient legal education or money, and judges were often found to be corrupt. The jurisdiction of inheritance was therefore moved from religious courts to the native, civil courts where claims were to be adjudicated according to *adat* rather than Islamic law. Arguably, the most controversial enactment of the colonial period was

the abolishment of polygamy in 1937, a move bitterly opposed by some Muslim activists who considered this an unacceptable intrusion into religious affairs (Lev 1972: 10–16; Hooker 1978b: 94–7).

Legal institutions thus remained hierarchical, despite the difficulty in centralisation efforts. The courts were administratively divided into civil, customary and religious, with their own ‘jurisdiction’. Similarly, Dutch colonial authority retained some pre-colonial positions for Islamic judges, introducing Dutch terms such as ‘*opperpriester*’ and ‘*rechter*’, while retaining *qadi* and *penghulu*. However, administrative changes involved moving the position of the Islamic judge from the Department of Native and Cultural Affairs to the Department of Justice. Because of the scarcity of judges and overlapping tasks, *qadi* often served several different functions: as judge and Adviser on Islamic ‘legal’ (*fiqh*) matters in the secular court (D. *Raad van Justitie & Landraad*), as head of the Religious Council (*Raad Agama*), as coordinator of the *imams* and as registrar of births, marriages, divorces, marital reconciliation and death.<sup>5</sup> The governor-general selected and appointed these judges. Any unresolved disputes between the ‘*ulama* and *adat* ruler or between the civil and military judges would be referred to the governor-general, so that the colonial administration served as the final arbiter of the native disputes, including the religious-cultural ones.<sup>6</sup> Thus, *shari’ah* became ‘Islamic religious law’, and its position became reorganised within the colonial system. When *shari’ah* was applied, it was in ‘domestic’ affairs under separate Islamic/religious courts. Penal or criminal law matters (A. *hudud*) and political affairs came solely under the jurisdiction of Dutch law.

### **Establishing Shari’ah Council (Majlis Sara) in South Sulawesi**

In Sulawesi, in the matter of marriage, divorce, and marital reconciliation for the city of Makassar, the governor and the Hadat Council (previously *parawe ade*) issued a resolution with regard to marriage, divorce, and marriage reconciliation. Customary law came to be applied in cases involving the ‘traditional’ native population, and the printed books of *adat* that were compiled became a manual for colonial officials, without requiring them to have an understanding of the flexibility of the oral versions of such laws. *Adat* was administered as a suitable law for the bulk of the native peoples (Hooker 1978a: 20).

With the penetration of Islam, conceptually and in practice, *adat* became separately defined and, when written down, became more rigid and inflexible. Institutions such as *imam*, *qadi* and the Religious Council, deemed to have represented some Muslim interests, apart from Dutch-influenced civil law, continued to prevail, despite overlap, adaptation and modification.<sup>7</sup> Given the diverse ethnicity of Muslims in the East Indies, the governor granted the *'ulama* some jurisdiction over native Muslims, gave Arab *imams* jurisdiction over the Arabs deemed foreign Orientals, and assigned locally born *Chinese imams* (*imam peranakan*) jurisdiction over Chinese Muslims.<sup>8</sup>

The Dutch colonial administration managed the Shari'ah Council (Majlis Sara or Raad Igama) – previously *parewa sara* during the pre-colonial time – by employing the existing *qadi* under the Department of Justice. The Dutch made the *qadi* the head of the *penghulu* and the head of the Shari'ah Council now as civil servants, advising on Islamic legal matters at the Justice Council (D. Raad van Justitie) and the Land Council (the Land Raad). The *qadi* became the head of the court of the Shari'ah Council, oversaw the *imams* and managed the registrations of marriages, divorces, reconciliations, deaths and births that he received from the *imams*. The *qadi* would receive monthly salaries and additional incomes from the registration fees. The Dutch colonial government made the *imams* not civil servants, however. *Imams* became 'servants of the religion of Islam' without governmental salaries. The *imams* would receive incomes from their registration services mentioned above. The Shari'ah Council resolved disputes on marriage, the determination of the guardian or representative (A. *wali*) of the bride in marriage and representative for children in situations where the parents and other family members were absent, and in questions regarding inheritance, gifts, wills and other private affairs.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the Dutch colonial power was responsible for legal bureaucratisation in South Sulawesi as in other places in the East Indies. *Shari'ah* became defined as primarily ritualistic and legalistic rather than as a comprehensive religion governing various religious and public affairs. Making law distinguishable from other domains of life constituted a process of secularisation. European bureaucratisation of the justice system transformed the location and identities of *shari'ah* and *adat* through the process of secularisation but did not necessarily lead to the complete destruction of Islamic law and customary law in the colony as it accom-

modated some aspects of them (such as marriage and a few other matters) while leaving all other Islamic matters open to the Muslim groups themselves through their flourishing production of *fatwas*, as discussed in the previous chapter.

### **Mediating Muslim Disputes in South Sulawesi**

There were a number of cases where the colonial administrators, both Dutch and native, were involved in resolving internal Muslim disputes and schisms, such as prayer, mosque and school construction, when requested or deemed necessary. In some cases, Muslim reformist leaders, *adat* headmen and Dutch colonial officials were caught up in Islamic disputes that required a court decision. For example, the *qadi* of Makassar, Haji Maknun Daeng Manrangka, came to the Religious Court to charge a Muhammadiyah leader, Haji Abdullah, of heresy. Haji Abdullah gave part of his Friday sermon in Buginese and Makassarese, which was considered to challenge the practice of delivering all parts of the sermon in Arabic. The *qadi* asked the government to ban the activities of Haji Abdullah. The Dutch Assistant Resident ordered all parties to meet in the court, where it was decided that Haji Abdullah had not contradicted the Qur'an and the hadith and therefore giving his sermon in Buginese and Makassarese languages did not harm the social order. Nonetheless, Haji Maknun would not accept the decision and personally discouraged people from following Haji Abdullah, which meant that the tension between the Muhammadiyah and the traditional *parewa sara* remained (Bosra 2003: 309–10).

In another case the *zelf-bestuurder* in Luwu was asked to moderate a religious debate between the Muhammadiyah and Haji Ramli, the *qadi* of Luwu in 1932. The debate concerned issues such as the noon prayer on Friday, the number of *raka'ah* (movements during devotions) on *tarawih* prayers in the month of Ramadan, the *qunut* prayer at morning prayer and the recitation of *talkin* prayer on a funeral. Haji Ramli argued that the practices mentioned above were considered good *bid'ah* (and were therefore not prohibited). Although the Prophet did not do the *qunut*, *talkin* and other acts of ritual, he did not prohibit them. The Muhammadiyah speaker argued against the categories, contending that such practices were just *bid'ah* and never practised by the Prophet Muhammad. Acting as 'moderator', the *zelf-bestuurder*

official decided that neither argument was conclusive and allowed each group to practice what they believed (Bosra 2003: 313–16).

Another debate that involved the colonial government in South Sulawesi concerned the establishment of mosques. In Labakkang, the Muhammadiyah built a mosque offering religious ritual and services that were different from the established practice. The *qadi* called in the police to ban the mosque from operating. The local Muhammadiyah sent a report to the South Sulawesi branch of the Muhammadiyah in Makassar, which referred it to the colonial Central Office in Yogyakarta. From here the matter went to the Office of Native Affairs mentioned earlier, which laid down that the mosque should be allowed to operate since it did not violate any governmental regulations. Still another case concerned the building of a Muhammadiyah school in Soppeng in 1938. The South Celebes Dutch Resident received a complaint of the penetration of the religious tradition from the Raja of Soppeng and responded by calling for a meeting attended by all of the parties. After listening to all of the arguments, the Resident concluded that construction of this school did not contravene the law (Bosra 2003: 325–30).

The interpretations of Islamic law became primarily related to marriage, divorce and other family matters whereas the administration of civil and criminal laws was left to the modernising colonial government. Here there was legal secularisation in the sense of differentiation between civil and private matters, but there was cooperation as well as conflict between Muslim functionaries, *adat* figures and colonial offices.

### **Favouring Western Law and Conflating *Adat* and *Shari'ah* in Malaya**

In Malaya, British colonialists shaped *adat* in relation to their understanding of a unified Malay race that followed the Islamic faith. As in the East Indies, '*adat*' was seen as indigenous customs that existed even before the arrival of Indian influences, and were thus 'pre-Islamic' (Hooker 1975: 81–2). For Wilkinson, Muslim law was essentially religious: 'Law is theology because the only law that the devout recognise is religious law' (Wilkinson 1906: 63). Malay laws could be religious and could be non-religious, but the Committee of Malay Studies mentioned earlier, for example, did some research and compiled monographs with titles such as *Muslim Law in Malaya*, *Negeri Sembilan Customary Law* and *Negeri Sembilan Adat-sayings*,

and that point to their efforts at differentiating the ‘essences’ of Malay law.<sup>10</sup>

Yet it was difficult to study the local jurisprudential system in Malaya, because it was primarily oral and so diverse that centralised implementation was difficult if not impossible. In his introduction to the translated *Ninety-Nine Laws of Perak*, Wilkinson wrote: ‘Malay laws were never committed to writing; they were constantly overridden by autocratic chiefs and unjust judges; they varied in each State; they did not harmonise with the doctrines of Islam they professed to follow: (and) they were often expressed in metaphors or proverbs that seem to baffle interpretation’ (Wilkinson cited in Peletz 2002: 25). Here, Wilkinson implied that if Malays truly followed Islam, they would have produced a written and uniform system of law – but, regardless of Muslim influence, judicial decisions remained arbitrary. In his view, the Perak Laws, mentioned earlier, ‘had never been enacted by any legislative authority and were always liable to be overridden at the arbitrary will of the King’ (Wilkinson 1929: 1). Even though the author of the written *adat* Laws of Perak, Sayyid Husain, was Muslim, his long family connection in Perak caused the strict letter of the Laws to be much modified by actual practice (5). Not only that, Wilkinson contended, the Perak Laws, were ‘very far from being systematic and complete’, and their impracticality was reflected in references to camels and lions. Furthermore, he argued, they were ‘not indigenous’, since they derived from the Hindu and Muslim ‘grand systems’, and there was no attempt at systematisation – and a system, he believed, was the very life of jurisprudence. Even the idea of a Muslim-based ‘code of Law’ was contradictory because the Muslim concept of law was based wholly on the Qur’an and its commentaries, he claimed. A Muslim lawyer who produced a ‘code’ would probably be regarded ‘an infidel and a dangerous revolutionary’ (11–15). Wilkinson thought that Islamic law had never been codified as a code of law despite the fact that in the earlier times in Arabia such codes had been produced by Muslim rulers and jurists. He probably understood the absence of code in the Malay context rather than in other Muslim countries.

Although to a lesser extent than Dutch colonialists, the British were concerned to deepen their understanding of Islamic law in the Malay context. For Wilkinson, Islam had introduced both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ effects to Malay life, giving them a ‘happier religion than the pessimistic faith of the

Hindoos' as well as literature and a certain amount of knowledge of the 'great world'. On the other hand, Islam was intolerant of 'indigenous cultures' deemed un-Islamic or infidel, and thus 'weakened the force of the Malay customary law, the great bulwark of the subject against the tyranny of his chief' (Wilkinson 1906: 16).

For men like Wilkinson, long a student of Malay culture, some teachings of Islam were inferior to Malay *adat*. Islamic doctrine of the 'holy war', he affirmed, struck at the very root of all morality and piety by practically denying human rights to 'non-Muhammadans', by justifying the kidnapping of aboriginal peoples and by countenancing piracy and murder when the victims were only 'infidels whom it was legitimate to slay' (ibid.). On the status of women, Wilkinson went on to argue that Islam 'prejudicially affected the status of Malay females', reducing their position, in theory, to 'one of absolute dependence on the male sex'. He contended that, '[W]hen all justice has been done to the personal teaching of Muhammad, the fact remains that the Malays are most prosperous, most intelligent and most industrious in those parts of the Peninsula (such as the Menangkabau States) where they kept to their traditional customs in opposition to the doctrines of Muhammadan Law' (17). The Malays would ultimately become more rational and productive when they rejected non-rational aspects of *shari'ah*.

Wilkinson also contended that the survival of *adat* was threatened not only by Islamic law but also by English law. The study of traditional palace language and the associated ceremonial was dying out, he argued, and the introduction of a new European element into the sultan's courts was destroying the importance of past knowledge (79). Yet although English law challenged much of Malay customary law, in practice English law could not just replace Malay customary law, which remained pervasive.

For his part, Richard Winstedt generally agreed with much of what his colleague Wilkinson said about English law, customary law and Islamic law, but he strengthened the distinction yet further. In his view the Malay legal system included belief and politics as part of Malay culture, which he defined as 'a body of ideas, practices, and techniques that have been cherished by the Malays long enough to affect their way of life, a legacy that gives them heart and interests and saves their minds from inanition as food saves their bodies' (Winstedt 1947: 1). He further said,

Malay culture includes a fear of nature spirits, an instinctive perception of the 'unbecoming' rather than of the sinful and the criminal, the séance of the shaman, the Hindu ritual of a royal installation, the celebration of the Muhammadan New Year, the sermon in the mosque, the pilgrimage to Mecca, Sufi mysticism, the Hamlet of the Malay opera, the curry, football, the cinema and the mistranslations of the vernacular press. It includes, indeed, much more, but compared with the (comparatively few) great cultures of the world it has been derivative, owing ideas and practices to prehistoric influences of central Asia, to the religion of Persia and Arabia, to the material civilisations of Portugal, Holland, and Great Britain, and the remote but compelling fantasies of Hollywood. (Winstedt 1947: 1)

Here we saw Malay culture as eclectic and derivative. He believed that Malay culture largely derived from foreign cultures, but he did not want to describe it as 'fixed and rigid'. The ability of native jurists to adjust to context was embodied in a legal saying: 'Every time a flood comes, landing-places shift: every time a chief succeeds, custom changes' (Winstedt 1969a: 149). This recognition of some degree of fluidity of Malay custom led Winstedt to explain the Malay legal system in terms of four different kinds of legal sources: 1) digests and tribal sayings, matriarchal law of agricultural clans, the *adat pepateh*, or law of Ministers, cherished by Minangkabau of Sumatera (part of Indonesia), and their colonists in Negeri Sembilan (part of Malaya); 2) Malay indigenous patriarchal law, the *adat temenggong*, law of the Minister for War and Police, mixed with Hindu law and overlaid with Muslim law; 3) digests of maritime law (like those Melaka had developed for Bugis and Makassar trading-ships) and 4) Malay translations of Muslim works of the Shafi'i school (Winstedt 1947: 91–2). Yet here he included Islamic legal tradition to be part of Malay culture.

This kind of systemisation raised problems, however, because *adat* digests were never applied as centralised legal rules. The *adat temenggong*, for instance, referred to some fragmentary rules, which were direct expressions of kinship (Hooker 1975: 145). Problems arose regarding the translation of *adat* laws into English administrative and legal organisation. One example was the Malay term '*bulat*', meaning the unanimous statement of a resolution of clan chiefs deciding a point of custom: was it analogous to a legislative statement?

(153). Although it was an *adat* practice accepted by the colonial judiciary, the application was not necessarily clear.

Despite these ambiguities, having read law for a year at New College, Oxford, Winstedt felt that he was better equipped than some cadets when he started to administer justice in a magistrate's court. Once, a Malay was charged with shooting a female deer and Winstedt fined him ten dollars, but found out later that it was not a deer but a vermin. In his memoirs he believed that the decision he made demonstrated a flexibility that the written Indian Penal Code favoured by the colonial government would not have allowed (Winstedt 1969a: 42). At the same time, Winstedt also criticised undue reliance on circumstantial evidence that characterised customary law: 'Customary law requires signs of guilt; religious law calls for witnesses. When customary law meets circumstances obscure, it throws wide its net . . . Crime leaves its trail like a water-beetle; Like a snail, it leaves its slime.' In speaking of Negeri Sembilan, with its strong connections to Sumatra, Winstedt commented that 'this flaw in the Minangkabau system contradicts the British law of evidence which is stricter and more favorable to an accused person . . . what was cheating under Minangkabau custom is sometimes a civil offense under English law. Yet if criminal law in Negeri Sembilan is now British, the law of property remains matrilineal and hardly affected by the Muslim canon.' Yet, although Winstedt made distinctions between Muslim law and customary law in other places, here he described the laws as having leniency when he noted, 'sins can be pardoned in this world with a proper fine' (Winstedt 1947: 103).

For Winstedt, English jurisprudence highlighted the distinction between what he saw as Malay constitutional, criminal and civil law. Malay 'constitutional' law was generally commensurate with the ruler's prerogatives in matters of protocol (108). In matters of land, slavery, interest, inheritance, almsgiving, marriage and divorce, Islamic law affected customary law, but its application relied on the *qadis* and the ruler (110–16). He explained that in the initial treaty with Great Britain, each ruler reserved for the Malays the interpretation of their own religion and custom, but the conflict between the demand for witnesses in Islamic law and circumstantial evidence in customary law turned out to be a compromise. In addressing this and other conflicts, Winstedt claimed that the sultans were willing to accept colonial intervention in affairs relating to religion and custom (117).

Winstedt was aware that Muslims believed in the universalism and comprehensiveness of *shari'ah*, but contended this was not in practice in Malaya, that it was British justice that had universal validity, impartiality, and comparative humanity. In this context, only one Malay system of law stood any comparison: the matriarchal system prevalent in Minangkabau, Sumatra, and Negeri Sembilan, Malaya. 'With Minangkabau civil law, neither Muslim nor British law has interfered.' On the other hand, in the rest of British Malaya, where the patriarchal system was in force, 'criminal law . . . was a tissue of barbarities, inconsistencies, and class favoritism, three of the most damning flaws in the administration of justice' (Winstedt 1948: 98–100).

As can be seen, Wilkinson and Winstedt found Malay laws pluralistic and eclectic even before the penetration of British law. British law was used as a standard by which both understood and judged Islamic and customary laws. In their writings, they addressed tension, contradiction, integration and overlap among these now distinct legal categories. This, however, is not in line with the British and sultans' formal assertion on the close association of Malayness with Islam, as discussed earlier. I argue that the association of Islam with Malayness was asserted to serve primarily as a socio-political identity marker as a response to perceived and real internal and external challenges, which does not tell us about the tension as well as integration of the existing and newly introduced colonial, Islamic and Malay customary laws. I would further argue that although aspects of customary law contained Islamic elements they did not become categorised and administered as identical. This all suggests historical and social constructions of what law is Islamic, what law is customary and what law is modern in Malaya. Yet, the very constructions of these did occur and influenced the multifaceted, colonial–colonised relationship in Malaya. In most cases, the British favoured their legal understanding and practice over Islamic and customary traditions. The administration of these distinct laws became even more complex, as will be discussed in the following.

### **Administering Hierarchical Justice in Malaya**

Like the Dutch, the British used a race-based justice system in their legal administration. The British realised it was not practical to introduce English law in a comprehensive manner, since migration had made the country far

more diverse than before and drastic change would undermine the intended goals. A first concern was to distinguish ethnic groups from one another – people should be identified according to their races and religions.

Like the Dutch, the British narrowed the domains of Islamic law to family matters, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. In the Straits Settlements, English law was introduced to cover all areas except marriage and divorce where Islamic law prevailed (although there was some practical difficulty in deciding which schools of Islamic law would be upheld, in most cases being that of Shafi'i). The British introduced the Muhammadan Marriage Ordinance in 1880, but amended it in later years (1920, 1923 and 1934) to deal with matters relating to marriage and divorce. The Islamic law of inheritance was recognised but it was restricted to property, and English law was applied to intestacy. In the Federated Malay States, the British also introduced marriage and divorce ordinances, although these focused primarily on procedures rather than on the substantive content. They also enacted matters of inheritance and property, but these were more complex than those in the Straits Settlements because of the matrilineal *adat pepateh* operating in Negeri Sembilan. In the Unfederated Malay States, statutory provisions covered the registration of marriage and divorce (Hooker 1976: 19–23). Comparatively speaking, Hooker contends that in the Unfederated states, Islamic law was least affected by the introduction of English law (24), although he also argued that in all Malay states, Islamic law was always subject to the authority of the courts that could refuse admission on a variety of grounds, such as 'the law is not reasonable', or 'contrary to natural justice' (Hooker 1975: 110).

The British appointed Legal Advisers for the Malay states. In the Federated Malay States, the Legal Adviser served to advise the Resident-General, the federal officers and the Resident by drafting enactments and legal instruments. Malay translations, whether in Roman characters or Arabic script, had no legal force. In the Un-federated Malay States, including Kelantan, the Malay enactment, rather than the English translation, had the force of law. Proposed legislation was drawn up in English and translated into Malay for passage by the State Council (Willer 1975: 93–4).

In 1904 the British colonial government also created the Mohammedan Laws Enactment that applied only to the Federated Malay States, although it was sometimes invoked by British Advisers in the Unfederated Malay

States. A generation later, in 1934, the British also issued the Mohammedan Offences Bill, which stipulated punishment for certain offences, such as teaching without permission from the Religious Council, and publishing books without official letters (Yakoob 1984: 10; Abdullah 2010: 140). Other offences remained under the jurisdiction of the British-made Criminal Law. This, however, suggests the British intervention in matters religious and customary in contradiction with the aforementioned Pangkor Treaty of 1874 that stipulated British non-interference in the affairs of Malay religion and custom.

### **Hierarchising Justice in Kelantan**

In Kelantan, a separate Chinese court was empowered to resolve civil disputes as well as questions of marriage and divorce between Chinese. Any appeal regarding marriage and divorce should be made to the sultan, while cases relating to civil disputes would go to the High Court. Thus, ‘the Chinese Court shall decide all matters in accordance with Chinese law and custom except in so far as such law or custom may be contrary to other law in force in the State’.<sup>11</sup> Europeans became parties to civil cases and, as reported in 1912, they appeared more frequently than in past years, while European advocates were permitted to appear on some occasions.<sup>12</sup>

The British appointed a Legal Adviser; established a unified, yet hierarchical, court system (including the Court of Revision); codified Islamic Law; and enacted a statutory law, which entailed matters deemed public, such as land reform and commercial transactions. The State Council was the highest decision-making body of state government. It consisted of the sultan as the head, another local aristocrat and the British Adviser. Although the sultan was the head, the British Resident or Adviser often controlled the agenda (Talib 2003: 73–4). The State Council attempted to codify Islamic law, especially Muslim marriage and divorce, and itemised Islamic law offences, and by so doing they incorporated or associated Islamic affairs, administration and law within the colonial-sultan regime.

The British also created different levels of courts: the Residency Court; the Senior Magistrates Court; the Courts of Magistrates of the First, Second, and Third Class; the Courts of Qadi and Assistant Qadi; and the Courts of Penghulus. They also created a Court of Revision, which dealt with criminal,

civil and land cases, and, at the highest level, the High Court.<sup>13</sup> This administrative reform restructured the ‘traditional’ hierarchy, formalised rules and regulations concerning their positions, and centralised commands, although the interaction was more complex than was apparent in official treaties and policies.

In their annual reports, the ‘Legislation’ section listed the following: 1) Muhammadan Marriage and Divorce Enactment, 2) Ganja Prohibition Enactment, 3) Appraisers Enactments, and 4) Vehicles Enactments. This suggests that Islamic law and Malay law were administratively conflated, but they concerned only with marriage and divorce enactments, separate from other matters.<sup>14</sup>

The British acted in relation to circumstances, such as perceived and real inefficiencies, delays, corruptions and local demands for British advice. In some cases, British Advisers were able to say to the State Council or to the sultan, ‘I can’t interfere in religious matters’, or, ‘Obey the decision of the Council (Majlis) of Religion.’ In other cases, British Advisers would intervene in financial matters, for instance, by suggesting that MAIK, discussed earlier, approve an outstation mosque construction grant or settle a disputed *bayt al-mal* land purchase deal, and would also advise the council about administrative matters (Willer 1975: 211–12). Why did the British interfere in some affairs of Malay religion and custom, but not in others? British officials explained that they understood complaints against the local *qadis*, and saw that the absence of standardised criteria of selection and evaluation resulted in unevenness of judicial competency. Ignorance, misinformation and case-by-case circumstances, colonial administrators argued, required intervention in religious affairs. When they saw contradictions between English law and Malay law, they followed the former.

British Adviser in Kelantan, W. A. Graham (1905–9), regarded Islam and Malay custom as ‘traditional’ and ‘backward’ and attempted to reorganise the traditional administrative system into a more unified system that would maintain British rule (Talib 2003). On the matter of crime, for example, English law should supersede Malay *adat* in the interests of Law and Order (Willer 1975: 171). Graham tried to convince the sultan to appoint judges, build a courthouse and enforce modern rules of legal procedure, including the establishment of a High Court. The sultan was generally reluc-

tant to take this advice because the initial agreement between the British and the Malays had specified that matters of religion and custom, which he believed included the legal system, should fall within the jurisdiction of the Malay ruler. Graham, on the other hand, was concerned that certain aspects of the Malay justice system did not align with Western practices. Eventually, the sultan agreed to establish Graham's proposed High Court, retaining for himself the highest office and controlling the Department of Justice and the lower courts (Yegar 1979: 160).

Graham's successor in Kelantan, J. S. Mason (1909–19), maintained this system but also attempted to modify some aspects of *shari'ah* because he believed that the existing religious courts were handling cases outside of their jurisdiction. Matters of land inheritance, previously considered the province of the Islamic courts, were transferred to the secular Land Department (Rahman 1992: 64–5, 70–1). Other differentiated issues concerned crimes, auction sales, land, gold buyers and royalties, mining, royal lands and Malay reservations.<sup>15</sup> Mason's reforms included Islamic revenues and expenditures in the state budget. In 1910, he listed [appointed] two mosque (*surau*) inspectors, a second *qadi* court judge in each district and a Friday judge. The Kelantan Mufti Wan Musa bin Haji Abdul Samad (1908–16) sought Mason's consent to create two new *surau* inspector positions who would be remunerated from the 'Muhammadan Religious Fund'. With the sultan's agreement, this request was approved (Willer 1975: 174–5). The secularisation of what Malays would see as religious issues increased the overlapping and blurring of British civil, religious and customary laws.

With the support of British Adviser Mason, in 1913, the Sultan of Kelantan (Muhammad IV) issued 'the Mohammedan Court Regulation', containing rules that required an attorney in every case, witnesses, and, with the consent of the sultan and the approval of the Mufti or Judge of the High Court, punishment in the form of imprisonment and/or fine.<sup>16</sup> Matters under the jurisdiction of the High Court included such issues as inheritances, property of married couples, property of orphans and minor cases of 'domestic violence'.

As previous chapters have shown, the compromises reached between British officials and the Malay elite had a significant impact on the religious status quo and the position of the British. In various activities regarding

mosques, zakat, court and education, the *sultans* and *imams* used their powers, but in practice they often requested the advice of the British on how to manage these. In 1926, the Kelantan State Council passed a number of enactments and amendments, including an amendment to the penal code and to the 1911 Muhammadan Marriage and Divorce Enactment. The initiatives of Graham and Mason, however, were not necessarily sustained. British Adviser W. M. Millington (1926–7), for example, was not particularly interested in the procedures of the Religious Court. However, in collaboration with the *mufti*, he did regulate the salaries of *qadi* and officials, and increased staff numbers.<sup>17</sup> The *mufti* gained the right to abolish the Religious Court, although he shared authority in religious matters with the *qadi*.<sup>18</sup> Like other British advisors, he also had to consider requests for an additional allowance to the *‘ulama* who served as both *mufti* and *qadi*.<sup>19</sup> Millington observed that initially local judges ignored new laws, preferring former customs and personal interests. As time went on, however, most judges studied the laws and improved their knowledge of new procedures. In consultation with the British Adviser, the revised court system dealt with criminal and civil appeals of the decisions of the High Court. The High Court, the Central Court, the Religious Court and smaller courts at district level shared legal power in Kelantan. Overlapping cases, such as criminal cases, were dealt with in the above different courts (Millington 1927: 12–13).

British Residents and Advisers came to Malaya with an understanding of law, and they were keen to reform the legal system of the colonies. They defined Muslim judicial theory and *adat* in terms of the British judicial ideals. Administratively, the British sought to unify and centralise the legal system, but they had to recognise and accommodate different systems of law – as long as these remained in conformity with law and order. The impact of the British legal reform in Malaya, and in Kelantan in particular, was that Islamic religion came to be institutionalised in a compartmentalised manner; Islam became primarily jurisprudential and ritualistic, often in coincidence with the form of Islam that the *kaum tua* taught to Malays.

Thus, Dutch and British scholars and administrators emphasised a fundamental disparity between Western law and Islamic law (that may be integrated with, or in conflict with, local customs). Many Europeans considered Islamic law to be medieval and stagnant, in contrast to the legal dynamism in

the West.<sup>20</sup> Islamic law and customary law were part of the local domain but many of these were not subject to formalisation efforts.

### Conclusion

This chapter discusses the way in which the Dutch and British understood and administered legal diversity in Indonesia and Malaya. They believed that to be modern they had to introduce rationality, regularity and practicality into colonial legal systems. They regarded customary or traditional laws in the Indonesian-Malay colonies as irregular, arbitrary, flexible and inefficient. Colonial administrators privileged Western over customary and religious laws. Michael Peletz has referred to Weberian and Geertzian ‘rationalization’ and found limitations in them for the study of the modernisation of ‘Islamic courts’ in Malaysia from the 1890s to the present time (Peletz 2002: 17–19). Although they criticised prevailing laws, Europeans nevertheless recognised that non-Western societies had their own customs and legal precedents that competed with their civilising mission (Cooper 2005: 131). They preserved the oral laws by documenting them.

European differentiation between various legal systems was based on presumed racial distinctions between European and native populations. Europeans who studied ‘classical and medieval’ Islamic laws regarding slavery, polygamy, holy war and commercial transactions considered Islamic law to be incompatible with modern Western law. After importing their legal codes to the Indonesian and Malay colonies, Europeans put narrow limits on the jurisdiction of *shari’ah* as Islamic law, ignoring Muslims who believed in an all-encompassing *shari’ah*, but leaving Muslim groups to interpret and apply many other Islamic matters through their *fatwas* and other non-governmental means. They did, however, integrate some Islamic laws related to marriage, divorce and inheritance into their colonial laws and retained the traditional function of *qadi* and *penghulu* by moving them into government departments or by making them more answerable to colonial authority. In these cases, colonial legal modernisation and Islamic legal reform collided in their negotiations as to whether local practices should be deemed Islamic or customary.

Some Europeans had to interfere in some legal disputes between Muslim reformers and *adat* leaders. In the East Indies the governor-general could

be the final arbiter in disputes between *shari'ah* and *adat* regulations. The Dutch codified customary law, collecting the formerly diverse and fluid *adat* rules into a system that was more rigid. However, because customary law was strong among the native elite and commoners, colonial and native officials recognised it in order to judge cases and communicate their judgements more effectively.

In Malaya, the British argued that English law would override Malay customary law when there was contradiction, and left religious and customary matters to the sultans and the *'ulama*. They recognised that familial aspects of Islamic law had transformed Malay customary laws. The British saw Islam as a universal religion and its laws as sacred and eternal, but they maintained that Islamic law was not really practised among the Malays because of the strong influence of *adat*. By overriding the traditional, ineffective laws, the British sought to reform the legal domain, which had important intended and unintended consequences in Malaya: the gap between the official policy of non-interference in the religious and customary affairs and the actual practice; the disparity between the association of Islam with Malay identity and the actual tension between Islamic law and Malay customary law; and the coexistence between European modernisation and religious traditionalisation.

The Dutch and the British secularised the colony by differentiating between the law and other domains of life in their attempts to modernise the colonial legal systems in relation to Islamic and customary law. Although they did not seek to reform Islam, they influenced the way that Muslim reformers viewed *shari'ah* and *adat*. Islam was located between customary laws and Western, secular laws. The diversification of legal authorities and the reinforcement of particular interpretations of Islam as a legalistic religion both contributed to this situation. Religious orthodoxy and orthopraxy also became reinforced in part due to colonial formalisation of some legal practices and indifference toward others. Politics and a culture of legal plurality signified confirmation of conceptual and institutional distinction and parallelism, as well as diversification and hybridisation.

The concept of 'jurisprudential politics', described as 'conflicts over the preservation, creation, nature, and extent of different legal forums and authorities' (Benton 2002: 2, 10), is therefore useful, but it should include the compromises among different agents and the comparison of legal moder-

nities discussed in this chapter and the previous one. In colonial Indonesia and Malaya, law became ‘reconfigured’, or ‘transformed’. Despite the asymmetry of power relations (Asad 2003: 256), the coloniser and the colonised shaped their legal and normative orders. The internal reform of *shari’ah* by Muslims, its toleration by the colonial powers and colonial legal modernisation were both the precondition and the consequence not only of the secular processes of power and coercion as Talal Asad has argued, but also of the Islamic religious processes of making things orthodox or lawful and heterodox or unlawful.

This and the previous chapter suggest some of the similarities and differences between the three legal cultures and systems and their multifaceted interactions, focusing on the colonial context in the formation of modernities in the Indonesian-Malay world. Both chapters have demonstrated that European colonial administrators and Muslim reformers came from different backgrounds and often conflicted with each other on the notions of rationality and modernity, but they had parallel desires to establish their ideas of justice and to ensure social order. To become modern, Muslim reformers sought to serve their God and homelands, whereas Europeans sought to serve merely their empires. But the Muslims, too, recognised the changes that occurred in worldly (secular) matters, including legal considerations. This facilitated their accommodation to many aspects of the European legal system. Under the liberating and constraining circumstances, they found that European civil and common laws and punishments were more practical than stoning adulterers to death or cutting off the hands of thieves, for example. Comparatively, Muslim reformers, while more critical than European colonial modernisers towards *adat*, were more receptive to modern Western laws than were Western colonialists toward Islamic and customary traditions.

## Notes

1. Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur, The Office for the Native and Muhammadan Affairs, 1920: 91–3.
2. Beudeker, *Memorie van Overgave van de Assistent- Resident van Makassar*, the period between 1 September 1946 and 12 June 1948, 102–6.
3. The regions were West Java, Middle-Java, principal lands, East Java and Madura, Aceh, Gajo, Minangkabau, South Sumatera, the Malay territory, Bangka and

- Belitung, Borneo, Minahasa, Gorontalo, South Sulawesi, Toraja, Ternate, Ambon, Timor, Bali and Lombok. *Adatrechtbundel* Vol. I, 1910; Keuning (1961: 223–5).
4. *Adatrechtbundels*, Vol. 31: Celebes, 1929, 428–31.
  5. Unlike the official *qadi*, the imams received their local income from registration of marriage, divorce and the like. ‘Kerangkaan Riwayat Urusan Agama Islam di Makassar’, Pasal 1: tentang Hal *Qadi* (Hoofd Penghoeloe)’, *Collectie H.Th. Chabot*, 1932–1970, DH 1251, KITLV; ‘Matthes over de *Adat* van Zuid-Selebes (1885)’, *Adatrechtbundels*, vol. 31: Celebes, 1929, 275.
  6. Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur (1920): 91–3.
  7. W. J. de Klein, ‘Bestuursmemorie van de Onderafdeling Makassar’, July 1947, KITLV, H 902, 9.
  8. Serie Y, ‘Godsdienstig Recht en Godsdienstige Rechtspraak’, No. 42, Gewestelijke Regelingen Nopens Mohammedaansche Huwelijken in de Buitengewesten (1912)’, *Adatrechtbundels*, vol. 31, Celebes, 1929, 428–30.
  9. ‘Pasal 3: tentang Hal Madjlis Sjara’, ‘Kerangkaan Riwayat Urusan Agama Islam di Makassar’, written at Makassar, 17 March 1942, *Collectie H.Th. Chabot*, year 1932–1970, DH 1251, KITLV, 2.
  10. ‘Memorandum on Malay Studies’, 5 August 1911, ANM.
  11. State of Kelantan Notice No. 9/1923 Notice under Section 2 of the Court Enactment, 1910, British Adviser Office Notice in Malaya, 1922–1928, D/Suk 5/1. ANM.
  12. KAR, 1911, D/Suk 2/14.1.ANM.
  13. KAR, 1911, D/Suk 2/14.1.ANM.
  14. KAR, 1911, D/Suk 2/14.1.ANM.
  15. State of Kelantan, *Selected Laws 1911–1939* (Singapore: Malaya Publishing House, Ltd, n.d.), ANM; Government of Kelantan, *Enactment No. 5 of 1934, The Sultanate Lands Enactment*, signed by W. D. Barron as the British Adviser and the Sultan, ANM.
  16. ‘The Mohammedan Court Regulation, 1327’, 218/1913, BAK, 1911–1919 siri M, ANM.
  17. BAK, file 47/1913, 1913; No. 90/158/12, 1912, ANM.
  18. ‘H.H. (His Highness) The Sultan asks that the Ecclesiastical Court may be abolished and that the Mufti and Kathi may remain to deal with questions affecting Muhammadan religion’, BAK, No. 112, file 218/13, 1913, dated 22 November 1913, ANM.
  19. ‘Hj. Wan Mohamad Hakim Mohkamah Sheriah Kota Bharu, informs that he

is constantly visiting the office of Majelis Ulama to do the work of Mufti in addition to his own duties as Judge Ecclesiastical Court and asks that the British Adviser may grant him a pony allowance', *BAK*, 155, 173/16, 1916, ANM.

20. Borrowing from Snouck, Max Weber called the Islamic tradition of law '*qadi* justice', meaning that it was arbitrary and disconnected from rational legal reasoning. He used the term for any kind of legal judgement based on common sense or inherited notions regarding justice and expediency. Weber noted that what was allowed or not allowed in Islamic law was a fundamentally political determination. Crone (1999: 249); Benton (2002: 102); Weber (1993 [1922]: 263–4).



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PART IV

**MODERNISING  
EDUCATION**



# VII

## Teaching *Agama* and the Secular

The schools were ‘not intended to cultivate hatred against the government schools,’ but to teach children about their ‘religion and nation,’ in order to advance the nation and bring them civilization.

(M. Ask Hidajat, *Al-Wafd*, PSII Makassar, 1933)

Who has believed that religious knowledge will benefit us in both this world and the hereafter, while the knowledge of other things will only benefit us in this world?

(Aqi, *Pengasuh*, Kelantan, 1930)

The religion–secular dichotomy emerges within Muslim contexts, too. In the early twentieth century, reformers began pushing to establish more schools, contending that a broad education in a variety of subjects (belonging to the religious and the worldly) was a path to empowerment and progress for local Muslims and the nation at large. A teacher in South Sulawesi, for example, wrote an essay in the journal *Al-Wafd* urging his party, PSII, to establish more madrasah (schools) to serve the towns of Mandar and Sinjai. He explained that although people in these Muslim communities ‘have attended numerous sermons in the mosques’ they were still ‘without strong Islamic faith’. To emphasise his point, he quoted the Dutch saying, ‘*kennis is macht* [knowledge is power]’.<sup>1</sup> The goal of Muslim education was not to re-establish the Islamic caliphate or promote Islamic political unity; the goal was to encourage people in the East Indies and in Malaya to be ‘better Muslims’ by teaching, *ta’lim* or *pengajaran*. In these efforts, Muslim reformers, particularly modernist but also traditionalist, were open to new developments in educational subjects, vocabularies and technology, as long as they did not see any violation of Islamic principles.

### **Distinguishing *Ilmu Agama* from *Ilmu Dunia***

Muslim reformers in colonial Indonesia and Malaya distinguished different types of knowledge and the values that they put on education. It also examines school organisation, curricula and pedagogy, which combined various sources of knowledge and practice. Native Muslims from the Jawi land who travelled to Mecca or Cairo to study tended to focus on religious learning rather than secular knowledge, a distinction that had existed in Islamic schools and college-mosques since before medieval times but that became reinforced in the colonial context. Upon returning home, these *‘ulama* as educational reformers maintained the broad Islamic division between religious knowledge (*ilmu agama*) and worldly knowledge (*ilmu dunya*). Any subjects concerning the hereafter, the world to come after death, were considered religious knowledge. Following categories established by early Islamic scholars, they divided religious knowledge into topics of faith, worship, and social relationship. Of these three, they considered the last form of knowledge to be the most flexible and adaptable to changing social contexts. Any subjects having to do with this world were grouped together as worldly or general knowledge (called during this time ‘foreign’, ‘modern’, ‘Western’, or ‘*algemene*’ [D.]).<sup>2</sup> Worldly matters generally concerned whatever people needed to know in order to survive, live comfortably and enjoy life. These classifications sometimes contradicted but often coincided with colonial distinctions between educational topics (see the next chapter). What Europeans considered modern, secular or scientific subjects were roughly equivalent to what Muslim teachers considered worldly topics, while traditional, religious or socio-cultural subjects would be considered religious topics.

The Arabic term *‘alim*, meaning ‘a learned person’ (plural: *‘ulama*, Q.35:28), became defined as ‘religious scholars’, a conceptualisation that effectively excluded ‘rational scholars’ or ‘scientists’. Islamic teachers in the colonial era followed this ‘medieval’ system of knowledge so that they saw only independence and disconnection, rather than integration of the religious and the non-religious. However, some Muslim reformers viewed science from any origin as being part of the religious or Islamic knowledge that deserves learning and teaching because they saw all kinds of knowledge as being essentially from the divine. In Kelantan, for example, the sultan and

the Council of Religion and Culture encouraged the teaching of a variety of 'useful sciences'.<sup>3</sup>

The distinction became salient when the *'ulama* wanted to emphasise the identity and value of certain forms of knowledge and when knowledge became institutionalised. The *'ulama* in colonial Indonesia and Malaya followed a systematisation or formalisation of knowledge (particularly introduced by al-Ghazali and other 'medieval' scholars) into *tauhid*, the science of the Qur'an, the Qur'anic exegesis, the hadith, *fiqh* and *tasawwuf* on the one hand, and the non-religious, non-revealed sciences – grouped under 'worldly knowledge' – on the other. Each of these fields of knowledge emerged at different times, but knowledge accumulated and was systematised by a chain of transmitters, representing what historian William Graham calls the *isnad* paradigm. Graham's notion of a sense of connectedness with the past (Graham 1993) was in this case in order to distinguish between the authentic and the false and between the valuable and the non-valuable. In Indonesia and Malaya, this dichotomy came into shape not only because of textual interpretations of the Qur'an, the hadith and religious scholarship, but also because of complex relations between the colonial and local authorities. Different networks retained different ways of connecting to the past, and different readings of the present shaped how different elements of the past were reconstructed, emphasised or omitted.

Different types of Islamic schools had existed in the Indonesian-Malay archipelago before the twentieth century. The Arabic word for school, *madrasah*, became associated specifically with 'Muslim schools' in the East Indies and Malaya. Muslim boarding schools, called *pesantren*, originally a Sanskrit word meaning 'the place for students', had already existed in the East Indies at least since the nineteenth century. Some claim that the *pesantren* (and similar forms of schooling in other places) may be influenced by older Hindu traditions. They have pointed not only to Sanskrit terminology and the concentration on religious teaching, but also to other similarities between *pesantren* and the Hindu education, such as their village setting, unremunerated but highly respected teachers and student solicitation of alms. However, following Mahmud Junus, Karel Steenbrink argued that the characteristics of the *pesantren* were also found in the earlier Islamic tradition of education in Baghdad (Steenbrink 1974: 17–20). 'Medieval' Islamic colleges also

displayed some similarities with the *pesantren* tradition, such as the use of *waqf* for support and the focus on Islamic sciences (Makdisi 1981). While some continuities are evident, the rise and dynamics of Islamic schools in colonial Indonesia and Malaya are nonetheless quite different from those in the Arabic lands. The differences also occurred between those in the East Indies and those in Malaya.

In Malaya, *pesantren*-type boarding schools were called *pondok*, possibly a local adoption of the Arabic word meaning ‘a place to stay’, or alternatively a local term that subsequently assumed an Arabic form. Despite the origins and difference in name, *pesantren* and *pondok* were not divided up into separate classes nor were classes organised around formal curricula. Each teacher set their own schedule for teaching and completing each course of study and decided which texts to use and how they would be interpreted (Hashim 1996; Dhofier 1999). Teachers conducted classes informally, were often inconsistent in showing up to teach and received no regular salaries. Religious teachers (called *kiyai* in Java or *tok guru* in Malaya) nevertheless played a central role in educating mostly rural communities. In most schools in the Indonesian-Malay archipelago they followed the Sunni theology and the Shafi’i *madhhab* (with some subordinated lessons on other theologies and legal thoughts). The religious education they provided in nineteenth-century schools may have been new to their students, but it was based on the knowledge that had been developed in ‘medieval’ times. The *‘ulama* taught *fiqh*, *kalam*, the hadith and related disciplines, rather than mathematics, botany, physics and other subjects deemed science (Makdisi 1981: 217–19).

As they saw fit, Muslim teachers pushed to reform the educational systems in the colonies. They helped establish new schools, provided licence for teaching (A. *ijazah*) programmes and strengthened the *waqf* base to support their schools. While they were united in this respect, they often disagreed on pedagogical methods and what topics should be taught. Some appropriated elements of Christian and Western colonial educational systems and included secular topics in addition to the ‘medieval’ system of teaching religious knowledge. Muslim teachers followed aspects of *adat* and used local languages (such as the Jawi books) to teach about Islam, although in most cases they did not teach *adat* as a distinct subject in Islamic schools.

Muslim educational reformers cited sacred texts to justify maintaining

the distinction between religious and secular topics of study, but also to explain the inclusion of both in the curricula for Muslim schools.<sup>4</sup> Many Muslims increasingly conflated secular knowledge of the sort usually offered in colonial and Christian schools with modernity. Some newly established Islamic schools were also deemed modern when they promoted reason (*akal*), progress (*maju*) and worldly topics of education in addition to Qur'anic revelations and the goal of happiness in the hereafter. Traditionalist Muslims tended to maintain 'classical and medieval scholarship' in their schools but although they did not emphasise *ijtihad* or the teaching of science as the modernists did, they did not necessarily denigrate the value of science. In the first half of the twentieth century, some *pesantren*, usually associated with the traditionalists, also began to offer basic courses in mathematics and science and other skills they considered useful. As I argue in this chapter, education in both religious and worldly subjects became a way of being simultaneously modern and Muslim. Although Arabic and Islamic disciplines transmitted from outside their places were new (thus modern) to these Muslims, it was science and other worldly skills transmitted from Europe that would become labelled as modern.

### **Modernising Schools and Curricula: Muhammadiyah in Java and Sulawesi**

In his historical work on education in the East Indies, Karel Steenbrink follows his analysis of the traditional *pesantren* or *surau* with a discussion of modernisation, which he sees as occurring first in Sumatera. A Minangkabau reformer, Abdullah Ahmad (a friend of Malay reformer Tahir Jalaluddin, mentioned earlier, and Haji Malik Karim Amrullah) who had studied in Mecca, returned to Minangkabau in 1899, where he established the Sekolah Adabiyah at Padang Panjang in 1907. Although he was able to obtain a government subsidy through the introduction of features of the Dutch school system – classroom, blackboard, chairs and tables, and even four Dutch teachers – for many of his compatriots these innovations went too far. Only two local teachers were employed, and study of the traditional religious sciences was made secondary. In Java, however, Ahmad Dahlan, as founder of the Muhammadiyah discussed earlier, oversaw the establishment of modern schools that were more successful and more widely accepted than was the case

for the Sekolah Adabiyah in Sumatra. This was in large measure due to the Muhammadiyah's urban location (Yogyakarta), where there were many civil servants and traders who were already persuaded of the value of a modern education (Steenbrink 1974: 37–42, 50).

Through the Muhammadiyah, Dahlan focused on the local need for educating men and women, girls and boys by using any methods he deemed useful, such as classrooms with chairs and tables and the educational organisation typical of Dutch governmental and Christian missionary schools (Salam 1963: 46–9; Nieuwenhuize 1958: 45–6). In the simplistic view of Kraemer, Dahlan, very concerned about illiteracy in Muslim communities in Java, introduced some aspects of Christian missionary education because he did not want Muslims to assume that their leaders did not care about their education (Kraemer 1952 [1928]: 93). Exhorting the younger generation, Dahlan said 'Muhammadiyah tomorrow will be different from Muhammadiyah today. So keep going to school, seek knowledge wherever. Be a teacher and come back to Muhammadiyah. Be a doctor and come back to Muhammadiyah. Be an engineer, and come back to Muhammadiyah' (Salam 1963: 70). People should 'study religion by using reason', and talk about religion not only in churches but also in mosques, Dahlan is reported to have asserted (Kutojo and Safwan n.d.: 43).

Some modernists saw a conceptual contradiction between 'Western' and 'Islamic education' simply because the former stressed science while the latter focused on religion.<sup>5</sup> Although worldly goals like finding jobs or advancing the nation were also evident, the aims of Muslim education were mostly expressed in religious terms. Beyond the objective of serving the *ummah*, reformist goals were articulated in terms of service to the nation without being necessarily anti-Western and anti-modern. For example, one speaker at a Muhammadiyah congress told the audience that they should strengthen their sense of nationhood (*kebangsaan*) but should not forget their religious obligations (*urusan agamanya*). The speaker stated, '[T]he famous Al-Azhar school, a study center for all young Muslims all over the world to seek religious knowledge, has also experienced some pleasing changes in order that its graduates be equal, side by side, with graduates from Europe and America. The effort is to strengthen Arabic and Islamic religion.'<sup>6</sup> Educational goals were expressed also in terms of the spiritual and the physical. Muhammadiyah

teachers should help students to build healthy bodies (A./I. *jasmani*) as well as to develop their spirituality (A./I. *ruhani*). The Muhammadiyah teachers generally gave different, but complementary, values to religious and non-religious knowledge, but they considered knowledge about the ‘seeds of religion’ (I. *benih agama*) the main subject at all levels of Muhammadiyah schools.<sup>7</sup>

By the early twentieth century, in referring to non-religious knowledge, the Muhammadiyah teachers used such terms as ‘foreign’ knowledge (*ilmu asing*), general knowledge (*ilmu umum*), worldly knowledge (*ilmu duniya*), ‘modern knowledge’ (*ilmu moderen*) and ‘Western knowledge’ (*ilmu-ilmu Barat*).<sup>8</sup> In dealing with this apparent dilemma, Mas Mansur, the Muhammadiyah leader from 1938 to 1940, used a mixture of Arabic and Dutch terms for Islamic knowledge, such as *Ilmoe Wetenschap Islam*.<sup>9</sup>

Given these aims, the example of Dutch education wielded considerable influence. The Muhammadiyah adopted and adapted Dutch names, terms and organisations, appropriating Dutch names for their subsidised schools on different levels, such as *kweekschool*, *volkschool* and *vervolgsschool*. Yet, for unsubsidised schools, the Muhammadiyah had to change the terminology, using a mixture of local and Arabic terms that distinguished them from the subsidised and fully supported government schools.<sup>10</sup> The original Dutch *kweekschool* became *madrasah*, and the other three became *sekolah* (Rahman 1988: 16–17). Despite these changes, by 1923, the Muhammadiyah had established 207 Westernised schools and only 88 *madrasahs* (Muhammadiyah 2010: 71).

An encouragement to combining the two areas of knowledge implied that they were conceptually distinct. Mas Mansur thus used the phrase *agama Islam* for God’s teachings as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad containing the commands and prohibitions for the well-being of humankind in this *dunya* and *akhirah*. Religion, for him, comprised both the ‘profane’ and the ‘sacred’, and the world encompassed all matters that had not been debated by the prophets and had been left to human wisdom. As one hadith put it, ‘You know about the matters of your world better’ (Pasha *et al.* 2003: 210–12).

These new Islamic schools usually used a combination of traditional and modern management practices. The Muhammadiyah leaders were more systematic, finding a site (usually in an urban area), collecting money, recruiting

teachers, requesting official recognition, building and opening the school and finally receiving applicants (Steenbrink 1974: 66). However, when the Muhammadiyah evaluated their programmes, including education, in their annual congresses, it became apparent that not all activists and teachers had been successful. Not only were they faced by a lack of trained teachers, a shortage of funds and poor facilities, they also found that interest in modern schooling among villagers was often low. Clearly, the programmes set forth in the 23<sup>rd</sup> Congress on 'schools' were not met by the Assembly for People's Education, one of the Muhammadiyah departments. They needed to revitalise their organisation to work more effectively in education, through conferences, production of teaching materials and the establishment of regulations for schools, teachers and students.<sup>11</sup> The teaching of Islam had to adjust continually to issues such as changes in the system and pedagogical methods. There was little attempt at standardisation because at this time Islamic organisations did not believe in the effectiveness of unifying all Islamic schools under one organisational umbrella, such as the Majelis Islam 'Ala Indonesia (the Indonesian Supreme Islamic Council) (MIAI) or the Association of Islamic Teachers and Education.<sup>12</sup> Each Islamic organisation established and ran their own schools according to their goals, orientations and resources.

### **Making Islamic Education Socialist: SI and PSII in Java and Sulawesi**

Socialist Muslim activists advocated an Islamic kind of socialism that could challenge 'Dutch Western capitalism' in their schools.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, while Tjokroaminoto, the SI leader discussed earlier, recognised this distinction, he felt that 'worldly knowledge and Islamic knowledge should not be separated; and this world and the hereafter should be in balance' (Amelz 1952: 166–8). The activists emphasised youth education that covered the integration of intellectual, spiritual and material aspects of human existence – all of which was aimed at 'power-building' (D. *machtsvorming*) of the new generation – but stressed that knowledge should be prioritised over politics and worldly pleasures (I. *keseimbangan*). They emphasised that their programmes were a means by which 'a true Muslim and a nationalist who has a big heart and great confidence' could be produced.<sup>14</sup> Their programmes were 'not intended to cultivate hatred against the government schools', but to teach children

about their 'religion and nation', in order to advance the nation and bring them civilisation.<sup>15</sup>

Tjokroaminoto also joined the discussion, contending that religious experts should understand non-religious matters. When he promoted a non-cooperative attitude toward the Dutch, he emphasised the distinctiveness of Islamic educational philosophy vis-à-vis the Western one. 'Our education', he argued, 'may not adopt influence from the non-Muslims; our education is non-cooperative. Our education aims to produce a true, yet modern Muslim. Our education should not produce *'ulama* who only understand religious knowledge and are small in number.'<sup>16</sup> Instead, Tjokroaminoto urged his group to make the curriculum comprehensive, and to adjust their teaching in relation to the age and skill levels of their pupils. At the elementary level, in addition to modern subjects, students should learn the basic Islamic prayers and study the Qur'an, both in Arabic and in the Indonesian/Malay translation. At the secondary level, these subjects should be expanded, and extended to include Islamic and 'Indonesian' history. Students should learn to speak and write in Arabic in the same way as they learnt Dutch, and should learn enough grammar so that they could appreciate Arabic literature and translate and understand the Qur'an. In addition, religious topics, including the life of the Prophet and his successors, should be taught in such a way that they would be not only interesting, and even fun, but would also help students to understand the reasons for Islam's success. In higher education, Tjokroaminoto continued, both general and religious knowledge should be taught at a more advanced level and employing more advanced Arabic. At this stage, teachers should teach *tafsir*, the hadith, *fiqh* and *kalam*. The goal was to produce graduates who were sufficiently knowledgeable to become religious teachers, but who would also be 'civilized and intelligent in its modern sense such as in those produced in Western universities' (Amelz 1952: 169–71).

In Makassar, the PSII established a teacher-training college for elementary schools and adopted the curriculum of colonial schools in order to expose trainees to modern pedagogy. PSII teachers were thus required to learn not only about basic Islamic religious knowledge, but also pedagogy, *zielkunde* (D. psychology), *kinderkunde* (D. knowledge about children), teaching methodologies and the educational systems in colonial and missionary schools.<sup>17</sup> PSII's eclectic approach to modern education suggests that the cultivation of Islam

and nationhood did not always mean anti-colonialism. In other words, despite anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideology, PSII leaders promoted a selective borrowing of Dutch and Christian educational practices. For them, modernisation required the combination of Islamic religious knowledge and science.

### **Teaching Islam and Useful Skills to Women and Girls in Java and Sulawesi**

The Muhammadiyah women's organisation, Aisyiyah, established schools for girls and hosted courses for women (Rusin 1979: 28–30). The teachers were not all women – men and women could teach each other. The modernists accepted the *fatwa* that stated that neither the Qur'an nor the hadith prohibited women from teaching men or men from teaching women. Muhammad himself imparted his teachings to women. Modernists did, however, make a qualification: women could teach men but they should avoid any religiously prohibited encounter and should keep their emotions and desires in check (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah 1967: 288–9). They aimed to increase awareness about human dignity and equality between men and women since they admitted that inequality contradicted the Qur'anic message.<sup>18</sup>

The Aisyiyah movement stressed that the educational goal was not merely to memorise the Qur'an and religious texts, but more importantly to enable girls to understand Muslim teachings and apply these in daily life. The curriculum included the doctrines and practices of Islam, such as the children's responsibilities for respecting parents, religiously accepted *adat*, hygiene, housework and cooking, handicrafts, child-bearing and the information about the Aisyiyah movement. Courses for wives were more practical, including instruction in the Indonesian or Malay language, Arabic and Latin, as well as Islamic teachings and practical matters, such as funeral preparations. Each branch of Aisyiyah was urged to work for the eradication of illiteracy through the establishment of kindergartens and elementary schools using the textbooks provided by the central board.<sup>19</sup> Apart from these courses, Aisyiyah had a two-year Islamic curriculum with subjects such as the pillars of faith and pillars of Islam for daily worship, *fiqh*, *adab* (A. morality) pertaining to women's lives and the memorisation of shorter chapters in the Qur'an so that they could be recited in prayers.<sup>20</sup> Female students were encouraged to wear the headscarf.<sup>21</sup>

One Aisiyah course, intended for women preachers, was divided into two streams: the first was for those who would teach educated, elite and non-Muslim audiences, and the second was intended for those teaching Islamic students and 'ordinary people'. The syllabus for preachers in the first category included the pillars of belief, *fiqh*, *tafsir*, the hadith, ethics, the history of the messengers of God and their peoples, colonial administration and government regulations concerning the Muhammadiyah and Aisiyah, knowledge about other religions, *adat*, and training in delivering a speech. The curriculum for the second category was similar but it excluded teaching other religions and local custom.<sup>22</sup> Presumably *adat* was regarded as a distinct subject, where emphasis was given to its maintenance amid challenges, or reforming some aspects in light of the reformist ideas. In sum, the new schools of girls and women concentrated on the basic teachings of Islam and the acquisition of 'general knowledge' and skills, and female teachers also discussed women's roles and the importance of education and 'life-skills'. They sought to make 'a good contribution' (I. *isteri Islam jang berarti*) to their family and society.<sup>23</sup>

In Sulawesi, the question of education for girls was also debated among reformists, for, as one supporter asked rhetorically, 'Do only boys and men deserve this country? Do only boys and men perform Islam? Is this life only about men? God has provided girls and women with a wide choice: political, economic, and social.'<sup>24</sup> In Makassar, one of the PSII schools, the Islamic Institute for Girls (I. Poeteri Islam Instituut), adopted a curriculum that included Islamic studies and Arabic, but also handicrafts and other useful skills, considered necessary for future mothers. The school opened on 1 October 1932 for girls in the morning and for women in the afternoon.<sup>25</sup> The PSII schools of the Pergerakan Isteri (Women's Movement) aimed to empower women to maintain a hygienic and well-functioning household, promote marriage and health and provide proper funeral arrangements for women.<sup>26</sup> These schools taught Islamic ideas regarding the rights and responsibilities of men and women as given by God. Activists argued that Islamic views of the woman's role were unlike those of Western schools, which promoted the idea of women's emancipation.<sup>27</sup> Schools for both men and women were similar in that they taught the basic skills of reading the Qur'an, Arabic and writing, but differed in the educational culture. The emphasis in

girls' schools was on the function of women as mothers and daughters and as members of society.<sup>28</sup>

### **Producing Traditionalist Scholars: Nahdlatul 'Ulama in Java**

One of the objectives of Nahdlatul 'Ulama when it was formed in 1926 was to preserve and advance the *pesantren* tradition now confronted by the modernist challenge. Abdul Wahab Chasbullah, one of the founders, was an organiser who had experiences and contacts with modernist organisations (Steenbrink 1974: 68). But the 'scholar' founder, Hasyim Asy'ari, who was educated in a Javanese *pesantren* and then in Mecca, aimed to reform Javanese Muslim society primarily through *pesantren* education. Because 'ulama are heirs of the prophets, the objectives of religious education were to reach the status of a scholar and a noble man; to translate the knowledge acquired into good action; and to obtain the favour of Allah (Yusoff 2010: 159–60).

Asy'ari's method of teaching was known as *halaqah* (A. circling) or *bandongan*, meaning that students gathered around a teacher who would translate Arabic textbooks on different subjects such as *tafsir*, the hadith, Arabic and *fiqh*, and provide some explanation of words and their meanings. Another method commonly used in *pesantren* education, called *sorogan*, required students to read and translate an Arabic textbook into a local language (such as Javanese) in front of the teacher who would guide them and correct their mistakes. Similar methods applied to the *bandongan*, which was a larger group, whereas the *sorogan* was smaller and more personalised. Asy'ari reportedly refused to change these 'traditional' teaching-learning methods into a modern classroom or tutorial methods. Such changes had been proposed by his son Abdul Wahid Hasyim (versed in Javanese, Malay, English, Arabic and Dutch), who returned from Mecca in 1933. However, Asy'ari eventually reversed his objection to the inclusion of modern subjects in the *pesantren* curriculum; he accepted the teaching of the English and Dutch languages, Indonesian history and geography advocated by his son and by his nephew, Moh. Ilyas (Khuluq 2000: 31–7). Ilyas had attended the Hollands-Inlandse School (HIS), a Muhammadiyah elementary school teaching primarily general knowledge, Dutch and some religious knowledge. In the afternoons, however, he studied Islam and attended the *pesantren*, thus combining education in the traditional and modern methods. With the

approval of Asy'ari, Ilyas included general knowledge such as Latin, geography, history, Malay/Indonesian language, Arabic and Dutch, adopting the HIS method of teaching that he himself had experienced (Steenbrink 1974: 70–1).

Beyond curricula, some aspects of educational practice became a matter of religious dispute. People asked if schools could ask tuition fees from parents for their children. NU issued a *fatwa* suggesting that fees would be considered a gift to teachers that could either be paid immediately or in regular intervals, as long as they all had the intention of serving God, not for seeking the praises of others (in Masyhuri 1997: 52). Others asked whether Muslims were allowed to study books authored by *kafirs* used in Islamic schools, such as the Arabic dictionary that *al-Munjid* compiled by the Jewish scholar Louis Ma'luf. The NU then issued a *fatwa* stating that the study of works authored by a non-Muslim could be permitted for educated Muslims who would be able to distinguish the false from the true (in Masyhuri 1997: 110). Being a traditionalist reformer did not mean rejection of modern education and Western texts.

### **Reforming Islamic Schools in South Sulawesi**

Karel Steenbrink's extensive history of Islamic education in Java and Sumatera (1974) left Sulawesi largely unexplored. While education developments in Sulawesi display connections with the Javanese and Sumatran networks, the context and local dynamics were quite different. In South Sulawesi, Javanese and Sumateran teachers coexisted with Buginese and Makassarese teachers (often called 'gurutta') as well as Arab teachers. By 1929, the Muhammadiyah of the Makassar branch managed two schools: Hollands-Inlandse School (HIS), an elementary school teaching primarily general knowledge and Dutch and with an additional lesson on religious knowledge and the Muhammadiyah ideology; and Munir School, an elementary school teaching primarily religious knowledge with the addition of general knowledge. Both HIS and Munir schools were run according to the Dutch governmental regulations, and teachers were partly of Arab-descent, partly Makassarese and partly Javanese and Sumatran (Radjab 1999: 21–2).

Muhammad As'ad, mentioned earlier, founded a *halaqah* Islamic study in a mosque in 1928. He then established a madrasah: Madrasah al-Arabiyah

al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Arabic School) (MAI) in 1930, which followed the Meccan educational systems of Dar al-Falah (A. the House of Success) and Dar al-Ulum (the House of Knowledge) (Ismail n.d.: 6–9). The school later developed an association called ‘As’adiyyah’. During his time, Muhammad As’ad emphasised the teaching of Arabic books, but subsequently his students who became teachers included some modern subjects and classroom-style teaching in combination with traditional methods. One classroom session was held from morning to early afternoon, and a second from late afternoon to the evening. Both were full-time, with prayer breaks between sessions (Nawir 2000 [1999]: 86–7). As’ad found that because students came from different backgrounds and had different levels of knowledge, they needed to be classified and tested based on their knowledge of particular Arabic books (Said 2002: 13).

The *madrasah* employed primary teachers and senior students as assistants, who usually supervised the study of lower-level religious books (in the *pesantren*) or classes (in *madrasah*). Occasionally, a senior student was regarded by the *gurutta* as knowledgeable enough to be a substitute to teach upper-level books or classes.<sup>29</sup> As the number of students grew, the school moved to the mosque (Masjid Jami’ Sengkang), supported by the local ruler, the students and the community. MAI was able to maintain both an elementary school (*madrasah ibtidaiyyah*) and a secondary school (*madrasah tsanawiyah*).<sup>30</sup> From the primary to the secondary level, the students studied *tahdhiriyah* (A. basic, three years), *ibtidaiyyah* (beginner, four years), *i’daiyyah* (preparation, one year), to *tsanawiyah* (intermediate, three years). A special class was held for the training of ‘*ulama*, because of their intensive reading of religious Arabic books (Nawir 2000 [1999]: 86–7). The *halaqah* system still operated in the mosque and in As’ad’s house, while the classroom system was assigned to a separate building (Ismail n.d.: 16). The *madrasah* retained the *halaqah* and *pesantren* system, but adopted the classroom and some complementary modern subjects. The MAI followed the use of Arabic terms for religious and non-religious knowledge: *ilmu hisab* or *ilmu falaq* for astronomy, *handasah* for technology, *ilmu shibbah* for medical science and *jugrafiyyah* for geography.<sup>31</sup> All of these knowledges were new or modern to them.

As’ad and other teachers managed the school based on volunteerism like

other madrasahs. Expenses were met by the *waqf*, voluntary charity (*sadaqah*) and any form of material contribution (*infaq*) from the community and the students (Bone 1986: 15–18). As'ad was receptive to the idea of establishing madrasah out of or apart from the *pesantren*. In 1932, he and other 'ulama held a meeting in South Sulawesi in which they developed plans to establish a *madrasah* while continuing the existing traditional system. They allowed the *madrasah* to receive funds from the *zakat* and other sources from the community. They called for the *madrasah* to be free from any political sectarianism, and from any legal obligation to follow any particular school of thought. They also allowed the *madrasah* to open branches anywhere if the community so wished, and called on scholars and teachers to avoid disputes on non-essential matters.<sup>32</sup>

One of Muhammad As'ad's students, Abdul Rahman Ambo Dalle, would become another prominent teacher and leader in South Sulawesi and beyond after the Second World War. In the 1930s he continued the As'adiyah *pondok* system, even though he attended the Dutch native elementary school (HIS), used classroom-style pedagogy and established a new organisation, Dar al-Da'wah wal-Irsyad (the House of Mission and Guidance) (DDI).<sup>33</sup> Another As'ad student, Muhammad Nur, attended a Dutch-Malay elementary school in Maros before leaving for Mecca, where he studied basic knowledge about Islam and science in Indonesian language.<sup>34</sup> Although Ambo Dalle and Muhamad Nur belonged to multiple Southeast Asian linkages that incorporated Sunni, Shafi'i networks, Dutch colonial schools, the Javanese system of education and local Bugis-Makassarese connections, they were to become the 'ulama whose scholarly credentials rested on their mastery of religious knowledge.<sup>35</sup> They represent the new processes by which 'knowledge' could be distinguished, so that professions became differentiated between 'ulama and masters of other knowledge.

Apart from the As'ad network, in another South Sulawesi town, Pinrang, various teachers, including the principal who had graduated from different places (Al-Azhar, Cairo, Islamic schools in Padang, West Sumatera and from a Native Teacher Training School (Hollands-Inlandse Kweekschool (HIK)) in Bandung, West Java), with the support of local nobility and *zelfbestuurder*, together established a school named Madrasah Al-Jamiyyah al-Islamiyah or the School of the Islamic Association in 1939. The school taught

primarily Islamic religious knowledge and Arabic but included the teaching of basic Dutch and English, history, geography, economics, and political science. The school emphasised that religious knowledge and general sciences (*D. algemene kennis*) were all needed by the youth of the contemporary age.<sup>36</sup>

### Teaching Arabic in South Sulawesi

The Arabic language exercised such influence on the literary cultures of Islamic South and Southeast Asia that for many Muslims it was no longer viewed as a foreign language. ‘Arabic – at many levels and in various forms – emerged as an integral element of Islamic cultures in these regions’ (Ricci 2011: 181). This explains why certain Arabic terms such as *munafiq* and *kafir* were not translated, even though other Arabic terms were rendered in local languages. Learning and teaching Arabic became the main characteristic of ‘traditionalist’ reformist schools. It was these schools that produced the *‘ulama*, and they regarded Arabic as an instrument (*ilm alat*) for learning other Islamic disciplines – *nahw* (A. grammar), *sharf* (A. conjugation), *balaghah* (A. linguistic aesthetics) and *tajwid* (A. recitation of the Qur’an), sometimes in combination with *mantiq* (A. logic) (Safwan and Kutoyo 1980/1: 82). Although at some levels teachers taught Arabic grammar in Arabic, many *pesantren* teachers taught the Islamic disciplines using local language as the medium of instruction (Balai Penelitian Lektur Keagamaan 1983/4: 15–16). For example, the Arabic grammar book discusses Arabic verbs, nouns, tenses and conjugations, but with a Bugis or Makassarese translation (Hamid 1983). Some schools used both Arabic and Bugis as languages of instruction, but the ability to read the Qur’an and the hadith in Arabic rather than in translation was greatly valued. For most Muslims, Arabic was the language of their faith and even the language of paradise. Arabicisation occurred through this systematic process of teaching and learning as well as through religious rituals and prayers that used Arabic. The mastery of what was viewed as a holy language became an important marker of identity of traditionalist students and scholars and their institutions.

Although the teaching of Arabic became strengthened in the traditionalist schools, it was challenged in the modernist and government schools that had adapted the colonial and Christian missionary teaching methods. While Arabic was elevated as a religious language and penetrated everyday usage in

the Indonesian-Malay world, it had to face the challenges posed by the introduction of Western scientific and technological terms. As a result, Arabic (that had in medieval times been the language of philosophy, science and technology), became associated with the religious, whereas English or Dutch became associated with with the secular and modern.

The traditionalist–modernist distinction becomes problematic, however, when we consider a pupil who attended or a teacher who taught at both traditional and modernist schools. Mustafa Zahri (born in 1914 in Majene, in Sulawesi), was a Muhammadiyah teacher who previously learnt Arabic and *fiqh* from a *qadi*, studied at a Dutch village school, furthered his knowledge of Islam from Meccan and local teachers in a traditional *pesantren* in Salemo (in the Spermonde islands off the coast of Sulawesi), enrolled in the *pesantren* of Muhammad As'ad in Sengkang, studied under Hamka and other Muhammadiyah teachers in Makassar, and finally founded a *madrasah* in his village. Contributing further to his fluid educational experiences, he was a follower of Naqsyabandiyyah, a *tariqah* that the Muhammadiyah followers shunned. Another example of a Sufi teacher from Sulawesi who attended a Dutch village school but never received a *pesantren* or *madrasah* education was Puntung Nuntung. He was a leader of Tariqah Khalwatiyyah Samman and obtained his Sufi knowledge directly from his father and from studying at the Sufi centre Pusat Lompo in Maros (Rahman 1988: 20–7).

### **Distinguishing *Ilmu Agama* from *Ilmu Umum* in Malaya**

In Malaya, Malay language and culture was juxtaposed with English and Arabic in schools as the sultans, *'ulama* and the British attempted to modernise education more generally. The distinction between religion and science in Malaya was similar to that in the East Indies, but Malaya had a close connection between Islamic and Malay ethnicity.

The Malay reformers Tahir Jalaluddin and Syed Al-Hadi believed that it was Muslim inability to include science, economics, geography and administration in the 'religious category' that had led to the backwardness of Muslim communities and their subsequent colonisation by European powers (Bakar 1997: 55–6). Jalaluddin, who criticised Malay backwardness, was a firm believer in the importance of modern education as a pathway to progress; indeed, he himself had mastered Islamic astronomy (*A. ilm al-falaq*) at

Al-Azhar University in Cairo and encouraged others to study new forms of knowledge.<sup>37</sup> Knowledge could be found from many sources, as his poetic exhortations to Malays made clear:

O brothers!  
 The Dignity of Knowledge is Beyond Limit  
 So high the Degree to the Sky  
 In this world and in the hereafter Allah keeps.<sup>38</sup>  
 The word of Allah our Lord of the universe  
 In the Qur'an, He has his decree  
 Are those who are learned the same  
 As those who are not?  
 Those who are learned in all ages  
 They are the ones who bring the world safe  
 They serve the nation as in the Saying  
 Loving the nation is part of the faith.<sup>39</sup>

The goal of acquiring divine knowledge (*A. ilmu rabbani*), he warned, should not be to gain status, employment, food or fine clothes, for this reduced humans to the level of animals. Rather, knowledge should be sought because it dignified humankind, and modernising education was the key to reaching progress and social mobility.

In Al-Hadi's view, many people, including *'ulama* and rulers, were plainly ignorant of both the wisdom and the requirements of the religion taught by Muhammad because they did not seek knowledge except to use it as a tool for material existence and obtain wealth. Al-Hadi criticised Malay education, which he said emphasised memorisation without understanding the meaning. Al-Hadi contended that if Muslims had read history they would know that Islamic teachings were the foundation for European progress and modernity because it was through Muslim Arabs in Spain that Europeans learned about Islamic sciences from writings that were translated, edited and circulated. Therefore, Muslims should study *ilmu jiwa* (the science of soul, psychology), *ilmu tuboh* (biology), *ilmu kedokteran* (medical sciences) and *ilmu falaq* (astronomy) (Al-Hadi 1931: 62). At the same time, he criticised Muslims who studied only Western knowledge, while neglecting Islamic studies. In his novel, *Faridah Anum*, Al-Hadi displayed a critical attitude toward those

Muslim students who wanted to study Western sciences rather than Islamic knowledge (Al-Hadi 1931: 117, 120). In other words, he positioned Islamic, rational knowledge above Western sciences, although he stressed the compatibility of Islam and science in general.

Dissatisfied with the existing *pondok*, madrasah and Arabic schools, Al-Hadi proposed an Anglo-Malay school to teach Malay, English and other subjects to Muslim children who were unable to attend English schools.<sup>40</sup> He supported the British establishment of schools for girls and called on Malays to follow this progressive path. The members of the Union of Johor Women Teachers (Persekutuan Guru-guru Perempuan Johor) advocated the same message. The Malay Women's Training College was founded in Melaka in 1935 as the counterpart of the SITC, in Perak founded in 1922 (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 238).

Al-Hadi advocated the establishment of a modern religious school to teach 'religious and secular knowledges' in some of his writings and served as teachers in different schools in Penang and Malacca until he passed away in 1934. Later scholars, teachers and administrators were able to establish Malay Muslim colleges in part because of the influence of Al-Hadi and other Muslim reformers (Bakar 1994: 122–3). Al-Hadi taught in several schools, including the Madrasah Masyhur Islamiyah, which was sponsored by a leading Arab community in Penang and he served as the principal of the school during 1918 and 1919. He invited other teachers, including Jalaluddin, to support the school and he initiated the building of a mosque and a house for people's education. He was able to recruit some tens of teachers and 300 students. The school used the medium of Arabic in instruction and Arabic textbooks. He employed an English teacher and an Arab descent, who also taught in the morning at the Anglo-Chinese School and in the afternoon at the Madrasah Masyhur Islamiyah. Al-Hadi tried to secure funds for running the school, made sure the teachers received their salaries and also gave regular reports to a board of directors of the school (Bakar 1994: 70–2). In short, Al-Hadi established a modern education, complete with a building, a board of directors, a headmaster, management of finances and salaries and a regular textbook-orientated curriculum.

### Reforming Schools and Curricula in Kelantan

In Kelantan, the *pondok* school had been around since at least the early nineteenth century. But the sultan and the MAIK, discussed earlier, sought to modernise education by establishing a *madrasah* focusing on Arabic, and Malay and English schools focusing on general knowledge. In 1917, the council established the Islamic Kelantan School (A. al-Madrasah al-Muhammadiyah al-Kelantaniyah) or Ma'had Muhammady. The madrasah was defined as a newer system of schooling that aimed to produce religious scholars and public intellectuals (M. *cerdik cendikia*) who would be more aware of modern knowledge and institutions than were traditional scholars, the *'ulama* or *tok guru*. Assisted by British Advisers, the sultan and the council encouraged the teaching of a variety of 'useful sciences'.<sup>41</sup> In the words of one of its teachers, the school operated 'according to the progress of the world today' (M. *secara kemajuan dunia sekarang*), even introducing formal examinations.<sup>42</sup>

The school offered courses on the twenty attributes of God, prayer, Islamic history, calligraphy, *tajwid* (recitation of the Qur'an), writing letters, arithmetic, natural science and English. These initiatives were the result of a widespread feeling that Malays at large were excluded from various professions and skilled occupations, whereas 'foreign people', such as the Chinese who had only recently come into Kelantan, had assumed some types of work previously carried out by Malays, such as building houses. The way for Malays to move forward was to obtain training that would be relevant, marketable and attractive to ordinary people, 'following the will of today'.<sup>43</sup> The Ma'had Muhammady also included Malay and English classes in its religious school, and Roman characters were introduced into the Malay and religious classes. 'Modern' subjects such as geography and hygiene were part of the syllabus, and some of the traditional religious textbooks were replaced with others deemed 'better'.<sup>44</sup>

The council also established a Malay school with 292 pupils, as well as providing for the education of four pupils at schools outside Kelantan (Millington 1927: 10). A number of *penghulus* in Kelantan supported the new Malay schools and a few even became teachers. In some cases, they even tried to convince the people to send their children to Malay schools rather

than to the *pondok*. It is evident that some Malays saw the rise of a new Malay school system as an alternative to the predominant religious schools (Rahman 1998: 45–6).

The reformer Tok Kenali assumed a prominent role in the establishment of English, Arabic and Malay schools in Kelantan. Some graduates of English sections went to the Maktab Melayu at Kuala Kangsar, and some managed to continue their study of law in England. Several graduates of the Malay section of the school went to Maktab Perguruan Tanjung Malim and others went to Kolej Pertanian Serdang to learn agriculture. The Arabic section of the school produced graduates who continued to study in Egypt. Others became activists, writers (such as Abdul Kadir Adabi and Saad Sukri), officials and so forth (Al-Ahmadi 2000: 480–1).

Tok Kenali advocated the teaching of subjects other than religious disciplines in Malay schools, such as history, geography, English, *mantiq* (logic), literature and trade. His reform-mindedness contributed to his realisation of the usefulness of non-religious disciplines for Malay students (Bakar 1997: 59). In one of the Malay schools, for example, teachers held exams for history, evaluating students' comprehension about the Malay law, the sultans of Kelantan and the different towns in Kelantan.<sup>45</sup>

### **Educating Equality among Malay Girls and Women in Kelantan**

The question of female education also gave rise to debate and new initiatives. In general, *pondok* students were male, although there were some that included girls. However, the female presence was more pronounced in the *madrasah*, because they specifically promoted education for girls. Many Malay teachers and writers supported this innovation, arguing that there should be equal opportunities for both sexes so that all could participate in public life (Hassan 1980). A significant number of female pupils were enrolled in Kelantan's Malay schools, especially after 1904. As time passed, this trend became more evident, since for some Malay writers to be progressive meant to address women's problems. From the 1930s to the 1950s, for example, *Pengasuh* authors discussed a variety of women's issues such as Islamic, customary and interracial marriage and male–female relations more generally; inheritance for girls and women; girls' education and study outside Kelantan; female hospitals; and women's rights. The author of one article

in 1930, reporting on the Indonesian women's movement, was inspired to call on Malay readers to follow in their footsteps, especially with respect to the establishment of girls' schools in Kelantan. For their part, female Malay authors noted the ways in which Indonesian women had struggled for gender equality, and the subsequent advantages: 1) men and women share responsibilities, develop their intellect and receive equal respect; 2) stereotypes and assumptions about women and their roles are eliminated; 3) women educate their minds; and 4) Indonesian women, as mothers, also maintain a sense of being part of a nation. The author called on readers to support the founding of schools for girls:

O mothers of the Peninsula, raise your awareness! That her children are shaking [in] our land! That men cannot work without women's help. That women's minds are narrow when [all they do is] clean clothing, maintain the health of their children and [provide] their food, clean their households so that they don't bother the minds of men . . . We encourage the state of Kelantan [to] build a school for girls and women because they are responsible for the *ummah* . . . We support the establishment of a Sultan Zainab School in Kelantan.<sup>46</sup>

The Sultan Zainab School was eventually established in 1937 in Kota Bharu. It was first called The Government's Girls' English School for the daughters of the ruling house and Malay elite. While special attention was given to topics such as domestic science, handicrafts and art, the conjoining of 'Malay and religion' in the curriculum is significant. Malay teachers taught Malay subjects, which included reading, writing, oral and written composition, and used two sets of books in each class, one a Jawi reader and the other a Romanised reader – the latter itself a statement of modernity. Among the textbooks used were *Cherita Pulau Mas* ('The Story of Pulau Mas') (in Jawi script), the biography and plays of Shakespeare (translated into Jawi language), various Malay stories (in Rumi), *Cinderella* (*Hikayat Taman Peri* in Rumi) and stories from Alhambra Palace. The religion syllabus for girls was the same as that for boys: they were taught by a visiting religious teacher, and their courses contained elementary religious knowledge such as the pillars of Islam and the obligatory rituals.<sup>47</sup> The English syllabus included various textbooks, such as *English through Actions*, *Picture Lessons* from Children's

Education, and stories such as ‘Little Red Riding Hood’ and ‘The Little Red Hen’. All subjects were taught in English, apart from ‘infant hygiene’ for parents and Malay language and religion, which were in Malay and/or Arabic.<sup>48</sup> This school did not open enrolment to the general population until 1953. This suggests that in Kelantan during this time only Malay boys had access to the Malay, English and Arabic schools managed by MAIK as well as the ‘traditional’ *pondoks*. The school was reserved for the Malay girls of the elite.

### Teaching Arabic, Malay and English in Kelantan

MAIK played a crucial role in maintaining the binary categories that associated Islamic knowledge with Malayness and situated secular knowledge in a more Westernised environment.<sup>49</sup> English-language schools used English and Malay terms for non-religious knowledge such as geography, history, mathematics and the sciences, while Malay schools used Malay (both Romanised and Jawi script), but adopted English idioms for subjects considered ‘worldly’, such as physiology (Hashim 1996: 43–6). At the same time, however, Muslim teachers saw Arabic as a noble language, the mother of languages, the language of the Qur’an, the best language of the best nation and the key to religious knowledge. A Malay teacher, Muhammad Daud bin Salam, said that he had heard of some *madrasah* teachers and writers who doubted the value of Arabic. In response, he urged such individuals to develop the teaching and use of Arabic to prevent its disappearance as had happened to other languages. Daud bin Salam appeared to be among the *kaum tua* who sought to maintain Jawi for the journal *Pengasuh*, seeing the study of Arabic and Malay as a means of reviving the Malay nation (*kaum* or *bangsa*) and Muslim *ummah*. Without the unity of language, there would be no unity of the Malay *kaum*, and without the unity of the nation there would be no *kemajuan*.<sup>50</sup>

The lessons for Malay Muslims were clear: an author quoted one hadith, ‘ignorance (A. *jahl*) is the antithesis of knowledge (A. *ilm*’) and ‘no poverty is worse than ignorance’.<sup>51</sup> *Shari’ah* knowledge was sacred and *ilmu pengetahuan* profane, and yet both should be combined to attain progress and contentment in this world and happiness in the hereafter. Without religious knowledge, life would not be good (M. *buruk*): ‘There is nothing worse than doing a wrong and bad thing and neglecting the right and good thing.’<sup>52</sup> Malays had become

weak and were left behind because they focused only on Qur'anic reading, and sometimes even equated secular knowledge with arrogance and religious indifference.<sup>53</sup> One said, '[W]ho has believed that the knowledge of *shari'ah* would benefit us in both this world and the hereafter, whereas the knowledge of other things would benefit us only in this world?'<sup>54</sup> *Pengasuh* author told his readers that once he had recognised the backwardness and laziness that typified Malays, he understood the need for *kemajuan*. In a global context, Malays must strive to catch up with other nations that had established their supremacy. Only through the pursuit of *ilmu pengetahuan* that had made certain nations 'great' could Malays, old and young, men and women, achieve *kemajuan*.<sup>55</sup> With the growing stress on science and vocational skills, Malays thus came to see religious knowledge as a distinct category.<sup>56</sup>

In keeping with the growing expectation that education should provide practical and vocational skills, the Kelantan government established a Malay Agronomy School (M. Sekolah Pertanian Semenanjung) in Kota Bharu. The curriculum included agronomy (M. *ilmu perihal tanaman*), physics (*ilmu kejadian tabi'i*), chemistry (*ilmu kimia*), bookkeeping (*ilmu memegang buku*) and agricultural economics (*ilmu bagi pentadbiran hal tanaman*) – all to be delivered in English for a three-year course or in Malay for a one-year course.<sup>57</sup> Sciences were taught in English because there were no suitable Arabic or Malay books or qualified teachers.

Other Malay schools taught various skills such as basketwork, mat weaving, brick and tile manufacturing and carpentry. Physical training was incorporated into the educational programme, and some schools had gardens, with seeds provided by colonial officers. In the Malay, English and Arabic schools run by MAIK, administrators modified the syllabus to include instruction in elementary hygiene and to train Malays in using Roman characters.<sup>58</sup> The curriculum of a Malay school in Pasir Mas, not far from Kota Bharu, taught geography, *ilmu alam* (science of the nature) and *tarikh* (history), the latter focusing on Malay history, geography and literature, including *Hikayat Abdullah* and *Pelayaran Abdullah* (the memoirs and travel accounts by the well-known Munshi Abdulalh, scribe Thomas Raffles) and traditional stories now available in print and used in the Federated Malay States, such as the *Hikayat Si Miskin* (Story of a Poor Man). For science and geography, Malay schools used Romanised Malay, and examinations could ask student

to locate places on a map, or ask them to explain why Earth is round or why the Malay Peninsula does not have four seasons.<sup>59</sup>

The use of Jawi script provided the link between Arabic and a sense of Malayness, since the British Government encouraged using Rumi, not Jawi, as a teaching medium for Malay (see further next chapter). The contemporary Malay philosopher Naguib Al-Attas has argued that the displacement of Jawi tended to further Malay detachment from Islam (Al-Attas 1972). However, the *pondok* continued to maintain the use and teaching of Jawi as well as Arabic (Ahmad 1991/2: 17), and it was therefore *pondok* teachers and students who played the most important role in reforming Malay education while maintaining Arabic and Jawi script.

This is not to say that the *'ulama* were preoccupied with the retention of Arabic and Jawi script. For instance, *Pengasuh* urged Malays to learn foreign languages, especially English, because 'they will find their life easier'. They would then be able to read English books and understand English law and culture, which would be useful to them living under a British administration. Developing their written and verbal skills in English would also enable people to adapt more easily to the interests and principles of the colonial government, and to voice their requests and aspirations to the authorities. It was thus important for *'ulama* to refute the view that the English language would necessarily encourage wrong-mindedness and non-belief (Ahmad and Hassan 1983: 124–5).

Malay reformers typically framed their encouragement for teaching English in terms of progress. The editors of *Pengasuh*, for example, requested that the State of Kelantan establish more English schools because 'English has become the language of administration, commerce, and the general public in this world as well as the desired and loved language in Kelantan which is under the shade and shadow of the British government'. This was apart from English courses already introduced at MAIK and despite the state's support for Malay students studying English abroad. The experience of other nations had shown the value of instruction in English, deemed both noble (*M. mulya*) and crucial (*M. penting*) in Kelantan's path to progress. Without knowledge of English, Malays would continue to be left behind (*M. tertinggal*).<sup>60</sup>

The curricula in governmental and vernacular Malay schools in Kelantan demonstrate four important points. First, the inclusion of religious knowledge

in a curriculum focused primarily on general sciences and vocational skills was based on the belief that the identity of Islam and Malay was intimately intertwined. Second, the association of Arabic and Jawi with Islam and Malayness found its counterpart in the association of English with non-Muslims and non-Malays, but it was still considered a valuable acquisition. Teachers of secular subjects were different from teachers of Malay and religion, but they coexisted in the government school system. Religious, Malay and secular subjects were to be taught in schools for the sake of progress. Third, the sultan and Malay reformers, including *'ulama*, teachers, and writers for periodicals and newspapers, played an important role in modernising Malay education. Fourth, together with Islam, knowledge of Malay literature, history and geography was now considered a significant element in Malay ethnic and cultural identity in the face of challenges from other identities, notably the Chinese (and Indian). The British colonial regime helped crystallise this integration.

### **Preserving Traditional Pedagogy with Modern Adaptation**

In Indonesia and Malaya, many teachers used methods they had learned while attending schools in Mecca and Cairo. They also particularly used memorisation and understanding of the Arabic texts, with some questions and answers and discussion when the teachers felt necessary. In Kelantan, Tok Kenali encouraged students to purify their souls, since impurities could hinder their understanding and remembering, and reminded them that the motivation to learn must come from within. He urged Malays to seek religious knowledge at its centre, namely Mecca, for that was where they could benefit from the wisdom of authoritative scholars and from discussions with colleagues. Before each lesson, he asked students to read books by different authorities dealing with the topic under discussion in order to compare these with their teacher's perspective and to evaluate different lines of reasoning (Yusoff 2010: 85–6). In one of his poems, Kenali expressed his idea that learning involved observing and thinking, not merely memorising:

The aim of knowledge is afar  
 Cannot be hunted with bow and arrows  
 Cannot also be inherited from forefathers and uncles

Indeed, knowledge cannot be acquired except by sprawling on the floor of  
mosques

Until the floor softens because of the pressure from writing on it

And by observation

As well as by thinking

And by reading and studying oceans of books

(Yusoff 2010: 79)

Kenali's pedagogical approach, with its combination of memorisation and reformist thought, may appear paradoxical. However, memorisation was still fundamental because of the objective of reciting the Qur'an and the hadith. Simultaneously, he stressed constant exposure to Arabic reformist ideas, which would enable Malay society to address contemporary social, cultural and political problems and to make Islamic doctrines relevant in terms of social change. In Tok Kenali's school students would recite their memorised verses or passages from books, while he would listen lying down or sitting, only giving a sign when the student made a mistake in the recitation. Following correction, the student was required to repeat the entire verse or passage until it was memorised perfectly (Salleh 2002: 80). For more advanced audiences Tok Kenali introduced articles from Egyptian reformist journals such as *al-Abram* (A. the noblest) and *al-Muqattam* (A. a town in Egypt whose name means 'garbage town').<sup>61</sup>

Tok Kenali also encouraged the question-and-answer method of instruction. He assigned his assistants, known as study leaders, to teach lower-level religious books to other pupils. The assistant's task was to answer questions, and if he was unable to do so he was sent to Tok Kenali for further advice. He himself enjoyed posing questions to his students and audiences, and he encouraged them to engage in the discussion by quoting the Qur'anic verse 'And ask those who know if you do not know' (Q. 16:43) (83). For him and other like-minded teachers, the modernisation of education meant reform in aspects of teaching methods, the use of classrooms, adoption of sitting at desks, the classification of students according to levels of knowledge or age and the use of Arabic, Malay and English according to the different fields of study. Modernisation could also mean adding 'science' and other skills deemed 'worldly' in addition to the Islamic disciplines deemed traditional and religious.

## Conclusion

In their respective studies of Islamic education in the East Indies and Malaya, Steenbrink and Hashim share the view that Muslims become modernised in part through their interaction with Dutch and British colonial powers and in part through their exposure to Islamic reform from outside of the region. While this chapter has supported their observations concerning Islamic educational organisation, curricula and pedagogy, it has offered some additional data. It has also broadened the comparative discussion of the formation and interaction between Islamic and colonial modernities in the educational domain as they were played out in the Netherlands East Indies and in British Malaya.

In this context, Islamic modernity was manifested as a combination of faith and reason, but also as a mixture of the traditional and the modern. Muslim proponents of educational reform in the East Indies and Malaya did not consider Islam to be irrational, unprogressive or antagonistic to science. They believed that Islamic teachers could simultaneously guide people on a spiritual path while also providing the skills and knowledge necessary to achieve material success. Muslim educators interpreted the Qur'an and authoritative Islamic scholarship in pressing their view that educational reform was necessary. They were particularly concerned with changing the ways in which education was organised and the pedagogy and content of educational activities. Modernists established new schools (largely in urban areas) and adopted aspects of European educational systems in modernising their schools, including curricula, classrooms and other facilities, and instruction in European languages. Modernisation further included educating girls as well as boys, and reformers even offered courses for women.

Sacred texts and traditions motivated reformers to modernise the educational system, while they were careful to ensure that their Muslim students remained pious. Modernists argued that studying the Qur'an and Arabic would enable Indonesian-Malay Muslims to join the global modernity of Islam. However, they criticised traditionalist *'ulama* for teaching the Qur'an, the hadith and other ancient texts strictly in Arabic. Modernist reformers were more practically involved in transmitting foreign languages than traditionalists. In the East Indies, modernists used Dutch terms for organisational

structures and the various sciences in Indonesian language in addition to Arabic for religious knowledge; in Malaya, Malay and English were used in addition to Arabic. Local teachers also translated Arabic concepts into local terms for purposes of communicating with their students effectively. Despite the long-standing linguistic connections that bound the Islamic Indonesian-Malay world to the Arab heartlands, in comparative terms, Arabic became more embedded in Malaya than in the East Indies.

Like modernists, traditionalists viewed an Islamic education (including the study of Arabic) as essential for modern Muslims, and still felt that learning about the hereafter was more valuable than knowledge about this world. Their adoption of modern subjects came later than was the case for modernists. Traditionalist *'ulama* at rural *pesantren* and *pondok* considered themselves guardians of Islamic religious knowledge. The practice of learning and teaching the Qur'an and Arabic constituted part of the Islamic tradition of knowledge, which could successfully confront other forms of knowledge, indigenous and foreign. This religious knowledge tradition survived the modernisation so evident in the school system because for generations it had retained its own rationality and self-sufficiency, and had provided, to borrow a phrase from Islamic scholar Fazlur Rahman, 'satisfactory answers to ultimate questions of worldview' (Rahman 1984: 46). Yet, some Muslim reformers in the East Indies and Malaya did not find Islamic knowledge completely satisfying because they saw the worldly benefits in teaching and learning the secular knowledge and skills. Rahman, however, is still right about the outcome: a 'secularist' state of mind, that is, the duality of loyalty to religion and worldly affairs (47).

The dichotomisation of knowledge into the worldly and the religious and their integration became more explicit in the modernist schools. Islamic subjects were narrowly defined as 'religious' precisely because the reformers wanted to add 'secular science' and other profane subjects to the educational system. Modernists promoted studying the natural sciences and acquiring modern technological skills because they would be beneficial for Muslims in helping them to lead successful lives. Secular knowledge was associated with the practical issues of this world, whereas religious knowledge was seen as essential for Muslims preparing for the world to come. Knowledge about the material was combined with knowledge about the spiritual because each had

its power and limitations. These socio-historical developments impacted the forms, transmission and meanings of Islamic religious knowledge.

The reform of education in the East Indies and Malaya thus sustained some traditions and spheres of knowledge, while pushing others aside. Because being Malay was conflated with Islam, educational reformers in Malaya promoted the inclusion of classes in Malay language, history and literature (along with Arabic and English). Meanwhile, *adat* cultural knowledge, differentiated from Islamic religious and from secular knowledge in formal schools, became devalued. *Adat* customs and beliefs continued to be transmitted orally by families, by elders at home and by the community's ritual leaders, but they were not part of the school curriculum.

## Notes

1. *Al-Wafd*, Nos 1–3, March–April 1934, Year 10; *Al-Wafd*, Nos 11–12, April 1936, Year 11.
2. *Pemberita Makassar*, 29 February 1940.
3. *Pengasub*, vol. 3, 8 August 1918.
4. The Qur'an contains verses that Muslims believe encourage a religious education (*tafakkuh din*). Q. 9:122, for example, reads: 'Nor should the Believers all go forth together: if a contingent from every expedition remained behind, they could devote themselves to studies in religion, and admonish the people when they return to them, that thus they [may learn] to guard themselves [against evil].' Other verses suggest that a worldly education would be useful for achieving happiness in this life, although it should not be valued over seeking happiness in the hereafter: 'But seek, with the [wealth] which Allah has bestowed on thee, the Home of the Hereafter, nor forget thy portion in this world: but do thou good, as Allah has been good to thee' (Q. 28:77).
5. 'Pekerdjaan Bagi Moejaddid', *Almanak Tahoen 1345*, 1926/1927, 139.
6. Hasjim (1931), 'Choetbatoe'l Arasj', in *Almanak Moehammadijah Tahoen Hidjrah 1351*, DYogyakarta: Pengurus Besar Moehammadijah Taman Poestaka.
7. Tanfid Hoofdbestuur Moehammadijah (1938), *Boeah Congress 23: Mengandung Poatoesan Congres Moehammadijah Ke 15 sampai ke 23*, 2nd edn, Jogyakarta: Hoofdcomite Congres Mohammadijah.
8. PSII, for example, used the term '*ilmu pengetahuan umum*', which can be translated as 'general sciences'. *Soeara PSII*, No. 1, 25 April 1937, Year 1.
9. *Tentara Islam*, No. 1, June 1932, Year I.

10. *Boeah Congress 23: Mengandung*, 16–17.
11. Mansoer, H. M. (1936), 'Chutbatoel-Arsj', in *Boeah Congres Moehammadijah Seperempat Abad*, Yogyakarta: Hoofdbestuur Muhammadiyah, pp. 5–12.
12. 'Bond van Onderwijs Aan Islamietische Scholen', *Het Licht (An-Nur)*, No. 1, March 1926, Year 2, 19–20.
13. *Al-Wafd*, No. 1, January 1933, Year 2.
14. Tjokroaminoto, 'Moslem National Onderwijs', 1925, in Amelz (1952: 166); Mansoer (2004: 83); PSII (1952), *PSII dari Tahun ke Tahun*, Departemen Penerangan & Propaganda, 1.
15. M. Ask Hidajat, 'Pemerintah dan onderwijs', *Al-Wafd*, No. 1, January 1933, Year 2.
16. Tjokroaminoto, in Amelz (1952: 168).
17. *Soeara PSII*, No. 4, 25 July 1937, Year 1.
18. Aisyiyah, *Statuten dan Huishoudelijk Reglement Moehammadijah 1935*, 66.
19. *Boeah Congress 23: Mengandung*, 32–7.
20. *Boeah Congres Moehammadijah Seperempat Abad*, 25.
21. 'Boeah Congres Moehammadijah Bahagian 'Aisjijah', 34.
22. 'Boeah Congres Moehammadijah' 36–7.
23. 'Qa'idah Moehammadijah Bahagian 'Aisjijah', 68; 'Kedudukan Prampoewan di dalam Islam', *Het Licht*, No. 11, January 1933, Year 8.
24. *Al-Wafd*, No. 2, February 1933, Year 2.
25. Similar schools opened in Mangasa, Balangnipa, Majene, Mangkura and other areas in South Sulawesi. *Al-Wafd*, No. 1, January 1933, Year 2; *Al-Wafd*, Nos 9–10, September–October 1933, Year 2.
26. When a Muslim dies, Islamic tradition has a procedure of preparing the deceased body for burial: from washing, praying, clothing and burying it. Male and female dead bodies are treated somewhat differently. The process required knowledge and skill that this women's organisation wished to teach. *Soeara PSII*, No. 4, 25 July 1937, Year 1.
27. *Soeara PSII*, No. 4, 25 July 1937, Year I.
28. *Boeah Congress 23: Mengandung*, 35.
29. When Muhammad As'ad died in 1952, one of his students, K. H. Daud Ismail, took over the leadership of the school, and changed the name into Madrasah or Pesantren As'adiyah, in honour of the teacher-founder, As'ad.
30. The school expanded to include the high school (Madrasah Aliyah) in 1955, and then the Islamic College (Perguruan Tinggi Islam As'adiyah) in 1964. Pesantren

- As'adiyyah also served as a socio-religious organisation, running conferences and creating branches with different religious and social activities. Bone (1986: 15).
31. Muhammad Abduh Pabbaja used these terms, but did not have the Arabic books for these disciplines. Interview with Muhammad Abduh Pabbaja, Sidrap, 9 July 2005; Anwar and Abady (1986/7: 52).
  32. Cited in Bosra, 'Peranan Kiai Haji Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle dalam Dinamika Masyarakat Islam Tradisionalist di Sulawesi Selatan', a paper delivered at the Commemoration of the Darul Dakwah wa al-Irsyad (DDI) Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle, 23 December 2003, Mangkoso, Barru, South Sulawesi.
  33. Interview with Musafir Pababbari, UIN Alauddin Makassar, 21 June 2005; Darussalam, 'K. H. Abd Rahman Ambo Dalle', 1999; Said (2002: 9–10).
  34. Mister is from the Dutch *Meester in de Rechten*, or Master in Law, or from the English Mister, Interview with Muhammad Nur, Makassar, May 2005.
  35. Amal (2003: 199–201); Khalid (2005: 9–18, 54–55, 207); Interview with Abdurrahman, Universitas Islam Makassar, 20 June 2005.
  36. *Pemberita Makassar*, 29 February 1940.
  37. Al-Edrus, 'Syekh Tahir Jalaluddin dan Persoalan Epistimologi Islam', in Aziz (2003: 48–57).
  38. Jalaluddin, 'Perasaan Pemerhatian', in Lubis, in Aziz (2003: 77).
  39. Jalaluddin, 'Perasaan Pemerhatian', in Lubis, in Aziz (2003: 82).
  40. Al-Hadi, 'Anglo-Malay school atau Malay-English school', *al-Ikhwani*, February, 1930.
  41. *Pengasub*, vol. 3, 8 August 1918.
  42. 'Pelajaran Uagama di Mesjid Besar Kota Bharu', *Pengasub*, No. 308, 5 December 1930.
  43. 'Pandangan Diatas Pekerjaan dan Pertukangan Melayu', *Pengasub*, No. 289, 1930.
  44. Annual Report on Education Department Kelantan, 1935. BAK, 1936, ANM.
  45. 'Periksaan September 1939, Ilmu Tawarikh', ANM.
  46. Wa Binti Encik Awang, 'Langkah Perempuan Indonesia', *Pengasub*, No. 307, 21 November 1930.
  47. 'Syllabus for the English School Girls', 15 April 1937, No. 6 in EOK, 154/37, ANM.
  48. The teacher for religion was a visiting *haji*. Annually, the number of pupils averaged ninety-five, with three women teachers trained in the Women's Training Centre at Melaka. 'Syllabus for Government Girls' English School,

- Jalan Merbau, Kota Bharu, Kelantan', 15 August 1937, No. 6, E.O.K., 154/37, ANM.
49. *Pengasub*, No. 6, 21 September 1918.
  50. Muhammad Daud bin Salam, 'Bahasa Melayu dan Bahasa Arab', *Pengasub*, No. 4, 22 August 1918.
  51. 'Peningat dan Pemimpin2 Melayu', *Pengasub*, No. 13, 3 January 1919, 1–3.
  52. *Pengasub*, vol. 17, 3 March 1919; *Pengasub*, vol. 19, 1 April 1919.
  53. *Pengasub*, vol. 21, 1 May 1919.
  54. Aqi, 'Pengetahuan Shara' dan lainnya', *Pengasub*, No. 291, 30 March 1930.
  55. Aqi, 'Lain-lain Ilmu Itu Bahagian Dari Hajat Kita Yang Besar', *Pengasub*, No. 291, 30 March 1930.
  56. 'Sekolah Tanaman di Serdang', *Pengasub*, No. 305, 28 September 1930.
  57. 'Sekolah Pertanaman Semenanjung', *Pengasub*, No. 302, 8 September 1930; 'Periksaan May 1939, Sekolah Melayu Padang Garong, Kota Bharu, ilmu Tanaman', ANM.
  58. *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the State of Kelantan for 1935*, 38–9.
  59. 'Peperiksaan Akhir September 1939 Sekolah-Sekolah Melayu Kerajaan Kelantan', ANM.
  60. Aqi, 'Kelantan dengan Bahasa Inggris dan Permohonan Kita Pada Mengadakan Sekolah Bahasa ini', *Pengasub*, No. 283, January–February 1930.
  61. The main writers of *al-Abram* (published in Cairo since 1875) were Muhammad Abduh and Jamaluddin al-Afghani. *Al-Muqattam* was an influential daily in Egypt founded by two Lebanese expatriates and was said to be pro-British. Salleh (1974: 94).

# VIII

## Secularising Education

The great colonial schools . . . taught generations of the native bourgeoisie important truths about history, science, culture. Out of that learning process millions grasped the fundamentals of modern life, yet remained subordinate dependents of an authority elsewhere than in their lives.

(Said 1994: 223)

Teaching agama shall be prohibited in governmental schools, but it is allowed outside regular hours, according to the decision made by the Department of Education and Religion.

(Departement van Orderwijs en Eeredienst 1919: 5)

The educational system has produced Malays who have taken honours at Cambridge and have been called to the bar and qualified as doctors and engineers. Continued social progress will depend on the extension of all types of education suited to local needs.

(Winstedt 1947: 177)

**E**dward Said has argued that one of the purposes of colonial education was to promote the history of Europeans and thus to ‘demote the native history’ (Said 1994: 223). In this chapter, while Said’s observation is generally correct, I will discuss the various ways in which Dutch and British colonial education functioned in the colonies. Europeans expressed a variety of educational goals, stating that an education assisted people in ‘pursuing happiness’ or ‘fulfilling the powers of the individual mind’, but that it should also ‘fit the needs of the community’ and help ‘create a better society’. Some colonialists hoped a good education would ‘bring East and West together’ and ‘soften the violence of the impact’ of Western norms on native life (Furnivall 1943:

4; Steenbrink 2006: 88). Europeans believed that in areas where ‘Eastern and Western cultures meet’, ‘Western culture’ should be emphasised, but as will be discussed in the following, they did not neglect ‘Eastern’ languages and cultures. Said is right about the general tendency, but some qualifications are necessary depending on the colonial administrators and local contexts. Nativeness and Islam were not always identical. Local languages such as Javanese, Buginese and Malay were generally favoured over Arabic by the European educators due to the latter’s ‘foreignness’ to the local population. The Europeans generally saw the teaching of Islamic disciplines as medieval with memorisation and indoctrination in contrast to what they saw as modern science and education.

The Dutch taught Dutch language to the native elite and the willing ordinary people but they studied and taught some local languages (Javanese, Buginese and so forth) in the vernacular schools. They generally excluded Arabic and attempted to regulate the management of Islamic and native schools at large, but they allowed the teaching of Arabic and Islamic schools outside the government schools. The British privileged English as a subject in all governmental schools, but they favoured the teaching of Malay language, history and culture over Arabic in the vernacular schools. They tolerated the teaching of Arabic and Islamic knowledge by the sultan and the *‘ulama*, even when they supported the official conflation of Malay identity with Islam. There were thus a diversity of discourses and policies among colonial scholars and administrators in their dealings with Western education and with vernacular and Islamic education.

### **Favouring Western over Eastern Education**

Unlike Muslim reformers who sought to cultivate Islamic faith and culture, colonial officials demanded a Western education for their children so they would be able to ‘represent Western civilization’ in the East Indies (Snouck 1994a [1906]: 60, 65). But in establishing educational policies, the Dutch Government faced a dilemma regarding the type of education they should provide, and its specific purposes. The Dutch perceived native peoples as ‘backward and poor’, but did not agree on how to address their educational needs. There were some policy-makers who argued that it was best to concentrate on educating European residents, but others felt called to

bring a Western education to selected and willing natives, although there was disagreement on the degree to which this should accommodate local educational methods (Brugmans 1938: 2–8, 1961: 152; Geschiere 1966). Snouck differentiated between ‘our system of education’ and the ‘native system of education’. He urged the colonial government to develop a Western-style educational system for the native population. In his view, however, this would help assimilate the *adat* elite, rather than Islamic leaders and populace, into Western culture, and it would certainly not be embraced by all natives (Snouck 1994a [1906]: 70–5).

Snouck contended that the West should help willing Muslims adapt their own forms of education to suit modern contexts. He saw that both Western nations and the Muslim world were almost equally concerned with the question of ‘whether a way will be found to associate the Moslim [*sic*] world to modern civilization, without obliging it to empty its spiritual treasury altogether’ (Snouck 1916: 123). The West could only hope that ‘modern civilization would not be so fanatical against Muslims’. Therefore, Snouck argued, the modern world should not offer Muslims the choice between giving up their religion or being treated as barbarians, as that would only lead to war. Instead, the West should allow Muslims themselves ‘to reconcile the new ideas which they want with the old ones with which they cannot dispense’, while helping them to adapt ‘their educational system to modern requirements’ (148). In fact, he was hoping to engage Muslims at large, not merely the *adat* ‘traditional’ elite. Regarding a traditional *pesantren* education incompatible with modern scientific education and Western pedagogy, but recognising that Muslims were often attracted to Western education, he argued that the West should intervene in modernising Muslim society but without destroying Islam’s spiritual heritage. In his view, the movement towards ‘modernity’ was generating its own momentum, for ‘all over Java, one can observe the *pesantren* losing ground; today everybody wants to go to modern schools’ (Benda 1958a: 8–9).

The Dutch colonial government ended up developing a complex school system to serve different populations within its colony. The Colonial Department of Education and Religion distinguished between schools for Europeans, natives, or ‘foreign Orientals’. Dutch colonial schools were named in accordance with race and social class, subject matter (that is, general

versus vocational), and level (that is, elementary, secondary, higher). There were European schools. The pupils of the European Elementary Schools (D. Europeesche Lagere Schools) (ELS) were young European children residing in the East Indies. The colonial government also established schools for natives that taught in the vernacular, making Malay (that became the basis of Indonesian) the primary language of instruction. Under the Department of Education and Religion, there were schools for the aristocracy (*anak bumiputera bangsawan*) using native languages (Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Malay, Buginese and so forth) or Dutch according to demands and circumstances; and there were schools for the ordinary people (*anak bumiputera kebanyakan*) using native languages only.<sup>1</sup>

The number of these native schools increased as demand grew, and elementary schools (Hollands-Inlandse School (HIS)), junior high schools (Middlebare Uitgebreid Lagere School Onderwijs (MULO)), and senior high schools (Algemeene Middelbare School (AMS)) could be found in most cities and provincial towns. These schools were further divided according to subject matter. There were two kinds of AMS, one of which stressed social sciences, economics, and languages, while the other emphasised natural sciences. Dutch and native languages were taught in both types of AMS. Hybrid schools such as the Dutch-Native School (Hollands-Inlandse School) taught both in Dutch and native languages and both natural and social sciences (Brugmans 1961: 161). The Dutch also established numerous village schools to provide native children with three years of basic education. The Minister for Colonies, De Graaff, wanted to expand these schools and make their teaching programmes relevant to village life, in part through delegating their supervision to the provincial authorities (Der Wal 1963: 492–507).

Sulawesi stands as a good example of the colonial concern to extended education. In 1910 there were only 29 native schools and about 95 village schools, but by 1936 the colonial government oversaw 750 vernacular schools with 55,785 pupils and 16 Dutch schools with 2,916 pupils. They managed vocational schools, like those that offered training in medicine, industrial and commercial skills, as well as training for teaching, for the civil service and administrative functions, and for the navy.<sup>2</sup>

The Department of Education sought to reform teacher training schools, employing Dutch teachers, and then gradually training the natives to be future

teachers. They extended the length of the study from four to six years. They created an advanced training school called HKS (Hoogere Kweekschool) in 1914 and transformed it into HIK (Hollands-Inlandse Kweekschool) in 1927 to reach the standards of the same school in Netherlands, but the 1929/30 Great Depression diminished the ongoing reform and transformation of the schools. As a consequence, many of the natives trained in these schools had to teach in unofficial schools (*wilde scholen*) in the East Indies (Suwignjo 2012). In South Sulawesi, Dutch scholar Benjamin Frederik Matthes (who studied Bugis literature) introduced the first teacher training college (D. *kweekschool*) in Makassar to train future teachers as well as other professionals such as doctors, merchants, civil servants, naval officers, and agriculturalists. The school taught maths, natural sciences, humanities (such as history), social sciences, arts and other skills (such as drawing and land surveying) (Brugmans 1961: 160). By 1940, as war clouds were looming, the Dutch Government planned to expand native education by building more new schools, but this also required teacher training. The proposed programme provided for eight new normal colleges to be built in 1941 to provide a four-year training period for secondary teachers. In 1942 the government was scheduled to establish 1,000 new people's schools and, in 1945, 250 new secondary-level schools.<sup>3</sup> But these projects were abruptly halted by the outbreak of World War II and the Japanese occupation of Malaya and the East Indies in 1941.

### **Changing Policies toward Islamic Education**

The Dutch policies towards the teaching of Arabic and Islamic subjects and towards Islamic schools and teachers in the colonies change and vary. The 1888 Fundamental Law prescribed the introduction of secular subjects into the existing *pesantren* schools in the East Indies, but the colonial administrators rejected the idea of including the *pesantren* into the colonial educational system due to the 'bad tradition of reading and memorizing the Arabic texts without comprehension' incompatible with modern education (Steenbrink 1974: 2–3). The 1892 Educational Law further prohibited the teaching of religious subjects in all the governmental schools, but it allowed the teaching of religious subjects and Arabic outside regular hours under the consideration of the Department of Education and Religion. The aforementioned law stipulated the reading and writing of native languages in native scripts and in

Dutch unless the department finds it irrelevant. It also requires the teaching of reading and writing Malay in Arabic and Dutch, although the Department of Education and Religion would decide about the value and accessibility of Arabic and Dutch among the native population.<sup>4</sup>

The same law also contained information about the school hours. Schools with the majority Muslim pupils were allowed to reduce the hours up to two hours on Fridays, and schools with the majority Christian pupils were allowed to reduce the hours on Sundays. Schools were also closed for two days during Christian and Islamic holidays. During the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan, schools in Muslim majority areas were allowed to have five weeks of holiday, and so the Christian schools had two weeks of holiday for Christmas. The first and the last dates of the holidays were to be decided by the school committees.<sup>5</sup> It is evident that the Dutch Government recognised the place of Arabic teaching and accommodated the religious needs of Muslim as well as Christian students under certain situations.

Resistance movements led the colonial government to be more interventionist in dealing with Islamic schools and teachers in the East Indies. Colonial administrators in the East Indies feared that a *pesantren* education would have a negative impact on Muslim attitudes toward the colonial order. There were cases in West Sumatra where the heads of *pesantrens* were discouraged from acting as teachers in governmental village schools due to their lack of expertise in the subject matters (Der Wal 1963: 142–51). While most educational policies were directed at government and native schools, the Dutch Government therefore attempted to regulate *pesantren* and to some extent Sufi places of learning. The Teacher Ordinance (*D. guru-ordonnantie*) issued in 1905 was developed following Muslim rebellions like the one in Cilegon, Java in 1888, which involved returning *hajji* and religious teachers. The Teacher Ordinance obliged every Islamic teacher to obtain an official permit from the native regents before being allowed to teach in public schools. Permits were only given to teachers who were ‘good’ and whose teaching was ‘not harmful to the public order’. Teachers had to list the names of their students and the subjects they taught. If a teacher failed to meet these requirements, he could be jailed for up to eight days or fined twenty-five rupiah (Suminto 1986: 52).

Dutch authorities also issued regulations concerning the teaching of

Islam. A 1917 regulation in Java (excepting Yogyakarta and Surakarta) stated that permission had to be obtained from the native regents to teach any form of Islam in schools or other public places, but private teaching in homes and mosques was exempt. The application should supply the teacher's origin, name, and level of education; where he would be teaching; a description of the curriculum; and the textbooks or Arabic books to be used.<sup>6</sup> An ordinance issued in 1932, popularly known as the 'Unofficial Schools or Wild Schools Ordinance' (D. *Wilde Scholen Ordonantie*) applied similar regulations to unsubsidised private schools and demonstrates that the Dutch Government also felt the need to bring *pesantren* under central control, since all would now have to obtain permission to operate.<sup>7</sup>

The ordinance stipulated that a teacher had to obtain permission from an Assistant Resident who could determine whether he or she was a good teacher and that the teacher should be at least a graduate of a government school or subsidised school or a school recognised by the Department of Education and Public Service. Faced by an outcry from Islamic and nationalist organisations, the Minister of Colonies (Welter) argued that the *wilde-scholen* should be fostered, but supervised and guided through a co-operative approach that would produce 'civic-minded individuals' (Der Wal 1963: 577). The various regulations suggest the Dutch colonial state vacillated between interference and non-interference with Islamic education as it tried to strike a difficult balance between freedom of religion for native people and maintaining their modern standards and public order.

### **Repercussions and Responses in the East Indies**

Modernising the colonial and native educational systems had direct repercussions on native life but had indirect impacts on the wider population. The local responses to colonial education varied: rejection, competition and imitation (Steenbrink 1974: 23). As the previous chapter has shown, the various Muslim responses to the Dutch colonial educational system cannot be easily categorised as either rejection or imitation. Furthermore, an increasing number of ordinary people were directly influenced when they attended colonial or native schools. The Dutch Government allowed local elites to send their children to colonial schools to further their assimilation into Western 'civilisation' (a contemporary Buginese scholar has called this

‘*Belandanisasi*’ or ‘Hollandisation’).<sup>8</sup> Some nobility sent their sons to colonial schools hoping that it would preserve and even enhance their own social and political status, although they knew that they were unable to become the governor, the Controller or the Assistant Resident, positions that were reserved solely for the Dutch. The highest post to which natives could aspire was as district chief or regent (Poelinggomang 2004: 125–6). For the native people, colonial schools were thus a path toward relatively better-paid governmental posts and this was their chief attraction. Others attended simply because only governmental schools were available in their area (Furnivall 1943: 38).

Graduates of these schools became known as ‘intelligentsia’ (I. *kaum terpelajar*), a term that separated them from the *‘ulama*, Islamic scholars educated in *pesantren*. *Kaum terpelajar* comprised modernised elite, by virtue of having been exposed to Western sciences, arts and humanities and having studied according to a Western pedagogy (Niel 1960; Bertrand 2005). Secularisation of education led to the diversification of native authority on the basis of knowledge and education. Colonial education as well as Islamic education shaped the polarisation of societies (for Javanese, see Ricklefs 2007).

The establishment of European and native schools throughout the East Indies constituted a modernisation project directed primarily at European and native elites. In South Sulawesi, some people called it the King’s School (I. *sekolah raja*) because it was to be attended by elite natives. Nonetheless, the existence of these schools eventually provided the rest of the population (including Muslims) with some awareness if not access to a Western education. An increasing number of school-age children attended colonial schools – by 1938 perhaps a third of this group. At the same time, more Muslim teachers became aware of the availability of colonial education in their localities (Brugmans 1938; Steenbrink 1974: 22).

Dutch schools also had indirect, but significant effects on the identity of local Muslims. As discussed in the previous chapter, Muslim reformers adopted aspects of the Dutch educational systems. Modernist reformers such as Ahmad Dahlan took Dutch colonial schools as a model for their own institutions. Traditionalist reformers such as Hasyim As’ari in Java and Muhammad As’ad in Sulawesi strengthened their *pesantren* or *madrasah* systems in response to colonial, Christian, and modernist Islamic challenges.

The impact of colonial education on the formation of Islamic modernist and traditionalist identities was clearly at work.

Another result of the introduction of Dutch schools was the diversification of ideological orientations. It was possible for natives to attend different types of school at different stages in their lives or at different times of the day. Muslim parents allowed their sons to attend colonial schools provided that they were able to study Islam in other schools or during the afternoons. For example, Muhammad As'ad's students, Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle and Muhammad Abduh Pabbaja, mentioned earlier, attended native elementary schools established by the Dutch in the morning and *madrasah* in the afternoon and evening. Ambo Dalle, who would become the leader of the Dar al-Da'wah wa al-Irsyad school and association, studied at a village school and later at the HIS, where he learned some Dutch and Buginese. After graduating from the HIS, he continued his education at a teachers' training school run by Sarekat Islam, before going to Mecca and other Muslim institutions to continue his Islamic studies (Rahman 1988). The graduates of these schools became actively involved in the propagation of Islam as well as in the dissemination of information and the organisation of new activities.

Agus Salim, the Sarekat Islam leader discussed earlier, was another product of Islamic, Malay, and colonial schools.<sup>9</sup> He read and wrote in Dutch about a variety of topics, including Islam, and used Dutch terms to address Islamic concepts, such as 'Allah's *godsdiens*' for the 'religion (*din*) of Islam', '*geloofsbelijdenis*' for 'proclamation of faith (*shahadah*)' and '*recht*' for '*hukum*' or law. He was both appreciative and critical of Dutch scholars like Snouck who wrote about various dimensions of Islam.<sup>10</sup> Because of his educational experience, Agus Salim traversed multiple intellectual worlds: West and East, local Minangkabau and Islamic Malay, global and nationalistic. He was considered a member of the *kaum terpelajar* and a *kiyai haji*, a modernist religious scholar. Identity categories became multiplied if not crossed and blurred.

Another indirect impact of colonial and missionary schools was the conflation of colonialism with Christianity. Some Muslim parents were suspicious of Dutch schools, because they thought that they served colonial or Christian interests. In Sulawesi, for instance, there were very few Muslim Javanese or Sumatran teachers at Dutch-organised native schools (Safwan and Kutoyo 1980/1: 60–3). The fact that many native teachers in these

colonial classrooms were Christians from Ambon and Manado contributed to Muslim fears that the schools would attempt to convert their sons to Christianity.

The British colonial approach toward Islamic education in Malaya was different from that of the Dutch in the East Indies. In Malaya, in spite of official non-interference in Islamic and cultural affairs, the British administration supported vernacular education and tolerated the spread of Islamic education in its own sphere, in some cases in Kelantan supervising it at the request of the sultans and the council. The British generally excluded Islamic subjects from colonial and vernacular Malay curricula, but they too tolerated teaching Arabic and Islamic knowledge outside the normal hours. By contrast, arguably in the East Indies the Dutch tightened control over Islamic and native education (Benda 1958a: 74; Yegar 1979: 258). But this general difference should not obscure the reality of fluctuation and difference in British and the Dutch policies towards Arabic, Islamic, and native education. The different discourses of education and differential impact of colonial educational policies in these neighbouring regions therefore needs to be specific and contextual.

### **Favouring Western over Islamic Education in Malaya**

British colonial administrators promoted modernisation of the educational system by opening English and Malay (vernacular) schools for native elites while allowing Indian and Chinese private schools to develop independently. They did not have to use education as an instrument of political control as much as the Dutch, because Malaya was less demographically diverse than the East Indies. Both English and Malay were commonly used as the medium of instruction. Yet British administrators and scholars did develop their own conception of what a modern education should mean for the native, but they assumed that the cultural environment of the native was not conducive to their becoming completely modern. British administrators agreed that Malays would remain 'ignorant and superstitious' unless they were 'modernised', and therefore wanted to transport the Malays into the modern world; conversely, it was commonly believed that this could not be fully achieved because Malays would never give up their past. In pragmatic terms, most officials also felt that that educating natives could go too far because these

could destroy Malay culture, and to a considerable extent these entrenched beliefs shaped British policies.

The British generally perceived the typical Malay as backward, illiterate and unskilled. While Raffles sought to ‘diffuse among them the light of knowledge and the means of moral and intellectual improvements’, most British hoped that Malays would gain a ‘material advantage’ out of their education and become ‘better citizens and more useful members of society’ (Stevenson 1975: 57–8). They saw the need for a technical and literary education, provided in English, to ‘enable them to take their proper place in the administrative and commercial life of these states’ (Hashim 1996: 52–4).

Wilkinson, known for his ‘love for and sympathy with the Malay people’ (Roff 1967: 130), seemed to be ambivalent about educating them. In the 1902 report, ‘The Education of the Asiatics’, Wilkinson called for reforming the education of the Malays by changing their mentality and habits, including reading, as well as changing textbooks such as the *hikayat*, ‘traditional’ histories that were no longer relevant for modern Malay pupils.<sup>11</sup>

Appointed Inspector of Schools in the Federated Malay States in 1903, Wilkinson not only established English-language schools that Malays could attend, but advocated that Malays should be selected for government employment solely on their merit. He systematised the system of granting scholarships and educational allowances to Malays and made the scholarships and allowances tenable in future. He also led the examination of the working details of the schools such as classes, curriculum, buildings, allowances, and accommodation (Stevenson 1975: 179–81).

He observed that Englishmen and Malays differed in their views of the nature of religion. For the former, theology was only one of several branches of knowledge. For the latter, theology encompassed all knowledges (Wilkinson 1906: 6). Modern Christians had embraced science, and would embrace scripture, too, but only as two separate sources of knowledge. Wilkinson contrasted this attitude, and that of modern Christian education, with that of Muslim schools, which did not teach science despite Islam’s high level of civilisation in ‘medieval times’. By saying that Muslims only focused on theology in their schools, Wilkinson meant that they honestly chose to base ‘their reasoning upon God’s word rather than upon the fallible experiments and observations of men’. And ‘even the well-read Malay is generally ignorant

or owes his information to English sources. To him history is a branch of theology . . . European methods of classifying snakes are far too technical to be expected of any Asiatic race, however observant.’ On the other hand, he did not want to criticise ‘too severely this mental attitude; it is bad for scientific research but has the merit of creating earnest and devoted men’. The average Malay, he said, would be more interested in traditional medicine, divination, and black magic because these concerned ‘his health, prosperity, and wealth more than his intellect’ (Wilkinson 1906: 43, 61–4). For him, Malay Muslims – who, as outlined in one of his notes, included Indonesian Muslims, since both were part of the ‘Asiatic’ or, more generally, an ‘Eastern’ race – had no tradition of science and technology, considered a fact radically different from European Christians.

Although some Malay Muslims were in pursuit of ‘religious knowledge’ as a specialty, Wilkinson argued that they were not interested in science. He noted that some educated Malays who devoted themselves to the ‘more orthodox studies of religion, Arabic, Malay, and mysticism’, were found in Mecca or in Cairo and Constantinople. However, there were only a very few centres of ‘theological study’ in the Peninsula, despite religious teachers with ‘bands of earnest disciplines’ and controversies between rival mosques (Wilkinson 1906: 78–9). His observation that Muslims were actually directed away from science conforms to his main argument that European Christian education with stress on science was essentially secular, whereas that of Muslims was religious. These differences in attitude could well be a deterrent in any effort to recruit Britons to teach English, history, and literature to Malays: ‘It is not too much to say that the average Englishman resident in the Malay Peninsula would consider it waste of time to attend to what he terms “native prejudices”’ (81). For Wilkinson, there was ‘a certain antagonism between the new schools and the old teaching’ (Wilkinson cited in Hashim 1996: 58–9).

Wilkinson became more optimistic than other British colonial administrators about the possibility of modernising Malays, arguing that archaic customs would die out naturally as Malays sought a modern education (Wilkinson 1925a: 73). In his view, Malays did not have to choose between modernity and tradition, but could use both in pursuing their objectives of unity and progress. Wilkinson favoured a vernacular education for primary schools, but he was responsible for implementing a new federal scheme aimed

at producing English-educated Malays for service in the government that surpassed anything before it in scope, organisation and vision (Stevenson 1975: 168).

The colonial regime frequently expressed a desire to increase the number of schools and teachers and improve the curricula and facilities available to the native population, but cultural and socio-political obstacles made some pessimistic about the future. Defending the record of colonial education, however, Winstedt noted that the modern educational system that began in Malay elementary schools had ‘produced Malays who have taken honours at Cambridge and have been called to the bar and qualified as doctors and engineers’. He also contended that the British encouraged emancipation of Malay women by education and example, contending that Malay women had become sufficiently advanced to enter politics, ‘in spite of being Muslims’. Believing that a secular, modern education readied Malays for ‘the battle of life’, Winstedt anticipated continuing social progress, but argued that this would depend upon the extension of ‘all types of education suited to local needs’ and upon satisfactory political and economic conditions (Winstedt 1947: 176–7).

Thus, British scholars and Advisers exhibited their varied attitudes toward Malay education. In some cases, they were ‘reluctant modernizers’, but in other cases, they became keen, serious advocates. While they advocated the need to bring the native population into the modern world, they saw a Western-style education as something that would be beneficial to only a limited number of Malays. Indeed, Malays themselves did not flock to enter government schools and, in later years, as Winstedt looked back over his time in Malaya, he acknowledged that ‘little enthusiasm was shown for the new learning (Winstedt 1969a: 68).

### **Teaching English and Malay in Malaya**

Similar to the Dutch system, schools were named according to governmental status, the ethnic origin of the students who attended them (for example, British or Malay), level (elementary, secondary, higher) and overall subject matter (academic or vocational). The colonial government made an attempt to preserve the balance between higher and lower standards of education and the local educational and employment needs. To this end, they tried to obtain

information concerning the social and economic background of the countries peopled by ‘three races’: Malays, mostly agriculturalists; Chinese, mostly industrialists; and Indians, mostly workers mainly on the Rubber States. They were making preparations also to establish a university in Malaya.<sup>12</sup>

Throughout Malaya, a primary education was provided in English, Malay, Chinese, or Indian languages, depending on the school. The Malay schools were free and maintained by the government. They prepared boys for entry into English schools and gave those who preferred to remain in the villages basic instruction in the ‘three Rs’ (reading, writing, and arithmetic), geography, Malay history, tropical hygiene, gardening, poultry-keeping, and general handiwork. Malay girls studied the same subjects with appropriate modifications. English schools were those in which English was the sole medium of instruction, although they admitted pupils of every ethnicity, the majority of whom were Chinese. The government ran most of the secondary schools, with the aim of having students pass the Cambridge School Certificate examination (Winstedt 1948: 133).

In 1900, the government issued a policy on regular attendance for Malay children at government vernacular schools. The government also issued the Standards of Examination for a variety of subjects such as Reading, Writing, Arithmetic, Composition, and Geography. For example, Geography, Standard III has ‘First ideas of a map. Geography of the Malay Peninsula and Asia’, and Standard IV and Ex-Standard has ‘Geography of the World in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. Map of the Malay Peninsula’ (Stevenson 1975: 208–11).

British and Malay educators collaborated on standardising the curricula and pedagogy used in English and Malay schools. In primary schools, teachers taught English, arithmetic, geography, history, handwork, hygiene, physical training, and mathematics. At secondary schools, they taught science, which comprised physics, biology, and chemistry. They were expected to teach different subjects using different methods: memorisation and practice for English and Latin, logic and exercises for mathematics, and observations and experiments for science (Hashim 1996: 52).

### Teaching Modernity in Kelantan

Kelantan offers an example of the collaboration between colonial administrators and their Malay counterparts, for both English and Malay men were appointed Superintendents of Education. Their job was to oversee the education of the Malays. The appointment of W. A. Graham as the British Adviser in Kelantan in 1903 saw the founding of the first government Malay school, headed by a Malay Muhammad Ghazali. Soon afterwards a government grant provided for mixed secular and religious education at the central mosque. Another British Adviser opened four new Malay schools in Kota Bharu, with a total enrolment of 1,960 and an average daily attendance of 74 per cent over the following seventeen years. Kota Bharu alone had forty Malay teachers and thirty-two Malay schools. Another British Adviser passed an enactment to make attendance in government schools required, although in most non-governmental schools in the state no compulsion was considered necessary. Funding for government schools and students and salaries for teachers was also increased.<sup>13</sup> In 1927, another British Adviser, W. M. Millington, observed that the Malays demanded a 'better education'. Though he wished to have all government offices staffed by educated Malays, this was not possible for lack of funds (Millington 1927: 10–11).

In the words of another British Adviser for Kelantan, Reginald Clayton, in 1930, 'the peasant be equipped mentally and physically to carry out the work of his forefathers more efficiently and with better results . . . [Every young Malay boy should] do as his father had done and . . . do it better; to produce more, to sell it at a better advantage, and to be freed from the limitations of ignorance, superstition, and disease.'<sup>14</sup> In this context, schooling could be provided completely in Malay, since (it was argued) English education for the majority of the inhabitants would not be conducive to the happiness of the people or the welfare of the state.<sup>15</sup>

In 1934, another British Adviser, William D. Barron, reported satisfactory progress in all the government-funded schools, including the English girls' schools. By that year, government schools numbered 65, with a total of 3,504 boys and 202 girls.<sup>16</sup> In 1935, in collaboration with the British, MAIK maintained one English class in the morning, one class for Malay language and religious instructions for children in the afternoon, and also one class for

Arabic and religious instructions for the adult. This shows that the religious establishment worked to modernise education in the state, although standards did not reach those of more established English schools in the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States.<sup>17</sup>

Regarding primary and secondary schools, the British considered educating girls a crucial factor in modernising education in Malaya. They established separate girls' schools to that end, but found that progress was much slower than they had expected. In the Straits Settlements in the 1910s, British administrators found that 'compulsory education for girls is considered to be out of the question, and it is a very slow business and apparently as far as the Malays are concerned, a hopeless one, to persuade the people into voluntarily sending girls to school'.<sup>18</sup> In Kelantan, in the 1930s, however, the British administrator realised 'a growing and most satisfactory readiness to allow girls to attend vernacular schools'.<sup>19</sup> Kelantan then established the Government English Girls' School for daughters of British residents and Malay government officials. The school was intended 'to train girls to be alert and quick minded and to become suitable housewife for Malay officers who have received higher education rather than to seek any high standard of technical education' (cited in Guat 1996).

### **Changing Attitudes toward Islamic Education**

Unlike the Dutch, the British did not regulate Islamic schools and teachers, but 'advised' the sultans and Malay administrators when needed or requested. While this 'advice' was in many cases mandated, the British generally kept their promise of non-interference with respect to religious education. Arabic and Islamic subjects were not included in governmental vernacular schools, since they were considered irrelevant for British modernisation projects, although they could be freely taught outside.

British scholar-administrators made sure that their educational projects in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States were thoroughly secular. They had no desire, and were officially not allowed, to create religious and Arabic classes. Initially, some Qur'anic and Arabic instruction was included in some English and Malay schools. One British Adviser even recommended that those who taught the Qur'an should be given sufficient compensation to assure their retention and the continuing attendance of

Muslim students in government schools. However, when the British introduced secular education, they gave little attention to Qur'anic teachings. When influential villagers were engaged as Qur'an teachers, it was on the understanding that they would collect pupils for these novel village schools (Winstedt 1969a: 67–8). Following his comparison of education policies in Java and the Philippines, Winstedt in fact recommended that the Qur'an no longer be taught in Malay schools.<sup>20</sup> While advocating compulsory education for Malay boys in vernacular government schools, Winstedt proposed delegating any Islamic instruction to the *'ulama* since 'the Koran classes were introduced originally, I believe, to attract pupils; and such inducement is no longer required' (Winstedt cited in Hashim 1996: 59–60). As a result, no Qur'an classes and little or no moral instruction were offered in government schools (Winstedt in Ahmad 1991/2: 13), and Islamic subjects were not re-introduced until the Educational Ordinance of 1957 (Shafie n.d.: 4). Although Winstedt held that government money would be better spent in providing scholarships for students to study in Egypt where the colleges 'teach a liberal and enlightened form of Muhammadanism' (Winstedt cited in Hashim 1996: 60), there was no scholarship given for this purpose. With the omission of Qur'an classes, Malay vernacular schools thus became more secular.

Winstedt's recognition of a reformed Islam at Al-Azhar University in Cairo shows that he recognised 'a liberal kind of Islamic education', but his main preoccupation was for Malay governmental schools to remain free from religion. He regarded Qur'anic study as a serious handicap for a Malay, who had to strain to learn to read the Qur'an because it was written in Arabic, a 'foreign language he does not understand' (Winstedt 1969a: 67). For him, Arabic was far less important than Malay because the latter was the means for the Malays to learn how to read and write their own language in both Jawi and Rumi.

In Kelantan, however, under certain conditions the British allowed non-regular religious classes to be conducted. For example, the private Malay schools were described as 'religious classes'. In 1935, the five Malay schools had religious classes from 2.00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. during school days. The government paid the teachers, and because the 'State religion is Islam and almost all the pupils in the Malay schools are Malays', the government felt

the need to establish religious classes in the government schools having more than 100 pupils.<sup>21</sup>

### **Repercussions and Responses in Malaya**

British colonial education stressed a distinct ethnic culture (English, Malay, Chinese, Indian) and helped conserve separate group identities. However, individuals from these groups attended English courses, and this contributed to a common experience, especially among the elite. At the same time, educational administrators such as Wilkinson helped disseminate Malay language in Latin script accessible to the Chinese and Indians who became increasingly regarded as part of the Malayan landscape (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 235–7, 240). These convergent and divergent tendencies were the crucial impacts of the complex, often ambiguous, colonial education. Although Islam – as taught in the *pondok* and madrasah, normatively served as a unifying factor among diverse ethnic groups, the mainstream cultural framework that equated being Malay with being Muslim was fostered by the British educational system, either through colonial inactivity (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 240–1) or through colonial interference in the administration of some aspects of Malay and Islamic affairs at the request of the Malay rulers themselves.

Like the Dutch, the British educational system brought about the emergence of a new intellectual elite (*kaum cerdik pandai*) whose background and interests varied, but they remained the producers of ethnic difference. The new elite groups included Arab-educated religious reformers, the largely Malay-educated radical intelligentsia, and the English-educated administrators recruited mainly from the traditional ruling class (Roff 1967: 211). In Kelantan, some of the Malay and English-educated students became activists of clubs and organisations and writers for new periodicals, such as Abdul Kadir Adabi whom we discussed in Chapter III. New social classes were formed. But more than the Dutch, the British educational system helped preserve ethnic polarisation, which was also responsible for an enduring ethnicity-based political system.

Malay attitudes toward English and Malay schools differed and were often ambivalent. There were cases where Malay parents reacted against colonial schools out of fear of Christianisation, and some would only send their children ‘on condition that the Koran was taught for half a day’ (Stevenson

1975: 120–1). In some cases, ordinary Malays showed their distrust of ‘foreign education’, especially if this entailed studying under infidel teachers (although Malays were among the teachers in vernacular schools). They did not see the relevance of secular education to their rural lives, and the vernacular education in urban areas was not accessible to many villagers. However, it is worth noting that the fear of Christianisation was not salient in Kelantan. Unlike Pulau Pinang (Straits Settlements), which had branches of the London Missionary Society, the Roman Catholics and the American Methodists, Kelantan rarely received Christian missionaries and did not witness the establishment of Protestant or Catholic schools, apart from a Presbyterian church built in Kota Bharu in 1939 (Guat 1996).

Parents and their children increasingly saw the need for both religious and secular sciences. Local nobility tended to embrace English education, either in some part of their schooling or throughout their entire education, and it could be argued that to some degree this served a self-interested purpose of keeping their aristocratic status intact. As an example, in 1931, following their studies in English schools, two nephews of the Sultan of Kelantan, Tengku Abdullah and Tengku Indra Petra, were sent to England for further education. Other Kelantanese boys continued their schooling in Penang and Singapore.<sup>22</sup>

There was a demand for more modern education. In Kelantan, the *kaum muda* promoted Islamic courses in government schools. As a step towards progress, *Pengasuh* urged the Kelantan Government to provide more financial support for Malay students to go overseas and study in Oxford or Cambridge. *Pengasuh* also proposed that any graduate of the prestigious Kuala Kangsar college be funded to continue his studies in Hong Kong or Europe. In order to reduce negative perceptions of secular education among Malay parents, *Pengasuh* also recommended that religious knowledge be taught in English government schools (Hassan 1998/9).

Both internal and external pressures and challenges shaped the mind of Malay *‘ulama*, the youth and their parents. While students were very keen to study the different branches of Islamic knowledge, the opening of new government jobs with the prospect of higher incomes and even higher social status led more and more to seek places in the few available government schools.<sup>23</sup> A new and different kind of modernity was introduced and popu-

larised by the British, but also by willing Malay youth and the Sultan, who saw no contradiction between Islamic theological and ritual conservatism and secular progressivism. Malay reformers such as Jalaluddin, Al-Hadi, and Kenali, whom we discussed earlier, embraced the pursuit of modern science and useful skills, justifying this on the basis of Islamic textual doctrines that condoned the acquisition of worldly as well as spiritual knowledge. Islamic reformers and colonial modernisers were not necessarily in conflict, despite some mutual ambivalence. British colonial educational discourse and policies shaped the diversification of Malay authority and identity on the basis of education and ethnicity, while encouraging the proliferation of local activities working for social mobility.

### **Conclusion**

Edward Said's work and historical studies in the East Indies and Malaya have tended to regard colonial educational ideas and institutions as focusing on their hegemony over Islamic and indigenous traditions of learning. This chapter, however, has attempted to explore diversity, compromises and exceptions among the colonialists toward European, vernacular, Arabic, and Islamic education. Colonial politics of inclusion and exclusion led to the secularisation of education in the Indonesian-Malay world and influenced the forms of knowledge that would be considered modern and thus worth teaching. Dutch and British educators and Western-educated intellectuals helped establish and intensify binary oppositions between Eastern and Western, native/vernacular and European, religion/culture and science, and traditional and modern. The segregation of different types of knowledge (together with their associated types of authority and identity) by category was not merely for convenience in structuring educational curricula. A Western, secular education became perceived as modern, while Islamic knowledge was categorised as religious and traditional. In many instances, however, colonial administrators vacillated in their policies towards vernacular languages, Arabic and Islamic religious subjects, from minimising its place and impact on native life to tolerating its teaching outside colonial education. Some colonials became 'reluctant modernisers', while others were more keen, depending on their interests and local circumstances as they saw them.

To the degree that the colonial educational system influenced the

organisation and curricula in Muslim and native schools, it nevertheless contributed to the overall modernisation processes in the Indonesian-Malay archipelago. Colonial promotion of the teaching of girls in schools contributed to an increased desire among Muslims reformers to also educate their girls and women.

Edward Said has argued that colonial education promoted European national histories, while relegating native history and culture and subjugating the native elite and people. Despite collaboration, European colonialism preserved the divide between native and Westerner (Said 1994: 223, 264). This argument is apt, but qualifications should be made. Not all colonial administrators and educators sought to devalue native history and culture. Not all colonialists were keen and optimistic about modernising natives. In many cases, the Dutch and the British helped preserve local languages and at the expense of Arabic and Islamic subjects in their supported vernacular schools. They distinguished Islamic and Arabic from local identities, and differentiated between global history and local history. At the same time, Muslim reformers demonstrated their agency in promoting modern Islamic education combining the religious (including Arabic) and the secular or in maintaining the teaching of Islamic knowledge and Arabic very often independently of colonial intervention. The native Muslims did not necessarily feel subordinated when teaching and learning in their *pondoks* or *madrasahs*, as discussed in the previous chapter. Colonial and Islamic modernities differed in their relative emphases on religious and local customary knowledge, but coincided and complemented each other in terms of teaching scientific or secular forms of knowledge, and in their organisational structure and vocabularies. European educational policies and Islamic educational reform became often independent of each other, but in other times became closely intertwined in modernising the Indonesian-Malay world. Despite the ambivalences and tensions, colonial and Muslim educators shared a common desire to improve literacy and overall human well-being in the modernising world.

## Notes

1. This law was signed on 28 September 1892 by Colonial Minister Van Dedem. Departement van Onderwijs en Eeredienst (1919), *Oendang-Oendang Sekolah*

*Jaitoe pada Menjatakan Peratoeran Hal Pengajaran Boemipoetera*, Weltevreden: Drukkerij F. B. Smits.

2. *Indisch Verslag*, 1937, Statistisch voor 1936, 1938: 84–5.
3. *Indisch Verslag*, 1937, Statistisch voor 1936, 1938: 88–9.
4. Departement van Onderwijs en Eeredienst 1919: 5, 12.
5. Departement van Onderwijs en Eeredienst 1919: 15–16.
6. Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur (1920), Het Departement van Binnenlandsch-Bestuur, *Handleiding ten Dienste van De Inlandsche Bestuursambtenaren op Java en Madoera, No.37/O.E., Mohammedaansch-Inlandsche Zaken*, Batavia: Drukkerij Ruygrok & Co., 1920, 13.
7. M. Ask Hidajat, 'Pemerintah dan Onderwijs', *Al-Wafd*, No. 1, January 1933, Year 2; Iriswati, 'Nog Eens Over 'Wilde Scholen Ordonnantie', *Het Licht*, No. 11, 10 January 1933, Year 8.
8. Interview with Abu Hamid, 5 July 2005, the Rector of Universitas 45, Makassar.
9. Salim cited in Hadler (2008: 87–8).
10. Salim, 'De Sluiering en Afzondering der Vrouw', *Madjalah Het Licht*, Year 2, 1926, in Salim (1954: 167–75).
11. Wilkinson, *The Education of Asiatics*, 1901/2, in *Special Reports on Educational Subjects*, vol. 8, 687.
12. Sir William McLean, 'Education and British Colonial Policy: Some Problems of Malaya', published for the Bureau of Educational Research, Howard University, 1 July 1946.
13. KAR, 1911–1924, D/Suk 2/14.1.ANM.
14. *ARK*, 1930, 30.
15. *ARK*, 1930, 31.
16. Government of Kelantan, Enactment No. 5 of 1934, The Sultanate Lands Enactment, signed by W. D. Barron as the British Adviser and the Sultan, ANM.
17. The 1935 Annual Report of the Department of Education, BAK, 1936, ANM.
18. Annual Report Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States 1910, m.290, ANM; Guat (1996).
19. *ARK*, 1936, m.43, ANM.
20. BAK, 1914, No. file 329/1914, Annual Report of 1913, Education Department, ANM.
21. The 1935 Annual Report of the Department of Education, BAK, 1936, ANM.
22. Government of Kelantan, *Enactment No. 5 of 1934, The Sultanate Lands*

*Enactment*, signed by W. D. Barron as the British Adviser and the Sultan, ANM, 26–32.

23. 'Apakah Tujuan Murid Sekolah', *Pengasub*, nos 297 and 298, 15 Shafar 1349 H/11 July 1930.

## Conclusion

Al-muhafazah ‘ala al-qadim al-salih wa al-akhz bi al-jadid al-aslah. [A. Retaining the good from the past, adopting a better present.]

(Arabic saying cited by Wahid 1999: 80)

The historical perspective can make an important contribution towards understanding how modernity’s universalism has been successively translated in Southeast Asia so that being modern can be paradoxically both global and local.

(Andaya 1997: 406)

The history of each of our own lives is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer histories of a number of traditions.

(MacIntyre 2007: 222)

In a keynote address to the International Research Conference on Muhammadiyah (IRCM) in Indonesia in 2012, Ahmad Syafi’i Maarif, drawing attention to the tension between Islamic nationalism and Western colonialism, argued that ‘Islam, as a liberating force, shared the nationalist ideal of freedom from any alien domination, both politically and militarily’.<sup>1</sup> In contemporary Malaysia, British colonialism is seen as being responsible for Christianisation, cultural imperialism, intellectual warfare, secularism, and Westernisation (Al-Attas 1985; Abdullah: 2005). Even the Muslim advocates of a progressive Islam, such as Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, then Prime Minister of Malaysia and the chairman of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), a grouping of fifty-seven countries, had to emphasise a long history of antagonism between Europeans and Muslims. He said, ‘Muslim nations

fell under the European colonial yoke. They lost their sovereignty, and their people lost their freedom. Their resources were exploited and plundered.<sup>72</sup> The preceding chapters have demonstrated the multiple ways in which Muslim reformers and European colonial administrators and scholars differed but also coexisted in formulating progress and pursuing reform and modernisation in Indonesia and Malaya. It has been argued that the colonial powers did not necessarily oppose Islam and local customs, and that Islamic reformers did not always resist Western colonial rule and the processes of modernisation and localisation. An emphasis on Muslim agency shows that reformers rarely felt subjugated as they sought to build *ummah*, serve the religion and contribute to the larger Islamic community through organisations, publications, legal opinions, and education. In becoming modern, the Dutch and British modernisers and Indonesian and Malay reformers often addressed and judged local and foreign customs in ways that were both contending and coexisting.

### **Multiple Modernities: Contending and Coexisting**

The idea of comparative modernity, or comparative modernisation, provides a useful departure point for understanding multiple definitions and expressions of being modern in different cultural contexts. Modernity should not be defined so broadly that it includes every notion of newness, nor so narrowly that it cannot capture all of the diverse meanings that it evokes. Many Europeans and Asians spoke of modernity as if it were emblematic of a new epoch, an age of progress or *zaman kemajuan*. Many Muslim reformers conceptualised this development as a stage in the linear evolution of worldly affairs, while others saw it in terms of an Islamic perception of time, as a progression from a pre-Islamic or non-Islamic age of ignorance to a *modern* age that would be marked by greater spiritual understanding within the new organisational, political, legal, and educational circumstances. To native Muslims, Dutch and English terms and organisations were new and modern, but to other native Muslims, Arabic, Javanese or even socialist Russian were new and thus modern.

Modernity has thus been defined in the singular as marking an age progress and often as a uniquely Western concept especially by the Dutch and the English colonial administrators and scholars, or – as argued in this book – with manifold connotations as different agencies understand progress toward

a better future in multiple ways. In other words, modernity becomes singular when interpreted as a conscious universalising effort, but it becomes plural when localised in accordance with the dynamics of particular situations. In the Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya, modernity was first caught up in the descriptive vocabulary of practice, such as *Islam moderen*, *kemajuan* and *ilmu umum*, but has since been integrated into the language of analysis used by contemporary intellectuals, for whom it is associated with new types of social organisation, technological and scientific advances, and more democratic forms of government. Modernities are often about making claims, but it is more than that. It involves programmes of institutionalisation and bureaucratisation, as well as cultural and social identities and norms pertinent to one's dynamic relations with past, present and future.

European colonialism and Islamic reform played their role in formulating and enacting modernities. Comparatively speaking, native populations demonstrated more diverse notions of the modern than the colonial powers. The elite and people's openness and willingness to selectively borrow external ideas (Arabic, European, other locales) was the key characteristic of their multiple modernities. People were increasingly eclectic in their sources of information and activities. The Dutch and the British tended to understand modernity in particularly 'Western' (or even Dutch or English only) terms, although some recognised the modern in some aspects of Islam and of the indigenous. Their encounters with the Islamic and the native shaped their understandings of modernity and projects of modernisation.

In many cases, Europeans and local ethnic groups conflicted or competed for various reasons. Some religion historians have argued that conflict and competition were integral parts of the early makings of Jewish, Christian and Muslim societies due to limited knowledge of the other, a lack of contact, rejection or fear (Peters 2003). By the late nineteenth century the Europeans' sense of superiority, which had played a major role in relations with Muslims, received new responses among Islamic scholars and activists, who called for unity and reform of the *ummah*, but who worked in their localities as individuals or groups. In Indonesia and Malaya, the universalising project of colonial powers collided with Islam's universalism as Muslim students and pilgrims returned from Mecca and Cairo to promote *da'wah* among their compatriots. In these circumstances, a degree of confrontation was inevitable. Energised

by religious zeal, some Muslim reformers perceived Europeans as infidels (*kafirs*) and enemies of Islam. Driven by imperial zeal, Europeans perceived natives or 'Asians' as backward and uncivilised. Modernities clashed when the actors demonstrated superiority of their own religious or racial identities and when they used or were perceived to have used force or imposition. Modernities also conflicted when one party felt discriminated by the other party or when one lost their sense of ownership and belonging due to the other's forceful intervention.

Because colonial modernisation was often linked to Christianisation, Dutch and British administrators and scholars had to position Christianity in the context of a non-Christian population. Local Muslims, too, came to associate Christianity with colonialism. But, although all the Dutch and British individuals discussed in this book came from Christian backgrounds, Christianisation was by no means their shared objective. At the same time, colonial views of Christianity were diverse; for some it was of marginal relevance in the actual implementation of government, while others viewed Christian values as underscoring the priorities of modernising regimes that they aimed to establish. Interactions between colonial agents and agendas in which modernity was informed by a Christianised base became more complex in the presence of Muslim reformers. A minority of Muslim activists rejected any compromise with Christianity, which they equated with European colonialism. Others found confrontation unnecessary and even sought to emulate Western Christian models of health care, legal system, education, and social welfare. Still others, focusing on Islam and theological, ritualistic and legalistic schools of thought, considered Christianity to be irrelevant.

However, such conflicts, whether perceived or real, were not the only result of encounters between European Christians and Muslims in Indonesia and Malaya. Their worlds were often entwined, and their futures were shared when they sought to reform society. European colonialists and Muslim reformers did not clash in all situations. Islam and European colonialism coexisted without confrontation in numerous contexts and in some cases even collaborated. It is not difficult to track open and tolerant attitudes, mutual recognition of the rule of law, selective borrowing of languages and organisational models, and cooperation in working towards the goal of improving the

basic conditions of life for people. There were also overlaps, ambivalences and compromises as well as indifference and autonomy.

Opportunities for cooperation arose in part from the diversity of Islamic populations and the different contexts in which the encounter with Europeans occurred. By the turn of the twentieth century, Muslims were already divided by geography, cultural differences and worldwide political and religious struggles. As the Ottoman caliphate declined, European colonial powers carved up the already fragmented Muslim lands. In practical terms, it became impossible for Muslims to be unified under Islam. The Saudi Government that controlled Mecca and Medina promoted a puritanist, unifying Islam that paradoxically divided Muslims even further and exacerbated tensions around cultural differences in the global *ummah*. Furthermore, neither the Ottoman nor Saudi governments offered Muslim communities feasible models for government, politics, law or education. Educated Muslims in Cairo and Mecca studied authoritative Islamic knowledge, but not science, technology, law, economy, or administration.

By the time that colonial powers had gained control of predominantly Muslim lands in the early twentieth century, Muslim traditional leaders felt little need to confront Europeans administratively, politically, legally or educationally. In both the Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya local rulers recognised the need for a government that could respond to the demands of the times. Muslim students and teachers who became advocates of reform regarded colonial modernisation projects as necessary for the improvement of local government, law, education, and the economy. They did not view modernisation of these domains as likely to cause any fundamental harm to their religious beliefs and institutions. Muslim leaders, scholars, activists, writers and teachers felt that they ‘could retain the good from the past and adopt a beneficial present in order to generate a better future’.<sup>3</sup>

Islamisation and colonial modernisation were able to coexist more or less peacefully in many cases. It is evident that in these contexts different patterns of modernity overlapped rather than conflicted because European modernisers and Muslim reformers shared certain goals, such as improving living conditions and bringing order, justice and literacy to local populations. European colonial powers and Muslim reformers often worked together or in parallel endeavours. They shared governing responsibilities in councils

comprised of both colonisers and representatives of the colonised. In other cases, the native elite, most of whom were Muslim, served as officials and advisors in the colonial system. Overlapping authority occurred on numerous occasions; in Kelantan, for example, reformers and the sultan created the Council of Religion and Custom, working alongside the British-created State Council, and Muslims turned to British advisors for technical assistance, in various public matters, including the religious and the cultural when necessary. In such situations, Europeans worked with local elites to manage the local population, who were subject to the authority of both the colonial government and the sultan.

Because of this collaboration, many Muslim reformers under colonial rule were not preoccupied with *jihad* as a major pillar of Islam. For some, certainly it was still defined as war against infidels, but others interpreted it in terms of *da'wah* (religious mission), *fatwa* (legal thought) or *ta'lim* (teaching). Muslim reformists also worked in the political domain often interpreting the Arabic concept of *siyasah*, sometimes the Dutch and English concepts of politics. In the East Indies, call for progress was expressed through 'constitutional' means by demanding the rights of native peoples. Other Muslims were involved in politics only to the extent that they were informed about contemporary issues; they did not participate in political parties. Regional differences also came into play; in South Sulawesi, local movements either accepted the Java- and Sumatra-based organisations or created their own. In British Malaya, Anglo-Malay Sultan alliance helps explain why Muslim actors were rarely interested in creating community-based organisations or in building political parties during this time.

Colonial authorities adapted European forms of government and politics to local contexts by incorporating certain Islamic and indigenous concepts and structures. Nonetheless, while they attempted to find compatibility between the West and the East, or the modern and the traditional, this was to be on their own terms. For their part, Muslim reformers served Islamic *ummah* by establishing community organisations in their localities and by selectively borrowing Western vocabularies and organisation. The ultimate goal was always to serve their religion (often using the concepts of *agama* or *din*) and the nation expressed as *qawm* (*kaum*) or *bangsa* as well as the territoriality-based *watan* and *negeri*. In tolerating and even accepting some

Western policies, Muslims drew upon earlier Islamic ideas of *shari'ah* and *ilmu*. Although they differed on what exactly law and education meant to their respective audiences, there was some correspondence with colonial policies. To be a reformed Muslim was to be scriptural and connected to the past and imagined religious communities, yet to be adaptable, patriotic and modern. Muslim reformers thought beyond mere Islamic global unity and mere nationhood; they envisaged and worked for progress and prosperity through organisation, social order, justice, literacy and scientific development in their homelands.

Questions regarding the application of colonial law in a majority Muslim society also loomed large as colonial bureaucracies expanded. European colonialists defined Western law as regular, fixed, rational and practical, but strove to make it work within the diverse and irregular legal systems of local cultures. The introduction of procedures that replaced, transformed or augmented existing Islamic legal traditions was particularly evident when Muslim reformers lacked requisite administrative knowledge and experience. The development of a hybrid system was made easier because local interpretations of *shari'ah* had proved sufficiently broad to incorporate practices that local cultures valued. Some Muslims accepted the hybrid legal system that evolved, while others compromised by producing *fatwas* on socio-religious issues, which they expounded in mosques and published in newspapers and periodicals. In Kelantan and elsewhere in Malaya, British administrators reformed civil and criminal laws, but left local authorities to modernise other laws. The sultan and official *'ulama* strengthened their authority over matters deemed religious and customary, such as Islamic teaching, ritual, marriage and inheritance. The Council of Religion and Custom made the *fatwas* binding through enacting punishments such as imprisonment or fines for committing religious sins. In matters other than the religious and the customary, Malay Muslims would generally follow colonial laws. In short, jurisprudential politics was not necessarily confrontational, since Europeans and Muslim reformers agreed that, to be effective, laws must change according to the demands of the times.

In the field of education, also departmentalised, Europeans promoted the idea that modernity involved schooling that emphasised rational knowledge and scientific understanding. Muslim reformers believed that Islam and

science were compatible and that seeking religion (*din* or *akhirah*) did not mean giving up *dunya*, but admitted that Muslims had been left behind by the scientific progress of the Christian West. In British Malaya the emergence of modern curriculum in *madrasah* schools is typically contrasted with the *pondok* or *pesantren*. Although useful, the idea of educational dualism is complicated by the fact that even traditional schools were changing and offering opportunities to acquire new skills. Binary divisions between traditional and modern schools emerged during the colonial time, but are also more complex in the East Indies, where educational models supplied by Muhammadiyah and NU and political parties such as PSII were adapted to local societies. These also became complicated by such eclectic systems as the vernacular schools, Dutch-native, Anglo-Malay, and even Malay and English schools offering all the languages provided by the sultan and the religious conservatives.

A feature of the new educational initiatives was the colonial division between religious and secular concerns. As we have noted, although the place of religion in society was never rejected, Muslim scholars and activists also divided the world into *dunya* and *akhirah*, concepts that were not fundamentally contradicted by secularising influences. Accordingly, when a modernist Muslim school was opened, the basic teaching subjects, notably Arabic and religious knowledge, were retained. Since ‘knowledge is vast while life is short’, as Islamic scholar Fazlur Rahman says (Rahman 1984: 33), many Muslims – believing that their future in the hereafter was in the balance – prioritised religious over secular education. In many traditional *pondok* or *pesantren* schools that operated independently and without governmental intervention only religious subjects were taught. Colonial modernisation thus contributed to the perpetuation of the association of the Qur’anic concept of *‘ulama* with Muslim religious scholars rather than with scholars who may include the scientists and intelligentsia more generally. As a qualification, however, Muslim modernists realised that studying secular sciences opened up wider employment opportunities, whereas those who only possessed religious knowledge were limited to working in Islamic courts, schools or mosques.

Colonial modernisers and Muslim reformers promoted certain features indicative of a modern society: rational thinking, literacy and access to print media, civil engagement, acceptance of the rule of law, material progress,

and acceptance of beneficial change. Because they regarded ordinary villagers as rooted in the past and their illiteracy and poverty, Muslim reformers frequently shared goals similar to those embedded in the European notion of a colonial civilising mission. They also realised the need for effective organisational tools. While agreeing on some principles, and differing on others, the news identities – modernists and traditionalists – became part of the complex processes associated with what was seen as a modern age, with all its opportunities, contradictions, and often unsettling juxtapositions – between true and false, old and new, indigenous and foreign, private and public, religious and secular, political and cultural, rational and superstitious, and material and spiritual.

Modernity can thus be defined more as a process and practice of becoming modern than a definable state of being or form of self-identification. Both colonial and Islamic modernities were concerned with reshaping orientations so that they were relevant for the here and now. Muslim reformers conceptualised modernity as submission to God even as they became more present-minded and more involved in worldly matters. The engagement with the local community through organising, preaching, writing and schooling was itself inspired by a sense of belonging to a wider community, *ummah* or nation, often replacing and sometimes coexisting with the old loyalties to the sultan or local leadership. Offering Muslims the promise of progress in this world, while retaining hope for an afterlife in heaven, Islam provided Muslims with reference points for reorienting their perceptions of how society should operate under any regime, including colonial regimes. And while Muslim reformers used religious sources and reinterpreted religious doctrines to meet their needs, as Max Weber put it (Weber 1958 [1921]: 270), they were not opposed to worldly engagement. Islamic modernity can be conceptualised in both spiritual and material terms. It is neither a reaction to nor a mimicking of European modernity, but the result of a mutual interaction between the two.

As this book has shown, colonial administrators were involved in creating new, hybrid forms of government, and with the reshaping of local societies through education and the introduction of revised legal systems. However, these projects were not necessarily coherent and not all administrators were agreed that modernising colonised societies was a realistic goal,

especially given limited resources of personnel and finance. Some colonialists believed in the power of Western ideas and institutions to transform natives into literate and prosperous world citizens. Anthropologist Talal Asad thus focuses on the way in which Western modernity has become so powerful that in the East it means a singular path toward progress (Asad 2006: 291–2). Many Dutch and British administrators generally saw modernisation as the ideal aim of the twentieth-century coloniser. But other European colonialists were less optimistic and felt that any modernisation project would necessarily be limited by the lack of resources, the nature of the native populations and the realities of geographic distance. Indeed, many people ostensibly under a colonial regime never personally encountered colonial authorities or participated in colonial institutions. Westernisation was also limited by the fact that colonial and missionary influences in more remote communities were often very weak or intermittent, especially in the East Indies (Lombard 1990: 37, 62). Accordingly, colonial modernity had both power and limitations and had the varying results and differing interpretations of success, depending on the cultural perspective of its agents (compare with Cooper 2005: 142–7). Muslim reformers, too, articulated the notions of progress and modernity in similar and different, and connected and independent, manners.

Edward Said argues that despite collaborations between natives and Westerners, Western colonial modernisation tended to destroy Islam and local customs, and colonial education tended to demote native history and culture (Said 1994: 223, 264). This characteristic can be found among the Dutch and the British in the East Indies and Malaya. But the relationship is not merely about destruction. The process of making things native, cultural, traditional or customary was not a monolithic, one-sided process. Europeans did not always attempt to destroy Asians and their histories and cultures. At the same time, the Muslim reformers, not only the native bourgeoisie that Said mentioned, played their role in making things traditional or modern, legitimate and illegitimate. Europeans and Asians often shared interests and projects of dealing with the traditional. This process is an integral part of becoming modern.

### ***Adatisation* and Modernisation as Conflicting and Entwining**

The process of *adatisation* is the act of rendering certain ideas and practices traditional, local, vernacular or customary (*adat*) shared by European modernisation and Muslim reform alike, albeit differently. Although modernity is often associated with a condition of change that runs against tradition, they are by no means opposites (Salvatore 2009: 5). On his study of Buddhist monastic education, Justin McDaniel noted that no overwhelming and internally consistent colonial ideology attempted to change all modes of Lao intellectual and religious expression; the French ‘were not trying to discount the local and the present in favor of the ancient and the pan-Asian’ (McDaniel 2008: 42). Historical evidence from the East Indies and Malaya show multiple powers: tradition, the secular modern and the religious modern. Traditionalist Muslim reformers continually changed, just as modernist Muslims cited past traditions to promote progress. Southeast Asian Muslims never rejected their own past (Andaya 1997), thereby demonstrating not only the eclectic nature of modernity, but also the hybrid character of Islam and that of the beliefs and practices subsumed under the term ‘tradition’. The Arabic word ‘*adat*’, signifying custom, had already been incorporated into Malay and other Southeast Asian languages well before Europeans arrived in the area. *Adatisation*, then, refers to the complex and convoluted ways in which ideas or practices became constructed as customary or traditional.

One form of *adatisation* is related to what Wolters called localisation: foreign ideas, practices or materials (such as books and artefacts) became localised before being incorporated into new cultural wholes (Wolters 1999: 55–7). Muslim reformers used foreign Arabic terms such as *ummah*, *shari’ah*, and *ilm* to refer to community organisation, religious law, and religious knowledge, respectively, as part of new cultural systems. European modernisers localised Dutch terms such as *godsdiens* and *wet* or *recht* (religion and law) before fitting them into local religious, legal and political systems, some of which were already Islamised. Muslim reformers also incorporated these Dutch terms into their vocabularies together with Sanskrit and Arabic-derived words such as *agama* and *hukum*. Contradictions rarely arose despite variations in meaning and application of similar terms borrowed from different

languages. In these instances, tradition or local custom served as the framework within which foreign ideas and practices (Islamic, Arabic, European, and so forth) were evaluated.

A second process of *adatisation* occurred when an idea or practice that was already considered part of local *adat* came under moral scrutiny. In judging whether certain customs and traditions were permissible or not under Islam, Muslim reformers often drew on sayings from the Qur'an or Prophet Muhammad and Arabic concepts such as *shirk*, *bid'ah* or *haram* to justify their decisions. In Sulawesi a telling example is the survival of the transvestite *bissu*, despite modernist opposition. The local norm of *siriq* was reinterpreted in light of Islamic norm. In Kelantan, the *bomoh* performance was judged in terms of its compliance with the *shari'ah* and morality. European scholars sometimes categorised *adat* practices (such as healing rituals and spirit veneration) in relation to Sunni orthodoxy as well as to their own Western cultural traditions. Muslim reformers (and sometimes European modernisers) approached local practices from the perspective of normative Islam, which sought to identify unacceptable accretions.

A third process of *adatisation* occurred when local customs were assessed in terms of their compatibility with Dutch or English values and institutions. Nevertheless, even when regarded as incompatible, *adat* practices were still regarded as worthy of colonial study, as in the case of *adatrechts* in the East Indies and the papers on Malay history and culture in British Malaya. European colonial administrators worked with local rulers and scholars to codify local ideas and practices.

Fourth, colonised subjects also assessed Western cultural traditions, which they labelled as *adat Barat* and often associated with modern culture (*budaya moderen*) in relation to their compliance with Islam and local custom. The *fatwas* issued by Muslim scholars drew analogies from the Qur'an, the hadith or medieval texts to decide whether aspects of *adat Barat*, such as art, music and performance, should be prohibited or permitted.

As we have seen, in many cases it was decided that Western or local traditions could be accommodated so long as they did not harm the faithful or contradict the fundamental teachings of Islam. The *shari'ah*, in the words of Talal Asad, 'is the process whereby individuals are educated and educate themselves as moral subjects in a scheme that connects the obligation to act

morally with the obligation to act legally in complicated ways' (Asad 2003: 241). Among Muslim reformers, the cultivation of Islamic norms required authoritative text (the Qur'an) and an exemplary model of the Prophet Muhammad through the hadith as well as the authoritative literature through the processes of interpreting for the purpose of judging the normative acceptability of foreign and indigenous ideas and practices.

Thus modernities are interpreted within cultural frameworks. Culture is constitutive of modernity and the latter is linked to cultural difference (Mee and Kahn 2012: 8–9). But the notion of cultural difference is not exclusively Western. Muslims, too, demonstrate their specific cultural frameworks in interpreting tradition and modernity. Coloniser and colonised described tradition in different ways and undertook *adatisation* processes for different, albeit not necessarily contradictory, purposes. Some Europeans, assuming that *adat* was resistant to innovation or transformation, judged tradition as good or bad depending upon whether it was supportive or an impediment to modernisation. Other Europeans saw *adat* as being more tolerant than Islam toward Westernisation. Muslim reformers, by contrast, viewed Islam as a progressive religion and saw relevant elements of tradition as a potential asset that could motivate local actors and facilitate the work of modernising agents. They attempted to use tradition to move people from what they saw as cultural divisiveness towards unification under Islam and from backwardness to advancement. The shifting nature of tradition – that could be sustained, strengthened, weakened or even destroyed – (MacIntyre 2007: 222), thus became a resource for modernity. Employed to motivate change and unity, *adatisation* became embedded in defining and applying Islamic and European colonial ideas and institutions to Indonesian and Malayan contexts. European colonisers and Southeast Asian Muslims marginalised some local customs, but they also conserved, transformed and even glorified other elements while transposing them to different frameworks, all within the multifaceted process of becoming modern.

World historian Marshall G. S. Hodgson (1977) argues that the great Western transmutation so pervasively impacted the Islamic world that the Muslim agents reacted to it in various different ways. The technicalisation, central to Western modernity, produced disruption of cultural traditions and placed pressure on natural resources, he contends. Hodgson further argues

that Muslims should employ and adapt their Islamic heritage to contribute to the modern world by conforming to the ‘modern conscience’ shared by Westerners and non-Westerners alike. This contention needs some qualifications. As argued in this book, first, Western colonial technicalisation did not always disrupt local custom; in many cases, it transformed and even reinforced it as an integral part of political and cultural identities. Second, Westerners also benefited from the knowledge about and experiences with the native, including Muslims. And, third, European colonialists and Muslim reformers could work autonomously or could coexist in their understandings of reform and agendas of modernisation.

Thus, the notion of religion is not entirely and exclusively a Western phenomenon. Talal Asad has helped understand how religion comes from a Western, Christian tradition transferred to the rest of the world, including the Muslims (1993: 27–54). In Indonesia and Malaya, both traditionalist and modernist Muslims began to use the Arabic term *din*, the Sanskrit term *agama* or the Dutch term *godsdienst* as a special category distinguishable from culture, politics, the economy and other matters considered ‘worldly’. Many Muslims employed theistic understandings of the Dutch *godsdienst*, the English religion and the Sanskrit *agama*, although there were many religions associated with diverse localities and ethnicities. The Muslim reformers often saw religion as a private matter although they sought to defend it or criticise the lack of religious understanding or application, often in relation to the internal weaknesses and the challenges from within and from without. Thus, the religious and the rest are always relational, and they are not always antagonistic.

### **Secularisation and Islamisation as Conflicting and Coexisting**

A crucial aspect of colonial modernisation was the separation of the religious and the secular. Proponents of secularisation theory, which emerged during the 1950s, held that since the European Enlightenment the forces of modernisation have fuelled an ongoing religious decline, both in society and among individuals (Berger 1999: 2–3). In line with more recent reformulations of secularisation theory, which contend that modernisation has not banished religion from public space (Dubois 2005), I have argued that Muslim reformers were instrumental in preventing any decline in Islamisation. If anything,

the religious identity of Muslims increased as they served the *ummah* and the nation (*bangsa* and *negeri*) and as regional interaction and global communications extended religious networks.

To a considerable degree, however, Islam in Indonesia and Malaya did undergo structural and subjective secularisation. The former refers to the institutional differentiation of state and society and the latter to the individual understanding and experience of secularising forces (Robinson 1999). The nature of colonial secularisation in the East Indies was shaped by the distinction that Dutch scholars had made between political Islam and religious Islam. This distinction led to government intervention in political Islam, while colonialists who sought to preserve diverse cultures furthered the secular agenda by disassociating Islam from ethnic identity. The British variant of secularisation was also concerned with government and politics, although direct intervention was more muted than in the East Indies. Since the British were in charge of secular administration, they collaborated with local elites so that colonial support reinforced the religious authority exercised by the rulers and *‘ulama* before the British arrival. Unlike the Dutch, British colonial scholars associated religion with ethnicity, specifically associating being Muslim with being Malay. While the colonial regime offered assistance in the administration of religious and cultural affairs, British officials avoided any appearance of open intervention in religious matters, which they saw as separate from the public domains of government, education, and law. British secularisation created less tension in the fields of politics, law, and education than was the case in the Dutch East Indies.

The colonial ideas and policies of secularisation would not work without the Islamic ideas of the distinction of various domains of life into *din* and *dunya*. Structural secularisation meant the transformation of Islam in both colonial contexts. Dutch and British colonial administrators worked with traditional elite and reformers to separate Islam as an *agama* or *din* distinct from other realms (political, legal, economic, and so forth). ‘Religious Islam’ was treated as part of culture and located in the private, non-political dimension of life, despite the fact that Islamic activities were part of the public life. Islamisation, that is, making Muslims more religiously observant, and colonial secularisation, which identified those domains that were not of religious concern, were not necessarily opposed (see Casanova 1994: 7, for Christian

contexts). Contemporary Indonesian scholar Nurcholish Madjid, for example, argued that secularisation, in the sense of making the sacred dimensions of Islam sacred and the profane dimensions of Muslims profane, as an integral part of modernisation could also be congruent with Islam. Secularism and secularisation are different: Secularism is an ideology, while secularisation is a process of liberating development necessitated by the historical growth of the Islamic community (1989). Along this line of thought, Islamisation and secularisation were not necessarily contradictory processes and in some cases were even mutually constituted.

Because of Islamic and colonial legacies in Indonesia and Malaysia, calls for Islamisation on the one hand and secularisation on the other continue to occur, although articulations are always diverse. Some reformists emphasise the modernisation of Islam and tradition; others call for Islamisation of modernity and tradition; still others promote the localisation of Islamic and Western modernities. In these contexts, religion transforms and is transformed by state and society. The public and the private, and the material and the spiritual, are distinguishable but are not necessarily separate, and often sustain each other (Kenney and Moosa 2014). Colonial modernity has its powers, but this influence is tempered by Islamic priorities and by the cultural heritage. Simultaneously, the definition, practice and significance of religion in Southeast Asia has been transformed by structural contexts, theological understanding and communities (DuBois 2009: 1–15), and by historical experience.

In Jakarta, 22 June 1945, Indonesian leaders wrote a charter that would become the preamble to the 1945 Constitution. The charter stated that freedom is the right of all nations and therefore colonialism (I. *penjajahan*) in the world should be eliminated because it contradicts a sense of humanity and a sense of justice. The Constitution established the Unitary State as a Republic with the President and Parliament. Malay leaders declared their independence from the British in 1957 and created their constitution. The Constitution of Malaysia did not make a specific reference to colonialism but formulated such ‘fundamental liberties’ as the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery, equality, and freedom of religion. Malay leaders established the Federation as a constitutional monarchy with the *Yang di-Pertuan Agong* as the Head of State and the Prime Minister as the Head of Government. Indonesia consid-

ered Islam both a reality and an inspiration, but did not establish it as the state's religion; instead it endorsed Pancasila, the Five Pillars, which consists of Belief in one God, just and civilised humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom and deliberations, and social justice for all of the people. Malaysia, however, declared Islam as the religion of the Federation, and in 1970 it created Rukun Negara, the Pillars of the State, consisting of Belief in God, Loyalty to King and Country, Supremacy of the Constitution, Rules of Law, and Courtesy and Morality.

In the domain of law, Indonesia established civil courts (influenced by the Dutch civil law) dealing with civil matters and *shari'ah* courts dealing with Muslim, private matters, while relegating customary laws as culture. Malaysia created civil and criminal courts (influenced by the English common law) as well as *shari'ah* courts dealing with Muslim, private matters. The Indonesian Government founded the Ministry of Religious Affairs (influenced by the Dutch and the subsequent office created by the Japanese administration), dealing primarily with Islamic affairs, but also other 'official' religions, whereas Malaysia created the Religion Division, as Prime Minister's Department (the Division was later upgraded to be the Islamic Affairs Division and then to the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia). A number of Malay States established councils of Islamic religion and custom (influenced by the State of Kelantan discussed in the preceding chapters). In the domain of education, Indonesia created the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Research and Technology, and had the aforementioned Ministry of Religious Affairs support Islamic education. Malaysia created the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation. Malays today continue to associate Malayness with Islam formally, and to a greater extent than Indonesians associate Indonesianness with Islam. Had there not been European colonialism and Islamic reform, the Indonesian-Malay world would have witnessed radically different forms of Islam and modernity.

More recently, scholars have introduced approaches under the framework of post-Orientalism that are described as cosmopolitan, interdisciplinary, classical and contemporary, individual and collaborative. These approaches emphasise the equal rights of everyone, every ethnicity, and present an ethos that is projected beyond ideological biases and interests of dominance (Lawrence, in Ernst & Martin, eds 2010: 305). It is difficult to avoid such

biases, but in this book I have attempted to demonstrate resemblances and differences, connections and disconnections in the colonial past of Indonesia and Malaysia. I have also tried to show the diversity of agents, interactions, processes, approaches and institutionalisations emerging through the colonial and Islamic projects of progress and modernisation. Traditions through which particular ideas and practices are transmitted and reshaped could clash or coexist because they hardly exist in isolation. The history of each of our own lives of becoming modern in this world, as moral philosopher MacIntyre puts it, is ‘generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer histories of a number of traditions’ (MacIntyre 2007: 222).

### Notes

1. Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif, ‘The Muhammadiyah and the Roots of Indonesian Nationalism, Democracy, and Civil Society’, keynote address delivered at the International Research Conference on Muhammadiyah (IRCM), on the campus of Malang Muhammadiyah University, 29 November–2 December 2012.
2. An address entitled ‘Islam, Malaysia, and the Wider World’, delivered at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, United Kingdom, on 1 October 2004, in Badawi (2006: 32).
3. Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–2009), the leader of the NU and the President of the Republic of Indonesia (1999–2001) and his contemporary Nurcholish Madjid (1939–2005) quoted this saying on many occasions.

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